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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

KUHLMANN, SUPERINTENDENT, SULLIVAN
CORRECTIONAL F AGILITY v. WILSON
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 84-1479.

Argued January 14, 1986-Decided June 26, 1986

After his arraignment on charges arising from a 1970 robbery and murder
in New York, respondent was confined in a cell with a prisoner, named
Benny Lee, who had previously agreed to act as a police informant. Respondent made incriminating statements, and Lee reported them to the
police. Prior to trial in a New York court, respondent moved to suppress the statements on the ground that they were obtained in violation
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied the motion, finding that Lee had obeyed a police
officer's instructions only to listen to respondent for the purpose of identifying his confederates in the robbery and murder, but not to question
respondent about the crimes. The court also found that respondent's
statements to Lee were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." In 1972, respondent was convicted of, and sentenced to imprisonment for, commonlaw murder and felonious possession of a weapon, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In 1973, respondent sought federal habeas corpus
relief, asserting that his statements to Lee were obtained by police investigative methods that violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The
District Court denied the writ, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
After the 1980 decision in United St,ates v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264-which
applied the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah v. United States, 377
U. S. 201, to suppress statements made to a paid jailhouse informantrespondent unsuccessfully sought to have his conviction vacated by the
state courts on the basis of his Sixth Amendment claim. In 1982, respondent filed the instant habeas corpus petition in Federal District
Court, again asserting his Sixth Amendment claim. The District Court
denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed. As an initial matter,
the court concluded that under Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1,
I
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sion to entertain a successive petition. Although§ 2244(b) makes no reference to the "ends of justice," that phrase still may be used generally to
describe the standard for identifying those cases where successive review may be appropriate. However, specific guidance should be given
to the federal courts as to the kind of proof that a state prisoner must
offer to establish that the "ends of justice" will be served by relitigation
of claims previously decided against him. Balancing the State's interests in finality of convictions and the prisoner's interest in access to a
forum compels the conclusion that the "ends of justice" are served by
successive review only where the petitioner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. The prisoner
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued in this
case--the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully admitted. Here,
the Court of Appeals conceded that the evidence of respondent's guilt
"was nearly overwhelming," and respondent's constitutional claim did
not itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. Pp. 6-17.
POWELL, J ., announced the judgm,Jl_nt of the CQµrt and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV1 and V, in which BURGER,
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a concurring op1mon. BRENNAN,· J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
MARSHALL, J ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F . 2d 741 (1984).
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" required consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact
that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned
that the circumstances under which respondent made his incriminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court concluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejec ed
r espon ent"s claim haa erred, and remanded the case to the
District Court with mstructions to order respondent's release
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. - - (1985), to consider
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" required consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the
facts of this case. We now reverse.

II
A

In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respondent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals
Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority conceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed conduct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now unconstitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respondent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual determinations. Id., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregarding "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings
5
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relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963),
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "successive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ.
Id. , at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sanders framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner
on a prior ·petition if "the ends of justice would not be served
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." Id.,
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sanders provided little specific guidance as to the'-kind of proof
that aprisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of justice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously
decided against him.
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opinare not fairly supported by the record." Id., at 749. In Judge Van
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' justify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has
gone on before." Ibid. (citations omitted).
6
The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U. S., at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circumstances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition,
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks,"
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that
the prisoner has abused the writ. Id., at 17-19.
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U. S. 218, 254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79.
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101,
104-105 (1942).
Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes a state prisoner's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the prisoner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amendment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Although the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially created exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice." Id., at 494. Among those costs
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a criminal trial "from the ultimate questiol). o:t'guilt or innocence,,;-,'
and exclusion o! r elia'6re evidence that was "often t he m ost
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." Id., at 490. Our decision to except this category of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger

10
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that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty."
Id., at 491-492, n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[ d] no
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." Id., at 492,
n. 31.
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963),
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intolerable convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional
ommands. But the Court never has defined the scope of
he writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure
hat an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the
state courts. E.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia,
supra, at 426-434. 8

/c

8
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases deciding that federal
habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims
plainly concern the "general scope of the writ." Post, at 3. The point of

The Com
rectly from
The provis
federal and
federal jud.
for a writ c
person ...
has been dE
tion for aw
new grounc
the judge.
served by S\
sis added).
sive petitio
guage of th
the task of
In 1966,
statutes an
Section 224L
petitions filE
those decisiom
affording fedez
should not exe
constitutional
Whether one c:
federal habeas
3, n. 1, or as ,
same, and wa~
pertinent inter
ion for the Cot
est" in a syste1
the other inter
defaulted claim
adopted an ex1
the fact that it

KUHLMANN v. WILSON

1g a successive
il ear that Con·al rule, to give
1e merits a hastance to those
Jermissive lan.on to entertain
is. Moreover,
,4 Cases in the
tended in 1976,
1.g that the dis!Ssive petition"
nds for relief."
§ 2244(b), howRule 9(b), 28
h.ould entertain
1
Unless those
or caprice, dismining when to
n by § 2244(b).
·e case in which
1 to hear a sucte referenee in
is to provide a
ommodate Conjudgments with
~ide relief from

es under which
~ constitutional
y outweigh the
of justice" inquiry
e a successive peti-

15

countervailing interests served by according finality to the
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the
prisoner.
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration.
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed
the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have
determined that his trial was free from constitutional error, a
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for
which he was incarcerated. That mt erest does not extend,
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v.
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harlan J., dissenting).
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the interests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes.
Finality serves many of those important interests. Availability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defendants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring
crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that they will escape punishment
through repetitive collateral attacks. 14 See Engle v. Isaac,
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly, finality serves the
""Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the law
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment."' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963).
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cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970).

In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional
claim with a colorable showing; of fa~u_al innocence. This
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a decade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of innocence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress tFia t
successive federal habeas review should be granted only in
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully
admitted. 17
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., concurring). Despite those costs, Congress has continued to afford federal
habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society
for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S.,
at 491-492, n. 31.
17
As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not,
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been unconstitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the. evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any

18
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C

Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of
resnondent's wlt "was nearly overwliel:rmng." 742 F. 2d, at
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this successive petition under § 2244(b) on the ground
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim
was final. 18
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt
or innocence.
18
The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our opinion in several respects. The dissent states that the plurality "implies that federal habeas
review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his
first federal petition a properly preserved [constitutional claim]." Post, at
2 (emphasis added). This case involves, and our opinion describes, only
the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, the first six pages of the dissent have little, ifany, relevance to
this case. There, JUSTICE BRENNAN merely reiterates at length his views
as to the general scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, with no explanation of how those views apply when a district judge is required to consider a habeas corpus petition presenting an issue decided on the merits in
a previous federal habeas proceeding.
The dissent further mistakenly asserts that we reject Sanders' holding
that the question whether successive review is proper should be decided
under a "'sound discretion' standard." Post, at 1. As we have stated,
the permissive language of§ 2244(b) of course gives the federal courts discretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and since
Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a general standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be appropriate. What Sanders left open-and the dissent today ignores-is the
critical question of what considerations should inform a court's decision
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In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of
Massiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used
his position to secure incriminating information from [the defendant] when counsel was not present." Id., at 270. Although the informant had not questioned the defendant, the
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant
in order to "elicit" incriminating information. Id., at 273;
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts,
like the facts of Massiah, amounted to "'indirect and surreptitious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. Id., at 273.
Earlier this term, we applied the Massiah standard in a
case involving incriminating statements made under circumstances substantially similar to the facts of Massiah itself.
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - (1985), the defendant
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accomplice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. Id., at
The Court concluded that these investigatory techniques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pending charges. 21 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, because of the relationship between the defendant and the
21
The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course,
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Moulton, supra, at--.

22
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informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit"
incriminating statements from the defendant. Id., at - - ,
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversation was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Ibid.
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL,
J., concurring)).
As our recent r.eeeflt examination of this Sixth Amendment
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the
Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at - - , citing United
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to
the police. - Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that
the police and their informant took some action, beyond
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.
B

I

It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from
any· disagreement with the District Court over appropriate
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that opeP..
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mistake, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correctness expressly required by 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). Patton v.
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539
(1981).
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(Slip Opinion)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
Uniwd Staws v. Detroit Lumber Co. , 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

TEAGUE v. LANE, DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

· No. 87-5259.

Argued October 4, 1988-Decided February 22, 1989

Petitioner, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of
attempted murder and other offenses by an all-white jury. During jury
selection, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challe!}ges to
exclude bl~cks. Petitioner twice unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial,
arguing that he was "entitled to a jury of his peers." The prosecutor
defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. After an unsuccessful state-court
appeal, in which he argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative
of the community, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal
further argued
District Court, repeati~fs fair cross secf10n cfaim.
that the opinions of several Justices concurring in and dissenting from
the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 702, as to what a
defendant must show to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
with respect to a peremptory challenge system. He also argued, for the
first time, that under Swain a prosecutor could be questioned about his
use of peremptory challenges once he volunteered an explanation. The
District Court held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent
and denied relief. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement that
applied to a jury venire also applied to a petit jury, and held that he had
made out a prima facie case of discrimination. But the Court of Appeals
voted to rehear the case en bane and postponed rehearing until after this
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79. Ultimately,
Batson was decided anq overruled that portion of Swain setting forth
tiie evidentiapr showing ne~
facie case of ra-
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cial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment with respect to a peremptory challenge system. Batso.n
held that a defendant can establish such a case by showing that he is a
"member of a cognizable racial group," that the prosecutor exercised
"peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race," and that these "facts and any other relevant circumstances raise a_D j nference that the prosecutor used that practice to
exclude the veniremenffom the petit jury on account of their race." 476
U. S., at 96. The Court of Appeals then held that petitioner could not
benefit from the Batson rule because in the meantime Allen v. Hardy,
478 U. S. 255, had held that Batson could not be a lied retr act'vely to
cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless,
and that the fair cross section requirement was li~
venire.

-

Held: The judgment is affirmed.
820 F. 2d 832, affirmed.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II and III concluding that:
1. Allen v. Hardy prevented petitioner from benefiting from the rule
announced in Batson, since his conviction became final before Batson
was decided~ The opinions filed in McCray-which involved the question whether the Constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges
to exclude members of a particular group from the jury, based on the
prosecutor's assumption that they would be biased in favor of other
members of the same group-did not destroy Swain's precedential effect, as petitioner urges they did, since a denial of certiorari imports no
expression of opinion on the merits of the case and concomitantly opinions accompanying such denial cannot have the same effect as decisions
on the merits. Pp. 3-5.
2. Petitioner is procedurally barred from raising the claim that he has
established a ~ olation of the Equal Protection Clause under Swain and
that Swain did not preclude an examination of the prosecutor's stated
reasons for his peremptory challenges to determine the legitimacy of his
motive. Since petitioner did not raise the Swain cl ·m at t ial or on
direct appeal, he fo e1 e review o e claim in collateral proceedings in
the state courts. Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, he is
proceeding,
barred from raising the cfa1m
,. m a federal habeas cornus
~
since he made no attempt to show cause for his def: lt and the Illinois
Appe ate Court, contrary to 1s contention, did not address the Swain
claim. · Pp. 5-8.
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(Slip Opinion)

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

HARRIS v. REED, WARDEN,

ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 87-5677.

Argued October 12, 1988-Decided February 22, 1989

Petitioner's state-court murder conviction was affirmed by the Appellate
Court of Illinois on direct appeal, where petitioner challenged only the
sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court then dismissed his petition
for postconviction relief-which alleged ineffective :issistance by his trial
counsel in several respects, including the failure to call alibi witnesses and the Appellate Court again affirmed. Although referring to the
"well-settled" Illinois principle that issues that could have been, but
were not, presented on direct appeal are considered waived, and finding
that, "except for the alibi witnesses," petitioner's ineffective-assistance
claim "could have been raised [on] direct appeal," the court nevertheless
went on to consider and reject that claim on its merits. Petitioner then
pursued the claim b filing a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court under 8
e recognizing that, absent a
showing either of "cause and prejudice" or a "miscarriage of justice,"
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, would have barred its consideration
of the claim had the State Appellate Court held the claim waived under
state law, the federal court determined that there had been no waiw r
holding, and went on to consider the claim in its entirety and to dismiss it
on its merits. In affirming the dismissal, the Court of Appeals ruled
that it was precluded from reviewing the claim's merits because it believed the claim to be procedurally barred. Finding the State Appellate
Court's order to be "ambiguous" on the waiver question, the court nevertheless concluded that it was bound by the order's "suggest[ed]" intention "to find all grounds waived except that pertaining to the alibi
witnesses."
Held:
1. The '"plain statement' rule" of Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
1042, and n. 7, is not limited to cases on direct review in this Court, but
I

t:rc
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WARREN LEE HARRIS, PETITIONER v. MARVIN
REED, WARDEN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February 22, 1989]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion and am in general agreement
with i t ~ n -~ ~~:[ th~ "plain state~ ent" ~ e of Michigan v. Long, 4630. -s. 1032 (1983), to the state courts' invocation of state procedural default rules. I write separately
to emphasize two points. First, I do not read the Court's
opinion as addressing or altering the well-settled rule that
the lower federal courts, and this Court, may properly inquire into the availability of state remedies in determining
whether claims presented in a petition for federal habeas corpus have been properly exhausted in the state courts. See
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U . S. 504, 515-517 (1972); ex parle
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1944).
In 28 U. S. C. § 22,5i{,b), Congress has provided that a writ
of habeas CO:i:£US "shall not be [Eanted unless it ap~ars that
the applicant has exhaust ct he remedies available in the
courts of thg_ State, or that there is e1 er an absence of available State co' ;ective processes or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to prote~ the
rights of the prisoner." The exhaustion requirement 1s no~
satisfied if the habeas petitioner "has the right ~
the law
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented." §2254(c). Thus, in · determining whether a
remedy for a particular constitutional claim is "available," the
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federal courts are authorized, indeed required, to assess the
likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner
a hearing on the merits of his claim.
~
he rule requiring that a habeas petitioner exhaust avail~ abl remedies in state court before seeking revi~w of the
same claims via federal habeas corpus serves two 1mp(!.rtant
in~ ts. ~
. its roots lie in the respect which the federal
courts owe to the procedures erected by the States to correct
constitutional errors, and the confidence that state court
_.
judges, take, and should be encouraged to take, their con~ stitutional duties seriously. ~
. the rule furthers the_inV
terest in the efficiency of federafhabeas corpus, by assurmg
that in general the factual and legal bases surrounding a petitioner's constitutional claim or claims will have been developed in a prior adjudication. See generally Rose v. Lundy,
455 u. s. 509, 518-519 (1982).
To protect these interests we have held that where a federal habeas petitioner raises a claim which has never been
presented in any state forum, a federal court may properly
determine whether the claim has been procedurally defaulted
under state law, such that a remedy in state court is "unavailable" within the meaning of § 2254(c). See Engle v. Issac,
456 U. S. 107, 125-126, n. 28 (1982). The lower courts have
consistently looked to state procedm:al default rules in making the "availability" determination, both before and after
our decision in Engle. See, e. g., Watson v. Alabama, 841
F. 2d 1074, 1077, n. 6 (CAll), cert. denied, _488 U. S. (1988); Leroy v. Marshall, 757 F. 2d 94, 97 (CA6), cert. deU. S. 831 (1985); Wayne v. White, 735 F. 2d 324,
nied ' 474
.
'325 (CA8 1984); Williams v. Duckworth, 724 F. 2d 1439, 1442
e(CA7), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 841 (1984); Richardson v.
Turner, 716 F. 2d 1059, 1061-1062 (CA4 1983); Beaty v. Patton, 700 F. 2d 110, 112 (CA3 1983); Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.
2d 867, 869 (CA9 1982); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F. 2d 318,
319-321 (CA9 1982); Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581, 584
(CA6 1979); Smith v. Estelle, 562 F. 2d 1006, 1007-1008 (CA5
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Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527 (1986). In these decisions,
the Court reaffirmed the h,2lding of Wainwright v. Sy_l!:.§s, 433
U. S. 72, 90-91 (1977), that a state pr"isoner pursuin_g_.fuderal
'~e or a_procedural dehabeas r e ies must show b
fill!lt a_ prej_udic~" flowing rom the alle ed constitutional
violation for a federal court o entertain his claim on e merits des ite the existence of an otherwise preclusive ~state-law
ground for decision.
n urray v. arrier, e Court rejecte~
ng of the cause and prejudice test . . . to
dispense with the requirement that the petitioner show cause
and instead to focus exclusively on whether there has been a
'manifest injustice' or a denial of 'fundamental fairness.'"
477 U. S., at 493. The Court went on to indicate that:
"We remain confident that, for the most part, 'victims
of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard.' But we do not pretend
that this will always be true. Accordingly, we think
that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause
for the procedural default." Id., at 495-496 (citation
omitted).
At several points in its opinion, the Court refers to a "miscarriage of justice" test to be applied in conjunction with
the cause and prejudice inquiry. See ante, at 2, and n. 2;
ante, at 3, n. 3; ante, at 6. I do not read the Court's opinion
as suggesting any alteration of the relationship between the
cause and prejudice inquiry and the narrow exception to the
cause requirement where a petitioner cannot show cause but
'can make a strong showing of probable factual innocence.
See Smith, supra, at 538-539 ("We similarly reject the suggestion that there is anything 'fundamentally unfair' about
enforcing procedural default rules in cases devoid of any substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy
of the guilt or sentencing determination"). The operative

test is cau
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With this ·
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(Slip Opinion)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
Uniwd Staws v. Detroit Lumber Co. , 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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CASTILLE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, ET AL. v. PEOPLES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 87-1602. Argued December 6, 1988-Decided February 22, 1989
Following the Pennsylvania Superior Court's affirmance, on direct appeal,
of respondent's conviction of assault, robbery, and related crimes, he
filed with the State Supreme Court successive unsuccessful petitions for
allocatur, which, under state law, can be granted in the court's discretion
"only when there are special and important reasons therefor." Respondent next filed a petition for federal habeas relief, raising various
federal claims, some of which had been raised before the state courts
only in one or the other of respondent's unsuccessful petitions for
allocatur. The Federal District Court dismissed the petition for failure
to exhaust state remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Without considering whether respondent could obtain state
collateral review of his claims, the court held that their inclusion in the
allocatur petitions sufficiently exhausted state remedies, since the
State's highest court had thereby been given an opportunity to correct
the alleged constitutional infirmities in respondent's conviction.
Held:
1. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(c) provides that a state-law judgment cannot be reviewed on federal habeas if the petitioner has a state-law right
"to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." This bar
does not apply where the petitioner has already made a "fair presentation" of the particular claim to the state courts, and has exhausted his
direct appeals, since in such a situation it can reasonably be assumed that
even if further state procedures are available, resort to them would be
useless. That assumption is not justified, however, when the claim has
been presented to the state courts for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless "there are
special and important reasons therefor." Raising the issue in that fashI

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

;ion, and the bar of
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his state remedies
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 87-1602

exists because re. Pennsylvania law
l. Pp. 5-6.

RONALD D. CASTILLE, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
MICHAEL PEOPLES

.irt.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[February 22, 1989]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Following a jury trial in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, respondent Michael Peoples, who had been arrested for robbing a man and then setting him on fire, was
convicted of "arson - endangering persons," aggravated
assault and robbery. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Commonwealth v.
Peoples, 319 Pa. Super. 621, 466 A. 2d 720 (1983). Respondent then filed a pro se petition for allocatur and appointment
of counsel with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Under
Pennsylvania law, such allocatur review "is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion, and an appeal will be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor." Pa. Rule App. Proc. 1114. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court granted the request for counsel without
reaching the merits of the claims presented. Shortly thereafter, respondent, represented by appointed counsel, submitted a second petition for allocatur, raising some, but not all,
of the claims he had raised pro se. On November 4, 1985,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the second petition
without opinion.
On July 28, 1986, respondent filed a petition for federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting: (1) that the prosecutor violated state law, and thereby due process, by cross-
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The function of the criminal justice system might best be
summed up as the protection of the innocent.
In criminal
prosecutions, an extensive system of rights and procedures guards
against the conviction of an innocent person. Equally important,
enforcement of the criminal law in all its phases -- crime
prevention, police investigations, criminal prosecutions and
corrections -- also aims at protection of the innocent.
By
detecting, convicting and punishing those who break our laws, we
protect innocent people from the depredations of criminals.
To protect the innocent effectively, the criminal justice
system must be devoted to discovering the truth. The truth is
the surest protection an innocent defendant can have. Uncovering
the truth and presenting it fully and fairly in criminal
proceedings is also of critical importance to the effort to
restrain and deter those who prey on the innocent.
Over the past thirty years, however, a variety of new rules
have emerged that impede the discovery of reliable evidence at
the investigative stages of the criminal justice process and that
require the concealment of relevant facts at trial. This trend
has been a cause of grave concern to many Americans, who perceive
such rules as being at odds with the goals of the criminal
justice system. Within the legal profession and the law
enforcement community, debate over these rules has been
complicated by disagreements about the extent to which
constitutional principles or valid policy concerns require the
subordination of the search for truth to other interests.
This report is a contribution to that debate.
It was
prepared by the Office of Legal Policy, a component of the
Department of Justice which acts as a principal policy
development body for the Department. At my request, the Office
of Legal Policy has undertaken a series of studies on the current
status of the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice
system.
This volume, "Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Judgments," is the seventh in that series.
It reviews the
historical development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction;
examines the contemporary operation of that jurisdiction as a
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means by which lower federal courts review state judgments; and
discusses the constitutional and policy considerations affecting
the continuation or restriction of this type of review.
It also
analyzes the prospects for reform in this area, considering both
legislative and litigative options.
In light of the general importance of the issues raised in
this report and its companion volumes, it is fitting that they be
available to the public. They will generate considerable thought
on topics of great national importance, and merit the attention
of anyone interested in a serious examination of these issues.

~:m:
EDWIN MEESE III
Attorney General

Executive Summary
Under contemporary practice, a state prisoner who has exhausted
his avenues of appeal in the state court system may continue to litigate
the validity of his conviction or sentence by applying for habeas corpus in
a federal district court. In the habeas corpus proceeding, the prisoner
may raise and secure a redetermination of the same claims of federal
right that have already been fully litigated and rejected at the multiple
levels of adjudication and review in the state court system. In practical
effect, this procedure places federal trial judges in the position of
reviewing courts, with authority to overturn the considered judgments of
state courts of appeals and state supreme courts in criminal cases.
An intelligent assessment of this review jurisdiction must start from
a clear understanding of the fact that the contemporary "writ of habeas
corpus" by which the lower federal courts review state judgments is not
the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law. Rather, it is a
purely statutory remedy that is fundamentally different from the
traditional habeas corpus remedy whose suspension is prohibited by the
Constitution. The emergence of this non-constitutional remedy as the
basis for a quasi-appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in state
criminal cases is essentially the result of judicial innovations that have
taken place since the 1950's. In Justice Powell's words, the result of this
development is that we now have a system of review that "assures no end
to the litigation of a criminal conviction," a system that "is viewed with
disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries."
This Report carries out a review of the historical development of the
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction; examines its contemporary character
and operation; and discusses relevant policy considerations. The Report
concludes that federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for
state prisoners should be abolished or limited as far as possible. The
limited reform proposals that were passed by the Senate in 1984 and that
are currently before Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice
Reform Act provide the best immediate prospect for improvement.
In greater detail, the main findings and recommendations of the
Report are as follows:

I. History of Habeas Corpus

tional limitations on the scope and availability of habeas corpus review
and drastically expanding the federal rights of state defendants.

The right to habeas corpus as understood at common law and by
the framers of the Constitution was essentially a right to judicial
protection against unlawful executive detention. A person who had been
taken into custody by executive authorities could apply to a court to issue
a writ of habeas corpus which would direct the custodian to produce the
prisoner and state the cause of his commitment. If the government made
an adequate return stating that the petitioner was being held on a
criminal charge, the court could set bail for the petitioner in cases where
bail was legally authorized, and otherwise would allow him to remain in
detention pending trial. If the government could state no legal ground for
the detention, the court would order his release.

Legislative changes in federal habeas corpus since 1867 have
generally been directed to restricting its availability to prisoners in state
or local custody. For example, Congress has barred access to federal
habeas corpus for persons convicted in the local court system of the
District of Columbia; created a presumption of correctness for state court
fact-finding in habeas corpus proceedings; and enacted a rule that
unreasonably delayed petitions can be dismissed in certain circumstanc-

Thus, habeas corpus in its traditional character was essentially a
pre-trial remedy which guarded against executive oppression. It could
not be used to challenge a person's incarceration pursuant to the
judgment of a court unless the judgment was void because the court
lacked jurisdiction.
The Constitution's prohibition of suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus was intended to perpetuate habeas corpus in its traditional
character as a check on lawless incarceration by executive authorities.
The right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and under the First
Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, was also only a limitation on the power of
the federal government, and had no application to persons detained or
incarcerated pursuant to state authority.
In 1867, Congress created an enlarged statutory habeas corpus
remedy -- not confined to federal prisoners -- to provide a federal remedy
for former slaves who were being held in involuntary servitude in
violation of the recently enacted Thirteenth Amendment. The remedy
under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was initially applied in a manner
consistent with the traditional nature of habeas corpus; it could generally
not be used to challenge imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a
competent tribunal. Following Moore v. Dempsey in 1923, a somewhat
broader approach emerged in the decisions under which relief on federal
habeas corpus could be available if no meaningful process existed in the
state courts for considering a prisoner's federal claims. Finally, innovative judicial decisions of the 1950's and 1960's effectively transformed
federal habeas corpus into a general appellate jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts over state criminal judgments by eliminating the conven-

es.
Congress has also given partial approval on a number of occasions
to more far-reaching reforms. In 1956, and again in 1958, the House of
Representatives passed legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference
that would have virtually eliminated federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners. In 1968, legislation that would have abolished federal habeas
corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners reached the Senate
floor as part of the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act. In 1984, the Senate passed by a vote of 67 to 9 legislation supported
by the Administration that would create a time limit for habeas corpus
applications, narrow the standard of review for previously adjudicated
claims, and effect a number of other important reforms. These proposals
are currently before Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice
Reform Act (S. 1970 and H.R. 3777).
II.

The Current Jurisdiction

Habeas corpus applications by state prisoners were a relatively rare
occurrence prior to the creation of a quasi-appellate federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction by judicial decisions of the 1950's and 1960's.
However, they now constitute a major category of federal litigation. In
1941, state prisoners filed 127 habeas corpus petitions in the federal
district courts. In 1961, the corresponding figure was 1,020. In 1987, it
was 9,542.
More detailed statistical information is available from an extensive
empirical study of habeas corpus litigation that was funded by the
Department of Justice and completed in 1979. The study indicated that
habeas corpus litigation entails substantial burdens for judges and state
authorities, but rarely results in the granting of relief to the petitioner.
There is no reason to believe that a "better" result is obtained in any

'
objective sense in the small proportion of cases in which the federal
habeas court does reach a different conclusion from the state courts.
The study also indicated that most habeas corpus petitioners had
been convicted of serious, violent offenses. Over 80% had been convicted
after trial and about the same percentage had had or were having direct
appellate review of their cases in the state system. About 45% had
pursued collateral remedies in the state courts and over 30% had filed at
least one previous federal petition. Thus, federal habeas corpus typically
serves to provide additional review for prisoners whose cases have
already received an abundance of judicial process in comparison with the
average criminal case.
The 1979 study also found extraordinary delays in habeas corpus
filings in comparison with normal appellate mechanisms. About 40% of
petitions in the study were filed more than five years after conviction and
nearly a third were filed more than ten years after conviction. Delays of
up to more than fifty years from conviction were noted in some cases in
the study.
The problem of delay is particularly acute in capital cases, which
are characterized by interminable litigation and re-litigation that impede
the execution of death sentences. Thirty-seven states authorize capital
punishment and about 2,000 prisoners are currently under sentence of
death, but fewer than a hundred executions have occurred in the past
twenty years. The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction provides an avenue
for obstruction and delay in these cases which the state legislatures are
powerless to address.
The Supreme Court in its current habeas corpus decisions has given
weight to considerations of finality and federalism that were ignored or
shrugged off in the expansive decisions of the 1960's. A number of
significant limitations have resulted. For example, McMann v. Richardson in 1970 and Tollett v. Henderson in 1973 narrowed the range of
claims that can be raised on habeas corpus by prisoners who have pied
guilty. Wainwright v. Sykes in 1977 restricted the raising of claims in
federal habeas corpus proceedings that were not properly raised before
the state courts. Stone v. Powell in 1976 barred consideration of Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule claims by federal habeas courts where
state proceedings provide a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate such
claims. Sumner v. Mata in 1981 strengthened the interpretation and

application of the statutory presumption in favor of deference by federal
habeas courts to the factual determinations of state courts.

III.

Considerations of Policy

Various contemporary features of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction reflect a failure of the standards and procedures associated with
federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its expanding scope. This
expansion has come about almost entirely through judicial innovation,
without legislative sanction. No legislature would pass a law stating that
a defendant has a right to appeal his conviction, but that he may wait as
long as he wishes before doing so. No legislature would pass a law stating
that a defendant may appeal again and again if dissatisfied with the
results the first time around. No legislature would pass a law stating that
a defendant has a right to further mandatory review of a nearly unlimited
range of alleged procedural errors that have already been thoroughly
considered and rejected by other courts of appeals. Yet all of these
characteristics can be found in the current federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction.
Proposals for correcting these anomalies are frequently met with the
fallacious contention that doing so would interfere with the Great Writ of
the common law, whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution.
Contentions of this sort reflect a simple verbal confusion. The common
law writ referred to in the Constitution and the contemporary statutory
writ by which the lower federal courts review state judgments are not the
same. The constitutional "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that federal
prisoners can use before trial to test the existence of grounds for
detention by executive authorities. The current statutory "writ of habeas
corpus" is a remedy that state prisoners can use after trial and exhaustion
of state appellate remedies to secure additional review of the judgments
of state courts. These two writs have fundamentally different functions
and are directed against the actions of different governments. They have
nothing in common but a name.
Various other arguments have been offered in support of the current
system of review of state judgments by the lower federal courts through
"habeas corpus." On examination, these arguments generally conceal a
one-sided concern with defense interests -- and a correlative disregard of
competing public interests and constitutional values -- or an unjustified
preference for aggrandizing the lower federal courts at the expense of the
state judiciaries, or some combination of these two biases. Both history

and contemporary practice refute the notion that defendants in state
proceedings must routinely have access to a federal forum for the
adjudication of their federal claims. The argument that habeas corpus
review promotes increased fidelity to the Constitution or furthers the
interests of justice is also unpersuasive. The notion that habeas corpus
litigation provides a beneficial type of "recreational therapy" for
prisoners ignores the fact that frivolous and harassing litigation is itself a
seriously antisocial activity, and disregards its potential effect of
increasing the arrogance of unrepentant criminals.
IV.

Reform Options

In 1983, Attorney General William French Smith suggested that
the optimum solution to the problems of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction would be the enactment of legislation abolishing federal
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners. We agree.
A reform of this sort would not affect in any manner the traditional writ
of habeas corpus whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution and
would not upset any deep-seated tradition or historically sanctioned
practice. State convicts would retain the right to seek direct review of
their cases by the Supreme Court following such a reform, in addition to
having access to the appellate and collateral review mechanisms provided
in the state court systems. The same reform has already been in effect for
close to twenty years in the District of Columbia, with no discernible
adverse effect on the quality or fairness of criminal proceedings.
A second possibility would be to limit federal habeas corpus to the
role of a backstop remedy, whose availability would be conditioned on a
state judicial system's failure to provide some meaningful process for
raising and deciding a federal claim. This would also constitute a
fundamental improvement over the pointless redundancy of the current
system.
A final legislative option is limited reform measures focusing on
particular problems of abuse or excess that arise under the current
system of review. This approach is taken in the reform legislation that
was passed by the Senate in 1984 as S. 1763 and that is now before
Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act (S. 1970
and H.R. 3777). The legislation would create a one-year time limit on
habeas corpus applications, normally running from exhaustion of state
remedies; establish a relatively simple and uniform standard of review
under which the federal habeas court would l!enerallv defer to the state

courts' determination of a claim if the determination was reasonable and
arrived at by procedures consistent with due process; clarify the
standards for entertaining claims that were not properly raised before the
state courts; and effect various technical improvements in habeas corpus
procedure. These limited reform proposals provide the best immediate
prospect for effecting basic improvements over the current system of
review.
Finally, it may be possible to achieve some significant improvements through litigation, though the litigative options are constrained by
existing statutory standards and settled judicial precedents. The possibilities in this area include securing judicial decisions extending the
deferential standard of Stone v. Powell -- which now applies to Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule claims -- to Miranda and Massiah claims;
securing the uniform application of restrictive standards concerning the
raising of claims that were not properly raised before the state courts;
and securing a stronger interpretation of the rule permitting the dismissal
of unreasonably delayed petitions.

l
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The proceedings of the [Constitutional] Convention do not
cast much direct light on just what the Framers assumed the
"privileges" of the writ to be; but it was of course the clear
contemporaneous understanding that the fundamental function of the writ was to test executive detention and that
convictions by a criminal court of competent jurisdiction
could not be reexamined on habeas corpus at all.
-- Hart & W echsler's
The Federal Courts and the
Federal System
Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28 U.S.C.]

§ 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review
state court criminal convictions. There is no statute of
limitations, and no finality of federal review of state convictions. Thus, repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know of no
other system of justice structured in a way that assures no end
to the litigation of a criminal conviction. Our practice in this
respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in other
countries. Nor does the Constitution require this sort of
redundancy.
-- Justice Lewis F. Powell
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I
am sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both
the federal and the state systems strong, independent, and
viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to
litigate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assuming office take an oath to support the federal as well as the
state constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion
when given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a
step in the right direction to defer to the state courts and give
finality to their judgments on federal constitutional questions
where a full and fair adjudication has been given in the state
court.
-- Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
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The objective of the law in criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court
has stated, is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." 1
As the earlier reports in this series have documented, the criminal justice
system in the United States has, in many areas, lost sight of this simple
truth. The process of investigation and adjudication in criminal cases is
burdened with rules and procedures that are in conflict with its basic
function.

3.

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
OF STATE JUDGMENTS

67

A number of our earlier reports have been concerned with
impediments to the search for truth that have their primary impact at the
stages of investigation and trial. For example, the police are frequently
barred by the Miranda rules from engaging in non-coercive, constitutionally proper questioning of suspects. At trial, these rules and other
judicially created rules may require that a defendant's pre-trial statements be concealed from the jury, though freely-given, probative, and
reliable. Similarly, the search and seizure exclusionary rule requires that
the trier be kept ignorant of physical evidence of unquestioned reliability
and probative value. 2
The objectives of accuracy and substantive justice may also be
disserved beyond the point of conviction by unsound mechanisms of
appeal and review. The government is generally barred from seeking
correction by an appellate court when the public is endangered through
the erroneous acquittal of a criminal, but review of convictions at the
instance of the defendant is, in contrast, essentially open-ended. Under
the contemporary operation of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, a
person convicted of a crime by a state court may repeatedly seek to have
his conviction overturned in the lower federal courts, with no particular

1
2

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

See Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 35, 36-37, 43-44,
47-52, 53-56, 62-63, 76-79, 97 & n.157 (1986) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. l);
Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule (1986)
(Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 2); Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986) (Truth in Criminal
Justice Report No. 3).
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limit on how long he may wait before doing so. The grounds on which
relief from the state court judgment is sought may cast no doubt on the
defendant's factual guilt, and may tum on close or unsettled questions on
which the lower federal courts themselves disagree.
The frequent practical effect of this procedure is to convert "the
process of review in criminal cases into a kind of interminable game, an
open-ended hunt for official error. In this attenuated process the question
is not whether an innocent defendant, mistakenly convicted, may enlist
the aid of an appellate court in correcting a miscarriage of justice.
Rather, it is whether a persistent defendant, however guilty, may
eventually get lucky and persuade some judge or court to find error,
given unlimited opportunities to do so." 3
This report examines the process by which we have come to have a
system of review which "assures no end to the litigation of a criminal
conviction," a system which "is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and
judges in other countries." 4 Section I reviews the history of habeas
corpus. Section II describes the current federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Section III discusses pertinent policy considerations. Section IV sets
out the possibilities and prospects for reform.

3

Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the
Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland,
at 1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986).
4

Address of Justice Lewis F. Powell before the American Bar Association Division of
Judicial Administration, at 9 (Aug. 9, 1982).

I. HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
The right to habeas corpus as understood at common law and by
the framers of the Constitution was elisentially a right to judicial
protection against unlawful executive detention. The habeas corpus
remedy could not be used to challenge the detention of a person pursuant
to the judgment of a court unless the judgment was void because the
court lacked jurisdiction. The Constitution's prohibition of suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus was intended to perpetuate habeas corpus in its
traditional character as a check on lawless incarceration by executive
authorities. The right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and under
the First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, was also only a limitation on the
power of the federal government, and had no application to persons
detained or incarcerated pursuant to state authority.
In 1867, Congress created a broader statutory habeas corpus
remedy to provide a federal remedy for former slaves who were being
held in involuntary servitude in violation of the recently enacted
Thirteenth Amendment. While later applications of the statutory remedy
went beyond the narrow compass anticipated by its framers, its scope
initially remained quite limited. In the initial period of judicial application, the courts generally adhered to the traditional standards under
which a prisoner could not challenge his incarceration pursuant to the
judgment of a court unless the judgment was void because the court
lacked jurisdiction. Following Frank v. Mangum in 1915 and Moore v.
Dempsey in 1923, a somewhat broader inquiry emerged in the decisions
under which federal habeas corpus could be available if no meaningful
process existed in the state courts for considering a prisoner's federal
claims. The final step in the creation of the current habeas corpus
jurisdiction came in decisions of the 1950's and 1960's which eliminated
the conventional limitations on the scope and availability of habeas
corpus review and drastically expanded the federal rights of state
defendants. The practical effect of this development has been to create a
general appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in relation to
state criminal judgments.
The legislative interventions in the development of the habeas
corpus jurisdiction since 1867 have consistently involved restrictions on
the availability of federal habeas corpus to prisoners in state or local
custody. Congress has barred access to federal habeas corpus for persons
convicted in the local court system of the District of Columbia;
conditioned appeals from district court denials of habeas corous oetitions
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on obtaining a certificate of probable cause; created a presumption of
correctness for state court fact-finding in habeas corpus proceedings; and
enacted a rule that delayed petitions can be dismissed in certain cases on
grounds of "!aches." Congress has also given partial approval on a
number of occasions to reform proposals that would have virtually
abolished federal habeas corpus for state prisoners or enacted more farreaching limitations on its availability.

A.

The Common Law, the Constitution, and the First
Judiciary Act

At common law, habeas corpus was essentially a means of securing
judicial review of the existence of grounds for executive detention. If a
person was taken into custody by executive authorities, he could petition
a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, which would order the custodian
to produce the prisoner and state the cause of his commitment. If the
government made an adequate return stating that the petitioner was
being held on a criminal charge, the court could set bail for the
petitioner, or would allow him to be detained pending trial, depending on
whether the offense charged was bailable or non-bailable. If the
government could state no legal ground for holding the petitioner, the
court would order his release. 5

5

See, e.g., Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States -- 1776-1865, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 243-45,
262 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court -- Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev.
451, 451, 460-61, 468 (1966); Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1513 (2d ed. 1973); R. Rader, Bailing Out a Failed Law: The Constitution and
Pre-Trial Detention in P. McGuigan & R. Rader, eds., Criminal Justice Reform: A
Blueprint 91, 94-96 (1983); Developments -- Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
1038, 1042-45 (1970) [hereafter cited as "Developments 'l
The description in the accompanying text reflects the basic functions of the common law
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (the "Great Writ"). The writ assumed its mature
form in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c.2, which strengthened and partially
codified the common law procedures for eliciting a statement of charges and enforcing
bail rights. The Act exempted persons committed on charges of felony or treason from
the benefits of the writ under its general provisions, but prescribed time limits for
indicting and trying such persons. See id.; Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts -Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 335, 337-38 (1952).

,..... ,

Habeas corpus could also serve some miscellaneous functions in the common law period,
such as testing the validity of process under which a person was held before trial,
challenging unlawful restraint by private persons, or testing a committing court's
jurisdiction. A general survey of early American practice appears in Oaks, supra (1965
article).

The importance of habeas corpus in this character -- as a safeguard
against arbitrary executive detention -- was recognized by the framers,
who included in the Constitution a prohibition of suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
safety may require it." The writ of habeas corpus referred to in the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution, however, differs in two fundamental respects from the present-day statutory writ by which the lower
federal courts review state criminal judgments.
First, the right to habeas corpus set out in the Constitution was only
intended as a check on abuses of authority by the federal government,
and was not meant to provide a judicial remedy for unlawful detention
by state authorities. This point is evident, to begin with, from the
placement of the Suspension Clause in Section 9 of Article I of the
Constitution, which is an enumeration of limitations on the power of the
federal government. The corresponding enumeration of restrictions on
state authority in Section 10 of Article I contains no right to habeas
corpus.
The same understanding was evident in the debate over the
Suspension Clause at the constitutional convention. There was no dissent
from the desirability of protecting the right to habeas corpus from federal
interference, but the convention divided on whether a proviso should be
stated to this general principle that would enable the federal government
to suspend the writ in emergency situations. It was assumed in the debate
at the convention that the states would remain free to suspend the writ
even if the Suspension Clause were adopted in an unqualified form, and it
was argued unsuccessfully that this made federal suspension power
unnecessary. 6 Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, the First
Congress in 1789 made the restriction of the federal habeas corpus right
to federal prisoners explicit, providing in the First Judiciary Act (ch. 14,

§ 20, 1 Stat. 81-82):

6

See 2 M . Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 438 (1966); 3 id. at
157, 213, 290. The majority was evidently unpersuaded that the individual states'
suspension power would be equal to the exigencies of invasion and rebellion. The
minority position also failed to take account of the potential need to suspend the writ in
response to rebellion by a state, as opposed to rebellion against a state. This point
assumed reality when the writ was suspended through federal action during the Civil
War.

r-

[T]he justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the
district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.
Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to
prisoners in gaol [i.e., jail], unless where they are in custody,
under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are
committed for trial before some court of the same . . . .
Second, the writ referred to in the Constitution, as noted above, was
the common law writ of habeas corpus, whose essential function was to
serve as a check on arbitrary executive detention. Recognition of the
common law scope of the writ is reflected in the Constitution's
authorization of the suspension of the writ in cases of rebellion or
invasion, whose obvious purpose was to permit in such circumstances
executive
detention unconstrained by normal legal processes and stan7
dards. As Blackstone explained:
To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate,
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an
act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the
person, by secretly hurrying him to [jail], where his sufferings
are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.
And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this
may be a necessary measure ... . [T]he ... legislative power,
whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to
imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so
doing ... . [T]his experiment ought only to be tried in cases of
extreme emergency; and in these the nation parts with its
liberty for a while, in order to preserve it for ever. 8

permitting suspension in cases of rebellion or invasion was voted on at
the constitutional convention, a final objection was heard that the
suspension authority was unnecessary because judges already had
discretion to commit persons or bail them in most important cases. 9 In
Federalist No. 84, Hamilton explained the habeas corpus right in the
proposed Constitution by citing Blackstone's characterization of habeas
corpus as a remedy for arbitrary, secret imprisonment. As noted above,
the First Judiciary Act described the function of the writ as "inquiry into
the cause of commitment" and referred to its availability to federal
prisoners "committed for trial."

B.

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867

Between 1789 and the end of the Civil War, there was little change
in the character of federal habeas corpus. In response to particular
incidents of state resistance to the execution of federal law and
interference with a foreign agent, acts of 1833 and 1842 extended the
availability of federal habeas corpus to certain agents of foreign
governments and to federal officers detained in the states for acts done in
carrying out their duties. 10 In other respects, the First Judiciary Act's
limitation of the availability of habeas corpus in the federal courts to
persons in federal custody remained operative. The writ's application to
federal prisoners continued to be limited to its common law functions.
After the Civil War, however, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, which extended the availability of the federal writ to persons
"restrained of . . . liberty" in violation of federal law, without any
requirement of federal custody. The Act was drafted in response to a
resolution of December 19, 1865, of the House of Representatives
directing its Judiciary Committee
to inquire and report to this House, as soon as practicable, by
bill or otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the
courts of the United States to enforce the freedom of the wives
and children of soldiers of the United States under the joint
resolution of Congress of March 3, 1865, and also to enforce
the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitu-

The framers' conception of habeas corpus as a check on executive
abuses and a pre-trial remedy that could be used to elicit a statement of
the cause of commitment and enforce bail rights was also reflected in
other ways in the materials associated with the adoption and implementation of the Constitution. Before the proviso to the Suspension Clause
7

See the sources cited in note 6 supra.

9

1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 131-32 (1765).

10

8

l

2 M. Farrand, supra note 6, at 438.
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 31, 33 (1965).

tional amendment abolishing slavery. 11
The "resolution of March 3, 1865" referred to in this directive was a
measure pre-dating the Thirteenth Amendment (see 13 Stat. 571) which
freed the families of Black Union soldiers who lived in areas that were
not covered by the earlier Emancipation Proclamation. The reference to
the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery was to the Thirteenth
Amendment, which went into effect the day before the directive was
adopted.
The initial version of the bill resulting from this directive extended
the availability of habeas corpus in the federal courts to persons held in
"slavery or involuntary servitude," but a later version of the bill, which
was eventually enacted, contained the broader "restraint of liberty"
language. The probable reason for this language change may be found in
tlie efforts of the slave states to circumvent emancipation by enacting
oppressive apprenticeship, contract labor, and vagrancy laws that
restrained the liberty of former slaves. The broader language of the final
version of the bill would have been more readily applicable to restraints
of liberty under these laws than the earlier "slavery or involuntary
servitude" version. 12
The reformulated bill was brought up on the floor of the House of
Representatives by Representative Lawrence in the first session of the
39th Congress. The general merits of the proposal were not debated, but
Representative Le Blond objected to a proviso in the bill which stated
that it was inapplicable to persons held by the military authorities on
charges of military offenses or of participation in rebellion against the
federal government prior to the passage of the act. Lawrence responded
that the bill was not addressed to the situation of persons in military
custody. Rather, he explained, the bill was introduced pursuant to the
resolution of December 19, 1865 (pp. 7-8 supra), and would correct the
inadequacy of federal jurisdiction to protect the rights and liberties of the
persons referred to in the resolution. Following this brief interchange, the
bill was passed by the House. 13

11

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865).

12

See Mayers, supra note 10, at 34-35, 43-44.

13

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 4150-51 (1866). See generally Mayers, supra note 10,
at 36-38.

In the Senate, the bill was then brought up by Senator Trumbull,
whose discussion of the measure indicated that it was a House bill with
which he had limited familiarity. As in the House, the debate was brief,
and focused on the proviso relating to persons in military custody and
some minor collateral issues. In the course of the debate, Trumbull
pointed out that the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the federal courts to persons held under federal laws. He
stated that the point of the bill was to extend the availability of federal
habeas corpus to persons who might be held under state laws in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States (Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4228-30). Trumbull's explanation may have been an
improvisation based on the face of an unfamiliar proposal, 14 or may have
been an unelaborated reference to the state laws which were being used to
keep freed slaves in a de facto state of servitude. 15 On account of the
objections raised about collateral matters in the Senate, the bill was held
over. It passed in the next session without further significant debate
(Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730, 790).

Overall, the legislative history of the Act shows a clear purpose of
providing a federal remedy for emancipated slaves who were being
deprived of liberty in the states. It does not show that the creation of a
broadly applicable federal remedy for state prisoners was intended or
anticipated. 16

14

See Mayers, supra note 10, at 38-39.

15

In 1868, while arguing for withdrawal of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the
denial of habeas corpus to a person in military custody, Senator Trumbull explained the
original purpose of the Act of 1867 as follows (Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096):
"The act of 1789 authorized the issuing of .. . writs in cases where persons were
deprived of their liberty under . .. color of authority of the United States. Why, then,
was the Act of 1867 passed? It was passed to authorize writs of habeas corpus to issue in
cases where persons were deprived of their liberty under State laws or pretended State
laws. It was the object of the Act of 1867 to .. . meet a class of cases which was arising
in the rebel States, where, under pretense of certain State laws, men made free by the
Constitution of the United States were virtually being enslaved, and it was also
applicable to cases in the State of Maryland where, under an apprentice law, freedmen
were being subjected to a species of bondage." Accord, id. at 2168 (Representatives
Hubbard and Wilson). Maryland was mentioned separately from the "rebel" states in
Trumbull's statement because it was a slave state that sided with the Union. See
Mayers, supra note 10, at 43-44, 52 & n. 80.

16

Some post-enactment statements indicated that the Act of 1867 was adopted to protect
Union loyalists or officers, as well as freed slaves, from persecution in the rebel states.
See Ex parte Mccardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 322 (1867) (argument of Senator

However, the language of the Act -- together with the absence of
committee reports and the perfunctory discussion of its purpose on the
House and Senate floors -- contained the seeds of later expansive
developments. On its face, the enacted bill provided a general authorization for exercising federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for the benefit of
persons who were being denied liberty in violation of federal law. In
contrast, the initial version of the proposal (see p. 8 supra) had expressly
limited its application to persons held in slavery or involuntary servitude.
This difference in formulation would not have appeared particularly
significant at the time of the bill's enactment in 1867. Imprisonment
pursuant to the judgment of a court was generally not considered to be in
violation of law for purposes of habeas corpus, even if the judgment was
predicated on legal error. 17 Moreover, there were virtually no limitations
on restraints of liberty in the states under federal constitutional or
statutory law, aside from the Thirteenth Amendment and related civil
rights legislation: The rights of criminal defendants against the states
under the original Constitution were minimal; the Bill of Rights did not
apply to the states; and the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been
proposed or ratified. 18 However, with the ensuing expansion of federal
procedural rights through constitutional amendment and judicial innovaTrumbull as counsel for the government); Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2126
(1868) (Senator Buckalew). This interpretation was initially proffered in the context of
efforts to prevent Southern resisters from using the Act to challenge the military
governance of the subjugated Confederacy. It may have originated as an afterthought
which permitted unfavorable comparisons between the resisters who sought to use the
Act and the loyal persons it was meant to protect. See Mayers, supra note 10, at 48-52
& n. 70. It may also have reflected some confusion between the Habeas Corpus Act and
other Reconstruction measures. See id. at 39 n. 37; Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
2119-20. Even if these post-enactment statements are taken as accurate, however, they
show no broader purpose than dealing with specific evils arising from the unique
conditions attending Reconstruction.
17

See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830); Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus/or State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 466, 474-75
(1963); Oaks, supra note 5, at 262 (1965 article).
In the final stages of the Senate debate on the Habeas Corpus Act, Senator Johnson
raised the possibility of an application being made under the Act by a person convicted
and imprisoned in a state, but his statements indicate that he was considering the case
of a person in federal custody being held within the territory of a state pursuant to the
judgment of a federal tribunal that lacked jurisdiction. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. , 2d
Sess. 730, 790. Granting relief in such a case would have been consistent with the
traditional scope of habeas corpus. See pp. 11-12 infra.

18

IJ

See Mayers, supra note 10, at 44-45, 52-55.

tion, the potential resulted for broad federal court review of state
criminal judgments, to the extent that the federal courts were willing to
abrogate the traditional restrictions on the function of the habeas corpus
remedy. The course by which these restrictions were eroded and
eventually abandoned is examined in the next part of this report.

C. Subsequent Judicial Developments
The development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction subsequent to 1867 falls naturally into three stages. In the initial period, the
common law standards generally remained in effect and habeas corpus
could not be used to challenge a conviction entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. In the course of the second period, the jurisdictional standard was supplanted by a general approach under which the
availability of federal habeas corpus would depend on whether the state
had provided some meaningful process for considering a defendant's
federal claims. In the third period, innovative decisions of the 1950's and
1960's effectively converted the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction into a
general appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in relation to
state criminal judgments.

1. The Jurisdictional Standard
As discussed earlier, the essential function of the common law
habeas corpus remedy that was incorporated into the Constitution was to
guard against abuses of executive power affecting personal liberty.
Imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a court could accordingly not
be challenged through a habeas corpus application. The only significant
qualification to this principle was that the question of a committing
court's jurisdiction could be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding,
reflecting the view that a judgment entered without jurisdiction was a
nullity. 19
19 See,

e.g. , Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830); Oaks, supra note 5, at
261-62 (1965 article). Even jurisdictional challenges were often effectively precluded by
a presumption that a court of general jurisdiction acted within the scope of its
authority. A broader inquiry was authorized in relation to the judgments of "inferior"
courts under a rule that the jurisdiction of such a court must be shown affirmativel y.
However, "inferior" courts in the relevant sense only included certain courts of limited
jurisdiction -- for example, a court martial might be so classified -- and did not include
the regular lower federal courts or state courts of general jurisdiction. See Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. at 203-05, 207-09; W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus §§ 266-68 (2d ed. 1893).

a.

Federal Prisoners

The Supreme Court consistently applied these common law principles in relation to federal prisoners in its early decisions under the First
Judiciary Act. For example, in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193,
201-03 (1830), the Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of a
habeas corpus application alleging that the petitioner had been convicted
pursuant to a defective indictment. The Court explained:
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment of
a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on
all the world as the judgment of this court would be .. . . It
puts an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it ... .
An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful,
unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a
nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject,
although it should be erroneous.
The enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 made it possible
for federal prisoners to point to that Act, as well as to the original habeas
corpus provisions of the First Judiciary Act, as the basis for their
applications. This did not, however, result in any change in the scope of
the writ. Federal convicts were still confined to the assertion of
jurisdictional defects. 20
Post-Civil War cases involving federal prisoners did, however,
generate some extension of the notion of a "jurisdictional" defect. 2 1 The
Supreme Court held in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1879),
that a conviction pursuant to an unconstitutional statute could be
attacked on habeas corpus, stating that "[a]n unconstitutional law is
void, and is as no law," and that "if the laws are unconstitutional and
void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes." This
20

21

This was consistent with the intent behind the 1867 Act. Federal habeas corpus had
been available to federal prisoners under settled common law standards from the
beginning of the nation, and both the House and Senate managers of the 1867 Act
emphasized that its purpose was to create an enlarged jurisdiction for the benefit of
certain persons who were "restrained of . .. liberty" in the states (see pp. 8-9 supra).
They presumably would have taken it for granted that the traditional standards would
continue to apply in any overlapping application of the new jurisdiction to federal
prisoners.
See Bator, supra note 17, at 465-74; Developments, supra note 5, at 1045-48.

doctrine, as the cited passages indicate, reflected the notion that a
prosecution pursuant to an invalid statute was tantamount to a
prosecution carried out without any kind of legal authority. The late
nineteenth century cases also reflected a greater willingness to grant
review by habeas corpus where a claim implicated the sentencing
authority of the committing court. 22
The tendency to apply an extended notion of "jurisdiction" in
certain areas apparently resulted in part from the pressures generated by
the general preclusion of appellate review in federal criminal cases during
most of the nineteenth century. Even this limited extension of habeas
corpus review was curtailed after federal defendants were given the right
to appeal. 23 Throughout this period, the general rule continued to be that
a conviction would not be overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding if
the court rendering the judgment had the authority to hear and decide
the case. 24

b.

State Prisoners

In relation to state prisoners, it became apparent in the early cases
that the text of the 1867 Act provided inadequate guidance concerning
the exercise of the enlarged federal habeas corpus jurisdiction it had
created. State defendants filed petitions under the Act while state
proceedings were underway or after they had been concluded, but the
Act contained no provision concerning deference to prior state adjudications or pending state proceedings. Rather, it provided simply that the
district court was to find the facts in a summary fashion on the basis of
the testimony and arguments of the interested parties.

These features of the Habeas Corpus Act become more understandable when one considers its narrow original purpose. The typical case
anticipated by the Act's framers would not have been that of a defendant
in a state prosecution, but of an emancipated slave who was unlawfully
being kept in a state of servitude by a private slaveholder, perhaps under
the purported authority of a state statute re-designating the slave as an
"apprentice" or holding him to a labor contract under threat of criminal
sanctions. In such a case, the question of deference to state judicial
22

See Bator, supra note 17, at 467-68, 471-72.

23 See

id. at 473-74 (rejection in early twentieth century cases of habeas corpus review of
constitutionality of criminal statutes).

24

See id. at 471-74, 483-84.

processes would not arise. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866
authorized the removal of state proceedings to federal court as protection
against violations of its provisions by state authorities. 25 Thus, there
already existed in 1867 a more complete protection against violations of
the narrow range of existing federal rights in state prosecutions. This
would also have tended to eliminate any reason for the framers of the
Habeas Corpus Act to anticipate or make provision for the case of a
defendant who asserted violations of federal rights in state judicial
proceedings. 26
Hence, the state defendant who sought relief under the Habeas
Corpus Act presented a case whose procedural ramifications had not
been addressed in the formulation of the statute. When cases of this sort
did subsequently arise, the Supreme Court adopted two doctrines in
dealing with them.
First, the Court held that the power conferred by the Habeas
Corpus Act should ordinarily not be exercised until the state courts had
had an opportunity to address the petitioner's allegations in the normal
course of state proceedings. The doctrine was first articulated by the
Court in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), which rejected a
petitioner's pre-trial challenge to his detention on a state indictment
pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional statute. The doctrine deriving
from Ex parte Royall and its progeny, termed the requirement of
"exhaustion of state remedies," is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(c).

25

26

The Civil Rights Act conferred national citizenship on blacks and provided for equality
of civil rights regardless of race. Section 3 of the Act authorized removal to federal
court of state proceedings against persons who were denied or could not enforce in the
state courts the rights secured by the Act, and state proceedings against officers for acts
done pursuant to the Civil Rights Act or the Freedmen's Bureau Act. See Act of April
9, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
See Mayers, supra note 10, at 43-48.

The only reference to the effect of state proceedings in the Act of 1867 was a provision
declaring "null and void" state proceedings relating to the subject of a habeas corpus
petition which took place while habeas corpus proceedings or appeals therefrom were
underway, or after a final judgment in such proceedings discharging the petitioner.
Considering the general purpose of the Act, the obvious point of this provision was to
prevent a slaveholder from invoking state judicial processes to regain custody of the
slave after habeas corpus proceedings had been instituted. See id. at 47-48.

Second, in cases involving state prisoners -- as in cases involving
federal prisoners -- the jurisdictional standard was applied, following the
traditional understanding of the nature and function of the habeas corpus
remedy. In the absence of a jurisdictional defect, violations of a
defendant's constitutional rights in state proceedings were not grounds
for relief in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 27
2.

Adequacy of State Processes

The second stage in the development of the statutory habeas corpus
remedy -- in which the jurisdictional standard of review was ultimately
abandoned -- arose from the decisions of Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
In Frank v. Mangum, the petitioner argued that relief on federal
habeas corpus should be available because the state proceedings involved
denials of due process -- specifically, mob influence on the trial and the
defendant's absence from the court when the verdict was returned -- that
were sufficient to divest the trial court of jurisdiction and make the
judgment against the defendant a nullity (237 U.S. at 318-23). The
Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the petitioner
had not established that he had been subjected to any denial of due
process. 28 In addressing these issues, the Court emphasized that the state
proceedings as a whole had to be considered, including the "corrective
process" provided by the state for considering the trial irregularities
alleged by the petitioner. In light of the state courts' consideration and
rejection of the petitioner's contentions in the context of new trial
motions and appeals to the state supreme court, the Court found that no

27

See Bator, supra note 17, at 478-84; Developments, supra note 5, at 1048-50; Fay v. Noia ,
372 U.S. 391, 452-54 (1963) (Harlan, J ., dissenting). The extended notion of a
"jurisdictional" defect encompassing the unconstitutionality of the governing statute
was also applied in cases involving state prisoners. See Bator, supra, at 479-80;
Developments, supra, at 1049.

28

The Court assumed that a due processs violation would constitute a "jurisdictional"
defect because the Fourteenth Amendment denies the state authority Uurisdiction) to
deprive a person of life or liberty without due process. See 237 U.S. at 326-28, 331-32.
However, this did not entail any broad scope of review because of the narrowness of the
general concept of due process at that time -- notice and an opportunity to be heard
before a competent tribunal -- and because of the Court's insistence that the whole
course of the state proceedings must be considered in determining whether adequate
process had been provided. See id. at 326-27, 335-36, 340.

due process violation had occurred. 29
Eight years later, the Court invoked the Frank decision's standards
in holding that another mob-domination claim could properly be
reviewed on habeas corpus. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923),
involved several black defendants who had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in a situation of widespread racial conflict and
violence in Arkansas. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the
convictions with an essentially conclusory rejection of the defendants'
allegations of mob domination at trial. 30
The defendants then applied for federal habeas corpus on the
ground that "the proceedings in the State Court, although a trial in form,
were only a form, and that the [defendants] were hurried to conviction
under the pressure of a mob without any regard for their rights and
without according to them due process of law" (261 U.S. at 87). The
district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court overturned the
dismissal, holding that federal habeas review was properly available, in
the absence of adequate state corrective process, to examine a claim that
the state trial was a sham proceeding conducted under mob domination
(261 U.S. at 90-92):

In Frank v. Mangum . .. it was recognized of course that if in
fact a trial is dominated by a mob ... and ... "if the State,
supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a
judgment . .. produced by mob domination, the State deprives
the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law."
We assume in accordance with that case that the corrective
process supplied by the State may be so adequate that
interference by habeas corpus ought not to be allowed. It
certainly is true that mere mistakes of law ... are not to be
corrected in that way. But if the case is that the whole
proceeding is a mask -- that counsel, jury, and judge were
swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion,
and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither
perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility
29

30

ILL

The "corrective process" point was emphasized in rejecting the claim of mobdomination. The claim relating to the defendant's absence at the end of the trial was
rejected on the ground that the state could validly treat it as waived in light of the
procedural history of the case (237 U.S. at 338-44).

See Bator, supra note 17, at 488-89.

that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding
an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights .... We
shall not say more concerning the corrective process afforded
to the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to
allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they
make the trial absolutely void.
The specific holding in Moore v. Dempsey was narrow, 31 and later
habeas corpus decisions continued for some time to speak the language of
"jurisdictional" error. As a practical matter, however, cases following
Moore showed a greater receptivity toward utilizing habeas corpus as a
means of reviewing claims which could not be raised or considered by
other means. 32 In Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942), the
Court held explicitly that non-jurisdictional claims could be entertained
in certain circumstances in habeas corpus proceedings. 33
It must be emphasized, however, that the relaxation of standards in
this period did not immediately result in a quasi-appellate habeas corpus
jurisdiction. Moore v. Dempsey itself had observed that "[i]t certainly is
true that mere mistakes of law . . . are not to be corrected" by habeas
corpus, 34 and much later decisions continued to reflect a conception of
habeas corpus as a backstop remedy which would only come into play if
31

The Court's decision in Moore is intelligible in terms of common law habeas corpus
standards. It apparently reflected the view that the general rule against challenging the
results of a judicial proceeding on habeas corpus did not apply if there had been no real
judicial proceeding. There was evidence that the trial court had effectively acted as an
instrument of the mob, rather than as a judicial forum in any realistic sense, making the
proceedings "void." Cf Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926) (in Moore there was
allegedly "only the form of a court under the domination of a mob").

32

See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68
(1938).

33

Waley involved a habeas corpus petition by a federal prisoner who alleged that his
guilty plea was coerced. The Court held that the claim could be raised on habeas corpus
because the alleged threats against the petitioner were off the record and could not be
considered on appeal (316 U .S. at 104-05).

34

261 U.S. at 91; see Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445-47 (1925) ("habeas corpus calls in
question only the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is challenged .. . the
judgment of state courts in criminal cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely
because some right under the Constitution of the United States is alleged to have been
denied to the person convicted").

its unavailability
would effectively leave the petitioner with no possible
35
remedy. The general approach of the period was summed up by the
Court in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, ,118 (1944):
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the
merits of [a petitioner's] contentions ... a federal court will
not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the
questions thus adjudicated .... But where resort to state court
remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the
federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no
remedy, see Mooney v. Holohan . . . or because in the particular
case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice
unavailable or seriously inadequate, cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86; Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S. 412, a federal court should
entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be
remediless. 36
3.

Creation of a Quasi-Appellate Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction

The final stage in the expansion of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction came in the decisions of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953),
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963). These decisions abrogated the conventional limitations on the
habeas corpus remedy and also provided that habeas corpus review was
not to be subject to the normal constraints applicable in direct review by
appellate courts. In conjunction with the expansion of substantive
constitutional rights by decisions of the 1960's, this created a general
reviewing jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts over the judgments of
state courts in criminal cases.

35

a.

Expansion of the Scope of Review

Brown v. Allen involved state prisoners whose claims of discrimination in jury selection and coerced confessions had been considered and
rejected in state proceedings. The Supreme Court nevertheless reexamined the merits of the prisoners' claims before affirming the state
judgments when they were brought up on habeas corpus. In the words of
Professor Henry Hart, the decision "manifestly broke new ground":

[The decision] seems to say that due process of law in the case
of state prisoners is not primarily concerned with the adequacy
of the state's corrective process or of the prisoner's personal
opportunity to avail himself of this process . . . but relates
essentially to the avoidance in the end of any underlying
constitutional error. 37
In its specific formulation, Brown v. Allen involved two major
opinions -- the formal opinion of the court authored by Justice Reed, and
a separate opinion by Justice Frankfurter. 38 Justice Reed's opinion for
the Court was characterized by a certain vagueness in its treatment of the
standard-of-review issue. The Court noted that a state court's determination of a petitioner's claims was not res judicata, but emphasized that a
federal court had discretion to reject a petition on the state record if
satisfied that "the state process has given fair consideration ... and has
resulted in a satisfactory conclusion," and that no hearing "on the merits,
facts or law" was required if the court was "satisfied that federal
constitutional rights have been protected" (344 U.S. at 458, 463- 64). In
turning to the specific claims raised in the case, the Court stated that it
was reviewing the district court's conclusion that the state "accorded
petitioners a fair adjudication of their federal questions" (344 U.S. at
465), but it then proceeded to carry out a detailed consideration of the
merits of those questions.

See Bator, supra note 17, at 493-99.
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The facts of the cases cited in relation to potentially appropriate circumstances for
habeas corpus review were as follows : In Mooney v. Holohan , 294 U.S. 103 (1935), the
petitioner alleged that his conviction was solely based on the prosecution's knowing use
of perjurious testimony, and that the factual basis of this claim could not have been
discovered through reasonable diligence prior to his new trial motion and state appeal.
It was unclear whether this type of claim could be raised under any state remedy. Moore
v. Dempsey was the mob-domination case discussed at pp. 16-17 supra. In Ex parte
Davis, the petitioner alleged that he could not pursue a state appeal because the state
would not provide a free transcript of a trial court proceeding and he could not afford
to pay for a transcript.

Justice Frankfurter's opinion was far more emphatic in its specification of the duties of a federal habeas court in reviewing a state judgment.
State fact-finding could be relied on, he stated, in the absence of some
37

Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106 (1959).
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Justice Frankfurter wrote formally for the Court only on the effect in a habeas corpus
proceeding of a prior denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. See 344 U.S. at 451-52.
However, four other Justices apparently agreed with the general views expressed in his
opinion. See id. at 488, 497, 513.

"vital flaw" in the state process, but Congress has "commanded" federal
district judges to exercise independent judgment concerning questions of
law and the application of law to fact (344 U.S. at 506-09):
State adjudications of questions of law cannot, under the
habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely
these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide
Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not
dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal
significance of such facts . .. the District Judge must exercise
his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values.
Thus, so called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of
adjudication with the federal judge ... . Although there is no
need for the federal judge .. . to shut his eyes to the State
consideration of such issues, no binding weight is to be
attached to the State determination. The congressional requirement is greater. The State court cannot have the last say
when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally
may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal
constitutional right .. . .
These standards ... preserve the full implication of the
requirement of Congress that the District Judge decide
constitutional questions presented by a State prisoner even
after his claims have been carefully considered by the State
courts. Congress has . . . seen fit to give this Court power to
review errors of federal law in State determinations, and in
addition to give to the lower federal courts power to inquire
into federal claims, by way of habeas corpus.
Unfortunately, Justice Frankfurter failed to explain the provenance
of the legislative mandate that a federal trial judge reconsider the
substantive accuracy of state court determinations of such questions and
that he override those determinations whenever he happens to disagree
with them. No such purpose can be inferred from the legislative history
of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and Congress never subsequently
voiced any objection to the far narrower standards of review that had
been applied in innumerable decisions by the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts between 1867 and 1953.

The legislative history of the version of the habeas corpus statutes
that was before the Court in Brown v. Allen -- enacted as part of the 1948
revision of the Judicial Code ~- also did not provide any support for the
legislative "command" discerned by Justice Frankfurter. Rather, it
showed an assumption that a prisoner could seek federal habeas corpus
relief if he was denied a "fair adjudication" of his federal claims in state
proceedings. 39 This was not the quasi-appellate standard of Brown v.
Allen, but the adequacy-of-state-process standard that had emerged in
decisions following Moore v. Dempsey.
Finally, Justice Frankfurter failed to explain why Congress -- which
allegedly had mandated that federal trial judges protect constitutional
rights by automatically re-determining relevant non-factual issues -nevertheless left the same judges with discretion to let possible constitutional violations go by if they resulted from erroneous state court
determinations of the facts relevant to the resolution of a constitutional
claim. 40
The last major steps in the expansion of the habeas corpus
jurisdiction came in 1963, with the decisions of Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391.

In Townsend, the Court replaced the rather diffuse pronouncements
of Brown v. Allen concerning the discretion of district judges to defer to
state fact-finding with a detailed set of limitations on the authority of
federal habeas courts to respect state court determinations. Specifically,
the Court held that a new evidentiary hearing would have to be held by
the habeas court whenever "( 1) the merits of the factual dispute were not
resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair
hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
39

40

The House bill contained explicit "fair adjudication" language in proposed 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180
(1947), characterized this as declaratory of existing law as set out in Ex parte Hawk (see
pp. 17-18 supra), a decision that gave a particularly clear statement of the principle of
deference to adequate state processes. The Senate deleted this language and made other
changes because the House formulation conflated the standard of review and the
exhaustion requirement and because it was assumed that review under the fair
adjudication standard would be available in any event following exhaustion of state
remedies. See S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong. , 2d Sess. 9 (1948).
See generally Bator, supra note 17, at 502.

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court
hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing" (293 U.S. at 313).
The Court in Townsend also stated that the district judge may not defer
to the state courts' findings of law and must independently apply federal
law to the facts, indicating that these points had been settled by Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Brown v. Allen (293 U.S. at 318).
Finally, in Fay v. Noia, the Court addressed the question of when
federal habeas courts could consider claims that had not been raised
before the state courts in conformity with applicable state procedural
rules. Proceeding under remarkable misconceptions concerning the
historical function of habeas corpus, 41 the Court held that procedural
defaults which would bar raising a claim on direct review would not be
accorded the same effect in habeas corpus proceedings. Rather, a claim
could be denied on such grounds only if a petitioner "deliberately bypassed" state procedures, and even in such a case, entertaining the claim
would remain within the discretionary authority of the federal habeas
judge.
b.

Expansion of Substantive Rights

Thus, by the early 1960's, the Supreme Court had removed
practically all significant limitations on the ability of federal district
courts to entertain and review federal claims raised by state prisoners in
habeas corpus proceedings.
The effect of these innovations was vastly magnified by the
concomitant increase in the federal rights that were available for
assertion. The Court's caselaw of the 1960's was characterized by
unprecedented expansions of the general concept of constitutional due
process; innovative decisions which held, contrary to earlier precedent,
that most of the specific procedural provisions of the Bill of Rights
applied in state proceedings; and expansive interpretations and extensions of those provisions. The general effect of this development was to
eliminate state discretion with respect to most basic questions of criminal
procedure, and to make it possible to dress up almost any sort of alleged

41

See Oaks, supra note 5 (1966 article); Mayers, supra note 10; Friendly, ls Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 170-71
(1970); Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1465-66 (2d ed.
1973).

procedural irregularity or error as a constitutional claim. As Judge
Friendly has observed:
)

[T]he limitation of collateral attack to "constitutional"
grounds has become almost meaningless . . . .
The dimensions of the problem of collateral attack today
are a consequence of two developments. One has been the
Supreme Court's imposition of the rules of the fourth, fifth,
sixth and eighth amendments concerning unreasonable
searches and seizures, double jeopardy, speedy trial, compulsory self-incrimination, jury trial in criminal cases, confrontation of adverse witnesses, assistance of counsel, and cruel and
unusual punishments, upon state criminal trials. The other has
been a tendency to read these provisions with ever increasing
breadth . ... The result of these two developments has been a
vast expansion of the claims of error in criminal cases for
which a resourceful defense lawyer can find a constitutional
basis.
Any claimed violation of the hearsay rule is now
regularly presented not as a mere trial error but as an
infringement of the sixth amendment right to confrontation.
Denial of adequate opportunity for impeachment would seem
as much a violation of the confrontation clause as other
restrictions on cross-examination have been held to be. Refusal
to give the name and address of an informer can be cast as a
denial of the sixth amendment's guarantee of "compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses." Inflammatory summations or
an erroneous charge on the prosecution's burden of proof
become denials of due process. So are errors in identification
procedures. Instructing a deadlocked jury of its duty to
attempt to reach a verdict or undue participation by the judge
in the examination of witnesses can be characterized as
violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial.
Examples could readily be multiplied. Today it is the rare
criminal appeal that does not involve a "constitutional" claim
Whatever may have been true when the Bill of Rights
was read to protect a state criminal defendant only if the state
had acted in a manner "repugnant to the conscience of

mankind," the rule prevailing when Brown v. Allen was
decided, the "constitutional" label no longer assists in appraising how far society should go in permitting relitigation of
criminal convictions. 42

In conjunction with the elimination of constraints on the scope and
availability of habeas corpus review, the pervasive constitutionalization
of state procedure effectively converted the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction into a general review jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts in relation to state criminal judgments. While the claims that
could be asserted were still limited to "constitutional" claims, the relative
trivialization of the concept of constitutional error tended to deprive this
constraint of practical significance.

D.

Subsequent Legislative Developments

Following the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,
Congress has never moved ahead of the courts in extending the scope or
availability of federal habeas corpus. Its interventions in this area have
primarily been directed to limiting or offsetting the effects of judicial
innovations that resulted in an increased availability of federal habeas
corpus.
The earliest and best-known restriction of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction following the Civil War resulted from the case of Ex parte
Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). The Reconstruction Act of 1867
(Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 3, 14 Stat. 428) divided the rebel states
into military districts and authorized the use of military commissions or
tribunals to control the civilian population in the subjugated areas. The
framers of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had sought to guard against
its use by persons in military custody through an express proviso in the
legislation, but the proviso only exempted from the Act's coverage
persons held for military offenses or for "having aided or abetted
rebellion ... prior to the passage of this act." This did not, by its terms,
apply to acts of resistance subsequent to the passage of the Habeas
Corpus Act, and Southern resisters promptly attempted to take advantage of the loophole.
Mccardle, a civilian held in custody by the military authorities for
trial by a military commission, was denied a writ by a federal district
42
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Friendly, supra note 41, at 149, 155-57.

court, and appealed the denial to the Supreme Court. Concerned that the
Supreme Court might hold the Reconstruction scheme unconstitutional,
Congress divested the Court of jurisdiction over appeals under the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The Court upheld the validity of this
restriction in Ex parte McCardle, supra, and dismissed the appeal. The
43
Court's review jurisdiction under the Act was not restored until 1885.
While the earliest legislative restriction of habeas corpus under the
Act of 1867 related to a federal prisoner, the focus of subsequent
concerns has been state prisoners' use of the Act to challenge their
convictions. As early as 1884, a House Judiciary Committee Report
(H.R. Rep. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.) strongly criticized the practice
of lower federal courts under the Act of entertaining challenges to state
convictions. In the Committee's view, the Act was part of the legislative
response to the danger to Union loyalists and resistance to emancipation
that existed in the Confederacy following the Civil War, and was not
meant to give the inferior federal courts the authority to overturn the
judgments of state courts. However, the Committee declined to take any
direct action against this type of review on the grounds that the "special
causes" which had motivated the Act's adoption might still exist to some
extent, and that restoring the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
might be adequate to secure a satisfactory construction of the Act.
In the current century, a number of significant restrictions on
federal habeas corpus have been enacted, and more far-reaching reforms
have received partial approval by Congress on a number of occasions.
Measures currently in effect and other reform efforts will be discussed
separately.
1. Reforms Currently in Effect
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2553 and Fed. R. App. P. 22, a
state prisoner is barred from appealing the denial of habeas corpus by a
district court unless a circuit judge or district judge certifies that there is
probable cause for the appeal. This requirement derives from an
enactment of 1908 whose specific purpose was to curb the use of habeas
corpus appeals and the associated stay of state proceedings to delay the
execution of capital sentences. It currently serves the general purpose of
avoiding the need for a full-dress appeal where the petitioner cannot

43 See

Mayers, supra note 10, at 41 & n. 44, 51 & n. 76.

make a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right. 44
In 1966, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which creates a
presumption of correctness for state court fact-finding in habeas corpus
proceedings if certain conditions are satisfied, and provides that the
petitioner has the burden of overcoming this presumption by "convincing
evidence." This goes beyond the rule of Townsend v. Sain (see pp. 21-22
supra), which only held that a habeas court could dispense with an
evidentiary hearing in certain circumstances. 45
In 1976, Congress adopted Rule 9(a) as part of a general set of
procedural rules for habeas corpus proceedings. The rule provides that a
petition may be dismissed if the state has been prejudiced in its ability to
respond by delay in filing unless the petitioner shows that the petition is
based on grounds he could not have discovered through reasonable
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred. This
overturned judicial precedents which held that petitions could not be
dismissed on grounds of delay ("laches"). 46
In addition to the foregoing reforms affecting state prisoners, two
noteworthy changes affecting the habeas corpus right of federal prisoners
have been brought about through legislation.

First, in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, Congress replaced
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners with a
statutory motion remedy codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The rule of habeas
corpus procedure requiring a prisoner to apply to the court having

jurisdiction over the place where he is incarcerated had resulted in a
concentration of habeas corpus petitions in the judicial districts containing major federal prisons. Section 2255 effected a more equitable
distribution of prisoner litigation among the district courts by providing
instead that a prisoner must apply to the court that sentenced him. It did
not change the substantive standards governing applications for collateral relief by federal prisoners, but did tend to ensure that applications for
such relief would be made in the district where pertinent records and
witnesses are most readily available, "where the facts with regard to the
procedure followed are known to court officials, and where the United
States Attorney who prosecuted the case will be at hand to see that these
facts are fairly presented." 47
Second, in establishing a separate court system for the District of
Columbia in 1970, Congress barred D.C. prisoners from seeking habeas
corpus in the federal courts, limiting them instead to a collateral remedy in
the D.C. courts. The practical effect of this reform is that prisoners in D.C.
have no access to the lower federal courts to review their convictions or
sentences, but such review remains available for persons convicted in the
substantially similar court systems of the states. The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of this reform in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372
(1977). 48 The significance of the experience in D.C. is further discussed in a
later portion of this report (pp. 57-59 infra).
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See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 & n.3 (1983).
The utility of the certificate-of-probable-cause requirement has been limited by the
vesting of authority in district judges as well as circuit judges to grant certification, and
by its inapplicability to appeals in collateral proceedings involving federal prisoners.
Proposed remedial legislation is discussed at p. 64 infra.
45

Section 2254(d) was enacted as part of legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference
that also contained restrictions relating to repetitive applications (now § 2244(b)-(c)).
The Committee Reports are S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., and H.R. Rep. No.
1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
The utility of the § 2254(d) presumption has been limited by the fact that it only applies
to purely factual determinations and by the vagueness of some of the statutory
conditions on the application of the presumption. Proposed remedial legislation is
discussed at p. 63 infra.
46

The background, interpretation, and limitations of Rule 9(a) are discussed at pp. 69-71
infra.
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Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175, 178 (1949); United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-19, 220-21 (1952).
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The Court rejected the argument that the motion remedy under the D.C. Code is an
inadequate substitute for habeas corpus because the D .C. judges (like most state judges)
lack life tenure. See 430 U.S. at 381-83. The Court also relied on the fact that the Code
preserves the potential availability of habeas corpus where the motion remedy "is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention." However, this
qualification has proven to be essentially theoretical. No decision has found the local
remedy inadequate or ineffective to examine alleged errors at the trial level. See
generally Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Streater v. Jackson, 691 F.2d
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982), raised the possibility that a D.C. prisoner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal might be considered on federal habeas corpus in light of
the unavailability of the statutory motion remedy to review appellate proceedings, but
the federal petition was dismissed in light of the D .C. Court of Appeals' subsequent
rejection of the petitioner's claims. See Streater v. United States, 478 A.2d 1055 (D.C.
App. 1984).

2.

Other Reform Efforts

In the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the requirement of
exhaustion of state remedies in habeas corpus proceedings was codified in
28 U.S.C. § 2254. The codification, after stating that access to federal
habeas was generally barred unless state remedies were exhausted, went
on to specify:
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the
meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.
The enactment of this prov1s1on -- now § 2254(c) -- was the
culmination of efforts by the Judicial Conference in the course of the
1940's to secure the limitation of federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners. 49 Judge Parker, who chaired the Judicial Conference's habeas
corpus committee and played the leading role in its work on this
legislation, explained that the provision would generally bar access to
federal habeas corpus in any state which permitted repetitive recourse to
its collateral remedies. He also expressed the view that this would have
the practical effect of abolishing federal habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for state prisoners across the board:
The effect of this ... provision is to eliminate, for all practical
purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts for
habeas corpus in all states in which successive applications
may be made for habeas corpus to the state courts; for, in all
such states, the applicant has the right, notwithstanding the
denial of prior applications, to apply again to the state courts
for habeas corpus and to have action upon such later
application reviewed by the Supreme Court ... on application
for certiorari . . . . [T]here should be no more cases where
proceedings of state courts, affirmed by the highest courts of
the state, . . . will be reviewed by federal circuit or district
judges. 50

Notwithstanding the unequivocal language of the prov1s1on of
§ 2254(c) and Judge Parker's observations concerning its meaning, the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen refused to give it effect (344 U .S. at
447-50), and held that exhaustion does not require repetitive recourse to
state remedies. In reaching this result, the Court stated that it was
unwilling to accept so radical a change from prior habeas practice
without "a definite congressional direction."
Shortly after Brown v. Allen, the Judicial Conference tried again.
The legislation it proposed this time provided that a federal habeas
corpus application by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state court could be entertained
only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal
constitutional question (1) which was not theretofore raised
and determined, (2) which there was no fair and adequate
opportunity theretofore to raise and have determined, and (3)
which cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a
proceeding in the State court, by an order or judgment subject
to review by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of
certiorari.

51

This proposal was supported by the Judicial Conference, the
Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National Association of
Attorneys General, the section on judicial administration of
52 the American Bar Association, and the Department of Justice.
Following
hearings in the first session of the 84th Congress before a subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee, 53 it was voted out by the Judiciary
Committee (H.R. Rep. No. 1200) and passed by the House of Representatives on Jan. 19, 1956 (102 Cong. Rec. 935-40). It was passed a second
time by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1958 (104 Cong. Rec.
4668, 4671-75).
In the course of Congress's consideration of this proposal, the
proponents of the legislation pointed out that the use of habeas corpus as
a writ of review was a recent development that was unrelated to its
historical function. The general purpose of the legislation was to bar
51

Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
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See generally Parker, supra note 47; Reports of the Judicial Conference of the United
States 22-23 (1943), 22 (1944), 28 (1945), 21 (1946), 46 (April 1947), 17-18 (Sept. 1947).

soParker, supra note 47, at 175-78.
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See id. at 7.

53 Cited

in note 51 supra.

access to habeas corpus in the inferior federal courts whenever a means
was available for raising a claim and creating a record for Supreme Court
review in the state courts. It was argued that this reform would correct
the increased caseload burdens, indefinite prolongation of litigation,
delay in carrying out capital sentences, and conflict between the state and
federal judiciaries that had resulted from the recent expansions offederal
habeas corpus. It was also noted that legislation to the same effect had
been enacted in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, and that the new
legislation was necessitated by the Supreme Court's refusal in Brown v.
Allen (see pp. 28-29 supra) to give effect to this reform in the absence of a
clearer expression of legislative intent (102 Cong. Rec. 935-36, 939).
Despite repeated passage in the House, the Judicial Conference's
proposal was never brought to a vote in the Senate. In contrast, the next
"abolition" proposal that made significant progress in Congress originated in the Senate. Title II of the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets of 1968 was formulated as a general response to Warren
Court activism in the criminal justice area. 54 It contained provisions
designed to overturn Miranda v. Arizona and other Supreme Court
decisions barring the use of traditionally admissible evidence, and also
contained a provision, proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2256, which would have
abolished federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state
prisoners:
The judgment of a court of a State .. . in a criminal action
shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of law or fact
which were determined, or which could have been determined,
in that action until such judgment is reversed, vacated, or
modified by a court having jurisdiction to review by appeal or
certiorari such judgment; and neither the Supreme Court nor
any inferior [federal] court . . . shall have jurisdiction to
reverse, vacate, or modify any such judgment of a State court
except upon appeal from, or writ of certiorari granted to
review, a determination made with respect to such judgment
upon review thereof by the highest court of that State having
jurisdiction to review such judgment. 55

The bill was voted out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The
Committee Report stated that the proposal relating to habeas corpus
would correct the problems of delay and abuse resulting from recent
Supreme Court decisions that had transformed habeas corpus into a
quasi-appellate mechanism. In supporting the constitutionality of the
reform, the Report noted that the constitutional writ of habeas corpus
was only a means of eliciting a statement of the grounds for detention
and could not be used to challenge a conviction by a court with
jurisdiction; that the Constitution's preservation of the habeas corpus
right only operates against the federal government and not the states; and
that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was only enacted as a means of
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. 56
Following extensive debate on the Senate floor, a compromise was
reached under which the anti-Miranda provisions of the legislation -now 18 U.S.C. § 3501 -- were retained, but proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2256
and the other provisions of Title II restricting federal court jurisdiction
were deleted. 57
The contemporary focus of legislative reform efforts has been bills
based on a set of limited reform proposals that Attorney General William
French Smith initially transmitted to Congress in 1982. 58 The current
reform proposals would establish a one-year time limit on habeas corpus
applications by state prisoners, normally running from exhaustion of
state remedies; narrow the standard of review in habeas corpus
proceedings; clarify the circumstances under which claims that were not
properly raised before the state courts can be raised in habeas corpus
proceedings; make technical improvements in habeas corpus procedure;
and institute certain comparable reforms in the collateral remedy for
federal prisoners. The nature and rationale of these proposals are more
fully discussed in a later portion of this Report (pp. 61-64 infra).
These proposals were approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee
and passed by the full Senate in 1984 by a vote of 67 to 9. 59 In the 99th
56

See 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2150-53.
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See Report, supra note 54, at 66-67.
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Title II is generally discussed in the first Report in this series. See Office of Legal
Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial lnlerrogation 64-67 (1986).
55
I 14 Cong. Rec. 14182.
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See generally The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2216 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
1n the 98th Congress, the proposals were transmitted by the President to Congress as
title VI of the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act. Following hearings, see
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on

Congress (1985-86) they were not brought to a vote in the Senate because
of filibustering by opponents of the legislation at Senate Judiciary
Committee mark-ups. 60 In the House of Representatives they have been
introduced with broad sponsorship in various bills, 61 which have
invariably been buried at the subcommittee level in the House Judiciary
Committee. No significant action has occurred in the House because of
opposition by the House leadership.
In the current (100th) Congress, the reform proposals have recently
been transmitted to Congress again by the President as title II of the
proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act (H.R. 3777 and S. 1970).

II. THE CURRENT JURISDICTION
Justice Robert Jackson, in his separate opinion in Brown v. Allen,
complained that judicial expansions of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction were resulting in "floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious
petitions [which] inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our
own" (344 U.S. at 536). The "flood" to which Justice Jackson referred
consisted of 541 petitions in the preceding year (1952). In comparison,
9,542 federal habeas corpus petitions were filed by state prisoners in the
most recent reporting year (ending June 30, 1987). As these figures
indicate, habeas corpus applications were a relatively rare occurrence
prior to the creation of a quasi-appellate federal habeas corpus jurisdiction by judicial decisions of the 1950's and 1960's, but now constitute a
major category of federal litigation. More detailed statistical and
quantitative information is set out in the first part of this section.

decisions of the current period are described briefly in the second part of
this section.

A. Empirical Findings
Information concerning the volume of habeas corpus applications
and other federal litigation is available in the Annual Reports of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. As noted above,
these figures show that large-scale habeas corpus litigation by state
prisoners is a recent phenomenon in historical terms. In 1941 there were
127 petitions. In 1961 there were 1,020. The number of applications
thereafter increased astronomically in the course of the 1960's, reaching
9,063 in 1970; subsided in the early 1970's, reaching a low of 6,866 in
1977; and has since increased fairly steadily. The figures for habeas
corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal district courts over
the past ten years are as follows:

Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, 32-41,
160-65 (1983), the proposals were voted out by the Senate Judiciary Committee as a
separate bill (S. 1763), see S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and passed by
the Senate, see 130 Cong. Rec. 1854-72 (1984).
6()There was an additional hearing in the 99th Congress. See Habeas Corpus Reform :
Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985).
61

E.g. , H.R. 5594 of the 98th Congress.

-

1984
8,349

!W..

-

1979
7,123

8,534

1983
1982
1981
8,532
8,059
-1980
7,790
7,031
1986
-1987
-9,045
9,542

More detailed statistical information is available from a study of
habeas corpus litigation that was funded by the Justice Department and
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While the volume of habeas corpus litigation has grown in recent
years, the marked tendency of the Supreme Court's decisions since the
start of the 1970's has been to draw back from the heady expansion of
inferior federal court review of state judgments that characterized the
Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence of the 1960's. The most significant

1978
7,033
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The figures in the text are drawn from the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The aggregate figures for state prisoner
habeas corpus petitions include, in addition to normal petitions in which jurisdiction is
predicated on claimed violations of federal rights ("federal question" petitions), a small
number of petitions by prisoners in United States territories where the federal courts
have jurisdiction over local criminal matters (" local jurisdiction" petitions). For
example, the 1987 figure of 9,542 comprised 9,524 "federal question" petitions and 18
"local jurisdiction" petitions, and the 1986 figure of 9,045 comprised 9,040 "federal
question" petitions and 5 "local jurisdiction" petitions. In addition to reporting 9,542
habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners, the most recent report (1987) noted 1,808
habeas corpus petitions and 1,664 "motions to vacate sentence" by federal prisoners
(Table C2).
A tabular summary of the volume of prisoner litigation between 1961 and 1982 appears
in S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 4 n.11 (1983). A more comprehensive summary
of statistical data relating to habeas corpus litigation appears in Special Report of the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Review of State Prisoner Petitions : Habeas Corpus
(March 1984) [hereafter cited as "Statistical Report"].
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completed in 1979. The study, carried out by Professor Paul Robinson,
examined a sample containing 1,899 petitions filed between 1975 and
1977, which comprised about one-eighth of all habeas corpus applications filed in the country in the relevant period. 63 The general picture of
habeas corpus litigation that emerges from the available empirical data
and other factual information is as follows :
1.

Workload and Results

The work involved in processing habeas corpus cases constitutes a
substantial burden on state officials and the court system. In connection
with a typical petition, the state is required to transmit records and to
respond to the legal and factual contentions raised by the petitioner. The
district court must review the record to the extent necessary and redetermine each claim that is properly presented, working from the
evidentiary basis set out in the record together with the submissions and
arguments of the parties. Frequently the district court's decision is
appealed, resulting in additional work for judges, state officials and
defense counsel at the level of the federal courts of appeals. 64 Since a
prisoner is required to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal
habeas corpus, the lure of an additional level of review in the federal
courts -- in which claims rejected at the state level are open to relitigation -- results in increased recourse to state remedies. The availability of federal habeas corpus accordingly increases the workload of the
state courts as well as the federal courts. 65
Despite the substantial expenditure of prosecutorial and judicial
resources entailed in habeas corpus litigation, the normal outcome is
dismissal of the petition or affirmance of the state judgment. In the 1979
study, only 3.2% of petitions resulted in any form of relief and only 1.7%
63

The findings of the study were initially reported in P. Robinson, An Empirical Study of
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Judgments (Federal Justice Research
Program 1979). The data gathered in the study was later independently analyzed in
Allen, Schachtman, & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and its R eform : An Empirical
Analysis, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 675 (1982). A concise summary of the main findings of
these reports appears in Statistical Report, supra note 62, at 5-7.
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See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 21-23; The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982 :
Hearing on S.2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
42-44 (1982); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S.829 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1983).
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See generally Friendly, supra note 41 , at 144 n. 10.
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resulted in an order directing release from custody. Even these low
figures cannot be taken as reliable indications of the "benefits" of habeas
corpus review, since there is no reason to believe that the federal court
determination in such cases is generally "better" than the contrary state
judgment it supersedes. In purely descriptive terms, a successful petition
normally means only that a federal trial judge disagreed with a number
of state trial and appellate judges. 67 The judgmental or subjective nature
of the determinations required is suggested by the large differences
observed in the 1979 study between the granting rates for different
federal judges -- a small number of judges accounted for a large
proportion of successful petitions. 68 As Judge Friendly has observed:
In the vast majority of cases we agree with the state courts
... . In the few where we disagree, I feel no assurance that the
federal determination is superior .. . . [W]e do not know how
many of these [successful habeas] cases represented prisoners
.. . whom society has grievously wronged . .. or how many
were black with guilt. The assumption that many69of them fall
in the former category is wholly unsupported.
In considering the low incidence of successful petitions, an analysis

of the study data concluded that "[i]f one considers only the statistically
measurable benefits of habeas review, they appear to be outweighed by
70
the costs of expansive habeas review."

66 See

P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 4(c), 14.
Even where an appellate panel affirms the granting of a writ, the issue remains one of
disagreement among federal and state judges who are equally bound to uphold the
Constitution and federal law . See generally pp. 42-49 infra.
68 See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 53 (out of 51 judges who handled state habeas
petitions, three judges accounted for 29.9% of all petitions granted and twelve judges
accounted for over two-thirds of all petitions granted).
69 Friendly, supra note 41, at 165 n. 125, 148 & n. 25; see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953) (opinion of Jackson, J.) ("Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by
another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook
normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal . . . is
not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a
super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would
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also be reversed.").
Schachtman, & Wilson, supra note 63, at 683. But cf id. at 683-90 (noting nonquantitative costs and benefits alleged for habeas corpus review). These nonquantitative considerations are examined at pp. 40-53 infra.

70 Allan,

2.

Character of Petitioners and Prior Proceedings

The 1979 study indicated that habeas corpus petitioners constitute a
highly atypical class of prisoners. Most petitioners had been convicted of
serious, violent offenses. Over 80% had been convicted after trial, and
practically the same proportion had had, or were having, direct appellate
review of their cases in the state system. Moreover, about 45% of
petitioners had pursued collateral remedies in the state courts, including
over 20% who had filed two or more previous state petitions. Over 30%
of petitioners had filed at least one previous federal petition. 71
In contrast, the vast majority of state defendants plead guilty and
have no trial or appeal. Thus, habeas corpus typically operates as a
mechanism for providing additional review to prisoners whose cases have
already received an abundance of judicial process in comparison with the
average criminal case.
3.

Delay in Filing

Another finding of the 1979 study is that there are frequently
enormous delays between the conclusion of the normal adjudicatory
process in the state courts and the filing of a habeas corpus petition.
About 40% of the petitions in the study were filed more than five years
after conviction and nearly a third were filed more than ten years after
conviction. Still longer delays were noted in some cases in the study, up
to more than fifty years from the time of conviction. 72
71

72

The tolerance shown in habeas corpus proceedings for lengthy
delays in seeking review is particularly striking in comparison with other
procedures for seeking review or re-opening of criminal judgments in the
federal courts, which are subject to definite time limits. Federal
defendants, for example, generally must decide whether to appeal within
ten days (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)); state convicts seeking direct review of
their convictions in the Supreme Court generally must apply within sixty
days (Sup. Ct. R . 20); and even a federal prisoner who claims to have new
evidence of his innocence discovered after trial is subject to a two-year
time limit on seeking a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.
The problem of delay has been particularly acute in capital cases. In
such cases, the continuation of litigation prevents the sentence from
being carried out. While thirty-seven states currently authorize capital
punishment, and about 2,000 prisoners are currently under sentence of
death, the typical capital case is characterized by interminable litigation
and re-litigation, and fewer than a hundred executions have been carried
out in the past twenty years. 73 The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
provides an avenue for obstruction and delay in these cases which the
states are powerless to address. Attorney General William French Smith
has observed:
[T]he inefficiency of current court procedures has resulted in a
de facto nullification of the decisions of most state legislatures
to impose capital punishment for some crimes. The "public
interest" organizations that routinely involve themselves in the
litigation carried on in capital cases have fully exploited the
system's potential for obstruction. Delay is maximized by
deferring collateral attack until the eve of execution. Once a

See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 4(a), 7, 15. Even where a petitioner has not had prior
state court review of his claims, this does not imply that means for raising such claims
are unavailable in the state courts. Prisoners frequently by-pass state remedies and file
procedurally defective habeas corpus petitions. See id. at 13.

basis of petitions challenging events that occurred some time after conviction, such as
parole denial or revocation. Petitions of this sort were a small part of all petitions in the
study; nearly a third of all petitions were filed more than ten years after conviction, but
the average time intervals for petitions challenging post-conviction events were far less
than that; and the average delay in the various districts covered by the study was not
correlated with the incidence of such petitions. See id. at 703-04 n. 103, 706 & nn.
109-10.

See Allen, Schachtman, & Wilson, supra note 63, at 703-04. The cited report's
characterization of this data as showing that "lengthy delay ... rarely occurs," see id.,
is idiosyncratic.

Legitimate post-conviction delays in filing of up to a few years can result from the
exhaustion requirement, but this cannot account with any frequency for time intervals
exceeding a decade, which the study found to be common. The average time prisoners
took to exhaust state remedies was 2.8 years from conviction. See id. at 705. This
average figure would actually exaggerate the time necessary to complete the state
review process, since it would be inflated by cases in which prisoners failed to pursue
certain claims at trial or on direct review and then delayed a number of years before
presenting them on collateral attack in the state system.
Delays of the length and frequency noted in the report also cannot be explained on the
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NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (Nov. I, 1987). A
general analysis of the problem of dilatory habeas corpus litigation in capital cases
appears in Statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Paul Cassell concerning
Habeas Corpus and Capital Punishment Litigation before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government
Operations (Feb. 26, 1988) (hearing held in Madison, Florida).

stay of execution has been obtained, the possibility of carrying
out the sentence is foreclosed for additional years as the case
works its way through the multiple layers of appeal and review
in the state and federal courts.
The solution to this problem lies in part in the reform of
state court procedures . . . . The efficacy of state reforms is
severely limited, however, by the availability of federal habeas
corpus, which cannot be limited by the state legislatures .. ..
It ... prevents correction of the practical nullification of all
capital punishment legislation that has resulted from litigational delay and obstruction. 74
Overall, the available data provides a more definite empirical
content to Justice Jackson's characterization of habeas corpus petitions
as "stale, frivolous and repetitious." The delays involved in habeas
corpus litigation greatly exceed those allowed under any other appellate
mechanism, the prospect of success is slight, and the review that is
provided generally amounts to another round on claims that have
already been thoroughly worked over in the state courts.

B.

Recent Judicial Decisions

The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus jurisprudence, has
given weight to considerations of finality and federalism that were
ignored or shrugged off in the expansive decisions of the 1960's. While
the Court's ability to make changes in this area is constrained by
precedent and existing statutory provisions, some noteworthy limitations
have emerged in recent decisions. The most important decisions include
the following:
First, the decisions in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970),
and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), generally limit a defendant
74

Smith, Proposals for Habeas Corpus Reform, in P. McGuigan & R. Rader, eds.,
Criminal Justice Reform: A Blueprint 137, 145-46 (1983).
Executions have resumed on a significant basis within the past few years, though the
number carried out remains a minute fraction of the number of prisoners under capital
sentence. The causes of this development presumably include the Supreme Court's
resolution of various issues in its capital punishment caselaw whose uncertainty had
previously impeded executions, and a toughening of the Court's stance toward delay in
capital cases through habeas corpus litigation. See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880 (1983).

challenging a guilty plea in a habeas corpus proceeding to the claim that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea.
This normally precludes challenges to pleas based on alleged antecedent
violations of constitutional rights, such as a claim that the plea resulted
from a coerced confession obtained at an earlier point.
Second, the Court has narrowed the grounds for excusing procedural defaults in habeas corpus proceedings. Under normal standards of
appellate review, claims that are not properly raised in a proceeding in a
lower court are generally barred on review. Nevertheless, Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), held that a failure to raise a claim in conformity
with state procedural rules would not justify dismissing the claim in a
subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the defendant
"deliberately bypassed" state procedures (seep. 22 supra). Fay v. Noia 's
rejection of all ordinary concepts of finality and orderly procedure has
since been repudiated by the Court, which held in Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977), that procedural defaults will generally not be excused
unless the petitioner establishes "cause" for the default and "prejudice"
resulting from the alleged violation. Later decisions have generally given
narrow readings of the notion of "cause," holding, for example, that an
attorney's error in failing to raise a claim is not "cause" in the relevant
sense unless it was so serious as to amount to constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel. 75
Third, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims cannot be raised on federal
habeas corpus, so long as a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the
claim was provided in state proceedings. As a practical matter, this
generally bars review of Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus
proceedings. 76
Fourth, the decision in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), put
teeth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)'s general rule of deference to state court factfinding (see p. 26 supra). It required lower federal courts to identify the
specific statutory criterion that was not satisfied in cases in which the
presumption of correctness for state fact-finding is not applied, and to
explain the basis for the conclusion that the criterion was not satisfied.
75

The most recent and comprehensive explication of the "cause and prejudice" standard
·
appears in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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III.

CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY

Federal habeas corpus operates today as a quasi-appellate mechanism by which the litigation of state criminal cases can be continued and
indefinitely prolonged in the lower federal courts. While it is generally
taken for granted that one appeal as a matter of right beyond the trial
stage satisfies the interest in fairness to the individual litigant, habeas
corpus provides additional mandatory review beyond the various levels
of direct review and collateral review in the state court systems. While
federal review of the judgments of state courts has traditionally been
confined to direct review in the Supreme Court, the current habeas
corpus jurisdiction enables individual federal trial judges to overturn the
considered judgments of state supreme courts in criminal cases.
A particularly striking feature of the current system is the failure of
the standards and procedures associated with federal habeas corpus to
keep pace with its expanding scope. If habeas corpus is limited to
providing a judicial check on arbitrary detention by executive authorities
-- the basic scope of the "habeas corpus" right under the Constitution
(see pp. 4-7 supra) -- there is no need for time limits or rules concerning
deference to prior judicial determinations. If a statutory habeas corpus
remedy authorizes original proceedings in the federal district courts to
challenge the continued enslavement of blacks in violation of the postCivil War emancipation (see pp. 7-11 supra), there is similarly no need or
place for any particular constraints on the proceedings.
However, once habeas corpus has been transformed into a regular
appellate mechanism -- by which state prisoners may obtain additional
review of claims that have already been considered and rejected at
multiple levels of the state court system -- the result is an essentially
redundant litigative process which imposes costs and strains that would
not be tolerated in any other context. No legislature would pass a law
stating that a defendant has a right to appeal, but that he may wait as
long as he wishes before doing so. No legislature would pass a law stating
that a defendant may appeal again and again if dissatisfied with the
results the first time around. No legislature would pass a law stating that
a defendant has a right to further mandatory review of a nearly unlimited
range of alleged procedural errors that have already been thoroughly
considered and rejected by other courts of appeals. Yet all of these
characteristics can be found in the current federal habeas corpus

jurisdiction. 77
To the extent that this extraordinary type of review is to be retained,
one would expect to find some extraordinary justification for doing so.
The policy considerations bearing on this question will be examined in
the remainder of this section.

A.

Traditional Reverence for the Great Writ and its
Constitutional Status

Proposals for modifying the existing scope of federal habeas corpus
are frequently met with confused arguments that such proposals would
interfere with the Great Writ of the common law, whose suspension is
prohibited by the Constitution outside of extreme situations of public
emergency. The traditional esteem of habeas corpus, it is argued,
precludes or at least strongly militates against any reform that would
impair its scope or availability. 78
Arguments of this sort do not rise above the level of a simple logical
fallacy -- the fallacy of equivocation 79 -- because the common law writ
referred to in the Constitution and the contemporary statutory writ by
which lower federal courts review state judgments are distinct remedies
that, in fact, have nothing to do with each other. The constitutional "writ
of habeas corpus" is a remedy that federal prisoners can use before trial
to test the existence of grounds for detention by executive authorities. 80
The current statutory "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that state
77
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As discussed elsewhere in this Report, there is no time limit on habeas corpus
applications and the restriction of the claims raised to federal questions has become
largely meaningless (pp. 22-24, 36-37 supra). Delay in filing is constrained only by the
")aches" doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a). Under Rule 9(b), grounds for relief
rejected on the merits in an earlier federal petition may be dismissed if presented again
in a successive petition, but dismissal on this basis is a matter of discretion and grounds
not previously presented can be dismissed only if their earlier omission "constituted an
abuse of the writ."

See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 41, at 142, 170-71 (noting and responding to argument).

"Equivocation" involves drawing specious inferences by using a term with a particular
meaning at one point in an argument and using the same term with another meaning at
a different point in the argument. This occurs in arguments which infer that the
contemporary statutory "habeas corpus" remedy should not be restricted because the
common law revered and the Constitution protects a different " habeas corpus" remedy.
See pp. 4-7 supra. As a practical matter, there is virtually never any need to use the
constitutional writ in contemporary criminal cases because other rules and mechanisms

prisoners can use after trial and exhaustion of state appellate remedies to
secure additional review of judicially imposed detention.
The only discernible similarities between these two remedies are
that (1) they have the same name, and (2) both can be used -- albeit in
completely different circumstances -- to seek relief from detention or
incarceration which is alleged to be legally unjustified. Similarity (1) is
purely verbal, and similarity (2) would apply equally to all other
mechanisms for reviewing or re-opening criminal judgments, such as
ordinary appeals and new trial motions. No one has yet suggested that
the use of appeals and new trial motions to challenge convictions and
imprisonment transforms them into "habeas corpus" in the constitutional sense. The grounds for identifying the current statutory habeas corpus
remedy with the traditional writ safeguarded by the Constitution are
equally insubstantial.

B.

The Right to a Federal Forum

Another argument commonly offered in support of the existing
habeas corpus jurisdiction is that a person asserting a federal claim has a
right to have access to a federal forum for the adjudication of that
claim. 81
The short answer to this argument is that the Constitution itself and
historical practice are inconsistent with the existence of such a right. The
constitutional convention was divided on the question whether lower
federal courts should be established, and accordingly left the matter to
Congress's discretion. Since the Constitution does not require that lower
federal courts exist at all, there can be no right of access to such courts
for any particular claim. 82
In terms of historical practice, the general federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts is a late nineteenth century development. Prior
to that time, litigants asserting claims under the federal Constitution or
federal laws were frequently limited to filing suit in state court, and even

today, there are some areas in which federal causes of action can only be
brought in state court. When litigants currently assert federal defenses or
immunities in suits brought in state court, they generally have no right of
removal to federal court, and can obtain a hearing in a federal forum only
in the infrequent cases in which the Supreme Court grants review. 83
In state criminal cases, the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was

not a general reviewing mechanism with respect to federal claims prior to
the historically recent expansion of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
(see pp. 11-22 supra). Currently, if a criminal defendant is only sentenced
to a fine, he has no access to federal habeas corpus for consideration of
his federal claims, since habeas corpus can only be used to challenge
unlawful custody. If a defendant is sentenced to less than a few years in
prison, habeas corpus review is also likely to be barred as a practical
matter, since his sentence will have run its course by the time state
remedies are exhausted.
If a defendant has pleaded guilty, a federal habeas court is generally
barred from entertaining a claim of an antecedent violation of a
constitutional right under the rule of McMann v. Richardson and Tollett
v. Henderson. In other circumstances, access to a federal forum may be
barred by the rule of Stone v. Powell concerning Fourth Amendment
claims, the "cause and prejudice" procedural default standard of
Wainwright v. Sykes, or the !aches doctrine of habeas corpus rule 9(a) (see
pp. 26, 38-39 supra).

Thus, the premise of this argument -- that there is generally a right
to have a federal forum hear a federal claim -- has no basis in reality. If
the argument rests on the more modest assertion that there are special
reasons for providing access to a federal forum in light of the high stakes
involved in criminal cases, then it must fall back on other arguments that
would establish this underlying assumption. The most common argument on this point -- that federal courts show superior sensitivity and
receptiveness to the constitutional claims advanced by criminal defendants -- is addressed in the next part.

have developed which ensure that an arrestee will be promptly notified of the charges
against him and brought to trial on those charges. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.
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See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 605, 627-28 & n. 57 (1981) (noting and responding to argument).
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See id.; Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts & the Federal System 11 - 12 (2d ed.
1973); Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980).
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See Bator, supra note 81 , at 606 n. 3; District Court R eorganization : Hearing on H.R.
5994 and Related Bills before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
48-52 ( 1984).

C.

Enforcement of the Constitution

Perhaps the most common justification offered for the current
habeas corpus jurisdiction is that the federal courts have a superior
sensitivity to federal rights and are more receptive than the state courts
to claims based on such rights. Ensuring the adequate protection of
.constitutional rights for criminal defendants accordingly requires that
review of state court decisions on federal claims be available in the
inferior federal courts. 84
This argument depends on a questionable empirical generalization
about the disposition of the federal courts and the state courts which is
obviously not true in many particular instances, if it is true at all.
Decisions by state courts which define the rights of defendants more
expansively than the decisions of federal courts are not uncommon. 85
Normally, federal habeas courts reach the same conclusion as the state
courts ( see pp. 34-35 supra ). However, even if it were true that federal
courts are generally more likely to grant defendants' claims, it would not
follow that greater fidelity to the Constitution will result from expansive
federal court review.
In its basic provisions, the Constitution establishes a republican
form of government under which public policy decisions at the federal
level are made by a legislature accountable to the public in the enactment
of laws and an executive accountable to the public in their execution. The
federal government as a whole is confined to the exercise of the powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and any powers not so delegated "are
reserved to the States . . . or to the people" (Amendment X).
This general system of self-government is qualified by constitutional
provisions establishing various important rights against the government.
Even these provisions, however, reflect a recognition of the need to
maintain a fair balance between the individual's right to security against
crime and the right of defendants and suspects to be free of governmental
abuse or overreaching. For example, the Fourth Amendment does not
bar non-consensual searches and seizures in the investigation of crime,
84

This argument is developed at length in a broader setting in Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). A general response appears in Bator, supra note
81, at 623-35.
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See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489, 498-501 (1977).

but generally prohibits such activities only if they are unreasonable. The
fifth Amendment creates no presumption against obtaining incriminating admissions from a suspect or defendant and using them in
prosecution, but only bars compelling a person to be a witness against
himself. 86 The Fifth Amendment also recognizes that the government
may properly deprive offenders of life, liberty, and property in furtherance of law enforcement objectives, stipulating only that it may not do so
without due process. The Eighth Amendment does not bar severe
punishment for serious crimes, or even capital punishment, but only
prohibits punishment that is cruel and unusual. A judge who erroneously
grants a claim by misinterpreting or disregarding the Constitution's
limitations on the scope of the rights it defines departs from the
Constitution no less than a judge who erroneously denies a claim that
validly asserts a constitutional right.
With these considerations in mind, there is little force to the
argument for habeas corpus review based on allegedly superior federal
court sensitivity to constitutional values. It has not been shown that
federal courts are generally more likely than state courts to respect the
Constitution's limitations on judicial overriding of legislative and
executive decisions affecting criminal investigation and prosecution. It
has also not been shown that federal courts are more likely to respect the
Constitution's limitations on federal authority over state procedures, or
the Constitution's limitations on the scope of particular federal rights
that may be applicable in state proceedings. Overall, there is no
particular plausibility to the view that federal habeas corpus review
results in greater fidelity to the Constitution. The argument to the
contrary reflects partisanship for expansive interpretations of selected
portions of selected provisions of the Constitution, rather than a
commitment to the Constitution itself. As Professor Paul Bator has
observed:
We are told that federal judges will be more receptive to
constitutional values than state judges. What is really meant,
however, is that federal judges will be more receptive to some
constitutional values than state judges. And the hidden
assumption of the argument is that the Constitution contains
only one or two sorts of values: typically, those which protect
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See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation
102-03 (1986).

the individual from the power of the state, and those which
assure the superiority of federal to state law.
But the Constitution contains other sorts of values as
well. It gives the federal government powers, but also enacts
limitations on those powers. The limitations, too, count as
setting forth constitutional values. Will the federal judge be
more sensitive than the state judge in insuring that these
limitations are complied with? Whose institutional "set" is
likely to make one more sensitive to the values underlying the
tenth amendment? ls a federal judge likely to be more
receptive than the state judge in honoring other structural
principles, such as separation of powers? Why don't these sorts
87
of issues ever seem to count?

D. The Need for Surrogate Supreme Courts
Another argument for the current habeas corpus jurisdiction is that
the expansion of federal rights and the increase in the general volume of
litigation in recent times has made it impossible for the Supreme Court to
maintain an adequate degree of supervision over the state judiciaries in
criminal cases through direct review. It is accordingly necessary to
empower the lower federal courts to review state criminal judgments -- in
effect, to serve as surrogate Supreme Courts -- to maintain an adequate
88
reviewing capacity at the federal level.
Taken in its most obvious sense, this argument presupposes that
extensive day-to-day oversight of the state judiciaries by federal courts is
currently necessary to secure an acceptable degree of compliance with
Supreme Court precedent by the state courts. The weaknesses of this
argument are similar to the weaknesses of the argument that habeas
corpus review is essential to securing fidelity to the Constitution. It
assumes with no adequate basis that state courts are insufficiently
sensitive or receptive to claims of federal right based on Supreme Court
precedent, 89 and ignores the full range of constitutional values that are

Bator, supra note 81, at 631-34.
See Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact88
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Finding Responsibility, 75 Yale L. J. 895, 897-98 (1966).
See Bator, supra note 81, at 629-3 l (disputing, in relation to habeas corpus review,
89
alleged superiority of federal judges in sensitivity and competence under contemporary
conditions); Friendly, supra note 41, at 165 n. 125 (similar); O'Connor, Trends in the

recognized in the Supreme Court's decisions. Are federal courts more
likely than state courts to implement faithfully the Supreme Court's
decisions limiting judicial authority to override legislative and executive
decisions affecting criminal investigation and prosecution? Are federal
courts more likely to respect the Court's decisions concerning the limits
of federal authority over state procedure, or its decisions concerning the
limits on the scope of particular federal rights that apply in state
proceedings?
Overall, there is no particular plausibility to the view that habeas
corpus review results in greater fidelity to Supreme Court precedent.
Indeed, the Court is regularly required to devote a portion of its limited
time to reviewing and overturning the decisions of lower federal courts
which have erroneously granted writs of habeas corpus in reviewing state
cases. 90
A somewhat different version of the "surrogate Supreme Court"
argument holds that habeas corpus review is necessary to secure
uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law. In this
sense, however, the lower federal courts are inherently incapable of
serving as surrogate Supreme Courts. Only the Supreme Court itself can
prescribe nationally uniform and nationally binding caselaw rules. The
close to a hundred federal district courts and twelve regional federal
appellate courts can differ in their decisions concerning matters that the
Supreme Court has not resolved, and their views on such issues are not
binding on the state courts outside of the particular cases brought up on
federal habeas corpus.
Moreover, even in areas in which there is no review of state
judgments in the lower federal courts -- e.g., civil litigation -- the state
Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court
Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 812-14 (1981) (similar); Smith, supra note 74, at
149 (unlikelihood under contemporary circumstances of state court misapplication or
resistance to Supreme Court precedent); see also Neuborne, supra note 84, at 1119 ("We
are not faced today with widespread state judicial refusal to enforce clear federal
rights.").
90

See Habeas Corpus Reform : Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (l 985) [hereafter cited as "1985 Hearing"] (listing
of recent decisions in which Supreme Court overturned federal court of appeals
decisions favorable to habeas corpus petitioners). The cited cases include both cases in
which the court of appeals' decision was wrong on the merits and cases in which the
court of appeals did not comply with the limitations on habeas corpus review.
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courts are attentive to the opinions of the federal appellate courts on
unsettled questions of federal law, and the conclusions they reach are
likely to fall within the range of options appearing in the decisions of the
federal courts of appeals. In general, it is not apparent that the interest in
uniformity is significantly advanced by habeas corpus review, and not
apparent that harmful disparities would occur with any greater frequency if the state supreme courts had the same latitude as federal appellate
courts to adopt different resolutions and make their own judgments
concerning questions that the Supreme Court has left open.

The unique historical circumstances obtaining at the time
of the decision of Brown v. Allen may have led the Supreme
Court to see a need for a broad supervisory authority of the
lower federal courts over state criminal proceedings. One may
question the validity of perpetuating this authority into a time
when the circumstances that gave rise to it no longer exist. 92

E.

On a more mundane level, the "surrogate Supreme Court" argument is sometimes raised as a caseload issue. The restriction or
elimination of habeas corpus review, it is argued, would result in an
excessive burden on the Supreme Court's direct review jurisdiction.
However, the Justices of the Supreme Court do not appear to share
this concern, since a number of them have spoken out strongly in favor of
fundamental restrictions on federal habeas corpus, and the general trend
of the Court's recent decisions has been to limit the availability of federal
habeas corpus. 91 Recourse to the Supreme Court on direct review is
limited by a normal sixty day limit under Supreme Court Rule 20, a
safeguard against a burdensome volume of applications that is simply
lacking in the case of habeas corpus. Moreover, the Supreme Court is
regularly required each term to grant certiorari in a number of cases to
resolve unsettled questions of habeas corpus procedure or to reverse
unsound decisions by federal appellate courts granting writs of habeas
corpus. For the foregoing reasons, there is no adequate basis for believing
that limiting or eliminating federal habeas corpus would result in any net
increase in the Supreme Court's caseload.
Finally, it may be noted that the current habeas corpus jurisdiction
arose in a period in which the criminal justice systems in many states
were undermined by state-enforced racial segregation. This evil has since
been corrected by the civil rights legislation of the 1960's and by the
Supreme Court's decisions following Brown v. Board of Education. In
commenting on the import of these changes for habeas corpus review,
Attorney General William French Smith has observed:
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See S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 & nn. 13-16 (1983) (statements by
Justices critical of habeas corpus); pp. 38-39 supra (recent decisions limiting habeas
corpus).

Providing a Vehicle for the Articulation of
Constitutional Rights

It is sometimes asserted that habeas corpus proceedings provide an
important vehicle
for the articulation of constitutional rights by the
federal courts. 93
In relation to the Supreme Court, this assertion is groundless. Most
of the Court's important decisions in the past thirty years concerning
constitutional criminal procedure have been made in direct review cases.
While some important issues have fortuitously been addressed in the
context of habeas corpus litigation, the same issues could have been
considered and decided in cases coming up on direct review. In relation
to the federal courts of appeals, most rulings by these courts on
constitutional questions occur in the context of appeals from convictions
in federal prosecutions. Habeas corpus review does sometimes enable
federal appellate courts to pass on the constitutionality of unique features
of state procedure that have no counterpart in federal proceedings, where
the proper resolution on the basis of Supreme Court precedent is unclear.
However, unless some other argument establishes that the decisions of
federal appellate courts on these unsettled questions are likely to be
"better" than those of state supreme courts, there is no particular value
in having lower federal courts "articulate" the relevant rules.
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Smith, supra note 74, at 149; see Bator, supra note 81, at 631 ("the argument seems to
me to derive primarily from a special historical experience, involving the division of the
country on the issue of racial segregation, which is no longer of dominating significance
in governing the attitudes of state court judges"); see also Neuborne, supra note 84, at
1119 n. 55 ("The widespread breakdown of Southern justice which motivated
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ... and similar breakdowns during the height
of the civil rights movement which provoked calls for significant expansions of federal
jurisdiction . . . do not exist today").
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See 1985 Hearing, supra note 90, at 41 , 52 (argument and response).
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Correcting Injustices

Ii

Another argument is that habeas corpus review is needed to correct
94
miscarriages of justice occurring in state proceedings.
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A first problem with this argument is that habeas corpus review is a
very poorly suited means to this end. Guilt and innocence, as such, are
not in issue in habeas corpus litigation; only violations of constitutional
rights can be asserted. A federal habeas court may overturn a state
conviction on the basis of a constitutional violation that does not cast any
doubt on the factual accuracy of the verdict. Conversely, even conclusive
proof of innocence does not support the issuance of a writ, in the absence
of constitutional violations in the state proceedings. As a practical
matter, it is not federal habeas corpus, but the various remedies available
to defendants at the state level that provide the essential vehicle for the
95
correction of miscarriages of justice.
A second problem with this argument is that it fails to address the
question of limits. There is no limit in principle to the number of layers of
review that can be piled on top of each other. If fifty levels of mandatory
review were added to those now available, no doubt each additional level
might detect and correct some potential injustice that had gotten by at all
earlier stages. However, unless it is maintained that every prisoner should
be given a trial de novo whenever he wants one, there is an unavoidable
need to make the judgment that the costs of permitting additional re96
litigation at some point outweigh its benefits. The infrequency with
which relief is granted and the dearth of cases in recent years in which
demonstrated injustices have been corrected through habeas corpus (see
pp. 34-35 supra) tend to support the conclusion that the existing habeas
corpus jurisdiction goes well beyond that point. In general, it is assumed
that one appeal as of right strikes the proper balance. Habeas corpus
review provides far more than that.
Finally, in assessing the force of this argument, it must be kept in
mind that justice is due to the actual and potential victims of crime, and
to society at large, as well as to suspects and defendants. Injustice occurs
when the convictions of criminals are overturned after the lapse of time

94 See

Bator, supra note 81, at 613-14 n. 25 (noting and responding to argument).

95 See

1985 Hearing, supra note 90, at 45-46.

96 See

Bator, supra note 81, at 614 & n. 27 .

has made re-trial impossible. Injustice also occurs when the anguish of
crime victims and their families is prolonged for years or decades by
continued litigation and the prospect that the person who has ruined
their lives may yet be set free to claim other victims. The open-ended
review of state judgments by federal habeas corpus, extending far past
the conclusion of the normal adjudicatory process, carries particularly
acute risks of causing such injustices. 97

G.

Effects on the Behavior of Prisoners

It is sometimes asserted that engaging in habeas corpus litigation
provides valuable "recreational therapy" for prisoners, relieving the
tensions generated by the prison environment and helping to keep them
occupied. 98
While it is true that some prisoners who spend their time preparing
and litigating habeas corpus petitions may be diverted from other
harmful activities -- e.g., assaulting other inmates or engaging in drug
abuse -- it must also be recognized that frivolous and harassing litigation
is itself a seriously antisocial activity that carries substantial costs to the
system. More basically, viewing emotional gratification to petitioners as
an independent ground for authorizing habeas corpus review presupposes
a view of the federal courts as a kind of video arcade for bored prisoners
who should be free to toy with the system in order to keep them out of
worse sorts of trouble. This is irreconcilable with the proper view of
courts as impartial organs of the law whose function is to entertain
genuine claims of legal right and accurately resolve them.
This argument also assumes that engaging in habeas corpus
litigation will in fact improve the attitudes of prisoners and lessen their
disposition to commit antisocial acts. However, the view is widely held
by judges and writers that it has the opposite effect. Like other forms of
litigation, habeas corpus litigation provides prisoners with a cost-free
means of striking at the system and gaining increased esteem among
fell ow inmates. The more specific message of permitting endless challenges to convictions and sentences is that the system never really regards
the prisoner's guilt as an established fact, and that he need never accept
and deal with it. While the ability to command the time and attention of
97

Some cases illustrating these points are described in the Appendix to this Report.
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Cf Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4261, at
588 (1978) ("prisoners thrive on it as a form of occupational therapy").
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judges and prosecutors by filing a petition may be gratifying to many
prisoners, any positive "recreational" value of this practice must be
balanced against its potential effect of increasing the arrogance of
unrepentant criminals. As Professor Bator has observed:

11

A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of
inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate
certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibility of
justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of the
underlying substantive commands . . . . The first step in
achieving [rehabilitation] may be a realization by the convict
that he is justly subject to sanction . . . and a process of
reeducation cannot, perhaps, even begin if we make sure that
the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if society itself
continuously tells the convict that he may not be justly subject
to reeducation and treatment in the first place. The idea of just
condemnation lies at the heart of the criminal law, and we
should not lightly create processes which implicitly belie its
possibility. 99
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H.

Other Arguments

Other arguments are also occasionally offered in support of habeas
corpus review. For example, it is said that habeas corpus provides a
necessary means for securing a relatively detached and "isolated"
consideration of a defendant's federal claims, free of the multiplicity of
issues and factual complications that characterize earlier stages of
litigation. This argument would be more convincing if there were no
appellate courts in the states. In fact, however, the federal habeas court's
review is typically a revisiting of claims that have already received
detached consideration, in a setting isolated from the exigencies of trial
litigation, in the course of the prisoner's appeals in the state court system.
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Another argument is that habeas corpus review of state judgments
fosters a constructive "dialogue" between state and federal courts
concerning the issues that arise in habeas corpus litigation. 100 However,

habeas corpus is not needed to create such a dialogue. In the absence of
habeas corpus review, prosecutors and defense attorneys in criminal
cases would continue to cite both state and federal precedents supporting
their positions, and the judges of each system would continue to consider
the views of their counterparts in the other system in the ordinary course
of litigation. To the extent that habeas corpus does foster a federal-state
dialogue, it is not a dialogue of equals, but of superior and inferior. It is
the federal habeas court that gets the final word on the disposition of the
particular case under review, and the state courts within its domain may
depart from its views only at the risk of having their judgments
overturned in other cases that turn on the same issue. 101 Unless some
other reason can be given for subordinating the highest courts of the
states to the lower federal courts in this manner, the desirability of
"dialogue" on these unequal terms is less than obvious.

IV.

REFORM OPTIONS

The review of history and policy in the earlier sections of this report
shows that the statutory habeas corpus remedy in its contemporary
character is unrelated to the historical and constitutional functions of the
Great Writ (pp. 4-7 supra). In its specific operation it is inconsistent with
basic principles of adjudicatory procedure that are taken for granted in
other contexts (pp. 37, 40 supra). The arguments typically offered in
support of the current jurisdiction generally reflect partisanship for
defense interests -- regardless of countervailing public interests and the
actual balance of interests struck by the Constitution -- or an unjustified
preference for aggrandizing the lower federal courts at the expense of the
state judiciaries, or some combination of these two biases (pp. 40-53
supra).
At the level of terminology, it might be beneficial to adopt some
different name for the current review jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts in relation to state judgments -- e.g. , re-styling state prisoners'
challenges to their convictions and sentences as applications for "a writ
of federal review" rather than petitions for "a writ of habeas corpus".
101
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Bator, supra note 17, at 452; see Friendly, supra note 41, at 146; Spalding v. Aiken, 460
U.S. 1093, 1096-97 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J.); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale
L.J. 1035 (1977).

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 100, at 1036, is accordingly wrong in stating that the
Warren Court's innovations have resulted in "a dialogue on the future of constitutional
requirements in criminal law in which state and federal courts were required both to
speak and listen as equals." The situation in habeas corpus would be equalized only if
state trial judges were given the authority to overturn the judgments of the federal
courts in federal criminal cases.
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This would provide a characterization that accurately reflects the nature
of the existing jurisdiction. It might help curb the confusion between that
jurisdiction and the traditional Great Writ which chronically impedes
clear thinking in this area and is routinely exploited by opponents of
needed reforms.

many years after the normal conclusion of state criminal
proceedings. The lapse of time and the resulting disappearance
of evidence and witnesses may render response to the applicant's contentions -- or re-trial in the event that he prevails on
his claims -- difficult or impossible

At the level of substantive reform, various options may be
considered. The affirmative case for adopting such reforms to curb the
contemporary abuse of habeas corpus has been aptly summarized by
Attorney General William French Smith in an article published in 1983:

Fourth, the current system is wasteful of limited resources. At a time when both state and federal courts face
staggering criminal caseloads, we can ill afford to make large
commitments of judicial and prosecutorial resources to procedures of dubious value in furthering the ends of criminal
justice. Such commitments are necessarily at the expense of
the time available for the stages of the criminal process at
which the questions of guilt and innocence and basic fairness
are most directly addressed . . . . The time spent on habeas
corpus applications in federal courts is a particularly questionable indulgence. As noted earlier, the matters raised in such
applications have, in general, already been considered and
decided by the state courts. All too often the contentions
raised reflect only the imaginings of idle prisoners who turn to
"writ-writing" as a means of diversion or continued aggression
against society . . . .

First, the availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners,
beyond the various remedies and layers of review available in
the state courts, has little or no value in avoiding injustices or
ensuring that the federal rights of criminal defendants are
respected. The state prisoners who seek federal habeas corpus
are generally among the least deserving element of the prison
population . . . . [T]he typical habeas corpus applicant is
challenging his imprisonment for a seriously violent crime for
which he was convicted after trial. The typical applicant has
already secured extensive review of his case in the state courts,
having pursued a state appeal and also often having initiated
collateral attacks in the state courts on one or more occasions
. . . . There is no reason to believe that the state courts'
consideration of the claims of defendants who subsequently
seek federal habeas corpus is deficient in any significant
number of cases . . . .

A fifth and final criticism is that the present system of
habeas corpus review creates particularly acute problems in
capital cases . . . . It ... prevents correction of the practical
nullification of all capital punishment legislation that has
resulted from litigational delay and obstruction. 102

Second, the present system of review is demeaning to the
state courts and pointlessly disparaging to their efforts to
comply with federal law in criminal proceedings . . . . This
difficulty is aggravated by the particular procedures and rules
of review that are presently employed in habeas corpus
proceedings. A single federal judge is frequently placed in the
position of reviewing a judgment of conviction that was
entered by a state trial judge, reviewed and found unobjectionable by a state appellate court, and upheld by a state supreme
court .. ..

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Attorney General
Smith concluded that "the most effective response to the problems
resulting from federal habeas corpus for state convicts would be the
elimination of federal habeas corpus in that area." 103 We agree. This
reform option will be discussed in the initial part of subsection A of this
section, followed by discussions of other legislative reform options. These
include the option of confining federal habeas corpus review to cases
where a meaningful process for considering a petitioner's federal claims
was denied in the state courts, and the option of enacting limited reform

Third, the current system of federal habeas corpus
defeats the important objective of establishing at some point
an end to litigation. A prisoner may seek federal habeas corpus
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Smith, supra note 74, at 142-46.
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Id. at 149-50.
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legislation like that passed by the Senate in 1984. Subsection B examines
the possibility of achieving reforms through litigation.

A.

Legislative Options
1.

Abolition of Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners

Having reviewed the history of habeas corpus from its common law
origins to its contemporary operation, and having fully considered the
relevant policy issues, we agree with Attorney General Smith that "the
simple abolition of federal habeas corpus for state criminal convicts"
would be "[t]he most straightforward solution to the tensions, burdens,
104
and inefficiencies presently resulting from federal habeas corpus."
A
provision that would have had this effect was included in title II of the
proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (pp.
30-31 supra). The same effect could be achieved by a simpler formulation
along the following lines:
No court of the United States other than the Supreme Court,
and no judge of a court of the United States, shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the validity of a
person's detention pursuant to the judgment of a state court,
or to the execution of any other sentence imposed by a state
I

federal habeas corpus to state prisoners remained largely a theoretical
matter prior to the past thirty years. Its elimination would be limited in
substantial effect to practices that have emerged since the l 950's (see pp.
7-24 supra).
A reform of this sort would also not restrict or impair the
traditional, constitutionally-based mechanism for maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal law through direct review of the
judgments of the highest courts of the states by the Supreme Court. State
convicts would retain the right to seek Supreme Court review, in addition
to having access to the appellate and collateral review mechanisms
provided in the state court systems. 107
A final point in support of this approach is that Congress has
already effectively abolished federal habeas corpus in one substantial
jurisdiction -- the District of Columbia -- with no discernible adverse
effect on the quality or fairness of criminal proceedings (seep. 27 supra).
This naturally raises the question why the same approach should not be
tried in relation to the substantially similar judicial systems of the states.
Judge Carl McGowan has observed:
A matter that has rankled relations between state and
federal courts for some years now is the collateral attack on
final state criminal convictions provided by Congress in the
federal courts. A state prisoner who has unsuccessfully
exhausted his avenues of state trial and appellate relief can,
even many years later when retrial is not practically feasible,
attack that conviction in the federal district court as violative
of federal law, and procure his release if such a violation is
established. Since the same claim of federal law violation can
[be], and often is, made in the trial and appellate courts of the
state, with certiorari review available in the Supreme Court,
the state judges understandably have some difficulty in seeing
why their work should be reexamined in the federal courts
whenever a colorable claim of violation is alleged.

court.
For reasons discussed earlier, there can be no doubt concerning the
constitutionality of this type of reform. It would have no effect
whatsoever on the Great Writ whose suspension is prohibited by the
Constitution.

105

Eliminating federal habeas corpus for state prisoners also would
"not upset any deep-seated tradition or historically sanctioned practice." 106 The First Judiciary Act's general restriction of federal habeas
corpus to federal prisoners remained operative until the enactment of the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and even thereafter, the availability of

Id. at 147-48.
105 See pp. 4-7, 41 -42 supra ; The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 221 6
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-07 (1982) (opinion
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of Office of Legal Counsel).
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The fact that state prisoners would not always have access to a federal forum for
consideration of their federal claims is not objectionable either on constitutional
grounds or as a matter of policy. Such access is frequently not available even under the
current system of review. See pp. 41 -53 supra; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102-03
(1980).

smith, supra note 74, at 147-48.

._.,

The one place where this cannot be done is in the District
of Columbia .... Some twelve years ago Congress enacted a
comprehensive reorganization of both the local and federal
courts in the District . . . . In doing . . . this, the Congress . . .
provided in the D.C. Code for collateral attack upon a D.C.
criminal conviction to be made in the new and improved D.C.
court system. It explicitly declared, however, that no further
collateral challenge could be made in the federal courts in the
District of Columbia. Thus it is that for some years now,
although a state prisoner across the Potomac in Virginia, or
one over the line in Maryland, has a second chance for
collateral review of his conviction in the federal courts in those
states, a state prisoner in the District of Columbia does not.
[T]he Supreme Court ultimately held that Congress could
constitutionally make the choice it did, articulating that result
in terms which would appear to give Congress the same
latitude to end in all of the states collateral attack by state
prisoners in the federal courts. There have been no reports, so
far as I am aware, of egregious injustices to District of
Columbia prisoners because of this denial of state habeas
jurisdiction in the federal courts . . . .
The early finality of criminal convictions is generally
desirable, and especially so when that can be assured without
duplication of judicial effort. The resources of the federal
courts at the present time are strained by their own criminal
caseloads. They should not have to exercise a supervisory
authority over the administration of state criminal laws unless
that is plainly necessary in the interest of justice.
Certainly there appears to have been a steadily increasing
sensitivity by state judges to claims of federal right -- a
sensitivity that can only be frustrated by needless subjection to
second-guessing by federal judges. Since Congress has in effect
made the District of Columbia a laboratory for testing the
need for federal collateral attack by state prisoners, the
Congress would do well to study carefully the actual results of
that experiment. If it turns out to be positive, then the
opportunity exists to eliminate simultaneously a significant
number of cases from the federal courts and a condition which

has always roiled the waters of federal-state relations. 108
2.

Deference to Adequate State Processes

A second reform option would be to limit the scope of review on
federal habeas corpus to the question whether adequate processes were
provided in the state courts for considering the petitioner's federal
claims. While formulations of this approach could vary considerably in
detail, the basic idea would be to treat federal habeas corpus as a
backstop measure, which would only come into play if a state judicial
system had failed to provide some meaningful opportunity for raising a
federal claim and having it decided. This was, in part, the approach taken
in the Judicial Conference's proposal that was passed twice by the House
of Representatives in the l 950's. 109
This approach would essentially restore habeas corpus to the
function it fulfilled in the intermediate period of its expansion, between
the decision in Moore v. Dempsey in 1923 and the creation of a quasiappellate habeas corpus jurisdiction by Brown v. Allen and related
decisions (see pp. 15-18 supra). It would amount to a general application
of the current approach to review of Fourth Amendment claims in
habeas corpus proceedings under the rule of Stone v. Powell, which bars
re-litigation so long as a "full and fair opportunity" for litigating the
claim was provided in the state courts (see p. 39 supra). Justice O'Connor
has advocated the general application of this type of standard:
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I
am sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both
the federal and the state systems strong, independent, and
viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to
litigate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assuming office take an oath to support the federal as well as the
state constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion
when given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a
108

McGowan, The View From an Inferior Court, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 659, 667-69
(1982).
109

The Judicial Conference proposal would have barred access to federal habeas corpus
with respect to claims that had actually been determined in the state courts or that
could still be raised and determined in the state courts, but otherwise would have
· permitted access to federal habeas corpus if there had been no "fair and adequate
opportunity" to raise a claim and have it determined in state proceedings. See p. 29
supra.

7

step in the right direction to defer to the state courts and give
finality to their judgments on federal constitutional questions
where a full and fair adjudication has been given in the state
court. 110
Another way of looking at this reform is as an application of normal
res judicata principles in habeas corpus proceedings. In general, a litigant
who has unsuccessfully asserted a claim in a state proceeding is not free
to litigate the same claim over again in federal court. This principle was
explicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980), which held that rejection of a constitutional claim in a state
criminal proceeding estops the defendant from asserting the same claim
in a later § 1983 suit in federal court, so long as the state proceedings
provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.
This approach to habeas corpus reform has sometimes been
defended as superior to the abolition approach on the ground that it
would ensure the existence of some means of creating an evidentiary
record on a claim for purposes of Supreme Court review, and that it
would preserve an incentive for state courts to provide fair procedures for
the consideration of federal claims. 111 However, the force of the recordfor-review point is not great in the contemporary period, in light of the
fact that state proceedings do currently provide ample means for raising
112
the full range of federal claims that may be asserted by defendants.
There is also no reason to believe that the state judicial systems now
require a special "incentive," beyond the traditional availability of direct
review of state judgments in the Supreme Court, to provide fair processes
for the consideration of defendants' claims.

11
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Conversely, preserving habeas corpus review under an adequacy-ofstate-process standard has some unattractive features. Since the enjoyment of habeas corpus litigation by state prisoners is not wholly
dependent on a realistic possibility of success, litigation would continue
in this area by prisoners alleging that they had been denied fair state
processes for considering their claims, and a substantial amount of work

could be required in disposing of these petitions. Basic restrictions on the
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction would also predictably elicit from
some federal courts and judges the normal resistance of government
institutions to new constraints on their power. The preservation of review
of the availability, "adequacy," or "fairness" of state proceedings could
accordingly provide a basis for eroding or diluting these restrictions.
In general, however, this approach would constitute a fundamental
improvement over the pointless redundancy of the current system,
though not as clean and complete a solution as the simple abolition of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Its optimal formulation would
be a narrow provision preserving federal habeas review only where a state
system provides no means by which a federal claim can be raised or could
have been raised in the course of the state process. 113
3.

A final reform option would not attempt to make basic changes in
the character of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, but would focus
instead on correcting particular problems of abuse or excess that arise
under the current system of review. Legislation containing a set of
limited reform proposals of this type has been under consideration by
Congress since 1982. These measures, which have the support of the
Administration, the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National
Association of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys
Association, and the National Governors Association, were passed by the
Senate in 1984. They have recently been transmitted by the President to
Congress again as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act
(S. 1970 and H.R. 3777). 114 The specific reforms included in the
proposals are as follows:
113

Cf Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (unclear whether claim cognizable under
any state remedy, where petitioner alleged that conviction was solely based on
prosecution's use of perjury and that the factual basis of the claim could not have been
discovered through reasonable diligence prior to his new trial motion and state appeal);
Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (regarding provisions of D.C. Code
and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limiting potential availability of habeas corpus to cases where
other remedies are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention).
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See p. 31 supra; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 226-27, 235-36, 287-88, 309-11, 1111-12 (1983). The formal resolution of the
National Governors Association, id. at 235-36, endorsed the basic recommendations of
an earlier but generally similar set of reform proposals. Cf Habeas Corpus Procedures

110 o•connor,

supra note 89, at 814-15.
pp. 29-30 supra (Judicial Conference reform proposal designed in part to ensure
means of creating record for Supreme Court review). Cf Bator, supra note 17, at
455-60 (favorable assessment of some review of adequacy of state process).

111 See

112

C/ P . Robinson, supra note 63, at 22 (habeas corpus applications normally decided on
basis of evidentiary record of state proceedings and submissions of parties).

Limited Reform Legislation

First, there is currently no time limit on habeas corpus applications.
As noted earlier (p. 40 supra), this approach reflects a failure of the
procedures associated with federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its
expanding scope, and constitutes a departure from normal principles of
finality that would not be countenanced in connection with any other
appellate mechanism. As Justice Powell has observed:

I

Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28
U.S.C.] § 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
to review state court criminal convictions. There is no statute
of limitations, and no finality of federal review of state
convictions. Thus, repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know
of no other system of justice structured in a way that assures
no end to the litigation of a criminal conviction. Our practice
in this respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in
other countries. Nor does the Constitution require this sort of
redundancy. 115
j

The specific corrective proposed in the legislation is a one-year
limitation period on habeas corpus applications, normally running from
exhaustion of state remedies. The start of the limitation period would be
deferred in case a state unlawfully prevented filing, and in connection
with newly recognized rights and newly discovered claims.

1
: 1i

This reform would create an important check on the interminable
continuation of litigation that characterizes the current system of review.
It is, however, quite generous in comparison with the time limits on other
federal appellate remedies in its normal starting point, duration, and
exceptions. By way of comparison, a federal defendant must normally
decide whether to appeal within 10 days I of conviction, and a state
defendant seeking Supreme Court review must normally apply within 60
days of affirmance of his conviction by the highest state court. Even a
federal defendant who seeks a new trial on grounds of newly discovered
evidence must apply within two years of final judgment. As the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report on the reform legislation observed, "[t]he
last-mentioned limitation has the particularly curious effect that a
Federal prisoner who discovers proof of his innocence more than two
Amendments Act of 1981 : Hearing on S. 653 before the Subcomm. on Courts of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-8 (1981) (earlier reform bill).
115

Address Before the American Bar Association Division of Judicial Administration,
Aug. 9, 1982.
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years after final judgment has no judicial remedy, but must seek
executive clemency, while a State or Federal prisoner who asserts
violations of Constitutional rights which may cast no real doubt on his
guilt is afforded a Federal judicial remedy without limitation of time.
The time limitation rule . .. would reduce this discrepancy, bringing the
availability of [habeas corpus] into closer conformity with the approach
taken by Federal law in other contexts to maintenance of orderly
procedures and assurance of finality in criminal adjudication." 116
The second major reform proposed in the legislation is a general
narrowing and simplification of the standard of review. Under the
current system, state court fact-finding is presumed to be correct (subject
to potential rebuttal by "convincing evidence") if a number of conditions
set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) are satisfied, but the federal habeas court is
required to make an independent determination of questions of law and
to apply the law independently to the facts (see pp. 19-22 supra). This can
result in the overturning of a judgment -- following the passage of years
and affirmance by the appellate courts of the state -- though the federal
habeas court recognizes that the decision turns on close or unsettled
questions on which courts may reasonably differ and on which the
federal courts themselves may disagree. It can also require hair-splitting
decisions whether a state determination is purely one of fact or reflects an
application of law to fact, since the review standard for factual questions
(deference allowed if several conditions are satisfied) differs from the
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact (re-adjudication
uniformly mandated). The legislation would correct these problems and
others by establishing a relatively simple and uniform review standard
under which the federal habeas court would generally defer to the state
determination of a claim if it concluded that that determination was
reasonable in its resolution of legal and factual issues and was arrived at
by procedures consistent with due process. 117
A third reform in the legislation is a codification of the caselaw
standards for excusing procedural defaults in habeas corpus proceedings.
This would bring greater definiteness and clarity to the law in this area
and make it clear that the properly restrictive standards that the Supreme
Court has developed since Wainwright v. Sykes apply to all types of
116

S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10, 16-18 (1983). The legislation would also
create a comparable time limit on § 2255 motions by federal prisoners. See id. at 30-3 I.
117
See id. at 6-7, 22-28.
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defaults. 118
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Finally, the reform legislation incorporates two reforms of a more
technical nature that would reduce the redundancy and inefficiency of
habeas corpus litigation. It would provide that a federal habeas court can
deny a petition on the merits despite the petitioner's failure to exhaust
state remedies. This would avoid the waste of time and judicial resources
that currently results when a prisoner presenting a hopeless petition to a
federal court is sent back to the state courts to exhaust state remedies.
The legislation would also vest the authority to issue certificates of
probable cause for appeal in habeas corpus proceedings exclusively in the
judges of the courts of appeals. This would avoid the waste of time and
effort that now occurs when a court of appeals is required to hear an
appeal on a district judge's certification, though it believes that the
certificate was improvidently granted. 119

I
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B.

Litigative Options
j
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The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus jurisprudence, has
shown a sensitivity to interests of finality, federalism, and effective law
enforcement that were simply shrugged off or discounted in the caselaw
of the 1960's. For example, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-28 (1982), observed:
Collateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of
trial for both society and the accused. As Justice Harlan once
observed, "[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be
the certainty that comes with a~ end to litigation, and that

I!,
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See id. at 7-8, 12-16, 30. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986), the
Supreme Court effectively endorsed the definition of the "cause and prejudice"
standard proposed in the reform legislation, expressing confidence that this standard
would generally be adequate to guard against injustices. However, the Court indicated
that a procedural default should also be excused "in an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent." Id. at 495-96. This additional ground for excusing defaults has been
incorporated into the most recent version of the reform proposals, transmitted by the
President to Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act.
See S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 18-19, 21-22 (1983). Following a
recommendation of Judge Friendly, see Friendly, supra note 41, at 144 n. 9, the
legislation would also create a certificate of probable cause requirement for appeals by
federal prisoners in § 2255 motion proceedings.

attention will ultimately be focused not on whether conviction
was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be
restored to a useful place in the community" . . . . By
frustrating these interests, the writ undermines the usual
principles of finality of litigation.
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide,
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or
innocence" .... Our Constitution and laws surround the trial
with a multitude of protections for the accused. Rather than
enhancing these safeguards, ready availability of habeas corpus
may diminish their sanctity . . . .
Finally, ... [t]he States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they
also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate
both the State's sovereign power to punish offenders and their
good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.
In line with these views, the Court has generally been receptive to
limitations on the availability of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners,
to the extent that such restrictions are consistent with existing statutory
standards and can be carried out in a principled manner (see pp. 38-39
supra). While the potential gains through litigation are realistically more
limited than those that might be achieved through legislation, some
significant possibilities remain open in this area. Three examples -relating to deference to adequate state processes, the standard for
excusing procedural defaults, and dismissal of unreasonably delayed
petitions -- will be discussed in the remainder of this part.
1.

Applying the Stone v. Powell Standard to Other
Claims

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court adopted
a rule of deference to state processes which generally precludes
consideration of Fourth Amendment claims in federal habeas corpus
proceedings (seep. 39 supra). The Court noted that the exclusionary rule
for Fourth Amendment violations is not a constitutional right, but a
judicially created remedy designed to deter such violations. Considering
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the high cost to the truth-finding process of excluding reliable and
probative evidence of guilt, and the negligible contribution that applying
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings would make
to its deterrent effect, the Court held that Fourth Amendment claims
would not be subject to habeas corpus review so long as there was a "full
and fair opportunity" to litigate the claim in state proceedings.
However, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979), the
Court declined to apply the same deferential standard to habeas review of
claims of racial discrimination in grand jury selection, though such
claims -- like Fourth Amendment claims -- do not bear on the reliability
of the verdict reached at trial. In reaching this result, the Court
emphasized the long-standing historical practice of regarding such claims
as grounds for the reversal of a conviction, and the fact that state judges
in entertaining such claims are effectively required to judge their own
actions in administering the grand jury system. In another case, Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979), the Court rejected the
application of the Stone v. Powell standard t6 a claim that the evidence
'
was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt,
noting that "[t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon
inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence." Finally, in Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the
Court rejected application of the Stone v. Powell standard to a claim of
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's
failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim in a timely manner. The
Court relied primarily on the fact that the incompetence claim related to
the denial of a constitutional right of the defendant rather than to the
application of a judicially created remedy, and on the view that the
possibility of raising or litigating such a claim in state proceedings is
limited in light of a defendant's dependence on his attorney.
The reasoning in these decisions indicates that the applicability of
the Stone v. Powell standard to other types of claims does not depend on
any single consideration, but may be influenced by various factors. They
suggest that the following factors would weigh in favor of applying the
Stone v. Powell standard to a claim: (1) the type of violation asserted in
the claim generally does not implicate the factual accuracy of a
petitioner's conviction, (2) the claim relates to alleged violations of rights
by law enforcement officers, as opposed to violations occurring in
proceedings under judicial control, (3) the claim relates to the application of an evidence-exclusion sanction for such violations, (4) there is no
deep-seated historical practice of overturning convictions on the basis of

the type of violation asserted in the claim, and (5) there is no intrinsic
difficulty in raising or litigating the type of violation asserted in the claim
in state proceedings.
Applying these factors, a strong case can be made for applying the
Stone v. Powell standard to claims that voluntary statements obtained by
the police from suspects should be excluded on the basis of alleged
120
A good case can also be made, considering the
Miranda violations.
same factors, for applying the Stone v. Powell standard to claims that
voluntary statements made to undercover operatives or the police should
be excluded on the basis of Massiah (pre-trial right to counsel)
violations. 121
2.

Clarifying the Scope of the Procedural Default
Standard

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the "cause and
prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes (see p. 39 supra) generally
applies to failures to rafse particular claims at trial or on appeal.
However, the Court has reserved the question whether it applies to the
120

The Miranda procedures and the related rule of evidence exclusion are not
constitutional requirements, but prophylactic measures created in 1966 to guard
against unconstitutional coercion by police officers in custodial interrogation. In the
absence of actual coercion, the use at trial of a defendant's voluntary statements
obtained in violation of Miranda would generally raise no question concerning the
accuracy of the conviction. Miranda claims can be raised and litigated in state
proceedings as readily as Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. See generally
Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 76-79, 102 (1986)
(Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. I); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n. 11
(1977) (applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Miranda claims not addressed). A
number of federal circuits have declined to extend the Stone v. Powell standard to the
review of Miranda claims. However, the refusal in each case has apparently been based
on the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet made such an extension, and has
involved no effort to analyze the issue. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978); see also
Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048
(1982) (following Patterson, supra).
121

See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 3);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (applicability
of Stone v. Powell standard to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims analogous to Fourth
Amendment claims is an open question); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,450 n. 7 (1984)
(applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Massiah-type claim not addressed).
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the high cost to the truth-finding process of excluding reliable and
probative evidence of guilt, and the negligible contribution that applying
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings would make
to its deterrent effect, the Court held that Fourth Amendment claims
would not be subject to habeas corpus review so long as there was a "full
and fair opportunity" to litigate the claim in state proceedings.
However, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979), the
Court declined to apply the same deferential standard to habeas review of
claims of racial discrimination in grand jury selection, though such
claims -- like Fourth Amendment claims -- do not bear on the reliability
of the verdict reached at trial. In reaching this result, the Court
emphasized the long-standing historical practice of regarding such claims
as grounds for the reversal of a conviction, and the fact that state judges
in entertaining such claims are effectively required to judge their own
actions in administering the grand jury system. In another case, Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979), the Court rejected the
application of the Stone v. Powell standard toI a claim that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
noting that "[t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon
inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence." Finally, in Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the
Court rejected application of the Stone v. Powell standard to a claim of
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's
failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim in a timely manner. The
Court relied primarily on the fact that the incompetence claim related to
the denial of a constitutional right of the defendant rather than to the
application of a judicially created remedy, and on the view that the
possibility of raising or litigating such a claim in state proceedings is
limited in light of a defendant's dependence on his attorney.
The reasoning in these decisions indicates that the applicability of
the Stone v. Powell standard to other types of claims does not depend on
any single consideration, but may be influenced by various factors. They
suggest that the following factors would weigh in favor of applying the
Stone v. Powell standard to a claim: (1) the type of violation asserted in
the claim generally does not implicate the factual accuracy of a
petitioner's conviction, (2) the claim relates to alleged violations of rights
by law enforcement officers, as opposed to violations occurring in
proceedings under judicial control, (3) the claim relates to the application of an evidence-exclusion sanction for such violations, (4) there is no
deep-seated historical practice of overturning convictions on the basis of

the type of violation asserted in the claim, and (5) there is no intrinsic
difficulty in raising or litigating the type of violation asserted in the claim
in state proceedings.
Applying these factors, a strong case can be made for applying the
Stone v. Powell standard to claims that voluntary statements obtained by
the police from suspects should be excluded on the basis of alleged
120
Miranda violations.
A good case can also be made, considering the
same factors, for applying the Stone v. Powell standard to claims that
voluntary statements made to undercover operatives or the police should
be excluded on the basis of Massiah (pre-trial right to counsel)
violations. 121
2.

Clarifying the Scope of the Procedural Default
Standard

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the "cause and
prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes (see p. 39 supra) generally
applies to failures to rafse particular claims at trial or on appeal.
However, the Court has reserved the question whether it applies to the
120

The Miranda procedures and the related rule of evidence exclusion are not
constitutional requirements, but prophylactic measures created in 1966 to guard
against unconstitutional coercion by police officers in custodial interrogation. In the
absence of actual coercion, the use at trial of a defendant's voluntary statements
obtained in violation of Miranda would generally raise no question concerning the
accuracy of the conviction. Miranda claims can be raised and litigated in state
proceedings as readily as Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. See generally
Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 76-79, 102 (1986)
(Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. I); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n. 11
(1977) (applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Miranda claims not addressed). A
number of federal circuits have declined to extend the Stone v. Powell standard to the
review of Miranda claims. However, the refusal in each case has apparently been based
on the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet made such an extension, and has
involved no effort to analyze the issue. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978); see also
Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048
(I 982) (following Patterson, supra).
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See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 3);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J. , concurring) (applicability
of Stone v. Powell standard to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims analogous to Fourth
Amendment claims is an open question); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,450 n. 7 (1984)
(applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Massiah-type claim not addressed).
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decision to forego an appeal entirely, or whether the standard of Fay v.
122
Noia continues to govern in that context.
If Wainwright v. Sykes
applies, a defendant could generally raise a claim that he forfeited at the
state level by a failure to appeal only if he could establish that the failure
to pursue an appeal resulted from constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel. If it does not, then the belated raising of such claims on
federal habeas corpus could be barred only if the defendant "deliberately
bypassed" a state appeal.
A strong argument can be made that the "cause and prejudice"
standard should apply across the board, particularly when one considers
that even the virtually complete default of potential claims that results
from pleading guilty is currently assessed under this type of standard
under the rule of Mci\1ann v. Richardson and Toilet v. Henderson (see pp.
38-39 supra). In arguing for this approach, the Committee Report on the
reform legislation that was passed by the Senate in 1984 observed:
The Committee believes that it is preferable to employ
the "cause and prejudice" standard as the exclusive standard
governing the excuse of procedural defaults in habeas corpus
proceedings .... [I]t is sufficiently flexible to give appropriate
weight to [relevant] distinctions . . . . Insofar as decisions
normally committed to the personal choice of the defendant
[e.g., appeal] tend to be of basic importance to the further
conduct of a case, poor advice by counsel in relation to such
decisions is more likely to render his assistance Constitutionally ineffective, providing "cause" . . . .
In practical terms, decisions normally committed to the
personal choice of the defendant that may result in the
forfeiture of Federal claims are likely to be the decision
whether to plead guilty and the decision whether to pursue an
appeal. The effect of the decision to plead guilty on access to
Federal habeas corpus is already governed by special caselaw
rules, focusing on the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, ...
and would not be changed by enactment of the bill. The
decision concerning appeal can also be appropriately handled
under this type of standard. If an "effectiveness of counsel"
standard is adequately protective of defendants' interests in
connection with guilty pleas -- which normally result in
122 See

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).

forfeiture of the possibility of raising Federal claims both at
trial and on appeal -- such a standard would also seem
adequately protective in connection with decisions not to
appeal, which only result in forfeiture of the possibility of
raising Federal claims on appeal. 123
3.

Strengthening the Interpretation of the Laches Rule

Rule 9(a) of the habeas corpus procedural rules provides roughly
that unreasonably delayed habeas corpus petitions may be dismissed if
the state has been prejudiced in its ability to respond by the delay (seep.
26 supra). Rule 9(a) is not, and by its nature cannot be, a satisfactory
substitute for a normal time limitation rule. It differs from the limitation
rules of other criminal law remedies (see pp. 37, 62 supra) in that: (1) it
does not establish any definite time beyond which further litigation is
barred, (2) its application depends on a showing that the state has been
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in filing, (3) it
does not apply if the petitioner raises grounds of which he could not have
had knowledge prior to the prejudicial occurrence by the exercise of
rea.sonable diligence, and (4) it only provides that a petition may be
dismissed if the foregoing conditions are satisfied. Determining when the
claim was reasonably discoverable and if and when the state was
prejudiced can be burdensome and time-consuming, and the judgmental
and unpredictable nature of the determination limits the Rule's utility as
a deterrent to belated filing. On account of the Rule's limitations, it
provides no assurance that a petition will be dismissed even in cases
involving enormous delays in filing. 124
Rule 9(a) is, however, all that is available in this area at the present
time, and its potential utility has been undermined by a narrow judicial
construction. The Rule identifies prejudice to the state's "ability to
respond to the petition" resulting from delay as the basis for dismissal. In
Aiken v. Spalding, 684 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982), the court held that this
refers only to the state's ability to respond to the particular claims raised
in the petition. Under this interpretation, the fact that unjustified delay
by the petitioner has made it difficult or impossible to re-try him in the
123

S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1983).
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See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J.,

concerning denial of certiorari); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 154 (1985); Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir.
1983).
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event that a writ is granted cannot be given any weight in applying the
Rule. The same interpretation has been reiterated in other decisions
without any independent analysis. 125
However, an examination of the relevant legislative history shows
that the state's "response" to the petition can validly be understood as
encompassing re-trial of the petitioner in the event that the petition is
granted. The Advisory Committee Note to the substantially identical and
concurrently promulgated Rule 9(a) for § 2255 motion proceedings
stated explicitly that the purpose of the rule was to "prevent movants
from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in
meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial"
(emphasis added). 126 The same understanding was implicit in testimony
on behalf of the Judicial Conference before the responsible Congressional

125
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In the same context in Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, the Court noted that a Judicial
Conference advisory committee had made a proposal, which had not been adopted, to
amend Rule 9(a) to state explicitly that dismissal based on prejudice to re-trial was
permitted, and that Congress had not created a time limit on habeas corpus
applications. However, the purpose of the proposed rule change cited by the Court was
to "make clear that the !aches principle in [Rule 9(a)] also applies when the state ...
has been prejudiced in its ability to retry the petitioner." 52 U.S.L.W. 2145 (1983). The
notice of this proposed clarification did not state or suggest that such prejudice could
not be considered under a proper reading of the current Rule. See id. As discussed
earlier, pp. 31-32, 61-64 supra, the Senate overwhelmingly passed legislation in 1984
that would have created a definite time limit on habeas applications. The failure of the
House of Representatives to pass comparable legislation has no apparent relevance to
the interpretation of current Rule 9(a).

i
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See Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241, 1247 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1983); Strahan v.
Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1985). In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
264-65 (1986), the Court rejected a suggestion in Justice Powell's dissent that the
Court should create a caselaw rule allowing dismissal of delayed grand jury
discrimination claims where substantial prejudice to the possibility of a re-trial has
resulted. In discussing this question the Court noted that a Rule 9(a) dismissal had
been denied by the district court, and stated that "Congress has not seen fit ... to
provide the State with an additional defense to habeas corpus petitions based on the
difficulties that it will face if forced to retry the defendant." This remark assumed the
narrower interpretation of Rule 9(a), but it was evidently based on a facial reading of
the Rule, and constituted dictum on an issue that was not presented in the case. There
is no reason to believe that the Court would regard it as controlling in a case that
actually presented the question of what types of prejudice can be considered in a Rule
9(a) dismissal motion.

The Note also quoted passages from judicial opinions which emphasized the prejudice
to the possibility of re-trial created by delay in filing. See id.

committee. 127

In rejecting this understanding, the court in Spalding discerned a
general hostility on Congress's part to the purposes of Rule 9(a). In fact,
however, Congress rejected arguments raised at the hearings on the
proposed rules that Rule 9(a) should not be enacted, 128 and only changed
the Rule by deleting two sentences which would have created a
presumption of prejudice to the government in case a petition was filed
after a five-year period which would normally run from conviction. The
legislative history indicates that the reasons for this change were (1) a
concern that the five-year period running from conviction could expire in
some cases before a prisoner was able to exhaust state remedies, (2) the
view that the state is in a better position than the petitioner to show
whether it has been prejudiced by delay, and (3) the view that the
formulation without a definite time period specification would be
consistent with existing law, including the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
that "[a] motion for ... relief may be made at any time." 129 None of
these reasons provides a basis for distinguishing between prejudice in
meeting a petitioner's claims and prejudice to the possibility of re-trial, or
suggest a legislative purpose to reject the interpretation presented to
Congress in the Advisory Committee's notes.
Thus, a good argument can be made that reading "prejudice" under
the rule to include prejudice to the possibility of re-trial is more
consistent with the rule's intended interpretation than the narrow facial
reading adopted in Aiken v. Spalding, as well as that the interpretation
adopted in that decision imposes a limitation on the type of prejudice
that can be considered which makes no sense in principle. 130

127
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See Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 15319 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1976) (illustration of
"prejudice" under the Rule by case of prisoner considering delay until unavailability of
government witness would prevent new trial and reconviction).
See id. at 20-23, 25-27, 29-40, 32-43, 36-37.
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See id. at 32-33, 50-52, 107-08, 111-14; 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2478,
2481 & nn. 8-9 (House Judiciary Committee Report); 122 Cong. Rec. 30222-23 (1976);
id. 30758.
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See Aiken v. Spalding, 684 F.2d at 634 (Poole, J ., concurring).

Conclusion
In characterizing the development of the current habeas corpus

jurisdiction and the reaction to proposed reforms, Judge Friendly has
observed:
Legal history has many instances where a remedy
initially serving a felt need has expanded bit by bit, without
much thought being given to any single step, until it has
assumed an aspect so different from its origin as to demand
reappraisal -- agonizing or not. That, in my view, is what has
happened with respect to collateral attack on criminal convictions. After trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, in proceedings
where the defendant had the assistance of counsel at every
step, the criminal process, in Winston Churchill's phrase, has
not reached the end, or even the beginning of the end, but only
the end of the beginning. Any nturmur of dissatisfaction with
this situation provokes immediate incantation of the Great
Writ, with the inevitable initial capitals, often accompanied by
a suggestion that the objector is the sort of person who would
cheerfully desecrate the Ark of the Covenant. 131

1,

The "felt need" which habeas corpus has served in its historical and
constitutional function is one of basic importance in any civilized system
of justice. In its traditional character, it upholds the rule of law by
ensuring that the government cannot ·detain a person without specifying
the charges against him and bringing him to trial on those charges (see
pp. 4-7 supra).
L

I

In contrast, the current statutory "habeas corpus" remedy by which
lower federal courts review state judgments is simply an attenuated
appellate mechanism by which prisoners who have already been tried and
convicted, and who have unsuccessfully appealed their convictions (often
repeatedly), can re-litigate in the lower federal courts the same claims
that have been rejected at the various stages of adjudication and review
in the state court systems. This review jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts in state criminal cases is a recent outgrowth -- based on innovative
judicial decisions of the l 950's and 1960's -- from a narrow statutory
remedy created for completely different purposes in the Reconstruction
131

Friendly, supra note 41, at 142.

era. It has no relationship in character or function to the Great Writ
whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution. They have nothing in
common but a name (see pp. 7-24, 41-42 supra).
The resistance to necessary reforms based on confusion between the
current statutory "habeas corpus" remedy and the constitutional writ of
habeas corpus is a depressing testament to the power of terminology to
overpower substance and stifle intelligent reflection. Calling a decoy a
duck does not make it fly. Calling the existing review jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts over state judgments "habeas corpus" does not make
it into the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law.
Putting aside the erroneous identification of the current statutory
remedy and the traditional writ of habeas corpus, we see no reason to
retain federal habeas corpus for state prisoners in its contemporary
character. Mandatory review of claims that have been rejected in earlier
appellate proceedings goes beyond any legitimate interest of fairness to
defendants, and the absence of reasonable time limits and rules against
repetitive application would be dismissed as absurd if suggested in
connection with any other appellate mechanism. There is no reason to
believe that preserving this extraordinary type of review yields any
benefits that outweigh its very substantial costs to the interests in finality,
federalism, and rational application of criminal justice resources (see pp.
3.2-38, 40-53 supra).
As suggested by Attorney General William French Smith, abolishing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners would be the optimum
reform in this area. The Constitution allows this, because the "writ of
habeas corpus" it safeguards is unrelated to the current post-conviction
"habeas corpus" remedy, and because its prohibition of suspension of the
writ creates no right to a federal court remedy for persons in state
custody. State prisoners would continue to be able to secure review of
their cases following such a reform through the various appellate and
collateral review mechanisms provided in the state courts, and would
also retain the traditional right to seek direct review by the Supreme
Court (see pp. 56-59 supra).
Congress has enacted a number of restrictions on federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners which are currently in effect, and has made
substantial moves towards a more complete solution on several occasions. When the first glimmerings of the expansive potential of federal
habeas corpus appeared in the late nineteenth century, Congress reacted

with dismay, but deferred direct corrective action in the expectation that
restoring the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases
might suffice to rein in the lower federal courts (see p. 25 supra).

supra). Substantially the same reform proposals have recently been
transmitted by the President as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice
Reform Act (S. 1970 and H.R. 3777), and now await Congress's action.
As Attorney General Smith observed in 1983:

When the Supreme Court itself began to incline toward increasingly
expansive habeas corpus review of state judgments in the middle part of
this century, the Judicial Conference promoted reform legislation whose
practical effect would have been close to abolition. Legislation that was
arguably of this character was enacted in 1948, but the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Allen refused to give it effect in the absence of a clearer
expression of legislative intent. Legislation that was unmistakably of this
character was passed by the House of Representatives in 1956 and again
in 1958. Ten years later, legislation that would have abolished federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners reached the Senate floor as part of the
proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (see pp.
28-31 supra).

The writ of habeas corpus that currently burdens state
officials and the federal judiciary, vexes federal-state relations,
and defeats the ends of criminal justice is not the writ of
habeas corpus that was esteemed by the founders of our nation
and accorded recognition in the Constitution. The diversion of
the Great Writ from its historic function is the source of its
current disrepute and the problems it has engendered. Its
availability, in particular, to state criminal convicts to challenge their convictions in federal court may well be an
institution whose time has passed. For the immediate future
the best prospect for meaningful reform lies with the Administration's legislative proposals. These proposals would go far
toward correcting'the major deficiencies of the present system
of federal habeas corpus in terms of federalism, proper regard
for the stature of the state courts, and the needs of criminal
justice. 133

In 1970, in creating the current court system for the District of
Columbia, Congress barred access to federal habeas corpus for D.C.
prisoners. Thus, "although a state prisoner across the Potomac in
Virginia, or one over the line in Maryland, has a second chance for
collateral review of his conviction in the federal courts in those states, a
state prisoner in the District of Columbia does not." 132 No adverse effect
on the quality or fairness of proceedings in D.C. has been observed to
result from this reform (see pp. 27, 57-59 supra).
The Supreme Court as well has shown an increasing recognition in
recent years of the costs of the existing system of habeas corpus review,
and has adopted a number of limitations on its scope and availability.
However, the potential for reform through litigation is limited by the
constraints of precedent and existing statutory standards (see pp. 38-39,
64-71 supra).
Whether or not a general legislative solution along the lines of the
District of Columbia reform or earlier "abolition" proposals is practically feasible at the present time, the potential exists for basic improvements
through limited reform legislation addressed to the clearest abuses and
excesses of the existing system of habeas corpus review. Legislation of
this type was initially proposed by the Justice Department in 1982, and
was passed by the Senate in 1984 by a vote of 67 to 9 (see pp. 31-32, 61-64
132

McGowan, supra note 108, at 668.
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Smith, supra note 74, at 153.
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Habeas Corpus Cases

As noted at the start of this report, the contemporary system of
federal habeas corpus review of state judgments can convert "the process
of review in criminal cases into a kind of interminable game, an openended hunt for official error. In this attenuated process the question is
not whether an innocent defendant, mistakenly convicted, may enlist the
aid of an appellate court in correcting a miscarriage of justice. Rather, it
is whether a persistent defendant, however guilty, may eventually get
lucky and persuade some judge or court to find error, given unlimited
opportunities to do so." 134 This appendix describes some particular cases
that illustrate the costs of a system which permits the indefinite
continuation of litigation in criminal cases.
1. The Hillery Case. On the night of March 21, 1962, fifteen-yearold Marlene Miller was at home alone, sewing a dress that she expected
to wear on her sixteenth birthday. Marlene never got to wear the dress.
On the following morning, her body was found in an irrigation ditch near
her house. She had been subjected to an attempted rape, and the sewing
scissors she had been using, monogrammed with her name, were
embedded up to the handles in her throat.

Booker Hillery, who was out on parole from an earlier rape
conviction, was arrested for the crime, convicted, and sentenced to death.
Hillery's conviction marked the start of sixteen years of litigation in the
state courts.

1:

The conviction and sentence were initially upheld by the Supreme
Court of California on appeal in 1963 (386 P.2d 477). In 1965, that court
upheld Hillery's conviction again on re-hearing, finding all his claims to
be without merit or non-prejudicial, and characterizing the evidence of
guilt as "overwhelming" (401 P.2d 382, 395). 135 However, the jury that
sentenced Hillery to death had been given instructions relating to the
possibility of release on parole if a life term was imposed and the
possibility of reduction of the sentence that were inconsistent with a
California Supreme Court decision which followed Hillery's trial and
134
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Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the
Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland, at 1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986).
Hillery applied for review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court. The
Court denied certiorari (386 U.S. 938).

initial appeal. The case was accordingly remanded for a new penalty trial
(401 P.2d 384-85, 395).
At the second penalty trial, Hillery was again sentenced to death,
and the sentence was upheld by the California Supreme Court on appeal
in 1967 (423 P .2d 208). Hillery subsequently filed a petition for state
habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, presenting a new
challenge to the result of the second penalty trial. A potential juror had
been excused at that trial after she stated that she thought that she could
not sentence anyone to death in any case or follow state law relating to
capital punishment. The California Supreme Court believed that the trial
judge's questioning on this point and the juror's responses were
inadequate under the standard of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968), and overturned Hillery's capital sentence again (457 P.2d 565).
This decision in 1969 was followed by a third penalty trial, at which
Hillery was sentenced to death for the third time. He appealed to the
California Supreme Court, raising various claims attacking his conviction
and sentence. In 1974, that court affirmed the conviction again, but the
sentence was changed to life imprisonment on the basis of a 1972
California Supreme Court decision holding capital punishment to be
inconsistent with the state constitution. That decision had been promptly
overturned through amendment of the state constitution by initiative, but
this change was deemed too late to affect Hillery's case (519 P.2d 572). In
1978, Hillery engaged in a final round of state habeas corpus litigation
which terminated with the denial of his petition by the California
Supreme Court. 136
The conclusion of sixteen years of state court litigation in Hillery's
case was, to borrow Judge Friendly's phrase, only "the end of the
beginning." 137 Later in 1978, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in
federal district court, alleging that blacks had been intentionally excluded
from the grand jury that indicted him in 1962. This issue had been
raised, prior to Hillery's initial trial, before the state superior court judge
responsible for grand jury selection (Judge Wingrove). There had been
no blacks on the seven grand juries selected by that judge, though blacks
constituted about 5% of the county's population in the relevant period,
and blacks had served on trial juries. In ruling on a motion to quash the
136

See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 256 & n.2, 279 n.10 (1986); id., Brief for
Petitioner at 5-6 and Brief for Respondent at 3.
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Friendly, supra note 41, at 142.
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indictment, Judge Wingrove denied that the absence of blacks on the
grand juries he had selected was the result of discrimination, and stated
that he had made unsuccessful efforts to identify qualified blacks for
grand jury service. In particular, he had previously asked Hillery's
lawyer (who was black) to identify such persons, and had considered
selecting a particular black resident of the county for grand jury service,
but declined to do so after determining that it would interfere with the
prospective juror's regular employment. Judge Wingrove's rejection of
this discrimination claim was affirmed by the California Supreme Court
on appeal. The discrimination claim was later rejected again in state
habeas corpus proceedings. 138
Hillery's federal habeas corpus petition re-presenting this claim was
litigated over a period of five years before the district court (496 F. Supp.
632; 533 F. Supp. 1189; 563 F. Supp. 1228). In 1983, the district court
finally reached the merits of the claim and granted the writ. The evidence
before the court included the records of state proceedings; testimony
given in the federal proceedings by Hillery's former lawyer in support of
the claim that he had unsuccessfully litigated in the state courts twenty
years earlier; and a statistical analysis of grand jury selection in Kings
County up to the time of Hillery's case. Judge Wingrove was not
available to testify in response to the charge that he had engaged in
intentional discrimination on the basis of race, having died many years
before the federal proceedings.

selection process, 141 and the fact that Judge Wingrove did select a black
person to serve on a grand jury in the year following Hillery's
indictment. 142 The court refused to credit Judge Wingrove's explanation
of his actions in the state record and also discounted the state's
explanation that the county's black residents were largely engaged in
itinerant farmwork and would have suffered economic hardship from
grand jury service. 143 The district court's decision was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit on appeal in 1984 (733 F.2d 644).
that no blacks would serve" (563 F. Supp. 1247). However, the basis for this assertion
was not explained, and Judge Wingrove did select a black grand juror in the following
year (563 F. Supp. 1248).
141

The district court dismissed as irrelevant Judge Wingrove's explanation in the state
record that grand juries in Kings County rarely considered criminal matters, and
primarily performed a watchdog function with respect to the operations of county
government (563 F. Supp. 1233, 1250). However, this point was relevant as support for
a non-discriminatory purpose behind a practice of using certain judgmental standards
in selecting grand jurors. In relation to a body whose essential function was oversight
of county government, it was not unreasonable to want to choose "people who are
interested in the community, civic minded, the better type of our citizens" and
"someone who has some substance, some interest in government, some interest in
community activities, civil activities, people that take an interest that way." 563 F.
Supp. 1232 (quoting Judge Wingrove's explanation of selection standards). See
generally JA-33 and Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986) (description of grand jury functions and statutory conditions on service).
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Judge Wingrove's selection of a black grand juror was cited by the district court as
evidence that he had intentionally excluded blacks from grand juries on the ground
that it evidenced a change from prior practice after the discrimination issue was raised
in Hillery's case (563 F. Supp. 1248-49). One wonders what would have happened if
Judge Wingrove had not subsequently selected any black grand jurors. Presumably
that would also have been cited as additional evidence supporting the discrimination
claim.

143

Cf Los Angeles Times, Jan. 20, 1986 ("Raymond Niday, 63, a Lemoore insurance man
who was foreman of the grand jury that indicted Hillery . . . said .. . that economics,
not race, was the governing factor in selecting grand jury members: 'Three classes of
people served on the grand juries, a businessman able to sustain his family whether he
worked on a day-to-day basis or not, a retired person or a housewife. Farm laborers,
wage earners, blue collar people could not afford to serve on grand juries. You would
have created a hell of an imposition on any person in those categories. They had to be
out earning their living .... Blacks at that time in this county were at the lower end of
the economic scale, just as many whites were. If a person had the ability to
[participate], he or she would never have been excluded . .. . The evidence was totally
overwhelming against Hillery. We had no other alternative but to indict him .... The
court's decision [overturning Hillery's conviction] is a travesty, transposing an incident
that happened nearly a quarter of a century ago into the present day . . .. The futility of
it all upsets me.' ").

In granting the writ, the district court identified as supporting
evidence the absence of blacks on grand juries although blacks constituted about 4.6% of the adult population in the county, 139 Judge
Wingrove's knowledge that his standards for grand jury service did not
result in any blacks being selected, 140 the subjective nature of the
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See 386 P.2d at 486-87; 401 P.2d at 392-93; and sources cited in note 136 supra.

139

Much of the district court's opinion was devoted to a statistical analysis supporting the
conclusion that the absence of blacks on grand juries "was unlikely to be due solely to
chance or accident," assuming random selection from the general adult population
(563 F. Supp. 1241-46). This point, however, was of slight relevance to the ultimate
issue in the case, since the grand jury selection process was not random. The question
presented was whether the statistical disparity resulted from non-racial conditions on
service in an obviously non-random selection process, as opposed to the deliberate
exclusion of potential grand jurors on the basis of race.

140

The district court made the stronger assertion that Judge Wingrove continued to select
only persons meeting his standards "with full knowledge that such action would mean

1·

The state applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the Court
granted review (474 U.S. 254). The Court upheld the granting of the writ,
emphasizing that a finding of racial discrimination in grand jury
selection has traditionally been grounds for reversing a conviction, and
rejecting the idea of creating a limitation on the raising of such claims on
review in light of prejudice to the state's ability to re-try the petitioner.
Justice Powell, joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger, stated:

I

~I

I ,I '

The Supreme Court's decision entailed that the state would either
have to release Hillery or give him a new trial, although there was no
reason to doubt the accuracy of his conviction in 1963 for murdering
Marlene Miller. The impact of the Court's decision on the victim's
community and family were described as follows in a Time Magazine
article entitled "Seeing Justice Never Done":
Hanford, California, is a farm community, the kind of
place where people know each other by name and trust each
other by nature. "You can go downtown without a dime in
your pocket, do your shopping and come back to pay later,"
says City Councilman J. Brent Madill .... In any town, the
brutal killing of a teenage girl leaves a deep mark, but in
Hanford the wound remains, 24 years after the crime. And
now the U.S. Supreme Court has rubbed the wound open
again all these years later. . . .

Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury having
no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-year-old
girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that charge
beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of which is
unchallenged here. Twenty-three years later, we are asked to
grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus -- and
thereby require a new trial if that is still feasible -- on the
ground that blacks were purposefully excluded from the grand
jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that race discrimination has long since disappeared from the grand jury selection
process in Kings County, California. It is undisputed that a
grand jury that perfectly represented Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indictment would have
contained only one black member. Yet the Court holds that
respondent's petition must be granted, and that respondent
must be freed unless the State is able to reconvict, more than
two decades after the murder that led to his incarceration.

I

ii

"Where's the justice?" asks Councilman Madill. "Is there
any justice?" Most of Hanford believes little attention was
given to deterring the larger evil. . . .
Neighbors say that Marlene's parents, now in their 70's,
dread the possible reopening of the case. They still reside in
Hanford, though the house they lived in at the time of their
daughter's death has long since been torn down. The memories
have been harder to demolish. "The sad thing is that it keeps
coming back," says Marlene's brother Walter Jr. "We have
not been allowed the time to heal." And the end is still not in
sight. 145

It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational
system of justice.
11

The dissent went on to argue that the establishment of Hillery's
guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt at a fair trial demonstrated that
he had not been prejudiced in any legally relevant sense by discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, and that permitting such a nonguilt-related claim to be litigated indefinitely -- despite substantial
prejudice to the possibility of re-trial -- goes beyond what is reasonably
warranted for deterring discriminatory practices. 144
144

,,

C/ Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and Advisory Committee Note (challenges to grand jury
selection waived if not raised before trial); Remarks of Assistant Attorney General
Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the Administration of Justice sponsored by the
Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1986) ("[I]n Vasqu ez v.

Hillery . . . the conviction of the defendant for murdering a fifteen-year-old girl was
reversed after twenty-three years of .. . litigation on grounds of discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury ... despite the absence of any unfairness in the defendant's
trial. . . . As the dissenting Justices noted, '[i]t is difficult to reconcile this result with a
rational system of justice.' No purpose of affording justice to the individual defendant
can explain it, since there is no reason to believe that his conviction was anything other
than accurate and just. Nor can it be explained in terms of providing a systemic
deterrent to the specific evil for which relief was granted. Allowing defendants to
challenge the grand jury selection process for some reasonable time would suffice to
deter such wrongs. Allowing them to do so forever is irrational and absurd.").
145

Time Magazine, Feb. 17, 1986; see Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1986 ("A trial that
takes place so many years after the original crime only 'causes the victims more
suffering,' said Bernard Miller, the uncle of the slain girl. The family spent a lifetime
trying to forget a tragedy, he said, and now they are forced to remember .. . . 'My

II
I·'
I

The state authorities resolved to re-try Hillery, though doing so
presented extraordinary difficulties after the lapse of a quarter of a
century. Six thousand pages of transcripts from earlier proceedings had
to be reviewed. A number of key witnesses from the original trial were
dead; locating surviving witnesses and other persons with relevant
knowledge involved tracking down about 115 people throughout the
country. At the original trial, Hillery was discredited through the
admission of false alibi statements that he made to the police following
his arrest; these statements were ruled inadmissible at the re-trial because
the police had not observed restrictions on custodial questioning which
emerged in subsequent judicial decisions. 146 Hillery's testimony from the
1963 trial was also excluded. 147 However, physical evidence had been
retained from the original trial on account of Hillery's reputation as a
persistent litigator, and additional evidence was generated from this
material through the use of contemporary forensic technology. The loss
of witnesses was partially offset in some instances by having proxies read
transcripts of their testimony from earlier proceedings at the second trial.
On December 18, 1986, Hillery was again convicted of murdering
Marlene Miller in 1962, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Re-trying
brother and his wife were terribly traumatized,' he said. 'They've tried to live with it
and get on with their lives. But how can they when the courts keep tossing it back at
them? They're going to have to go back in that courtroom and relive the thing all over
again.'").
146

147

1n Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
statements obtained from a suspect in custodial interrogation could not be used at trial
if the suspect had requested and been denied counsel and had not been told that he had
a right to remain silent. The Supreme Court of California, in addressing one of
Hillery's appeals in 1965, had held that the questioning of Hillery violated Escobedo
and a related state decision because the police had not told Hillery that he had a right
to counsel and a right to remain silent (401 P.2d 382, 384, 394). Of course no such
requirement existed when Hillery was questioned in 1962, see Office of Legal Policy,
Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 25-32, 38-39, 55-56 (Feb. 12, 1986) (Truth
in Criminal Justice Report No. 1), and the California Supreme Court found in its 1965
decision that the admission of Hillery's pre-trial statements at his trial was harmless
error "in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt" (401 P.2d 394-95).
However, the 1965 finding that the admission of Hillery's statements was improper
was deemed to be "the law of the case" and sufficient to require their exclusion at his
second trial in 1986.

Hillery's testimony at the original trial included a reiteration of his pre-trial alibi story
-- which was shown to be false by other evidence -- and also brought out the fact that
he had a prior rape conviction (386 P.2d 481-82; 401 P.2d 395). These facts were
concealed from the jury at the re-trial in 1986.

Hillery had cost the county over $250,000. Within hours of the
conviction, a notice of appeal was filed with the California Court of
Appeal; Hillery's appeal is now pending before that court. And the end is
still not in sight. 148
2. The Aiken Case. Arthur Aiken and Antonio Wheat robbed gas
stations and killed the attendants. Following their third robbery and
murder within a single month in 1965, they were apprehended by the
police.

Aiken was advised of his rights after being taken into custody. He
was initially unwilling to talk to the police when questioned, and stated
repeatedly during a brief portion of the interrogation that he wanted a
lawyer and did not want to say anything. However, after Aiken was
confronted with his accomplice Wheat's refusal to retract statements
which imputed primary responsibility for one of the killings to Aiken, he
became eager to give his version of the crimes, and provided detailed
confessions which inculpated him in two of the murders. At trial, Aiken
was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death (434
P.2d 10, 14-15, 27-29).
The conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington,
which remanded the case for additional fact-finding concerning the
propriety of admitting Aiken's confessions. The trial court concluded
that the confessions had been properly admitted, and the state supreme
court, agreeing, upheld the judgment. 149
In reaching this result, the court noted that continued questioning
following a request for counsel or an expression of unwillingness to talk is
inconsistent with the restrictions on custodial questioning created by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, in light of Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), Miranda did not apply retroactively to
cases, like Aiken's, in which the trial preceded the Miranda decision (434
P.2d 21-22).
148

See Los Angeles Times, Dec. 19, Dec. 3, Nov. 25, and Nov. 17, 1986. Additional
information concerning the re-trial and subsequent proceedings was provided by
Robert Maline, the Kings County District Attorney who prosecuted the re-trial,
Ronald Fahey, who served as special prosecutor in connection with the re-trial, and the
Kings County Auditor's office.
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The court also rejected various other claims raised by Aiken, including claims relating
to pre-trial publicity, denial of severance, admission of evidence, and jury instructions
(434 P.2d 35-40).

The court also rejected arguments (434 P.2d 22-24, 31-34) that
Aiken's confession was involuntary or inconsistent with the more limited
restrictions on interrogation announced by the Supreme Court in the
decision of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The trial court had
found that Aiken did not confess because of overreaching by the police,
but out of a desire to rebut his accomplice's statements portraying Aiken
as the main actor in one of the killings. The trial court also found that the
officers conducting the interrogation -- which was taperecorded -- did not
hear Aiken's remarks about wanting a lawyer or being unwilling to talk.
The grounds for this conclusion included the denial of all officers
involved that they had heard such statements; the fact that Aiken "held
his head down ... spoke softly, slurred his words, and ... let his voice
trail off''; interference by numerous noises from outside with audibility in
the interview room; the distance of the interviewing officers from Aiken;
and the great difficulty of hearing on the tape many of Aiken's answers -including the disputed statements -- as a result of which the trial court
did "not believe that the interrogating officers heard, nor could possibly
... have heard, any request for an attorney or desire to remain silent"
(434 P.2d 27-33).

Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for
findings on the issue of whether the state had been prejudiced by Aiken's
delay. The district court found prejudice to the possibility of re-trying
Aiken and dismissed the petition a second time under Rule 9(a). The
court of appeals, in 1982, then reversed the second dismissal, holding
that prejudice to the possibility of re-trial can never be grounds for a
Rule 9(a) dismissal (684 F.2d 632; pp. 69-71 supra).
The state applied to the Supreme Court for review, and the Court
denied certiorari in 1983. In a statement concerning the denial of
certiorari, Chief Justice Burger observed (460 U.S. 1093):
The time has come to consider limitations on the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts,
especially for prisoners pressing stale claims that were fully
ventilated in state courts .... The astonishing facts underlying
this petition are illustrative and instructive.

Following the affirmance of Aiken's conviction by the Washington
Supreme Court in 1967, he applied to the United States Supreme Court
for review. The Court granted certiorari (392 U.S. 652), vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case to the state courts for reconsideration
in light of the decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),
regarding exclusion of potential jurors who oppose the death penalty,
and the decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968),
regarding the admission in a joint trial of a co-defendant's confession
which implicates the defendant.

On October 14, 1965, a jury ... found Arthur Aiken and
his codefendant guilty of murder in the first degree for the
robbery and slayings of three gas station attendants .... On
direct appeal, Aiken advanced numerous challenges to his
conviction. Following a remand to the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. . . . On petition for certiorari to this court, the
conviction was vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration .... After a second petition for certiorari, the conviction
was again vacated and remanded .... The state trial court then
resentenced Aiken to three consecutive life prison terms.

On remand, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the conviction and sentence in 1969, finding that the state procedures followed in
Aiken's trial had been consistent with the new constitutional rules that
were subsequently announced in Witherspoon and Bruton (452 P.2d 232).
The United States Supreme Court disagreed on the Witherspoon issue,
and overturned Aiken's death sentence in 1971 (403 U.S. 946). On
remand, Aiken was re-sentenced to three consecutive life terms.

On July 26, 1979, fourteen years after his original
conviction and eight years after his resentencing, Aiken filed
this [habeas corpus] petition .... He raised claims concerning
pretrial publicity, the voluntariness of his confession, and the
trial court's failure to grant severance -- all claims that had
been raised and decided . . . in his first appeal to the
Washington Supreme Court.

Aiken's case was then quiet for eight years. In 1979, however, he
filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district
court dismissed the petition on grounds of delay in filing under Rule 9(a)
of the habeas corpus procedural rules. A panel of the Ninth Circuit

On February 22, 1980, the District Court denied the
habeas petition ... [under] ... Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a). The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
prejudice may not be presumed. On remand, the state

presented evidence that it could locate only 30 of the 87
witnesses who testified at trial and that 136 of the State's 138
exhibits were lost or destroyed. Finding that the evidence
demonstrated that it would be difficult to retry Aiken ... the
District Court again dismissed the petition . ... The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that
Rule 9(a) allows consideration only of the State's difficulty in
"respond[ing] to the [habeas] petition," and not consideration
of the difficulty in retrying the petitioner.
Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 1983, the case
was returned to the district court, which reached a decision on Aiken's
petition in 1985. That court observed:
Aiken's conviction, which will soon reach its twentieth
anniversary, has been before the [state] trial court twice, the
Supreme Court of Washington four times, the Supreme Court
of the United States three times, the United States Court of
Appeals twice, and is before this court for the third time. 150
The district court rejected all of Aiken's claims on the merits
including the claim that admission of his confessions violated his rights
under the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
On the Sixth Amendment issue, the district court deferred to the
state trial court's determination that the interviewing officers had not
heard Aiken's requests for counsel, finding it to be fairly supported by
the record. While the result reached on this claim was correct, the
district court's reliance on the state court's findings and rationale was
unnecessary. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot attach
before a defendant is formally charged with a crime or initially brought
into court. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32 (1986). Since
these events had not occurred at the time of Aiken's interrogation (434
P.2d 14-15, 27-29, 54), his rights under the Sixth Amendment were not
violated even if the officers did hear his requests for counsel. 151
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The opinion generated in the district court was a magistrate's report that was approved
and adopted by the court. Aiken v. Spalding, Report and Recommendation in Case No.
C79-892R (W.D. Wash., June 14, 1985); Judgment of District Court in Case No.
C79-892R (W.D . Wash., Sept. 5, 1985). References to the statements and reasoning of
the "district court" refer to the magistrate's report.

isi

The principal case establishing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot

On the question of the voluntariness of Aiken's confession (the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment issue), the district court found -- like the
state courts almost twenty years earlier -- that Aiken had not confessed
because of police coercion, but in order to respond to his accomplice
Wheat's effort to shift most of the blame to Aiken. The district court also
found the case to be indistinguishable from Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
(1969) -- another case involving a post-Escobedo but pre-Miranda
interrogation -- in which the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a
confession obtained through continued questioning after the defendant
had expressed a desire to talk to a lawyer.
Aiken appealed the district court's denial of the writ to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel of the Ninth Circuit, in 1988, then
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, although
Aiken had previously litigated all of his claims in state court and the state
had conceded before the district court that state remedies were exhausted. 152 In the district court proceedings, Aiken had presented new
evidence in support of his confession claim -- specifically, a sound
expert's enhancement and analysis of the taperecording -- which had not
been presented to the state courts. The panel believed that this evidence
"substantially improves the evidentiary basis for Aiken's right-to-counsel
and voluntariness arguments," and accordingly should be considered in
the first instance in the state courts. 153
Thus, nine years of federal habeas corpus litigation -- following six
years of state and federal litigation on direct review and eight years of
attach prior to formal accusation, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), came after
the district court's decision. The Supreme Court had previously taken the same
position in different factual settings in United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984),
and the plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
1 2

s Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1988).

IS3 For

reasons suggested in the textual discussion of the district court's decision (pp.
86-87 supra), this conclusion was unwarranted. Even if the "new evidence" did
establish that the officers heard Aiken's requests for counsel, there could be no Sixth
Amendment violation, since adversarial judicial proceedings had not commenced at
the time of his interrogation. Both the district court and the state courts also made
determinations that rebutted Aiken's involuntariness claim and that were independent
of the question whether the officers had heard his statements (specifically, the finding
that Aiken's confession resulted from a desire to refute his accomplice's accusation
rather than from any misconduct by the police). Prior assessment of the "new
evidence" by the state courts is unnecessary because -- even taken for all it might be
worth -- it would not entitle Aiken to relief on his confession claim.

pure delay -- failed to produce a federal court resolution of the merits of
the claims raised in Aiken's petition. If his claims are again presented to
and rejected by the state courts, he will then be free to commence
another round of habeas corpus litigation in the lower federal courts.
3. The Witt Case. On October 28, 1973, Johnny Witt was out bow

and arrow hunting with a younger friend, Gary Tillman. The two men
had spoken on other occasions about killing a human, and had stalked
persons like animal prey. On that day, they waylaid 11 year old Jonathan
Kushner as he rode his bicycle along a path through a wooded area.
Tillman struck Jonathan on the head with a star bit from a drill. Witt
and Tillman then wrestled the struggling boy to the ground, bound and
gagged him, and placed him in the trunk of Witt's car. They drove to a
deserted grove and discovered when they opened the trunk that the
victim had died by suffocating from the gag. They then "dug a grave for
the Kushner boy and . . . slit his stomach so it would not bloat. Before
burying the victim, Witt and Tillman performed various acts of sexual
perversion and violence to Kushner's body." 154
Witt was turned in to the sheriffs department by his wife, and gave
a detailed confession to the crime following his arrest. At trial, he was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the conviction and sentence on appeal in 1977 (342 So.2d
497). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (434 U.S. 935;
434 U.S. 1026).

Witt then applied for post-conviction relief in the state trial court.
The application was denied, and the Florida Supreme court affirmed the
denial in 1980. The court noted that "Witt raises essentially six issues, all
of which he admits either were raised in the direct appeal from his
conviction and sentence, or could have been raised at that time." The
court went on to find that alleged changes in caselaw subsequent to
Witt's initial appeal were insufficient to justify the relitigation or belated
raising of these claims (387 So.2d 922). The United States Supreme Court
again denied certiorari (449 U.S. 1067).
In 1980, Witt applied for habeas corpus in federal district court.
The district court denied the writ. On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the rejection of most of Witt's claims,
154

Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1983); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 414 (1985); Witt v. State, 342 So.2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977).

but concluded that the writ should be granted on the basis of improper
exclusion of a potential juror.
The specific claim was that three prospective jurors who opposed
capital punishment had been excused on inadequate grounds. The
defense had raised no objection to excusing these individuals during jury
selection in 1974, and the same type of claim had been rejected by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Witt's initial appeal. Nevertheless, the
Eleventh Circuit focused on one prospective juror who was excused after
she indicated that she was opposed to capital punishment and that her
death penalty beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a juror and
judging the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This was deemed
improper under the standards of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
( 1968), and resulted in the overturning of Witt's sentence by the federal
appellate panel in 1983 (714 F.2d 1069).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the granting of
the writ in 1985 (469 U.S. 412). The Court held that excusing a potential
juror is proper if his views on capital punishment would substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror, and that a state court
determination that a potential juror is so biased is entitled to a
presumption of correctness under the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Supreme Court's decision on January 21, 1985, reinstating
Witt's capital sentence was followed by the usual last-minute flurry of
applications seeking to prevent or delay the execution of the sentence.
Witt unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the state trial
court, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and re-presenting on
a different theory his earlier objection to the exclusion of certain
prospective jurors who opposed capital punishment. The Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed the denial of relief (465 So.2d 510). The court found
that the belated raising of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
an abuse of procedure in light of the decision of Witt's attorney not to
raise such a claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, and also
rejected the claim on the merits. The court similarly found that the
belated raising of the revised juror-exclusion claim was unjustified and
also noted that the theory underlying the claim had been rejected in
earlier decisions.
Witt applied for habeas corpus and a stay of execution in federal
district court, presenting the same ineffectiveness of counsel and jurorexclusion claims. The district court dismissed the petition as an abuse of

the writ and denied a certificate of probable cause for appeal on March 1,
1985. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a stay
and a certificate of probable cause on March 4, 1985, agreeing that the
petition was an abuse of the writ and finding that it presented no
substantial ground upon which relief might be granted (755 F.2d 1396).
The Supreme Court denied an application for a stay of execution, denied
certiorari, and denied a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari
and a stay of execution on March 5, 1985 (470 U.S. 1039, 1046).
On March 6, 1985, after eleven years of litigation, Witt's death
sentence for murdering Jonathan Kushner was finally carried out.
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Senate
(Legislative day of Wedne.,day, April 18, 1990)
A blll CS. 1970) to establish COlllltltutlon&l
The Senate met at 9:30 a.m., on the
expiration of the recess, and was procedures for the Imposition of the sencalled to order by the Presluent pro tence of death, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration
tempore [Mr. BYRD].
of the bill.
PRAYl:ll

Pending:

Hatch amendment No. 1681, to strike proThe Chaplain, the R everend Richthat would prohibit the manufacard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the fol- vis1ona
ture, sale, and pos.sesslon· of certain semilowlna prayer:
automatic <assault) weapons.
Let us pray:

All1!1f'DXENT !fO. 1111
Owe no man a.ny thtng, but to love
The PRESIDENT pro tempore.
one another: for he that loveth another
hath Jul.filled the law.• • • Love wor- There will now be 45 minutes debate
keth no Ul to hu neighbour: therefore on the Hatch amendment, amendment
love t, the fuJ,/Ultng of the law.- No. 1681, with 30 minutes under the
control of the Sena.tor from Arizona
Romans 13:8,10.
Eternal God. 1n the pragmatic world [Mr. DECOKCIM] and 15 minutes
1n which we live, 1n the culture 1n under the control of the Senator from
which we are immersed, these words Utah, [Mr. HATCH].
Who seeks recognition? The Senator
of the Apostle Paul sound totally irrelevant. Yet we know 1n our hearts from Ut.ah. [Mr. HATCH].
Mr. HATCH. Mr•. President, I ask
. that. thla ls the wisdom of the agesthe opposite of violence, hate, indiffer- unanimous consent we put 1n a
ence, and all the destructive forces 1n quorum call with the time charged
life. Somehow, Father 1n Heaven. against neither Senator.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
quicken us to thla ultimate reality-

the way of reconclllatlon, heallng, and
fulflllment. Help us to see the world ls
starved for love, wives for love of husbands, husbands for love of wives, children tor love of parent.a, parents for
love of children. Help ua to understand. Father 1n Heaven, like oil ellmlnates friction, love brings peace. Help
us to love one another aa Thou dost
love us.
In Jesus• name whose love ls unconditional, universal and eternal. Amen.
RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME
The PRESIDENT pro tempore.
Under the previous order, the leadership time ls reserved.
OMNIBUS CRIME BILL
The PRESIDENT pro tempore.
Under the previous order, the Senate
will now resume consideration of S.
1970, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

Chair did not understand the request.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent we put 1n a
quorum call with the time charged
against neither Senator DEC0NCINI
nor myself. He is coming and he will, I
think, speak first.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore.
Without objection, It is so ordered.
The absence of the quorum has been
suggested. The clerk will call the rolL
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the rolL
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDENT pro temPore.
Without objection, It ls so ordered.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, before
we vote on my amendment to strike
the assault weapons language from
this bill, I would like to list one last
time the reasons I oppose the assault
weapons provisions.
This bill would, for the first time,
ban semiautomatic firearms. There ls

no functional difference between the
weapons listed 1n this bill and any
other semiautomatic weapon. They all
employ a firing action that has been
commonly used 1n firearms for over
100 years. The only difference be. tween these weapons and other semiautomatic firearms ls their appearance.
Despite some of the arguments we
heard during earlier debate on this
amendment, these weapons are not
the weapons of choice of criminals
Statistics tell us that handguns and
shotguns are still the most likely
weapons to be used 1n the comm1ssion
of a crime. For example, of all of the
guns seized by police 1n Los Angeles
and San Franclsco tn 1988, less than 3
percent were the assault style weapons
listed In thla and other bills. In New
York City, police recovered more than
16,300 guns In 1988--only 25 were
semiautomatic military-style rifles ·· now banned from Importation by the
admlnlstratlon. And here 1n Washington, DC, police report that none of the
assault weapons banned from Importation were recovered 1n 1988. The fact
that the Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco
and Firearms ls tracing more assault
weapons does not lend support to this
language. BATF only traces firearms
which It Is asked to trace. They do not
trace every crime weapon. And the
Bureau has stated that they do not
necessarily agree with those who cite
their trace findings as Indicative of the
percentage of these weapons used 1n
the commission of crimes.
The vast majority of the hundreds
of thousands of the listed weapons already possessed around the country,
are used for legitimate lawful activities such as self-defense 1n the home,
target shooting, and collecting. Some
for hunting, but mainly for legitimate
lawful activities of self-defense in the
home, target shooting, and collecting.
There may be some who use these for
hunting, but not very many.

• This "bullei" symbol ;cJcotifia sutemmts or insertions which are not spoken by a MMtber of the Senate oa the floor.
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The Senator from Arizona (Mr.
DECONCINI) is recognized.
Mr. DECONCINI. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, we have heard the arguments that these weapons . that
criminals use are stolen and that they
are lllegally obtained. Last night, I introduced the information from the
Oakland report that showed only 12
percent of close to the 400 guns that
were confiscated over a 3-year period
in Oakland were fllegal guns. They
were not purchased over the counter.
So these weapons are available today
over the counter in any gun store that
you go to. The people who use these
guns for criminal activity go in and
buy them. Why should they steal
them when all they have to do ls send
in a straw man, if they are a felon? In
Arizona, we have evidence that for
$100 they get a straw man to go in and
buy these guns. Why should they invol\•e themselves with any kind of
criminal activity when it is very easy
to buy them?
Mr. McCLURE. Will the Senator
yield on that point?
Mr. DECONCINI. On the Senator's
time, I will be glad to yield.
Mr. HATCH. I yield to the Senator
from Idaho.
Mr. McCLURE. I want the record to
reflect immediately after the co~ments of the Senator from Arizona
that if, indeed, a straw man was sent
in, that is an illegal purchase and,
therefore, if you are depending on statistics that show an illegal purchase
but based on a straw man purchase
that is, by law, illegal today.
·
Mr. DECONCINI. Let me Just respond to the Senator, I said in Ar!zo.

While ther may not be used by . Even if the provisions of S. 1970
many people for huntlng purposes, I achieved the impossible and kept all
would simply note that the second the listed guns out of the hands of
amendment says nothing about limit- crlm1nals, all the guns that remain
ing the use or ownership of firearms lawful for purchase under this bill
would be readily available. These proto hunting.
This language focuses not on crime visions cannot possibly, even on their
or criminals, it focuses on the second face, keep so-called assault weapons
amendment rights of law-abiding citi- out of the hands of hardened crimizens. It will not prevent hardened nals.
Mr. President, these provisions
criminals or deranged psychopaths
from obtaining a weapon l! that is strike at the heart of our constitutionwhat they want to do. These people ally protected right to keep and bear
will find their weapons of choice no arms. Other than their appearance,
matter how many guns we ban. Since these weapons are not different from
the majority of crime weapons are ob- millions of other weapons that are
tained through illegal channels, this always considered legitimate. There
assault weapons ban will simply make are legitimate, lawful purposes for
owning these weapons, and I do not
no difference at all.
This assault weapons language im- believe that we should be opening the
poses self-registration requirements on door to banning new classes of weapcurrent owners of restricted firearms. ons simply because the media chooses
These requirements impose a compli- to single them out. The facts do not
cated, cumbersome, unworkable, and support the need to ban these weapunfair imposition on honest, law-abid- ons.
Mr. President, I just have to say in
ing gun owners. The criminals will not
comply with these requirements. And closing that the only people who are
we do not know if the administration going to be hurt by the DeConclnJ laneven believes that this registration guage in this bill are going to be the
system will work. We do know, howev- honest, law-abiding citizens who want
er, that the administration is opposed to collect; own, target shoot, and, yes,
sometimes hunt with these guns.
to this portion of the bill.
Current owners of these firearms There are legitimate rights of these
may find themselves in violation of people to collect these weapons. They
the
registration
requirements, are not going to misuse them. The fact
through no fault of their own, if they of the matter is we are always going to
cannot obtain copies of the 4473 forms have criminals get what they want and
that result from future sales of the they are not going to register pursuant
weapons unknown to the current to the onerous burdens in this bill
within the underlying bill.
owner.
Anyone who violates the recordMr. President, I am tired of the
keeping registration requirements im- honest, law-abiding gun owners of this
posed by this bill will be ln violation of country being assaulted all the time
Federal law, and could be charged by those who really have as their own
with a felony. Even technical mistakes purpose the desire of getting rid of all na.
Mr. HATCH. Is this on the Senator's
that result in a violation of these con- guns. I am not speaking in this regard
fusing requirements can result in a of the Senator from Arizona. I know time?
Mr. DECONCINI. This is my time if
felony charie which, under firearms he feels differently on that. But most
statutes already a part of the Criminal of the impetus for this type of legisla- the Chair would so rule that I am back
Code, would prohibit that person from tion comes from those wpo really want on my time.
ever owning another firearm.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
to ban all weapons.
This would mean all firearms, not
Mr. President, there Is no real, logi- Sena.tor from Arizona is recognized.
Just assault weapons. As I already cal, Justifiable reason for doing ft in
Mr. DECONCINI. I said in Arizona
mentioned, some will find that they this case and taking away the rights of there was evidence of a straw man.
have violated the law long after they decent, law-abiding owners of guns. The report I cited last night, the Oakmay have sold the weapon involved The fact of the matter is, I hope our land report, indicated that 12 persimply because the new owner chose colleagues will support this amend- cent-Oakland, CA, did a survey-of
to transfer the firearm without provid- ment and strike these provisions from the 383 assault weapons confiscated
ing any type of notification to the the bill so we can then get about doing between 1986 and 1988 were illegally .
obtained. The remaining 88 percent .
original owner.
the rest of the criminal bill itself.
I reserve the remainder of my time. were pur chased legally, over .the
If these assault weapons, which the
I suggest the absence of a quorum, counter. I think ft is important to
bill would ban, are so bad, then why
are these provisions effective for only and I ask unanimous consent that the note, this gun costs less than $300 so
3 years? Indeed, these particular provi- time not be charged against either why would you want to steal it? Good
Lord, drug dealers can certainly afford
sions in S. 1970 are even stranger yet. side.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. $300 for a gun.
The Senate just yesterday tabled by
Mr. HATCH. I say to the Senator on
an overwhelming 82-to-17 vote the Without objection, the Senator's reMetzenbaum amendment which would quest will be granted. The clerk will thatpointhave banned all so-called assault weap- call the roll.
Mr. DECONCINI. On the Senator's
ons. In my oplnJon, such a ban would
The bill clerk proceeded to call the time.
Mr. HATCH. The testimony before.
not have prevented criminals from ob- roll.
taining any of these firearms or any
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I the committee was 80 percent.
other firearms. The criminal always ask unanimous consent that the order
Mr. DECONCINI. Pardon?
finds a way to get the weapon he for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. HATCH. That 80 percent of all 1
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. these guns were illegally obtained. I ·wants.
The provisions of S. 1970 ban fewer Without objection, further proceed- agree there are aberrations in the
so-called ~ault weapons than the ings under the quorum call will be re- country, that may be true, although I
Metzenbaum amendment banned. scinded.
do not think they can show whether
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about 45 secor.ds. It Is favored by drJg mili tary, !Lild this Is the law enforce•
dealers because the TEC- 9 Is Inexpen- rr.er.t version. It is advertised as the
sive and It Is ea.51ly conceal&ble wi thin perfect pollce entry weapon, born in
a coat. The list price is $380, some• R hodesia, improved in South Africa.
times less than that.
and then patented and perfected and
Ten assault gun models account for totally manufactured in the United
90 percent of the crimes Involving as- States. It ranks 17 among all assault
sault guns. One out of every five as- weapons traced in the first quarter of
sault weapons traded Is a TEC-9.
1989.
The next one I want to show you Is
Mr. President, it is clear to me that
called the Steyr-Aug. Th.ls is manufac- the time has come I.hat these guns
tured in Austria. It is a civilian version should not be available on the street,
of the Austrian assault weapon origi- at least for a trial period of time. We
nally designed to be converted to dif- are not infringing on anybody's second
ferent models. It accepts a variety of amendment rights. We bar people
military hardware, 30 rounds stand- from having bazookas today or Stinger
ard, detachable magazine. It can take mis.siles and machineg,.ms because ft
up to 42 rounds.
tArgets.
has been upheld that Congress can
Mr. President, this Is a gun that you put on those restrictions without barWe first have the MAC-11. This gun
happens to already be banned. BATF do not see hunters using a& they ring and infringing on the second
banned the production of the MAC-10 tromp through the woods shooting
rights of anybody.
u, 1982 because it was too easily con- wild turkey or deer, or even on the amendment
So, Mr. President, I am hopeful that
verted to fully automatic. The compa- shooting range.
my colleagues in this Chamber will
The next one is the Uzi Galil. This Is make the tough decision. I know the
ny continues to make this gun, however, and it is, based on the design, only a civilian version of the newest combat Political ramifications of even talking
changed enough to not fall into the weapon produced by Israel military in- about this. Believe me, I have had tbis
category of the MAC-10. It is equ.ipped dustries. It has been ba.'1?led by the bill up around here for more than a
with a 32-round magazine, a favorite President, as have all of these foreign year. I had a recall petition attempted
of surveillance and soldiers of fortune. imports. We do not know how long against me because I dared to offer
This gun is for military purposes. It is that will last. This will make it perma- something to fight drugs in what I
cheap. It is from $200 to $300. It is ad- n ent for 3 years. It 1s equipped with a
was a constructive way that
vertised by Its manufacturer as "the telescopic lens. It has a muzzle veloci- thought
would not infringe on the second
ty of 860 millimeters per second. It has amendment
gun that made the eighties roar."
rights.
Next we have the AK-47, which is so not shown up in the tracing statistics
Mr. President, I am going to a.st
familiar to so many people. It is manu- - yet.
There Is also the Uzi carbine. It is a ur.animous consent that the vote on
tactured by Poly Technologies. It Is a
the Hatch amendment occur at 10:30,
chilian model of the full~· automatic rifle and pistol combined, a civilian and
that any excess time under the
AK-47 designed by the Soviets and model of the fully automated Uzi incurrenUy produced by the Chinese for troduced by the Israel military indus- Hatch amendment be divided between
United States import. It is equipped try for import. This is the gun the I&- both Senator HATCH and myself.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is
with a 30-round magazine but It can n.ell military use when they go to war.
there
objection to the request?
It
Is
equipped
with
10or
25-round
handle a 5-, 20- or 40-round magazine
Mr. DECONCINI. Excuse me, Mr.
as well as a 75-round magazine. As fast magazine.
as you ca.n pull the trigger, that gun
We have the Beretta AR-70 manu- President. That the vote be set for
10:35. I ask unanimous consent thU
wm discharge, so you can shoot easily factured in Beretta., Italy. This is how the
request be changed to 10:35.
75 rounds 1n 1 minute. This Is the gun this gun Is advertised:
The
PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is
used by PUrdy 1n Stockton, CA. The
When the name of the p.me Is firepower.
price b about $370. But recently the Ultimate rifle for shooters who demand op- there objection to the request? The
gun price has gone up, since the shoot- timum firepower. Oilers heavy !irep<,wer, Chair hears no obJectlon. It Is so ordered.
ing tn Stockton, to about $1,500. We yet weighs aboutll pound&._
Mr. DECONCINI. I thank the Chair.
have a number of examples of this gun This Is a weapon that is being used
I understand there are a couple of
being used 1n Arizona against law en- against our police today.
forcement.
Then we have the FN-FAL manufac- Senators who do want to speak In
Then we have the Colt AR-15. It Is a tured in Belgium. It Is the NATO call· favor of this amendment and are on
civilian model of the military M-16 ber semiautomatic rifle. This is a their way. I only say, Mr. President, lt
that was widely used 1n Vietnam, not combat weapon used by NATO in Is really whether or not we want to
for hunting of deer but hunting of the Europe today if, God forbid, there was support law enforcement finally v.it.h
Vietcong. It is equipped with a 5-round military action. This has a detachable a modest approach to thi.3 particular
magaz1ne but ft can hold a 20- or 30- magazine. Twenty rounds ls standard. problem that they are facing on a dayround magazine. Its list price Is $750. It can take 10 rounds. It is ranked 13 to-day basis.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous conIn 1988 and 1989 It was ranked third among assault weapons traced in· the
sent that a letter from the Arizona /sJJ..
among all a55ault guns used 1n crime first quarter of 1989.
according to the BATF trace statistics.
Then we have what is known as the sociatfon of Chiefs of Police, the
Of 591 weapons traced 1n 1988 and 1n Streetsweeper, the Striker 12. This Is Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order
Just the first quarter of 1989, the only domestically produced after the o! Police, National Hes.dquarters, and
records I have here, they had 128 of import ban by the President. It ts a 12- several other letters of support from
those confiscated.
round, drum fed with 12-gauge ammu- law enforcement agencies be printed
The next one Is the TEC-9. It Is a 9- nition. It fires 12 rounds of 12 gauge in in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
rnlllimeter Lugar pistol, automatic less than 3 seconds. Yesterday I said it
pistol It Is domestically produced 1n would take 15 seconds. In less than 3 were ordered to be printed ln the
Florida. as I have said before. It Is fa. seconds this chamber can be emptied. RECORD, as follows:
AlUZOllA AssOCIATlO:W
vored as an intimidation factor, adver- It is not going to be emptied on deer
OP CJ1n:n OF PoUCE,
tised as an Intimidation factor. A because it would absolutely blow the
Phoenix, ·,4z, .4.uqu&t ,. 1981.
Miami manufacturer manufactures deer away. It is going to be emptied on Hon. 0!:Jf!fIS D!:CoNCllfI,
&bout 3,000 of these a month. It is people and Is used for spraying human U.S. Senate, Wcuhinvt<m, DC.
equipped with a 36-round magazine. It beings. Tha t was the reason it was deDear SENATOa D!:CollCIJIX: On behalf of
can take more. But that is I.his part veloped by the South Alrlcans as an the Arizona Aa!ociatlon of Chiefs of PoUc:e.
here. Those rounds can be fired 1n apartheid control weapon. It is for the I would like to commend your IIUPP<>rt of
st raw men purchased the guns or not,
Ei ghty percent is the testimony before
the committee.
Mr. Dr:CONCINI. Mr. President, all I
can cite is the most current survey
taken 1n Oakland, CA. by the law enforcement people there of the confiscated weapons that they confl.scated
during arrest of criminal activity. Only
12 percent of the 383 assault weapons
confiscated between that time were illegally obtained.
Mr. President, I would like to go
through some of these guns drug dealers use that the opponents want us to
believe are the guns law-abiding citizens v.ant to use to hunt and to shoot
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le~islatlon bannL'1g certain specified assault
rifles. As ) "OU a.re a ware, In J anunry of this
year a de put y sheriff was shot to death near
Flagstaff by criminals using assault rifles.
This lllustn.Les the nationwide problem
law enforcement officers are !acing today
from the un.restrlcted availability of assault
weapons to criminals and person., who are
mentally unstable.
It Is clear that the National Rifle Assocla•
tlon leaders.hip has chosen to take an unrealistic a.nd Inflexible stance evidenced by
their continued opposition to any legislation
attempting to regulate assault weapons.
Theae weapons have absolutely no huntln1
or legitlma.te sporting purpose. It Is time
that all Americans display your type of
courage a.nd conviction to take a stand
against I.he :t,,."RA and their unreasonable
and uncompromising policies.
I ha\'e personally talked to many members
of the NRA who do not support the stance
their leaders.hip Is taking. These people feel
the NRA leadership Is entirely out of touch
with the membership. While we all agree
banning certain rifles will not be the overall
cure for the problem. It Is a step In the right
direction. Legislation such as you are sponsoring givea law enforcement officers a tool
which enables us to deal with people who Illegally possess these da.ngeroUB weapons.
Once again. you have displayed your courage, Initiative and Integrity to support law
enforcement officers and protect innocent
citizens from slaughter. It does not go unnoticed you do this In I.he !ace of strong opposition from the powerful NRA lobby. Rest
assured the Chiefs Association will stand
behind you and assslst In any way possible
to overrome this strong opposition.
Thank :,,ou again !or your courageous efforts to combat violence a.nd drug trafficking In th1a country.
Sincerely,
0.utT D. LATHAM.
ChW of Police.
F'aATERNAL

Ot»n OP Poucs,

Louinnlle, 1fY, Juli/ 16, 1989.

Hon. DDOna DECo1'Cllfl,
U.S. Senate. E. Broadwa11 Blvd., Tuc.,on, AZ.

D!:.U SlcfATOll DECoNcnrr. Congratula•
tlona from the more than 4,000 law en!orcement officers In Arizona who support your
efforts In SB747. At a recent state conference In Prescott. the assault weapons. bills
were d.lacussed. We support your effort to
limit these types of weapons. Many of ua are
sport.men and members of the NRA. and
we are concerned with the Impact of your
bill. But more Importantly, we are mindful
of the ever increasing da.lly u.u.ults on ourselves and the Innocent victims In America.
We are fed up with the mindless argument
that sportsmen and every day citizens have
a r!irht to own any type of weapon available.
If your bill waa unconstitutional, the NRA
would not be putting mllllons Into the lobbying e.!fort. They would simply win the
battle In court. Common sense tells us that
gun legislation ls not new and must keep
pace with growing technology.
We u:rire you not to withdraw your bill In
favor of the Thurmond Crime Package. We
are not In favor of a watered down version
that will not solve anything.
Very truly yours,
PATRICK ln.JONGIU.

-

FltATEJUrAL

\

ORDER or POLICE,

LouuvUle, KY.
D11:il MR. McCor. I would also like to
extend the opportunity to the Senator to
write an article In our newsletter. We mall
to over 8,000 members 1n Arizona !our times
a year. You can send any communication di-

rectly to me and I wlll take care to have ft
included.
Sincerely yours,
PAT.

M!:TROPOLITAN POLICE DE:PARntefT,
SL Louts, MO, Februarv 1, 1989.

Senator PAUL SIMON,
Subcommtttee on the Co,utitutton. of the
Senate Judicia1'1/ Commttt.ee, Wa.shington. DC.

DEAR SENATOR SIMOK: I regret that I will
not be able to attend the Senate Hearings
concerning Semi-Automatic Assault Weap.
ons being conducted on Friday, February 10,
1989, but my schedule will not allow me to
leave my duties to the Department at this
time.
AB a law en!orcement official I a.m tr:>ubled by the Increasing misuse of these types
of weapons. I have always supported and
will continue to support any legislation I.hat
will protect the public from the sale of
weapons which have no sporting value. The
public and law en!orcement community are
facing an ever Increasing danger from those
persons who have used the current laws to
purchase these type weapons which more
and more are being modified and used to
commit crimes of horrible proportion. The
Brady Amendment and the ban on Teflon
coated bullet.11 are steps In the right direction. but even tighter controls are n eeded 1n
the areas of seml-automatlc and automatic
weapons being made acceaslble to Just
anyone who wishes to purchase one.
I will continue to fight any legislation
which will allow semi-automatic assault
weapons to nourish unchecked and out of
control, and give my whole-hearted endorsement to legislation prohibiting unquall!led
access to any weapons which have no sportIng value or leeitlmate need for anyone to
possesa.

I! I can be of any future help to you concemlng this or similar matters. please do
not fall to call upon me.
Slnce!'!!.!Y,
ROBERTE.ScHUTZ,
Colonel. Ch.kl of Police.

Poucs OmCERS AssOCUTI01',
JOLIET POLICE DEPARntE1'T,
Joliet. IL. April 1, 1989.

Hon. PAUL SIM01',
Diriaen senau Building, U.S. senc..u.
Wa.shtngton, DC.
Dv.11 SDATOJI SDl01': I have been a Joliet
police officer for over twenty-one yeara.
During that time, I have seen first hand the
t~edies caused by I.he proll!eratlon of firearms In our nation.
When I first became a police o!!lcer, a
"man wlt.h a gun" or "&hots fired" call in
Joliet waa unusual. Now these types of calls
have become common. This city has been
!aced with an escalating gang problem. The
crlmlnal used to be poorly armed. Now we
are t&kl.na well-made 9mm seml-automatlc
pistols of! the street. It Is Just a matter of
time before we are opposed by automatic
weapons with superior !Ire-power. ·
It Is !or this reason that I am urging you
to vote In favor of "The Assault Weapon
Control Act of 1989," S. 386. I believe the
survival of police o!flcers In the future may
literally depend on the ellmlnatlon o! AK-t7's, UZI's and slm.llar weapons.
Please vote In favor of this bill in order to
take these military weapons of! the market.
I would appreciate hearing your position on
thJs matter. Thank you.
Sincerely,
LT. NICHOLAS W. WEISI,
Chairman.

Cin· or SAM Josi., CA.
Mav

Senator HOWARD MrrzEMDAUN,

z. 1989.

Ru.ucU Senat.e Office Building,
Wa.shington. DC.

DEAR SElfATOll Mrrz!:NBAIJ1': The San Jose
Polfce Department strongly supports your
effort to outlaw military type assault rifles.
The mayor and city council of San Jose
have also passed a resolution urglnir the
State Legislature to outlaw assault rifles.
We view these weapons as having no place
1n a cMllzed society. Last year, within the
boundaries of San Jose alone we seized 15-t
such weapons; tragically, each and every
weapon Is capable of causing a Stockton
type massacre.
The following organizations al8o want assault rifles outlawed: the National Association of Chiefs of Polfce, the MaJor City
Police Chief's Association. the CalUornla
Police Chief's Association. the CalUomla
Peace O!flcers Association. the San Jose
Peace Officers Association <the collective
bargalnl.ng agency for all San Jose police of.
flcersl, the Federation of Police, the State
Troopers Association. the Police Executive
Research Forum and Just about every legitimate law en!orcement agency In the United
States.

Hopefully your committee will not be dis·
tracted by the National Rifle Association's
frantic efforts to contuse the public about
the overwhelming desire of law enforcement
to have these weapons of war outlawed. The
NRA has searched throughout the country
to !Ind a few Individual police officers opposed to the overwhelming majority opinion
of law en!orcement. These lndivlduala have
every r!irht to I.heir own opinion but your
committee should realize that I.hey are a
very small minority. I urge you In the Interest of the safety of police officers and cit!•
zens all.ke to pass th.II lerlslation.
Sincerely,
JOSEPH D. McNAllAJlA,
Chk/ of Poli«.
NATI01'Al. 8Bnun' AssOCIATI01',

.4kza!l(trla,. V.A.
Rl:SOLtJ'rt01'-NATI01'AL SBDun'
Asaoc1ATI01' SUPPORT OP TD 8. 388
Whereas, America's Sheriffs have major
responsiblllUes !or local law en!orcement in
the United States; and
Whereu, Sheriffs. I.heir o!!lcers and deputies are being con!ronted with criminals. Including narcotics violators and other violent
-

crim.lna1s; and

.

Whereaa, narcotics violators and ot.her
violent crlmlnall frequently arm themselves
with assault type semi-automatic weapons
and misule these weapona In the pursu!t of
their criminal activity against law entorcement; and
Whereas,- I.he continued use of these ·._.
sault weapons has contributed to the ~ .:..
number of murders of law enforcement o!ff• ·
,·
cers and Innocent civilian victims
Therefore, be It resolved that the National Sheriffs' Association goes on record u ;.;
strongly 11Jpportlng the CO!l&Te&I of the J~>
United States passage of Senate Blll-386 or ~
almllar leg1glatlon at the Federal level
··
lLulfOJS A.ssOCIATI01'
OP CHIEFS OP POLICZ.
Wtnnetka, IL, March ZZ, 1981. ·
The PJUtSll>IC!CT,
Tiu Whtte H0tue,
Wa.shtnglotl, DC.
DtAlt ·Mil. PRl:smEXT: You are to be •P- ~:
plauded !or your decision to stop the !mport
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ot military-style semi-aut om atic assa ult our cities today. The "drug war" we ha1·e tell you. They are frightened. They
wea pons.
_ been referring to for years ha.s become a want some support. They want some
It Ls my understanding that First Lady real wa.r on th e streets of our cities with real help.
Barbara Bush and the country's newly ln· weapons now th e rule, not the exception.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
sUllled Drug Czar William Bennett provided The firepower of the drug lords a.rmed with
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
measurable support for your heightened assault weapons has overpowered that of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
concern about the mentality that says these our nation's police departments and put the
assault weapons have some kind of useful lives of police officers and Innocent people clerk v.ill call the roll.
purpose !or the civilian population.
· in danger every day. I commend you for
The legislative clerk proceeded to
Now you must work to focus the attention moving Quickly to hold hearings on propas- call the roll.
of Congress on the passage of laws to ban als to ban the sale of these assault weapons.
Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous conthe sale, possession, and manufacture of Your leadership on this critical lscue in the
sent that the order for the quorum
para-mllltary assault rifles like the Chinese- 101st Congress will be invaluable.
m.&de AK47 . Both houses of the legislature
Attached Is a statement which I delivered call be dispensed with.
In Calilomla have recently passed such laws at the U.S. Conference of Mayor's Second
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
and even theu: conservative Governor Annual Conference on Crime and Drugs on ROBB). Without objection, It Is so or•
George DeukmeJlan has said he will sl.gn Monday, February 6, 1989. The message was dered.
such a law.
well received and led to passage of a resoluMr. HATCH. I yield 5 minutes to the
Addltlonally, Colt Industry's decision to tion by the Mayors and Police Chief's in atsuspend sales of such assault weapons ls ad- tendance calling for a ban on the manufac- distinguished Senator from Idaho.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
min.ble. We would like to see other gun ture and Importation of semi-automatic asmanufacturers In the United States take a sault weapons. Conference participants also Senator from Idaho Is recognized for 5
similar lead.
called on Congress to reverse Its position on minutes.
For the safety and welfare of all of our the Brady Amendment " in view of the mass
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator
citizens, there really Is no choice but to try murders of children and other Innocent for yielding.
to eliminate these assault weapons while people that have taken place in this country
Mr. President, In the limited time
clearly separating this Issue from all the since its defeat."
While I applaud locll.l lnltlatlves to ban that l.e have available to us this mornot her gun control debates rending this
the sale of assault weapons and/or to ing, I certainly do not want to prolong
country.
You have the ability to influence legisla- Impose a waiting period on the purchase of the debate because I suspect most
tion which could make access to these as- firearms, this Is not a problem which can be Members have made up their minds,
sault weapans more dilflcult. It seems a solved city by city or even state by state. It but It ts a little puzzling to note which
small price to pay and we sincerely believe Is a national problem which cries out for a p0rtions of the evidence that Is before
that the true hunter/flshertnan/rifleman national solution, which Is why your leader- the body should be brought forward
will not suffer as a result of such a sane, ship Is so lmpartant.
Unlike many of the other pressing prob- now.
limited, freedom-respecting method of llmltI want to call attention to Just one
lems you and I confront each day, the soluing gun violence.
tion to t he gun Issue ha.s virtually no price misleading aspect of the comments
Sincerely,
tag. The only price tag to be paid Is If Con- made by the Senator from Arizona. I
CHiu CARL DoBBS,
gress falls to act. It ls the increased social do not accuse him of attempting to
Presi.dent.
costs of fear and death in our neighbor- mislead. but I think the statistics
hoods. It ls the price paid when a policeman
[Vanguard, San Jose Police Officer's
ls gunned down or when a child kills a child themselves are misleading because the
Association, March 19891
Senator from Arizona was referring to
over a vial of crack.
J>J:l(l)mo LEGISLATI01' 01' " AssAULT TYPE"
I respectfully request that my attached what percentage of guns traced or
W&AP01'S
statement along with editorials which ap- what percentage of these kinds of
<By Carro J. Grande, President>
peared in the Boston Herald and Boston guns seized in crimes were of a parMembers of the San Jose Police Officers Globe be submitted for the record at today's ticular kind of gun that- ts banned by
Association have voted overwhelmingly to hearing. I urge Immediate consideration of
support California State Attorney General le&islntlon such as S. 386 introduced by Sen- his provision in this bllL
John Van de Kamp in his endorsement of ator Metzenbaum, and Quick passage of a - The point ls that a very, very small
prop0rtion of guns used in crimes are
Senate Bill 292 and Assembly Bill 357. Both final bill.
pieces of legislation address a level of reA.gain, thank you for your leadership on the so-ailled assault rifles; a very, very
spon.slblllty avoided by elected bodies over · this very critical Issue.
small number. And if you only have 10
the years because of well organized lobbies
Sincerely,
and one of them Is one of the banned
threate~ an erosion of our constitutional
RA Yll01'D L. PLYlOf,
11st, that means 10 percent of all those
rights.
Mavor of Bo,tcn.
that are seized.
San Jose's Police officers have very recentMr. DECONCINl. Mr. President. I
I would like to call attention to the
ly experienced a serious loss of life associated with the possession of a deadly weapan want to refer to one letter from the rep0rt of the Florida Assault Weapons
by a careless and deranged person. Slmllar Fraternal Order of Police in Louisville, Commission. The interim report-betragedies have also recently occurred in KY. It Is to myself, and it says:
cause they did not complete their
Stockton and Los Angeles, California, inDEAR SE1'ATOR DECONCUfl: Congratula- study In the time assigned to themflicted by persons po.ssessing the assault tions from the more than 4,000 law enforce- was filed on March 1, 1990. Anyone
type weapons addressed in the proposed le&- ment officers in Arizona who support your
lslatlon. We believe It ls time the majority efforts in SB747. At a recent state confer- who Is really Interested In how many
of our society be protected and shielded ence in Prescott, the assault weapons bills times these so-called assault rifles are
from the trauma inflicted by t he reek.less were discussed. We support your effort to used In crime should look at the Floriownership and disch arging of such weapons. llmlt these types of weapons. Many of-us are da Assault Weapons Commission InterThe propased legislation protects the law- sportsmen and members of the NRA. and im repcrt. You will suddenly find that
abiding rations! cltluns in their desire to we a.re concerned with the Impact .of your very, very few of the crimes committed
pos.,egs assault t ype weapons, but blanketly bllL But more Importantly, we are mindful in the State of Florida were commitremoves the guns access by the unstable in- of the ever increasing dally assaults on ourdividual who feels a need to vent thelr per- selves and the Innocent vlctlms in America. ted with the so-called assault rifles.
I would like to read a statement
sonal Image of low self-esteem on unsuspectWe are fed up with the mindless argument
ing victlms. We applaud the authors of AB that sportsmen and every day cltluns have made by Detective Jimmy L. Trahin of
292 and AB 357 as this legislation ls socially a right to own any type of weapons avail- the Los Angeles Police Department,
necessary and long overdue.
able. U your bill wu unconstitutional, the Firearms-Ballistics Unit, who testified
NRA wou,ld not be putting m.llllons into the on May 5, 1989, before a subcommittee
Office of tM Mavor,
lobbying effort. They would simply win the of this body.
Boston, MA, FebruaT'JI 10, 1989.
battle in court. Common sense tells us that
I will not read the entire statement,
Hon. PAUL SI.1101',
run legislation Is not new and must keep but I will start after the first paraChair, ~ate JudiclaT'JI Commtttee•, Sul>- pace with gro~ technology.
graph and see how far I can go.
commtttu on tM Con.,tttutton, Dirksen
Mr. President, I think it says to all.
Sffl4U Office But.ldtng, Wa.!htngton, DC.
With 18 years as a law enforcement offiDEA.a SDATOR S1.11oir. As you well know, the law enforcement people are cer with the Loi Angeles Police Departthe escalating use of high pcwered weapons scared. That ls the word we do not like ment, 12 of those years have been spent as a
ls one of the most Important Issues facin& to use, but that is the word they will Detective Train1n& Officer 88Sl&ned to the
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Flrea.ma-Ba.lllstlcs Unit. My vocatlon &nd
exper!ence ln firearms Identification has
put me In a unique position to witness first

May 23, 1990

The National Firearms Act of 193-i <55 years
old ) prohibits fabrication and possession o!
unregistered machlne guns, sllencen. and
sawed-off &hotgun£. The threat of prison
hand the realistic, and I repeat, the realistic
CoNCRESSIONAL TEsn!IONY Ofi AsSAULT
d~-, not seem to have deterred the criminal
magnltude of the problem., relating to fireWEAJ'OIIS, MAY 5, 1989
In fact, we seize more sawed--0!! sportina
arms In crtminal acUY1t1. Although my tes(By
Detective
Jimmy
L.
Trahin,
Los
Angeles
ahotguna than we do assault weapons. Even
timony here ls not u an offlCUIJ spokesman
for the Los Angeles Police Deput.ment, It Police Department F'lreanns-Balllstlcs Unit> common 22 caliber rifles have been convertLad.le. and GenUemen: I'm honored with ed. An Interesting note 11 that we ha.¥e
wUI be !ac.tual, not conjecture, and bSBed on
my person.al experience and training in the the l)I'lv!lege of belng asked to testify before never had an AK-47S converted, a TEC-9
thiJ. Subcommittee hearing regarding the converted. &nd H&K IH or 93 converted, a
field of nearly two decades.
Since I Vi1Il endeavor to be realistic, let's pendlni legislation dealing v.it.h the .so- Val.met M76 converted and so on. An atcalled
assault weapons Issue.
tempted oonversion wa.s attempted on one
address the facts and not myths,
With 18 yeani as a la.w enforcement offi- Ru,er Miru-H In the pa.st 12 yeara I have
Do we have a lar,re quantity of violent
cer
with
the
Lo6
Allgeles
Police
Departbeen in the unit and tt dJdn't work. Why?
crime lnvoh1ng flreanns? The answer la yes.
Do we lave a larger quanttty or violent ment, 12 of those yeara ha.ve been spent u a t94'I, of these so-called assault weapons a.re
DetecUve Training Officer asslilled to the not easily converted.
crime without firearms involved? The Ftreanna-Ba.lllst.lcs Unit. My vocation and
Who owns the majority of these mllitarJanswerla)"eS.
experience in firearms idenU!ication has
Have we had an Increase In so-called as- put me 1n a u.n.!Que position to wltnesa flrst atyle !lrearms? Tbe law a.bl~ c1tlzen. I
sault weapons being involved in violent hand the reallstlc. and I repeat, the realisUc can also categorically state that U you took
a suney of police ol!lcen 1n this country,
eel.mes? The answer is yes.
magnitude of the problems rela.Una to 1ireI use the term "so-called" assault weapons &nna 1n crl.mlnal acUv1ty. Although my tea- 1ou would find that the va.st majority would
because somewhere In this recent hysteria Umony here Is not as an official spokesman own at least one of these guns for o!f-dut:,
these mlllt..a.ry-style semi-automatic firearms for the Loa Angeles Police Department, it personal use.
When a law Is passed for societies protechave been mislabeled with the term "a.s- will be factual, not conjecture, and based on
sault". The actual definition relates to a se- my pe?"SOnal experience and tralning in the tion, It must do two things.
(1) It must solve the problem or ahow reallective fire gun capable of semJ and full field for nearly two decades.
autom&tlc fire utilizing an lntermedlate carSince I will endeavor to be realistic, let's istically that It will accompllsb something to
curb the problem; and
tridge.
address the facts and not myths.
(2) The people must have respect for the
Do we have a large quantity of violent
We have deflnltely seen an ln.crease In the
law knowing It Is 1n their best Interest.
crlmlnal use of these firearms durina the crime involving firearms? The answer la yes.
Considering number 1, does anrone firmly
Do we have a larger qua.nUty of violent
past 8 year,;. We have &lso seen an Increase
believe that banning assault weapons will
In quality semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, crime without fl.re&rms Involved? The curtail the crime problem? Hu rest.cictive
and other weapons durini the same time answer Is yes.
Have we had an Increase 1n ao-called as- f\111 laws worked here 1n Washington or
period.
N'ew York City? ls there any correlation
Are these assault weapons the cr1m.l.nahl sault weapons being Involved in violent with strict gun control and a decrease JD
crlmea? The answer 11 ye.s..
'"weapom of choice"? The answer Is no.
I use the term "so-called" assault weapons crime? The answer Is no. I've talked to hunWe take Into custody more handguns, or
dreds of fellow pollce officers and the overahotcuns. or 22 caliber rifles than any quan- because somewhere 1n this recent hysteria whelming majority agree that banning soUty ot a.ss&ult weapons that are seized. these milltary-style semi-automatic firearma called assault weapons ts not rolng to realisFrom an lnlormal survey that we took on have been m.lslabeled with the term "&S- tically decrease violent crime, gang activity,
over 4.000 l'\ll1S that were taken Into custo- ault". The actual definition relates to a se- or narcotics trafficking.
dy ~ a 1 year period. slightly mart! lective !lre lf\lil capable of semi- and 1u1l
There's no question that the dtb:ena of
automa.Uc fire utWzJ.ng an lntermedia.te carthan 120 would be clusified under this defi- tridge.
this country are 1rustnted and outraged
nition o! assawt weapon. That's approxiWe have definitely seen an increase 1n the with tbe ever lncreasmc crime problem. The
mately 3~ not the 20-50% embellished fig- crlm1nal use of these !lrearms durina the reaction by aome ls to do anythln£ whether
ures I'n been hearing nunored.
put 8 years. We have also seen an Increase or not It works. and wit.bout careful considAre the maJor1t::, of these !JrearmJ beina 1n qualJty seml-automaUc pistols, shotguns, eration of the conseQUencea. It'a ll'1llhful
illegally C01Jvert.ed to full automatk: ma- and other weBDOllS d ~ the same time thlnklng and hope that If we control some
c:llJne a:un st&tus? The aZJSWer 1a no. Our period.
o! these guns, crime wDl decre.ue.
Unit receives about a dozen auns a yea.r that
Restrictive laws on these so-called assaun
Are th~e assault weapons the cr1m.l.na1s
have been modified or attempted to be Rweapon of choice"? The answer 1s n o.
firea.nna will be &ivlna the <:oneemed dtlz.e.n
modlfled. Approximately half are faflures or
We take into custody more hand~. or a false senae o1 security In the belle! that
completely unreliable. Why? The vut ma- shotguns. or 22 caliber rifles than any quan- crime will supposedly diminish That's not
Jor1t:, ot aucb firearms are dl!flcult to con- tity of assault weapons that are seized. rotng to happen. Although It's too early to
vert and require extensive mod1!1cation. In From an tnformal survey that we took on reach any de!inl,tlve conclusion, I bave obthe put. the three most common f1reann.a over 4000 guns that were taken Into custody served aooolutely no positive effect whatsothat hue been utilized !or conversions con- ~ a 1 :rear period. Blightly more than ever on the crime problem 1n Los Angeles
sisted of.: The MAC-10/11 variants manulac- 120 would be clas&Uled under this dellnJtion since the local assault weapon ban was en•
tured by RPB and SWD; t.he U:rJ carbine of assault weapon. That'a •~oxlmately a.cted 3 months ~o.
and the Colt AR-15.
Let'• consider the second reQulrement o! a
3%; not the 20-50% embellished ! ~ I've
Why Tere t.hese the most popular conver- been h ~ rmnored.
law: "TI1e people must respect It".
1flons? Rot necessarily that the conversion
Are the maJortty of t hese firearms being
U a law Is PllSSed with the muston of hope
was~. bat the simple availability of aub- fileirali1 converted to full automatic ma- that It wm do something, t.he people muat
atttution machine gun part&. This loophole chine 1l1I?1 status? The -answer ts no. Our be behind IL Restrictive run control directbu now been closed with the passage of the Unit received about a dozen runs a year · ed ai. as.sault weai,ons will not st.rlk.e fear lI1
McClure-Volkmer Act of 1~ regarding ac- that have been modified or attempted to be the hearts of the crl.minal.1 finn1Y beDeve.
ceuibwt:, of parts.
.
modffled. Approximately half are fll.llures or however, that Jt wm have a dettlmental
On the other hand, U any crlminal has completely unreliable. Why? The TMt ma- Impact on the respect Ior the law by the
the Intense desire to create a machine ,-un, jority of such firearms are dlfncoJt to con- hundreds of thousands of a v ~ -cltlzena
any semi-automatic !lreann can be used. vert and reqntre extensive modification. In who possess these mill.t.ar.Y-style nrearma.
The Nat.loru.l Firearms Act of 1934 (55 years the past, the three most common flreanmi Law enforcement requires the peoples .supold> prohibt ts fabrlca.tlon and P<>,SSe$Slon -0! that have been utilized for conversions con- porL We do not need to create a new clasa
unrel1£iered mach1ne runs. aflencera, and lllsted of: The MAC-10/11 variants manufac- ol crlm1nal&.
It's unfortunate that we cannot enforce
sawed-cl! shotguns. The threat of prlaon tured by RPB and SWD; the ~ carbine
th~ thousands of aun laws presentlY existdoes not seem to have deten-ed the crlmlnal. and the Colt AR-15.
Why were these the most popular conver- lnJ, We do not have enough pollce, prosecuIn fact, we seize more aawed-of! sport.ma
shotguns than we do assault weapons. Even ll!ons? Not =-r!ly that the conversion tors. courts. Judge,, jalls, prisons, or money.
common 22 caliber rifles bave been convert- was easy, but the ~lmple &Ya11Abillt1 of sub- The entire cr1mlnal JUlltlce .syatem Is totally
ed. An tntttesttnir note 1s that we have lltltutton machine gun pa.rt,. nm loophole Inundated. A crlmlnal 11 lucky to do one
neYcr had an AK-47 con,oerted. a TEC-9 has now been elosed with the ~ i r e of the third of his sentence in Jail ~ n t gun
McClure-Volkmer Act of 1988 regarding to- laws are not belnr ~ While testl!yconverted, and BG&K 91 <>r 93 converted.
ceaibillty o1 parta.
~ In exceaa o! 400 Umea kl .firearms related
Mr. President, I !U!k una.nfmous conOn the other hand, l1 UJ7 crtmJnal ha.a cases during the D&St 1.2 ,eu,. I have !ailed
sent that that testimony be printed in the intense deaire to create a machine sun. to $U any ~cant. \lie of the enhancethe REco.a.n.
any aemJsautomaUc llrearm .can be Wied. ment law1 ~ to .auna ln\JO!ved ID

There being no objection. the material was ordered to be printed in the
Rr;cORD, as follows.:
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crimes. Th e majority of the time th ey are
not even filed. If fil ed on. they are reduced
or plea b~l\lned away. Fact: there ls no deterrent to usin g a gun In a crime.
In conclusion. I accept the fact that JumpIng on the assault weapon ban ls the
"trendy" thing to do, whether or not It accomplishes something productive. It should
be of utmost Importance that the consequences of slowly deteriorating the 2nd
Amendment to our Constitution be examined.
The problem Is not bad guns versus good
guns . .. It 's the bad guys using any gun 1n
a crlm1nal act with the knowledge that punishment for his actions will not be pursued.
It ls ludicrous to believe that the pending
legislation regarding assault weapons will
decrease crime. Based on my experience, I
personally feel It will create more problems
for law enforcement than It will solve, especially for the law abiding citizen. I urge you
to consider my testimony here today.
Thank you.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I reserve
the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
want to leave the record very clear
about the Los Angeles Police Department that has been cited here a couple
of times. I want to read into the
RECORD a letter from the Los Angeles
Police Protective League, compose of
police officers of the city of Los Angeles.
This letter happens to be to Senator
HOWARD ME'rzENBAUM. I will ask unanimous consent that it appear in the
RECORD at a later time.
It says:
DEAR SENATOR METz!:NBAUK: In response to
your Inquiry, the Los Angeles Police Protective Le114rUe supports leglslatlon that would
control sales and possession of assault type
semi-automatic weapons not only In California but on the federal level as well.
As active members of the National Association of Police Organizations CNAPO>. we
have supported S. 386 through our NAPO
representative and Vice President William
Pattison who has testlfled before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the Constitution.
Our Chief of Police, Daryl F. Gates, has
also testlfied as to the need for federal control of semi-automatic assault weapons
before the same committee.
We appreciate your effort8 to de-escalate
the level of violence In our country and to
provide law enforcement officers the support they need In providing a safer America
for all of our people.
So if he supports that one, he cer-

tainly supports this.
Also, Chief of Police Gates testified
before the Judiciary Committee. He
said:
These weapons, In my Judgment. have to
go. And I do not have any problem In defining those that are assault weapons. I can
tell you because I have had two police officers .kllled with assault weapons, one very
slmUar to the one that was held up here, an
AR-15.
Officer Dan Pratt was killed by an Individual In a d.,ve-by shooting who shot at him
15 times. hit him once. That officer would
be alive today had he not been confronted
with an assault rifle.
Another officer, another drive-by shooting. A MAC-10, an automatic pistol; he was

"

S 6795

shot at 17 times and hit seven tim es as he gerous types of assault weapons. We
was picking up his little boy fr om the hear t hose who say we want to s~rlke
..church school.
those modest restrictions down beWhat they do ls that they Just spray and
th en they have got the firepower to do that cause it interferes with the rights of
spraying, and when they spray, they hit hunters.
What are these characteristics that
anyone who happens to be there, and they
don't really care. We had 240 gang killings these so-called hunters want to be able
last year, 240 In the city of Los Angeles; 60 to use? One principal characteristic is
percent of those that were kllled were not that the assault weapon tends to be
gang members.
held at the hip. That makes for a
Mr. President. I do nut know any- great sporting weapon. I have had the

body that has a stronger support for opportunity to hunt in a very limited
the second amendment and a stronger way, and I have been out there with
political philosophy, quite frankly, in some hunters. I have not seen those
law enforcement than Chief of Police hunters hold their weapons at their
Daryl Gates. He ls a strong supporter hip and spray dozens of rounds of amof this legislation.
munition in a matter of seconds. That
Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to says something about a hunter; they
the Senator from Massachusetts.
are going to brandish an assault
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The weapon and hold it at the hip and
Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. spray out the ammunition in seconds.
KENNEDY] ls recognized for 5 minutes.
Shorter barrels sacrifice accuracy.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President. I Users of assault weapons are not interjoin those that have spoken last ested
in the accuracy. One of these
evening and earlier today in commend- weapons
ls called the "Street.sweeper."
ing the Senator from Arizona for the
amendment which he has seen incor- They want to spray their ammunition.
Who ls kidding who, that these are
porated into this Democratic crime
legislation and for the courage which sporting weapons, held at the hip,
he h as demonstrated in standing by it. spraying their ammunition out there?
Despite the statement.s that have been They are trying to defend this as a
made by opponent.s of this particular sporting weapon. This ls a sporting
provision, I think it ls an important weapon? In many instances they are
provision. and I am very hopeful that readily concealable assault pistols.
That ls one of the characteristics. How
it will remain in the bill.
Mr. President, the argument.s that many of those hunting rifles that
have been made against the DeConclni sportsmen use are readily concealable?
This amendment does not apply to
amendment, both last evening and
today, go to a number of different ar- popular hunting rifles, but it applies
guments. First of all, there are those to some of the most dangerous of the
that say that this kind of amendment pistols. Some of these assault weapons
violates their notion of a constitution- employ barrel shrouds to cool the
al right to bear arms. We heard that weapon during rapid fire. That is
argument yesterday, and we ·heard it really a hunting weapan. I suppase the
typical hunter wants to be able to cool
again this morning.
Mr. President, if we are to follow that barrel after spraying ammunition
that particular argument to it.s logical across the countryside while hunting.
conclusion, then we would permit the You want to have that barrel shroud
sale of machineguns, bazookas and out there to cool the weapon during
grenade launchers. No one ls possibly rapid fire. Then you have threaded
suggesting that .the legislation which barrels, which are fitted for silencers.
is on the books at the present time Who in the world is thinking that that
prohibiting American from owning ba- ls a spartlng weapon. Mr. President?
zookas and grenade launchers or re- That ls basically what we are dealing
stricting the sale of machlneguns ls with.
The argument.s can be ma.de here
unconstitutional. We do not hear that.
We just hear, if you go after these that we have to get the criminal off
kinds of assault weapans, it ls interfer- the street.s. and all of us are for that.
ing with gun collectors and with their This ls why we support the entire
Democratic crime package. But we
so-called constitutional right.s.
That is hogwash, Mr. President. We heard that argument a number of
have seen, over the last 25 years, years ago, and since that time, we
where steps have been taken, very have seen hundreds of thousands and
modest steps, indeed, in terms of the millions of additional weapons out
regulation of certain pistols and rifles. there. Well, they say these gun restricThose statutes have not been struck tions do not stop crime. Mr. President,
down by the court.s of this country as in my own State of Massachusett.s
violating the consitut!onal right to that had additional kinds of restricbear arms. If you go back as far as the tions on small concealable weapons,
1968 legislation, they have not been some 85 percent of all the weapons
struck down. So there ls a legitimate that were used in crimes of violence
mandate for the Congress of the were obtained out.side the State. We
United States to enact legislation to are defenseless because individuals are
try to protect law enforcement offi- able to go across the borders.
cials and the public.
Mr. President, as I said, the kinds of
This amendment has been crafted weapans that I Just mentioned here
skillfully, I believe, by the Senator are the kind that are included in the
from Arizona, to target the most dan- DeConclni amendment. Sha.me on
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U10se indi\idua.ls who say th&t these
are sporting wea.pona. They a.re not
sporting wea.pona; they a.re used in
crimes of violence, and they are used
in the drug trade. They pose a. very
substantial thre&t to the ille and the
well-being of the police officers of this
cow1try. l hope the Senate will not
vote to strike this particular amendment. I commend the Senator !rom
Arizona for seel.ni that it 1s included
in the le&is}.a.tion.
I support the assault weapons provisiona in the .Democratic crime package. Frankly, I am convinced that we
must do more. This proposal in no way
restricts the rights o! law-abldini citizens to possess or obtain other, legitimate semiautomatic firearms.
But this legislation will reduce the
number of deaths and inJurie3 from
semiautomatic assault weapons by
drug traffickers and other violent
crlminals.

This proposal would ban a specific
list of semiautomatic assault weapons
identified by law enforcement as a
danger to the community.
The weapons are listed by name,
model, and manufacturer. This legisla.tlon does not apply to conventional
setniautoma.Uc rifles, shotguns, handguns, or popular semia.utomatic hunting rilles.

Drug Director William Bennett long
ago undelstood the connection between narcotics and firearms. He wa.s
tnstrwnen1&1 in the a.dm.tnistration's
ban on a specific list of foreign-ma.de
assault weapona, complied after thorough exarniJl1l.t.fon of the issue by

BATF ex.perts.
The import ba.n is a significant step,
but lt only encompasses 25 percent of

the a.:;sault weapons in the United
States. The remaJ.nlng 75 percent are
made right here and they are Just as
deadly.
ThJa legislatl~n takes the next step.
I would take one additional step and
a.uthorize a careful review by BATF of
the r~rn&lnlng 75 percent, applylng the
same exacting standards to those guns
that it a.pplied in determlning which
imports to ba.n.
Assault weapons put awesome killing
power in the hands of drug runners,
hate groups. and other c.r:lrolnals. The
ease with which these weapons can be
obtained la fuelJng the a.nm race on
the streets of every community in
America. Study a.fter study by Cox
Newspapers. BATF and others document the growing preference for assault We'1)()ns amolli organized crime
and drug traffickers.
The time Is long past for Congress to
enact legisla.tion to ban the sale and
tca.nsfer of ASSAult weapons, while protect.Ing the interests ot law-abiding
citizena.
Thl.i legisla.Uon has the overwhelming support of our Nation'• police, including the 90,000-member Na.tional
Association of Police Orpnlzatlons,
the International Assoc:latJon of
Chle.Ca of Police, the 200,000-member
Fraternal Order of Police, &Dd the

May 23, 1990

other leading law enforcement orga.nl- used for collection, for pl!nldng, for
zations across thJs country share those target practice, and for Just plain good
views.

sportsman a.ctlvitles.

Thia ts literally a matter of life a.nd
Frankly, I.he hone3t people who buy
death for law enforcement.
these do not use them In criminal acIn Escondido, CA, in December 1987, Uvlty. U we banned all o! those. and
a diagnosed schlzophrenic lied on h1a all that Sena.tor :t.lrrZEHKAUK called
Federal i\lll purchase form about hi.I for yesterday, and another 40 that
&rrest record. mental condition. and probably would look Just u bad a,
drug use, a.nd purchased &n AK-47- these, you still would not stop the distype assault rifle. The next day, under honest criminals from using weapODB
the lnfluence of methamphetamines, because they can get them overseas
he used the AK-47 to kill a San Diego even though they are now banned by
County deputy sheriff, wound two the President of the United Sta.tes,
other deputies and hold police off five of these nine. You can still get
dur1ng a 12-hour shootout.
· them overseas.
In December 1988, a Dallas police ofThey can still get them in a variety
fleer was killed while ma.king an \lll· of ways. They can still steal them. I
dercover narcotics purchase. The 1n1ess you can say if they are not sold,
n used was a TEC-9 assault you cannot steal them. The fact is,
year, a MAC-ll assault pistol why do we pa.ss Jeg!slati?.n that affects
was used by a ma.n in Louviers, co, to only the decent, hone-,t people, bekill hlmseU, but not before he used it cause the crooks, crimJnals, a.nd vito kill a woman and her mother and cious people are going to be able to get
wound a police officer.
these, regardless.
Last August, a New Jersey State
I have to take a. llWe 1.ssue with
trooper wa.s shot four times in the Chief Gates. Chief Gates is not one of
chest and abdomen by drug traffickers the great police people who_stand up
wielding a MAC-11 assault pistol
for second amendment rights, to keep
Mr. President, we should not short• and be&r arms. Chief Gates ls one of
change the law enforcement comm.uni- the la.w enforcement leaders In this
ty on this issue. They are on the front country who has always, as far as I
Jines of the war on crime. They Jcnow know, called for gun control He has
best.
always been on the side of gun control.
They know what is needed, they
I am not criticizing his sincerity on
asked for this and tougher measures that but do not lump him with the
over 1 year ago when a Jone gunman vast majority of police officers In this
opened tire on unsuspect1ng school- country who do not wa.nt gun control,
chlldren in Stockton. CA.
sports people who themselves appreclMr. D1:CONCINI. I thank the Sena- ate ha.vtng the right to keep and bear
tor from Massachusetts. He baa been whatever arms they want to within
out on this floor for the 14 yea.rs that the law.
I have been here, working on this type
The fact rema.lns that Officer Traof legislation. I have not always been hin'.s testimony shows that Ule fire- ·
supportJve of his efforts, because I arms that the distinguished 8eoa.tor
thought they went too far. But I from Arlmna is criticizing here todaY
thank the Senator for speaking today in his bill are not the weapons of
as eloquently as he always does, in get- choice by crlmtnals. The fact ts that
Ung to the point niht away. I thank the statl.!tfcs show this. So do not use
him for the kind remarks. I also thank Chief Gates for us. Chief Oate.s 1a
the Junior Senator !rom Nebraska for always going to be for eun co.ntrol We
his remarks last night and the senior are talking about decent. honest, lawSenator from lliinois, who spoke on a.bid.in&' citizens who want to collect
behalf of this legislation.
.
these.
I ask the Chair how much time I
I have to say, on the rifles, If you
ha.ve rematnlne.
take the metal parts off and replace
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The them with wood parts, you have a
Senator ha.a 11 minutes, 17 seconds re- sporting rttle. It Is exactly t he same
matning.
gun.
Mr. Dl:CONCINI. Mr. President, I · With regard to the machine pistols,
yield the floor.
they are not used for hunting; they
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who are used for target practice and for
yields time?
collecttng.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I have
The honest people a.re not misus1ng
to say that I enjoyed the remarks of their weapons. It is the criminals who
the distinguished Senator from Massa- are. We should go after crfmlnals and
chusetts, as I always do. He is a very not honest people. This bill will make
energetJc spokesperson for his parttcu- it absolutely burdensome to honest
lar side.
·
people, to be persecuted as they were
We are not talking &bout automatic before the .Firearms Owners Proteoweapons here tha.t you spray the tion Act passed.
forest with. They a.re banned al.ready
Mr. Presk!ent, l reserve the remain·
by the law. We have agreed to that der of my Ume.
long ago. We are not talking about
The PRESIDING OFF!CER. Who
hunting weapons necessarily. There yields time?
.
may be some of thoee that are used far
Mr. HATCH. Mr. Prealdent.. how
hunting. Most of these wea.poo.s are mYcll remaina?
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. T\rn right! Whal kind of a country would Lary rifle I ha.ve still has a bayonel lug
this be if we were obliged to prove the on iL I assume it makes me half guilty.
minutes and 47 seconds.
I own more than one semiautomatic.
Mr. HATCH. Let me yield 2 minutes necessity to practice our reJh:ion. or
The first rifle I bought as a young
to the distinguished Sena.tor !rom st.ate our vie11·s?
Idaho.
No. I believe, like Thomas Je!Cerson, man ~•as a .22 semiautomatic. I hope
that does not make me a criminal.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The that:
Senator from Idaho is recognized for 2
I own a semiautomatic pistol that
Our Jeglsla.tors are not sufflcienUy ap•
minutes.
prised or the rightful Hmlts or their power: my father canied when he was prosMr. McCLURE. I thank the Sena.tor that their true office Is to declare and en- ecuting attorney back In the prohibiforce only our natural rights and duties. 1.nd tion days. When out raiding stills. lt
for yielding.
Mr. Prt!Sident. It Is dilficult to sum- to t.alle none of them from ua.
was thought necessary to have a firemarlze in a short period of time what
And:
arm to protect yourself. He carried
the basic arguments are.
No freeman shall be debarred the use of that semiautomatic pistol which I still
Mr. President, the perswtent growth arms within his own 1andl.
have. I take some pride In it. I hope
of violent crime in this country has
The very first shot of the Revolution that does not make me immoral or a
given rise to increasingly emoUonal at- was fired because the Government was criminal.
tacks on the ownership of certain flreThe whole thrust of this legislation
its troops to disarm the coloniarms. The response to the scourge of sending
al citizenry and render them helpless that we seek to strike from the bill
drug cnme reminds me of a rem.ark against the excesses of Parliament.
today is against law-abiding citizens
made around the turn of the century
The criminals, especially the street like myself. It does not a.ffeet criminal
when the Nation was embroiled in a criminals
dope dealers that the acUvity. it has almost no rele\'allce to
railroad strike. Henry Cabot Lodge police fear,and
obtain
their weapons Ule- the incidence of crime and will have
said to Teddy Roosevelt, .. Isn't there
gally
in
the
first
place. Many fully almost no impact on drug-related
something we can appear to be
automatic
assault-type
weaPons used crime at all, as the statistics show, and
doing?"
has been said over and over ag:i.in
Time does not change politicians in crime are smuggled in from Central as
on the floor of the Senate and in the
much, and there are a number of my America with the dope. We have been committee
hearings before this body
colleagues who are bent on appearing unable to prevent mlll!ons of illegal and the other
body. We are talking
aliens
and
tons
of
illegal
narcotics
to do something. By placing restrica myth, not a fa.ct.
tions on some firearms, so-called as- from entering our country each year. about
I hope the Hatch amendment is
sault weapons, they propose to halt How would a new law which pwlishes
. the violence that Invariably accompa- honest people for the crimes of others adopted and that we again refocus our
nies Ulegal drug trade. Now, if we are do anything but set up a more vigor- attention as we had to do earlier
dealing with appearances, It ls easy to ous black market in guns, and further against violent crime, not against the
frighten the public with lurid visions enrich the underworld kingpins in our means which some people believe
might be used in violent crime.
of superguns, gum that turn Sunday country.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
It la particularly ironic that convictSchool teachers into maniacal drug
ed felons would not be a.ffected by the Senator's time haa expired.
lords.
Mr. HATCH. I reserve the remainder
Mr. President, we are dealing here reglstrnt.ion scheme set forth in this
with a perception so superficial that it bill. The Supreme Court ha.s ruled of my time.
I ask the distinguished Senator from
amazes me that any tho:ughtful person that convicted felons are exempt from
can accept it. We have a DlYoPic pur- registering their cuns. even machine- Arizona if he could yield ~ minutes to
me.
suit of the public perception of legisla- 111ns. Ha'f/ne8 Y. U.S., 309 U.S. 85.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
tive responsiveness-even if the reMr. President, the requirements for
sponse is misguided or misinformed. obtaining a 44'13 for all semiautomatic Senator from Arizona ha., 11 minutes
Any firearm bu the potential for firearms listed in th.is bill are a bu- and 10 seeonds remaininc.
Mr. 01:CONCINJ. I am glad to yield.
misuse. Any firearm can be safely and reaucrat's dream. The pra.ct.lcal imPo&Mr. HATCH. Frankly, unless lhe dislawfully used. Are we to assume that sibllity to complying with these standif. say, the Senator from Arizona or ards ought to be Immediately evJdenL tinguished Senator has an,yth~ to
the Senator from Ohio, or the Senator Thia bill also would require anyone add, I am happy to let. that time run.
Mr. DECONCINL Mr. President, for
from Massachusetts came to possess a who sold such a. firearm to maintain
MAC-10. none of us in this body would records concerning every subsequent purposes of someone getting here at
be safe? Would actually touching and sale. ThJs ls absurd. This has nothing 10-.30 &.m. or being able to get here to
holding this sinister looking firearm to do with public safety. It is nothing the vote. I will only say I have to take
tum these gentlemen into dangerous more or less tha.n unwarranted h ~ exception with the distinguished Sena·
tor and friend from Idaho that there
criminals? Of course not. The very ment of honest firearms owners.
notion Is absurd. On the other hand,
And a.fter all this flurry of paper- is no evidence that these gum are
there are many violent criminals who work, we are not one step closer to owned Just by law-abiding citizens.
are & danaer whether armed or un- solving real. violent crime. We have These guns are found In criminals'
armed. Semiautomatic technology ha.s simply created a new, nonviolent hands. They are used by drug deale~
nothing whatever to do with the crime. Leglsla.tlon produced under and there is no question about it.
The Senator raises a good point. He
human psyche, which is where crime emotional pressure is rarely effective
and violence truly have their source. and frequently does more harm than says, number one. ft is a myth that
As I understand, Cain did not. shoot good. The answer lies not in a.ppearinc this legislation is going to do a.nythlnc
Abel with an 8$lW}t rifle.
to do something about semiautomatic a.bout stopping criminal . activity.
It ls appearance, Mr. President. that firearms." but. In doing somet.hlng When asked the question. la this legismake a MAC-IO different from many about crlminallt7 and criminal behav- lation going to stop the drug dealers
from killing our police and innocent
hunting rifles. And based on that ap- ior.
pearance alone, some of my colleagues
Mr. President, what we are really peaple, I do not know. J do not know.
are prepared to impose senseless re- dealing wit.h is the appearances rather
What It does do ta put a ba.n on these
strictions on the mlllions of American than the facts. I do not know whether selective guns now that are continufirearms ownen who use semiautoma- the assault rifle which I own ia illegal ously coming forward when the police
tics ror hunting, target shooting, col- or not. or immoral or not. It happens make arrests on ~ cases and it says
leetlna and home protect.Ion. I have to be my favorite hunting rifle. lt Is a during that period of Um~ that that
heard it said that none of us need this 19-03 A-3 .30-06, which I bought a ban ls there, for the first 1& months
type of firearm. How peculiar tbat number of years ago in a. military con- the Justice- Department will do &. comhonest· people should be reqwred Lo formation. It ts suggested ii it holds a prehensive study of all crime throughjt11tify the practice of a constltuUonal bayonet It Is unacceptable. Thia mill- out the country de~ with where
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Mr. HATCH. Mr. Presiden t, I ask
guns arc in\'ol\·ed and sec wh ether or al crimes, have to hire attorn eys, have
not there are less of th ese guns confis- to defends themselves, and if they get unanimous consent that the order for
convicted can never own a gu n agai n. the quorum call be resci nded.
cated.
If it does not work, what have we And they are going to be fined at a
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With•
Jost? We have lost 3 years and the Joss $1,000 rate, plus 6 months in Jail.
out objection. it ls so ordered.
of this gun. And if it does not work, It
Why? Because they failed to file a
Mr. HATCH. Mr. Pres ident, I ask for
automatically goes back on the shelf.
form or, In some cases, failed to get the yeas and nays.
If that study is overwhelming, then the form from somebody who will not
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
this body will have to face this issue give it to them.
there a sufficient second?
again. It is not going to go away. It is
It is not simply going down to a gun
There is a sufficient second.
not permanent law. It has a sunset shop and asking them for a form to fill
The yeas and nays were ordered.
provision. How much more protection out. It ls under certain circumstances
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
can you give to the law-abiding citi- but not under others.
suggest the absence of a Quorum.
zens, to the hunter, to the target
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
So, Mr. President, if it did something
shooter? I do not know what else we to the criminals, maybe there would clerk will call the roll.
can do If we really want to attack this be an argument here. It only does bad
The assistant legislati\·e clerk proproblem of these guns In the danger- things to the hones_t sports people. ceeded to call the roll.
ous hands of drug dealers. I think this When ,we came up with the Firearms
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
bill does it without Infringing on those Owners ~rotection Act, the whole Im- ask unanimous consent that the order
second amendment rights.
petus driving that act was we were for the quorum call be rescinded.
I yield the floor.
tired of sports people being abused by
The PRESIDING OFFICER. WilhThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The the Federal . Gov_er1_1ment, under the out objection, it is so ordered.
Senator from Utah controls no addi- most techmcal, ridiculous circumMr. DECONCINI. Mr. President,
tional time.
stances.
h
h t·
· ?
That ls what this does. And it is ofow muc ime remams.
Mr. DECONCINI. I yield 5 minutes
fensive to sporting people around this
The PRESIDING .OFFICER. The
to the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The country. Frankly, if you really ask the Senator controls 2 mmutes and 8 secSenator from Utah Is recognized for 5 law enforcement officers, the rank and 0nds ·
Mr. DECONCINI. I. want to thank
minutes chargeable to the Senator file around this country, the vast majorlty of them would disagree with Of- Karen Robb, ~enms Burke, and
from Arizona.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I appre- ficer Gates, who was always for gun others In my office for the effort and
.
work they have given here, and also I
ciate my esteemed colleague from Ari- control.
He has a right to be for that. I am want to thank a n~mber _of Senators
zona yielding to me. I know he ls sincere in making his arguments. I have not going to criticize him for that. cer- who have worked with their colleagues
to admit these weapons have appear- tainly the distinguished senator from here to make ~he arguments _the_las_t
ances that look as if they could cause Massachusetts has a right to feel the couple of days m support of this bill.
Mr. President, I think we are very
great difficulty. If you can change the way he does more than almost anystocks on those weapons and hand body. The fa~t of the matter Is, It still close to winning this victory today. I
grips, you basically have sporting does not Justify picking on the decent, hope Members who hav_e not decided,
rifles. It ls the same action, same ap- law-abiding citizens of this country as they walk in here, will take a look
proach that the semiautomatic weap- who want to collect, target shoot, at these weapons, take a look at these
ons use. We are not dealing with auto- plink, and, yes, use these guns for organizations.
matic weapons.
hunting if they want to. It is legitiThe statement has been made the
line police officer does not support
Second, I think a point we really mate to hunt.
I Just get tired of the Federal Gov- this. I take exception that these orgahave not emphasized enough is this
bill is another bureaucratic nightmare emment, with these types of rules and nizations do not represent the vast
for the wrong people. The only people regulations coming in, making it diffl- majority of their members. These are
that this bill Is going to affect will be cult for everybody. That is what this law enforcement organizations, for the
decent, law-abiding, honest collectors, bill does. That is the problem.
most part. These are the police and
plinkers, target shooters, sports
More than that, 1f this happens to the cops on t he street. These are the
people. Frankly, they are not out stay In this bill and it does happen to ones who say we have to have some
there spraying the countryside with become law, I guarantee that is Just support from you legislators in Washbullets, except In target practice. They step No. 1, an d everybody knows it. !ngton, DC. Many of them are memlove these guns and they love to· own That Is why t hese are fought so hard. bers of the NRA, and other second
them and they love to show them. Because every time they get one little amendment rights organizations.
They lO\'e to exchange them among le- Inch, they will try to take another
Mr. President, it is a tough vote for
gitimate sporting people.
yard the next time you tum around.
some. I understand t hat. I have been
I happen to not own any of these.
So that is why we have to stand up down that road, believe me, on this
The fact of the matter Is, I would not as sports people and say: Hey, no more issue as well. But it is a safe vote bemind owning some of them because of this. Let us not pick on those who cause It Is the right vote.
they are nice weapons. But, I do own are honest, decent people. Let us go ·. Mr. President, ·I suggest the absence
guns that would fit in the category of after the criminals, and let us do It of a quorum.
assault weapons that are legitimate with tough, criminal laws, which, by
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
hunting guns.
the way, S. 1970 Is not. That is why we clerk will call the roll.
This Is a bureaucratic nightmare are going to debate that plus habeas
The assistant legislative clerk prothat comes down on the wrong people. corpus reform right after this vote ceeded to call the roll.
It ls not going to do a doggone thing takes place, and we will show it Is not
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask
about criminal activity in this society, a tough law.
unanimous consent that the order for
not going to do a doggone thing about
Let us go after the real criminals, the quorum call be rescinded.
stopping guns going to criminals. They the people who are wrecking our socleThe PRF.SIDING OFFICER. Withare going to get them anyway, and ty, and let us not pick on the honest out objection, it is so ordered.
they are not going to comply with the sports people. .
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise
registration requirements of this parMr. President, I suggest the absence today in opposition to Senate bill 1970
ticular bill. · They are not going to of a quorum.
and In support of the Hatch amendcomply with them.
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. The ment. We have all heard arguments on •
The fact of the matter is decent, ·clerk will call the roll.
both sides of this issue and the prelaw-abiding citizens are going to be
The assistant legislative clerk pro- ponderance of evidence demands that
hauled Into court, charged with Feder- ceeded to call the roll.
we reject this kind of firearms law.
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\\"e've had t esti mony from the Justice ad\'ancements-radio and t.e!cv!slon
I k :1011.·. Mr. President, that some
Tr<>asury Departments, as well as are protec ted by til e first. am<>ndm<'nt th ing 11:i.s to change. We have t.o rto1
;,.n expert at the Smithsonian I nslltu- t hough neither existe d 200 years ago. the crimes that are distorting and d is
t:on. to the effect that military-style S imilarly, semiautom atic fi rearms are ru pting the way of life for so many in
s.Er.1iaut omati c rifles are different only pro tected by the second amendment, nocen t, law-respecting Americans.
in appearance from mlllions of other and 20 million Ame ricans have ex erThe bi!I that we are debating t.odaJ
semi automatic rifles, shotguns, and cised the ir rights and pcssess such a attempts to do just that. The antih ~ndgW1S. We har e seen the record of firearm.
crime measure before us attempts t«l
gun control and It Is a record of crime
A vote for S . 1970 or other restrictive provide a comprehensive appro:u:h t(l
fighting failure. Assuming that crimi- proposals w!ll not affect criminals or fi ghting the crime epidemic so prevanals will abide by gun restrictions Is reduce the violent crime rate. A vote lent In America today. By expa.ndfng
da.'1.gerou:;!y naive. The District of Co- for S. 1970, however, will deny millions death penalty offenses, limiting the
lum bia Is the best example of the of Am ericans choice and in doing so number of Federal appeals, and pereff ec t of gun ban laws. The District will \'iolate the bill of rights that so mitting the use of illegally seized mr...a.s some of the strictest gun control many Americans have fought to pre- dence under certain circumstances, we
la;;;·s In the Nation, yet today our Na- serve.
are upping the price of criminal acts.
tion's Capital is known as the "Murder
What Is especially Important In thfs
Finally, another point should be
Ca;,ita.l."
.
made. No citizen has the right to measure, however, Is the provision
V.' e have also heard from our con- abuse their second amendment right that would make It more difficult for
stit uents and their message, at least to to bear arms. Anyone who breaks the criminals to obtain the weapons t.llat
me. is clear: they oppose unworkable, !aw, anyone who uses a firearm in a are wreaking the havoc across our
ineffective gun bans and Instead are
can be and should be fully pun- country
today.
The antia.ssault
demanding reform of a woefully Inad- crime,
ished under the law. Law abiding gun v.eapon language contained In S. 1970,
equate criminal Justice system.
I am going to vote against this gun owners should not be asked, hov.-ever. 'll·ould prohibit the transfer, shippiDg.
t o give up their rights because of receiving, transport, or possession of
ban proposal, and I encourage my colcriminals-criminals
who would ignore nine specific assault weapons. On July
le~es to do so as well. Before you
gun control laws anyway. I hope that 7, 1989, by Executive Order, the Presicast your votes, I ask you to- remember
the Constitution and the bill of rights. the advocates of these restrlcti'.le gun dent permanently prohibited the imThat truly remarkable document has control amendments would advocate portation of 43 types of semlautomatJc
stood as our guide for more than 200 victim's rights and stronger criminal "·eapons.. Even though these weapon&
years and must continue to do so. law-enforcement against the perpetra- are banned from being Imported, manWhile debating anticrlme bills, the tors of crime, rather than bills tha,t re- uf acturers here In the United Stat.es
Senate has discussed at length the strict the constitutional rights of law- have turned to producing and sellinf
fourth amendment right against un- abiding citizens. For unless we crack virtual copies of the banned weapons.
reasonable search and seizure, the down on criminals and get them off The language In this bill would ban
sixth amendment right to counsel, and the streets, we cannot solve the prob- that practice by prohibiting the ~
the eighth amendment right against lem that legitimately concerns Ameri- ping, receiving. poss~ion, or transfer
of nine of the most. common types at
cruel and unusual punishment. It Is can society.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President. a. crime a.ssa.ult weapons.
time that we discuss the second
Thls weapon ban ls desperately
amendment as we debate another gun epidemic ts sweeping acro.ss our country today. This epidemic has become needed. Such a ban will make it lss
control proposal.
It is clear from the speeches and let- so common and so pervasive that convenient for crlminals to dh;toru,
ters of the day and the Constitution many Americans cannot remember the ~ and assault innocent families
itself that the Founding Fathers In• days when families could sit on their and tndlviduals. The Judl:cla.r:, ~
eluded the right to freely choose to front porches without fea.r of harass• committee on the Conatitution heard
own and use arms In the bill of ment by drug dealers. when one could oral testimony on the merits of ba&
rights-a document guaranteeing indi- walk down public streets at night ning assault weapons In May Ul89.
vidual liberties and freedoms. Men like without fear of being robbed or Toe committee was told that assault
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson. mugged, and even killed. In those weapons are involved ln virtually even
and Patrick Henry recognized the po- days, young mothers allowed children drug seizure taking place today alone
litical Importance of the citizenry's to play freelyin public parks, and one the Southwest border of the United
ability to bear arms, a premise which could drive down a. street at night States. A study condocted by the Athas carried on Into the 20th century. without the fear of geU.lng lost and lanta. Journal concluded that an uIn the early yea.rs of World War II wondering how safe it was to step and sault weapon Is 20 tfmes more like)'y to
thousands of private citizens, the mili- ask directions. I remember when be used in a crime than Is a conven- ·
tia if you will, brought their own arms seeing a policeman patrol a local tional firearm. The same study Indiwhen they volunteered for service. school was strange; now it ls a cates that even though assault we~
Thousands more rifles. shotguns, and common, dally occurrence.
ons account for Jess than 1 percent ot
handguns were sent to England to arm
Crime and adjusting to the fear of the total number of firearms privately
the ci tizenry In prepara tion for a Nazi crime have become a. way of life for ovmed, these weapom surfaced in apinvasion. Yes, \he Founding Fathers many. I am saddened to listen to. the proximately 30 percent of all firearms
were remarkably farsighted when It n ightly news and hear of criminals t.raeed to organized crime, lncludlng
came to the political right of private snuffing out innocent lives. I reul of drug cartel activity, gun traffickinw.
citizens to ov:n arms. One need only young men being viciously murdered and crimes committed by terrorbu in
look to the Soviet's desire to dlsann for a pair of Nike sneakers, a leather the UnitetJ States during 1988 and the
the freedom seeking Baltic populace Jacket, or $20.
first quarter of 1989.
to understand this.
The statistics that support. the growMr. President, l want everybody to
It is also _c lear that those who helped Ing crime rate are a.ppaJllng. For ex- grasp a distinction here. The nine asbuild this country recognized sport, ample, fn 1951, New Yorlt tallied 244 sa ult weapons listed that would be
recreation, hunting, collection, and homicides. In 1989, that. n umber tuumed by this legislation are not
self-protection as legitimate reasons r eached nearly 1,900. Here In th0 Dis- rifles for sportsmen, nor are they
for possessing arms. What we must ac- trict of Columbia., murders average hunting rifles or weapons commonly
knowledge ts that today's semfauto- cl01re to one a day. Nationally, In 1951, useci by Jaw-abiding cltf'Ae~ to protect
matfe firearms are Just as protected as there 'll'ere 3..2' policemen for every their lives or property. These- guns are
their forebears-muskets and plstoJs...- felony committed In the United States; semiautomatic assault weaPons. They
were in 1789. Constitutional rights do this year nearly 3.2 felonies will be have names like ..streetswceper, •
not change because of technological committed per every police officer.
•bushmaster," and "commando... In a
a..~j
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ci\'ilizcd soc iety, nobody needs to own mate ch annels. Instead, they acqu ire questi on hare no rn lid h unt ing or
suc h an assault weapon. T he only indi- firearms and
other
contraband spo rting purpose.
viduals who need t hese weapons are th roug h the bl ack mark ets whic h exist
We alread y lim it the ownership of
criminals, especially drug deal ers. across t he country. Moreo,·er, law en- mach ineguns, because they ha,·e no
T hese are the weapons th at allow the forcement statistics show t ha t mili- \'&lid hunting or sporti ng purposes. We
crim inals to be better armed than our tary-style semiautomatic fire arms are should also do so with the firearms
police officers. The a\'erage citizen rarely featured in crime. In fact, evi- specified In this legislation, because
does not keep a streetsweeper or a dence from cities like New York, Los they too have no valid hunting or
MAC-11 by his bedside to protect his Angeles, Washington, DC, and San sporting purpose.
life or property.
Francisco indicates that semiautomatPresident Bush endorsed this \'iew
Now, I have always opposed any ic military-style firearms play a minislast year when he barred the importa•
measure that would lead to the confis- cule role in overall violent crime.
cation of guns used for sports or huntSome have said the semiautomatic tlon of 43 types of assault weapons
ing purposes, or the confiscation of mechanism is the problem and it which were determined to have no
guns used by law-abiding citizens for should be banned. I can assure my col- valid hunting or sporting purpose.
The effect of the language in the bill
the protection of life and property, leagues such a proposal would not be
and I will continue to oppose such accepted lightly by the 20 million before us is to conform U.S. domestic
measures. However, there is no need Americans who own a semiauto rifle, law to the action President Bush took
for private citizens to own assault shotgun, or handgun. Why do so many with respect to Imported weapons.
The bill goes directly to and is limitAmericans own these guns? Sport,
weapons.
Contrary to the assert ions of some, recreation, collection, and self-defense. ed to only the firearms specifically
the vote on t his measure is not a vote And approximately 3 million semiauto named in the law.
on gun control- it ls a vote on crime military-style r ifles are owned by lawThese are listed by name: Norinco,
control. T he law enforcement commu- abiding cit izens for exactly the same Mitchell, and Poly Technologies Avtonity including the National Associa- reasons.
mat Kalashnlkovs, all models; Action
tion of Police Organizations, Inc., rep- •This legislation by its very nature Arms Israeli Military Industries UZI
resenting well over 100,000 rank-and- can only affect honest citizens. The and Galil; Beretta AR-70 [SC-70];
file State and local police officers vig- DeConcinl language In this bill re- Colt AR-15, and CAR-15; Fabrlque
orously support this language. It is quires private citizens to keep records Natlonale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, and
time for us to stop support ing our of the firearms they own- and any FNC, MAC-10 and MAC-11; Steyr
criminals and start supporting the law subsequent transfer of a listed gun- AUG; Intratec TEC-9; and Streetsenforcement community. To win the for the Government for the first time
/Striker 12.
war on crime, they need our help. I ln U.S. history. The enforcement weeper
The
claim
that this law would limit
hope that my colleagues will Join me nightmare created by this provision ls
in supparting the fight against crime truly mind-boggling. Does anyone en- ovmership or use of regular hunting
and remain firm on keeping the as- vision local law enforcement officers rifles is entirely false. By Its specific
sault weapon language In S. 1970.
. checking gun owners at target ranges language, It does not affect any weapMr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I rise in or gun clubs for their 4473 forms? Are ons other than those listed by name. .
The claim that this specific list
strong support of the Hatch motion to BATF or Treasury agents going to
strike the DeConcinl gun ban Included attend rifle competitions like the na- somehow reaches to all long-arms Is an
In the pending legislation. With only tional matches at Camp Perry to In· example of the use of misleading r hettechnical changes, title IV of S. 1970 ls spect the records of the competitors? I oric and overstatement. It is false. The
the p.me language offered by the hope not; the law enforcement com- law would reach precisely what is
senior Senator from Arizona and ap- munity has far greater concerns to listed and nothing more.
The legislation further requires that
proved last year by the Judiciary Com- deal with.
mittee on a 7-6 vote with one member
On the other hand, does anyone an 18-month study be undertaken to
absent. It bans 14 spectflc semiauto- expect criminals who may passess a determine if the reduction in supply of
matic firearms and would make crimi- prohibited firearm to keep the records these weapons has an effect on the
nals of American citizens who seek to required using 4473 forms? If the pur- firepower that our police face on the
purchase or transfer any of the more pose of the bill.Js to punish criminals, streets every day.
than 600,000 of those guns currently why then ls the penalty. a misdemeanWhat the opponents of this 1eglslaowned In the United States. It ls not or? Is that to make S. 1970 less objec- tlon do not like to acknowledge is that
crime control; lt ls gun control, pure tionable to our constltutents as we try they are · helping make our streets
and simple, and It would not be includ- to explain our position and vote? One unsafe for our police.
·
ed in any true crime control package.
fact I can attest to is that whatever
Despite their law-and-order rhetoric,
All of us, Mr. President, are shocked the penalty for not keeping records, the opponents of this legislation are
and outraged when horrible crimes criminals will not comply or be de- making sure that our police continue
like the Stockton and Louisville trage- terred from acquiring guns illegally. to be outgunned as they try to protect
dies occur. Our hearts go out to the Only swift, sure, severe punishment all
of us from criminals.
victims and our anger toward the vio- for using a firearm will help reduce
The
facts are simple: These weaplent perpetrators who commit such gun use in crime; and those laws are
acts runs deep. We all feel a need to do already on the books. What we have to ons-not. hunting rifles or target
rifles- but these military-style semisomething in hopes of preventing such do is enforce them.
acts In the future. S. 1970 ls not the
I strongly encourage my colleagues automatic weapons make up less than
answer, and even if the Senate strikes to vote for the Hatch motion to strike, one-half of 1 percent of the firearms'
' '
the gun ban lanaguage, as I expect we and let us get on with the demanding currently owned in our Nation.
Fewer than 1 gunowner In 200 even
will do shortly, the remaining bill will work necessary to shape S. 1970 into a
owns one of these weapons; 199 gunrequire serious revision before lt will true crime control package.
truly be useful ln getting criminals off · Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I owners out of every 200 do not own
the streets.
will vote against the effort to strike them, have seen no need to buy them,
I have had an opportunity to review the firearms provision from the crime and do not use them. That is the fact.
But the . aspect of that fact which
yesterday's debate on the gun ban, bill.
and one question sticks ln my mindI do so, not because It is the entire disturbs our police ls that although
who will be affected by this bill? That answer to violent crime In our Nation, the actual number of these l!;Uns In cirIs the crux of this debate. The Justice but because it ls a reasonable, moder- culation now ls minimal, they account
Department tells . us that criminals, ate and feasible recognition that our for almost a third of
the weapons
the very persons we want to control, Nation can accept some limits on fire- traced to organized crime, terrorism,
do not acquire guns through legit!- arms ownership when the firearms in and gun trafficking.

all
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Accordingly, I will support its retenThe test imony of American police firearms legally find those changes in
tion in the bill.
officers from \·irtually every State of our society acceptable.
the Union supports this point.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, earlier in
In Maine, for example. possession or
Police officers use and respect fire- use for sporting purposes of semiauto- this debate, I voted against the Metzarms. Many of them are hunters and matic firearms with magazine capac- enbaum amendment on assault weapsportsmen in their free time. Yet the ities of more than five cartridges ls ons. That amendment would have exvast majority of police officers support barred by State law. I have never met panded on the provisions of the
efforts to limit the availability of a Maine sportsman who believes that a DeConcini assault weapons bill by
these weapons.
hunter needs. more firepower than adding 12 more types of guns to the
There is a simple reason for that. that. Maine's law enforcement officers list of banned weapons, among other
The difference to a policeman facing a have never had to prosecute a person provisions. I voted against that amendsuspect with a handgun or a suspect for using such equipment in hunting.
ment because I was concerned that
armed with the equivalent of a miliThe Maine law and Maine experi- some of the guns on that expanded list
tary weapon is the difference between ence reflect the overwhelming truth could have legitimate uses in sports
police work and guerrilla warfare.
about semiautomatic assault-style and recreation. I do not believe in banWe should not be tolerating a situa- weapons. They are not weapons used ning guns that are used legally and retion in which our police fear for their by sportsmen or hunters. They are not
lives because the weapons wielded by firearms for hunting. And in Maine, sponsibly by hunters and other sportsdrug gangs are more powerful than their use for such a purpose Is illegal. men.
I do favor the DeConcini bill, howevthe weapons the police themselves are
So the question remains: What value
allowed to use. Those who are so loud do we serve by retaining the ready er. It achieves a reasonable balance between the legitimate interests Of hunin their protestations of support for availability of such firearms?
ters and sportsmen and the compelling
our police need to think about that.
I am also aware that this legislation, need to protect the public and law enWe are sending dedicated police men by itself, will not solve
problem of forcement officers from dangerous asand women into the streets of our violent crime or haltthe
the
criminal sault weapons with no legitimate pur· cities to face the equivalent of warfare misuse of firearms in our society.
pose except mayhem. I will, therefore
because a very vocal special interest
But no action, by itself, w!ll solve vote against the Hatch amendment to
wants to exert an extreme position on that
problem. And if we subject every strike the DeConcini language from
the ownership of firearms.
I am aware of the concenis that proposal to the test of perfection, we the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
some have raised about the precedent would do nothing at all in the face of
time has expired. Under the previous
of interfering with the legitimate crime and the misuse of firearms.
The legislation is moderate, limited, order, the question now is on agreeing
rights of law-abiding Americans to
own and use firearms legally. I am also and specific in its reach and its intent. to the amendment of the Senator
aware that some have sought to ex- It does not do more or promise more from Utah. The yeas and nays have
ploit those concerns by claiming, in- than a modest reduction in the fire- been ordered. The clerk will call the
correctly, that this legislation threat- power that our police must face on the roll.
ens the ownership of semiautomatic streets each day.
The assistant legislative clerk called
It will not take from any legal owner the roll.
hunting weapons.
Efforts to misinform hunters and of these weapons the right to own
The result was announced-yeas 48,
sportsmen are nothing new in this them. It does not prohibit the legal nays 52, as follows:
field, unfortunately. We saw the same transfer of these weapons between
[Rollcall Vote No. 103 Leg.J
disinformation
efforts
launched law-abiding collectors. Its paperwork
YEAS-48
against the penetrating ammunition requirements are not onerous.
And unlike the slogans of its oppo- Arnutronr
Garn
that made police body armor useless.
McClure
McCoMell
Gorton
We saw the same misinformation nents-which provide no answer to Baucus
Murkowskl
Gramm
when we began the effort to prevent any of the real-world problems-this Blneaman
Nickles
. I a t'10n con t a ins a seli-correc t'mg Boschwitz
Bond
Gras&Jey
the widespread development of fire- I egIS
Hatch
Pressler
Reid
Breaux
Hefltn
arms that could defeat detection by feature.
Roth
If it cannot be shown to have re- Bryan
Heinz
metal detectors at airports and other
Rudman
public places vulnerable to armed ter- duced the criminal circulation of these ~~~
:~:~
Sanford
rorists.
guns in 3 years, it will automatically Cochran
Humphrey
Shelby
Simpson
cease
to
have
effect.
Cohen
Johnston
So in order to counteract the misinSpecter
If it does show a reduction in the Danforth
Kasten
formation. let me clearly state now:
Stevena
·
Domenic!
Lott
This bill will have no effect on any le- criminal circulation of these weapons, ourenberger
Lurar
Symma
Thurmond
gitimate sportsman in the State of Congress and the public will have the Exon
Mack
Wallop
McCain
Maine or elsewhere. It will not prevent opportunity to debate again the value Ford
the purchase, ownership or legal use of allowing them to be readily availNAYS-52
of any semiautomatic hunting weapon. able.
Adams
Fowler
Mikulski
Those whose fears have been raised
Maine is the home of more hunters Ataka
OleM
Mitchell
Moynihan
by the misinformation campaign per capita than virtually any other ·. Bentsen
Gore
Nunn
Graham
about this legislation should ask them- State In the Union. Maine's hunters Biden
Packwood
Boren
Ha.rl<ln
selves If their rights have been in- and sportsmen know my voting record Bradley
Hatfield
Pell
fringed by the ban on cop-killer bul- in strong support of the constitutional Bumpers
Inouye
Pryor
Rleele
Jerrordl
lets or plastic guns. Have Americans right to bear arms. Maine's hunters Burdick
Robb
Byrd
Kaasebaum
·
h
b
become less free since those laws took an d spor ts men can disti nguIS
e- Cha!ee
Kennedy
Rockefeller
effect? The answer; obviously, is no. tween reasonable laws and unreason- Conrad
Kerrey
Sarbanes
Sasser
We have simply recognized that cur- able restrictions on their rights.
cramton
Kerry
Simon
If I thought this measure would in- D'Amat.o
Kohl
rent-day threats demand laws that reWarner
De.schle
Lautenberr
flect current realities.
f r inge unreasona b ly on any Maine oeconclnl
Leahy
Wilson
Our Nation has accepted restrictions hunter, I would not support it. But Dixon
Levin
Wirth
Lieberman
on the private ownership of machine- careful examination of the law-not Dodd
Metzenbaum
guns with no apparent loss of Individ- the false claims made about the law, Dole
ual liberty. Most of our States require not the hysterical rhetoric about what
So, the amendment <No. 1681) was
permits for concealed weapons.
might happen-careful examination of rejected.
Most of our States have firearms the law Itself persuades me it will not
Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
laws of various kinds on the books. harm the interests of any law-abiding
Mr. DECONCINI addressed thf'
And most Americans who own and use hunter in Maine or any other State.
Chair.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Republ ican leader.
Mr . DOLE. I su ggest the absence of
a quorum .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
absence of a quorum has been suggested. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
DrxoK). Without objection, ft 1s so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote on the Hatch
amendment, No. 1681. I ask for the
yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second?
There 1s a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader.
UlfAJfU(OUS~NSENTAGREDalff

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the vote
on the motion to reconsider the Hatch
amendment occur at 1:30 p.m. today;
that under the previous order the
Sena.te now proceed to consideration
of the Graham amendment and that
the agreement go..-erning debate and
disposition of that amendment be
modified to permit the Interruption
thereof at 1:30 for the vote on the
motion to reconsider made by the Sena.tor from Kansas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ia
there objection?
The majority leader.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I
modify my request. Under the previous order, the Graham amendment
will be accepted by voice vote and then
the Senate will be on the Thurmond
amendment. So I modify It to state
that the Senate will be considering the
Thurmond amendment. and the previous order be modified to permit Interruption of the debate on that amendment a.t 1:30 for the vote on the
motion to reconsider.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection to the unanimous request of the majority leader?
Mr. METZENBAUM. Reserving the
right to object, and I ru.ve no Intention or objecting, 1s It my understandIng that no quorum call could be put
In prior, in order to preclude the vote
occurring at 1:30, and that no quorum
call could be put In at 1:30?
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. we
have an understanding that the vote
will occur at 1:30.
Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank the
majority and minority leader.
Mr. DOLE. I ask one additional request; U In fact the motion to recon- ·
sider prevails, that there be an immediate vote on the amendment?
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.

The legis lati\·e clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for lhe quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With•
out objection, It Is so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I
renew my request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. ls
there obJectlon to the unanimous-consent request o! the majority leader?
Without objection, It ts so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I
thank my colleagues and th~ distinguished Republl.ea.n leader, the managers, and other Senators.
Mr. President, 1 yield the floor and
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
LlEBERMA.l'f}. Without objection. it is so
ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair recognizes the Senator from
Florida.
Under the previous order the Senator from Florida {Mr. GRAHAKJ is now
recognized to offer an amendmenL
AMENDMENT NO. 16U

<Purpose: To reform habeas corp\Jll
procedures>

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk, which wfil
be tn the form of a modification to
title II of the bill now pending.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment wm be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
The Senator from Florida [Mr. GltAHAM),
for himself, Mr. DECONCIJU, and Mr. BRTAN,
proposes an amendment numbered 1688..

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the reading or
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, It ls so ordered.
The amendment ls as follows:
Strike title II of the bill and Insert the following:
TITLE II-HABEAS CORPUS REFORM
SBC. 2tl . SIIORT TlTLlt.

This Utle may be cited a.s &.he "Habeu
Corpus Reform Act of 1990".
SIU:. :0:. SPECIAL HABEAS CORPCS PROCEDURES
IN CAPITAL ('ASES.

May 23, 1990

" 2257. Mmdat ory stays of execution: dura-

tion: limits on stay& of execution: successive peUtiona
·· 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time
requirement; tolling rules
"225.9. Certl(icat.e of probable cause Inapplicable
"2260. Co\lru;el In capital cases; trial &Dd
post-conviction; st.a.nd&rds
Prlsonen Jn Stsu custody aubJect lo rap,
ital aewnce: appolnnnent of counael: reqllirrfflffll of rate ef court or statute: prottdUta f«

"§ t2:i6.

appoint~t

"<a> This ctt.pter shall apply to cases arulng undef' eecUon 2254 of this ti.tie brought
by pri.sonen in State cusLody who are aubJeci, to a caplt.al sentence. It shall apply only
If 3Ubsection Cb> ls satisfied.
~cb> This chapter Is applicable If a State
establishes by rule of Its court of last resort
or by statute a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment or reasonable fees and litigation expenses of com•
petent counsel consistent wJth sect.ion 2260
of this title.
''(cl No counsel appointed pursuant to
subsection Cb) to represent a St.ate prisoner
under capital sentence shall have pre\•iously
represented the prisoner at trial or on direct
appeal In the case for which the appointment Is made unless the prisoner and counsel exl)T'eSSly request eontlnued representation.
"(dl The ineffectiveness or Incompetence
of counsel appointed under this chapter
durtng State of Federal collateral post-coov!ctlon proceedings shall not be a ground
for relief 1n a proceeding arising under thJa
chapter or section 2254 of this UUe. This .
llmlt.atiop shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel at any phase of
State or Federal post-conviction proceedings.
Mandatory ataya or uecatlo11; duratioa:
limits on stays or u«utlo11: 1111ttm1ive petitions
~ca> UPoll the entry In a court of record of
an order pursuant to aectton 2260 or thls
"§ %257.

title. a warrant or order setting an eneuUon date for a State prisoner shall be stand
upon application to any court that wowd
have JurisdlcUon over any proceedings filed
punuant to section 2254 ol thia title. The
application shall recite that the State has
Invoked the post-conviction review procedures of th1s chapter and that the sched·
u!ed execution Is subject to stay.
"Cbl A llta:, of execution granted l)Uffuant
to subsection Ca) shall expire !I..(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas
corpus peUUon under section 22M of t.hll
UUe within the turu! required m section
2258 of this tlUe; or
.. <2> UPon completion of district court and
court of appeal$ review under section 2%54
or thls title the petition for relief bl denied
and"{A) the thne for .filing a petition for certiora.rl ms expired a.nd no petition ha.s been
ftJed;

· "(B) & Umely pet.!Uon for certiorari waa
Ca) llf GENEitAL-Part IV of t!Ue 28, filed and I.be Supreme Court denied the peUnited States Code, is amended by inserUng tition; or
"'1:Cl a timely petition for eertlon.rf was
Immediately following chapter 153 the folflied and upon consideration of the case. the
lowing new title:
Supreme
Court disposed of It In a manner
"CHAPTER
154-SPECIAL
HABEAS
that left the capita.I ~ntence undlsturbed;
CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL O!'
CASES
"<31 & State prbooer unde.r captt.aJ sen"Sec.
tence waJves Ute eight to pursue habeas
"2256. Prisoners in State CU$tody subject lo corpus review unde.r section 2254 ol this
.
capital sentence; appointment title"tAl before a court of competent Jurisdicof coumel; reQUtrement of rule
of court or statute; procedu~ tion:
"<B> In the preseaoe of counsel; an4
fOl' appointment

~
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--c s >ind igent s who hal' e been se nt r nced to fo r not less than 5 years. and mus t ha r r had
death and who seek appellate or collateral not less than 3 years · experi ence In the han •
M'Qucnc,-s of h is decision.
dling of appeals In · that State courts in
rc1·iew in State court; and
--lc-1 If one of the cond it ions prol'ided In
"{C) indigents who have been senten ced to felony cases.
subs~t:on <bl is satisfied, no Federal court
--c e> Notwithstanding any other prorision
thrrea ft C' r shall hal'e the authority lo enter death and who seek certiorari review in the
of this section, a court, for good cause, may
a stay of execution or grant relief In a cap- United States Supreme Court; and
"( 2) provide for the entry of an order of a appoint another attorney whose backItal case unless.. <I> the basis for the stay and request fOr court of record appointing one or more ground, knowledge or experience would oth•
counsel
to represent the prisoner except erwise enable the attorney to properly repreli ef is a claim not previously presented by
the prisoner in State or Federal courts, and upon a Judicial determination <after a hear- resent the defendant, with due considering, If necessary> thatation of the seriousness of the possible penthe fa ilure to raise the claim is"(AJ the prisoner Is not Indigent; or
alty and the unique and complex nature of
.. <A > t h e result of Slate action in violation
"CB>
the
prisoner
knowingly
and
Intellithe litigation.
of the Constit ution or laws of the United
gently waives the appointment of counsel.
" Cf> Upon a finding In ex parte proceedStates;
"(bHlHA> Except as provided In para- ings that Investigative, expert or other serv"(BJ the result of the Supreme Court recognition of a new Federal right that is retro- graph <2>. at least one attorney appointed ices are reasonably necessary for the reprepursuant to this chapter before trial, if ap- sentation of the defendant, whether In conacti\·el}· applicable; or
"!Cl based on a factual predicate that plicable, and at least one attorney appointed nection with Issues relating to guilt or tssues
could not have been discovered through the pursuant to this chapter after trial, if appli• relating to sentence, the court shall authorcable, shall have been certified by a state- ize the defendant's attorney to obtain such
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
"(2> the facts underlying the claim would wide certification authority. The States may services on behalf of the defendant and
be sufficient, if proven, to undermine the elect to create one or more certification au- shall order the payment of fees and excourt's confidence In the jury's determina- thorities (but not more than three such cer- penses therefor, under subsection <g>. Upon
tion of guilt on the offense or offenses for lfication authorities> to perform the respon- finding that timely procurement of such
services could not practically await prior auwhich the death penalty was imposed, or In sibilities set forth In sub-paragraph <Bl.
"CB> The certification authority for coun- thorization. the court may authorize the
the rnJidity of the sentence of death.
sel at any stage of a capital case shall be- pro\·isfon of any payment of services nunc
"Ii Zt.'>11. Filing of habea~ corpus petition; time re"(il a special committee, constituted by pro tune.
qui~ment; tolling rule~
the State court of last resort or by State
"Cg> Notwithstanding the rates and maxi•
"Ca> Any petition for habeas corpus relief statute, relying on staff attorneys of a de• mum limits generally applicable to criminal
fender
organization,
members
of
the
private
under section 2254 of this title must be filed
cases and any other provision of law to the
_
In the a.pproprlate district court not later bar, or both;
contrary, the court shall fix the compensa"(ii) a capital litigation resource center. tion to be paid to an attorney appointed
than 365 days after the date of filing In the
State court of last resort of an order Issued relying on staff attorneys, members of the under this subsection Cother than State em•
in compliance with section 2260<aH2> of this private bar, or both; or
ployeesl and the fees and expenses to be
"(iii> a statewide defender organization, paid for Investigative, expert, and other reatitle.
"(b> The time requirements established by relying on staff attorneys, members of the sonably necessary services authorized under
private bar, or both.
this section shall be tolledsubsection <cl, at such rates or amounts as
"(Cl The certification authority shall"(}> from the date that a petition for certhe court determines to be reasonably nec"Ci>
certify
attorneys
qualified
to
repretiorari is filed In the Supreme Court until
essary to carry out the requirements of this
sent
persons
charged
with
capltaJ
offenses
the date of flnal disposition of the petition
subsection.".
if a State prisoner seeks review of a capital or sentenced to death;
(b) AMENDMENTS TO TABLI!: OJ' CHAPTERS."(ii)
draft
and
annually
publish
procesentence that has been affirmed on direct
The table of chapters for part IV of title 28,
dures
and
standards
by
which
attorneys
are
appeal by the court of last resort of the
United States Code, Is amended by lnsertln&
State or has otherwise become final for certified and rosters of certified attorneys; after the Item for chapter 153 the following:
and
State law pruposes;
"!Iii> periodically review the roster of cer• "154. Special habeas corpus proce"<2> during any periods In which a State
dures In capital cases...................... 2256"
tlfied
attorneys, monitor the performance
prisoner under capital sentence has properSEC. 303. LAW C'OSTROLI.ING IN FEDERAL HABEAS
of
all
attorneys
certified,
and
withdraw
cerly filed request for post-conviction review
PROCEEDINGS.
pending before 11, State court of competent tification from any attorney who falls to
<a> IN GENERAL.-Chapter 153 of title 28,
meet
high
performance
standards
In
a
case
jurisdiction which period shall, lf all State
United States Code, Is amended by Inserting
fil ing rules are met In a timely manner, run to which the attorney Is appointed, or falls a.fter section 2255 the following:
to demonstrate continuing compecontinuously from the date that the State otherwise
prisoner initially files for post-conviction tence to represent prisoners in capital litiga- " § 225SA. Law controllinr Frderal habeas corpu8
procttdinp
re\•iew until final disposition of the case by tion.
"(2) In a S tate that has a publicly-funded
the State court of last resort, and further public defender system that Is not organized
"All claims In habeas corpus petitions
until final disposition of the matter by the on a statewide basis, the requirements of brought by State prisoners In State custody
Supreme Court of the United States, If a paragraph (1) shall have been deemed to who are subject to a capital sentence shall
timely petition for review Is filed; and
have been satisfied If at least one attorney be governed by the law as It was when the
"13> du.Ing an additional period not to appointed pursuant to this chapter before petitioner's sentence became final, suppleexceed 90 days, if counsel for the State pris- trial shall be employed by a State funded mented by any Interim change In the law
onerpublic defender organization, and If the promulgated by the Supreme Court, lf the
" CA> moves for an extension of time in the highest court of the State finds on an Supreme Court determines, In light of the
United States district court that would have annual basis that the standards and proce- purpose to be served by the change, the
proper jurisdiction over the case upon the dures established and maintaJned by such extent of the reliance on previous Jaw by
filing of a habeas corpus petition under sec- organization <which have been filed by such law enforcement authorities, and the effect
tion 225-4 of this title; and
organization and reviewed by such court on on the administration of Justice, that It
"CB) makes a showing of good cause for
an annual basis> Insure that the attorneys would be Just to give prisoners the benefit
counsel's inabilty to file the habeas corpus working for such organization demonstrate of the Interim change In law.".
petition within the 365-day period estab• continuing competence to represent lndi•
(b) .AMENDMENT TO TABLI!: OF S£CTIONS.lished by this section.
The table of sections for chapter 153 of title
gents in capital litigation.
"Ii tt:;9. urtificate of probable cause inapplicable
"(cl If a State has not elected to comply 28, United States Code, Is amended by Inwith
the provisions of subsection <b>, In the serting afLer the Item for section 2255 the
"The requtrement of a cerificate of probacase
of
an appointment made before trial, at following:
ble cause In order to appeal from the dis•
least
one
attorney appointed under this "2255A. , Law controlling Federal habeas
trlct court to the court of appeals does not
corpus proceedings.".
apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this chapter must have been admitted to prac(c) APPLICABILITY . OJ' SECTIO!t.-The
chapter except when a second or successive tice In the court In which the prosecution Is
to be tried for not less than 5 years, and amendments made by this section shall
petition is filed.
must have not less than 3 years' experience apply only to prisoners whose sentences
~11 2260. (.,unsel in capital cases; trial and post- In the trial of felony prosecutions in that have become final after the date of enactC'om·irt.ion; •landard•
court.
ment of this Act.
"Cal A mechanism for the provision of
"(dl If a State has not elected to comply
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
counsel services to Indigents sufficient to with the provisions of subsection <b>, In the
invoke the provisions of this chapter shall- case of an appointment made after trial, at the previous order, the Graham
"< 1 > provide for counsel toleast one attorney appointed under this amendment is agreed to and shall be
"CA> indigents charged with offenses for chapter must have been admitted to prac- considered as original text for the purwhich capital punishment Is sought;
tice In the court of last resort of the State pose of further 1Unendment.
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t.

~

r
V

r
j

s

i
I·

,.
I•

1
j

j
~

s
I·

t
s
s
j
~

j

C')~P.Ntl\oA\

-

Te~~ '" ~11 ;~
r -.t•.C..

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

S6804

The a.mendmcnl <No. 1686) V.115
agreed to.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Presidenl, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeoed to call the rolL
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the Quorum eaH be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER CMr.
CONRAD). Without obJecUon. it ls so ordered.
Mr. KOHL Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent to speak as if in
morning business for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
· The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
Mr. KOHL. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. KOHL perta.ining to the introduction of S. 2675 are
located in today's RECORD under
"Statements on Introduced Bills and
Joint Resolutions.">
YOTK

The PRE.SIDING OFFICER. The
hour of 1:30 having arrived, under the
previous order the question ls on
agreeing to the motion to reconsider
the vote by which amendment No.
1681 was rejected.
The _yeas and nays ba\•e been · ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislatl\'e clerk called the rolL
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, on
this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. CHAFE!:] .
If he were present and voting, he
would vote ""nay." If I were at liberty
to vote, I would vote "yea."
I therefore withhold my vote.
(During the course of this vote. Mr.
BINGAMAN withdrew hJs live pair with
the Senator from Rhode Island {Mr.
ClunE] and voted in the affirmative.
The following tally, No. 104. reflects
such vote.>

Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr.
CRAnzJ Is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators 1n the Chamber ~·ho desire to vote?
The result was announced, yeas 49,
nays 50, as follows:
CRollca.11 Vote No. 104 Leg.]

YEAS-49
ArrA.SU"onc
Baucus
Bingaman
Bond
Bo«hlf<it&
Breaux
Bryan
Bums
Coats
Oochrtn
~

O&n(ort.11

G&rn

Nlckte.

OMISS!q

~~

Ht.Lett
H e rlln

Reid
Roth
Rudman
Sanford
Shelby

H eim
Helma
Hollings
HumphreJ
Johnstow

Fonl

Kas~
LoU
Lugar
Mack
Meet.In
McClu.tt

Adams
Alulkt.

Benl.sffl
Bldea

Dole
Domenlcl
Dur.-nberger
Exon

McConnell
Murkowsl<I

Gorton
Gnunm

Simpson
Specter
Stevens

6>-nuna
Thurmond
Wallop

NAYS-50
Borm
Bradley
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gun traces sent br police throughout
the country, to a central Froeral storehouse. researchers found that I\SSault
K.a&.,eba um
K en nedy
v.-eapons showed up In 10 percent of
Kerrey
these
traces. Assault weapons made up
KM'T'Y
almost one-third of all firearms traced
Kohl
Rock efeUct'
Sa.rtlll.nes
to ocganlzed crime. gun traUlcking,
l.&u~bet'-s
SMser
Le&hJ
·and crimes commltted by terrorists tn
Lerln
Slmon
the United States in a period of 1 year,
Lie berman
\Va.mer
1989, and the first. quarter of 1989.
M e tunbaum
Wll.son
Mik u lski
Wirth
These 11.re the reasons that the counM itcht>ll
try's law enforcement organizations
have come to the President, this adNOT VOTING-I
mlnistraUon. and the Congress !or
Chafer
help, and more importanUy, for proSo the motion was rejected
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President. tection. They have told us that they
today. I voted to retain the a.ntldrug cannot keep our streets safe, protect
assault weapons limitation provisions our children from drugs and violence,
in the pending legislation, the omni- and maintain order when they, thembus crime package. My vote came after selves, are in constant danger of being
weighing heavily the views and argu- maimed or killed by the destrucU~·e
ments of my constituents, law enforce- weapons of criminals. Our law enforcement oUlcials, experts, and my col- ment officers are being outgunned and
leagues. It is extremely important that overpowered by the spread of assault
my res.sons are clear, especially to the weapons throughout the criminal and
people of West Virginia whom I am drug underworld
As I have always said, there is n o
deeply privileged to represent in the
single solution or method for winninc
Senate.
To put It most simply, this \1;as a the war on drugs. I still firmly believe
vote to protect the citizens of West that we must mobilize the resources
Virginia and throughout this land and exerelse the legal tools to combine
from senseless crimes and violence. I effective drug education. drug treatam still a strong, fervent supporter of ment, Interdiction. eradication. and
the second amendment and the consti- law enforcement in the intensive, alltutional right to bear arms. My vote out assault on drug use and drug disdoes not represent any uncertainty tribution. The Antidrug .Assault Weap.
ons Limitation Act is a carefully deabout this position.
I came to the conclusion that the signed, highly targeted step to help
proposed ban on nine types of semi- carry out this assault successfully. It
automatic assault weapons is a neces- responds to the desperate cries for
sary, warranted step in our country's help from police officers. sheriffs, and
war on drugs and crime. Violent' and drug enforcement. a.gents in West Virdrug-related crimes have soared by 30 ginia and throughout America. It
percent In the last decade. Every 20 seeks solely to isolate the <lestruettve
seconds, a violent crime is committed weapons of erimlnals, not to limit or
In America. Police and law enforce- impinge on the weapons and guns tlrat
ment officials-along our borders, in citizens such as hunters. sportsmen. or
our cities, and in every corner of collectors wish and have the right to
America- are being _,gunned down by own.
The bill proposes to bar the new
drug traffickers, gang leaders. and
other violent criminals.
manufacture or Import of nine very
Underneath these trends of tragedy specific types of assault weapons, five
and horror is. the emergence of assault which are foreign-made and four
weapons. A3 we have heard from the which are domestically produced . .In
Director of the Federal Bureau of Al- fact, it's crucial to point out that
cohol. Tobacco and firearms, "it is the President Bush initiated the Idea of
general consensus of law enforcement curbing semJautomatic assault weap-·
of!lcials that the ever-increasing pres- ons, by taking the bold step last year,
ence of assault-type rifles in the illicit or July 7, 1989, of Imposing an Execudrug trade and tn other types of crime tive order to ban the Importation of 43
places the safety and the very lives of types of semiautomatic -weapons. As
the American pubUc Jn immediate our Presldent said in an Oval Office
peril."
address, drugs are a "grave threat sapIt ts abundantly clear from official ping our strength a.s a nation" that resurveys, news accounts. and the docu- quires us to wage an attack on every
mented experiences of law enforce- front.
ment officials throughout the country
The bill pending before us today
that semi.automatic assault weapons does not ban legal ownership of · the ·
have become the favored weapon-the nine listed weapons. And It imposes
weapon of choice-among a growing harsh penalties on future criminals
number of criminals, especially the who are caught using an assault
drug gangs plaguing America's cities. weapon to combat a violent or drug-reFor example. an intensive study per- lated crime. A new mandatory penalty
formed by Cox Newspapers found that of an extra 10 years of prison. would
an assault gun is 20 times more likely be slapped on the criminal on top of
to be used in a crime than a conven- any punishment imposed. for the comtional firearm. After lookinc at 43,000 mission of the actual crime.
B<lmp,-n
Burl,liclt
Byrd
Conrad
Cn>.nston
o ·Amato
Da.." 'hle
DeConcinl
Dixon
Dodd
Fowler
Glenn
Gore
Graham
Hart in

Halfi,- ld
I nou}'f!

J r ffords

Moyn ihan
Nunn
Packw,ood
Pell
Pryor
Rk'cle
Robb
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It ls Important to point out that the our debate on this crime bill. That
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""2266. Ha bc &.s corpus lime req ui rem ents.

bill is designed to sunset the assault means from now until the time we end I %!61. !Hfendanls • ubJut to capllal pun lsh,n.,nt
and prisontl""I In S ta~ cuslocly 1ubjttt to capweapon ban in 3 years after its effec- this debate on crime, this will be the
ital ~ nttnce: appol nt .. ent of counael: r<'(luirt•
th·c date. An Intensive 18-month study debate.
a-ient of rule of court or ~tatute: procNlurn for
of the Impact of the ban ls to be unThere will be no amendments to the
appoint=nt
dertaken as soon as the ban goes Into substitute about to be offered by my
'"( al This chapter shall applyeffect, In order to provide thorough In- friend from South Carolina. So at
'" (l l toformation and answers. The propo- some point, hopefully well before 6
cases In wh ic h the defendant is tried
nents of the ban openly acknowledge hours are up-but that Is the time for""< aA>capital
offense; or
that v.-e do not and cannot know the that has been allotted-we will have
""(Bl cases aris ing under section 2254 of
precise effects that a curb on these one vote on whether or not the this title brought by prisoners In State cusdeadly weapons will have on protect- Graham habeas corpus provision that tody v.·ho are subject to a capital sentence;
Ing our citizens and controlling crime is In the bill now or the Thurmond- and
'"(2> only If subsections Cb> and <c> are sat•
ln the way that law enforcement offi- Specter provision which Is about to be
cials at every level believe It will. But sent to the desk will prevail. I Just lsfled.
'"Cb>
This chapter Is applicable If a Stale
In my view, we have a moral and social wanted to set that out. I now wlll be
by rule of Its court of last resort
obligation to wage a relentless battle delighted to yield the floor to my dis- est..abllshes
or by statute a mechanism for the appointagainst crime and drugs, and to take tinguished friend· from South Caroli- ment. compensation. and payment of readecisive action to protect Innocent and na.
sonable fees and litigation expenses of com•
law-abiding citizens. Through the
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, petent counsel consistent with sect.Ion 2266
study, and when the bill must be con- while Senators a.re here, and before of this title.
'"<cl Any m echanism for the a·p polnt.ment.
sidered for renewal, we will have the they will be moving out, I just want to
opportunity to thoroughly assess say If they want to end these long ap- compensation, and reimbursement of counwhether a ban on these specific weap- peals, if they really want habeas sel as pro\"lded In subsection <bl must offer
ons of choice for criminals was effec- corpus, t hey better adopt this a.>nend- counsel to all St.ate defendants tried for a
capital offense and all State prisoners under
tive or 'il"hether It should expire.
mcnt.
ca pital sentence and must provide for the
In conclusion, I wish to underscore
AJU:Nl)!llENT NO. 1617
entry of an order b)• a court of recordmy hope that this section of the anti- (Purpose: To amend -title 28 of the United
'"< 1 > appointing one or more counsel to
crime bill will be recognized and reStates Code to provide special habeas represent the defendant or prisoner upon a
spected for what It is- it Is an antifinding that the defendant or prisonercorpus procedures In capital cases>
'"(A> Is Indigent and has accepted the
crime, antidrug, antlterrorlst, and anMr. THURMOND. Mr. President, t offer;
or
tlviolenee Initiative. The ceaseless send an amendment to the desk and
"<B> ls unable competently to decide
wave of drugs that has poured Into ask for Its Immediate consideration.
whether to accept or reject the offer;
America will not be stemmed unless
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. The
'"<2> find!~. after a hearlnit, If necessary.
we mobilize as a country and take ex- clerk will report.
that the defendant or prisoner has rejected
traordinary measures to eliminate this
the
offer of counsel and made the decision
The assistant legislative clerk read
extraordinary threat. Our citizens' as follows:
v.•lth an. understanding of Its legal conseright to bear anns Is not in peril. but I
The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. quences; or
certainly hope that the abillty of THURMOND],
'"(3l denyinit the appointment of counsel
for himself, Mr. Sncn:R, Mr.
cr1mlnals &nd drug criminals to prey HATCH, and Mr. SIKPSOIJ, proposes an upon a findlni that the defendant or prisoner Is not Indigent.
on the people and law enforcement of- amendment numbered 1687.
"Cd> No counsel appointed pursuant to
ficials In my State and throughout
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I aubsections Cb> and Cc> to representAmerica ls ln grave and immediate ask
unanimous consent that readlng of
'"( l l a State defendant beini tried for a
danger.
capital offense; or
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. Under the
'"(2l prisoner under ca.pltal sentence
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With•
the previous order, the Senator from out
during direct appeals In the S tate courts,
objection,
ft
ls
so
ordered.
South carouna [Mr. Tm7RllOND] ls
shall ha\·e previously represented the deThe amendment Is as follows:
recognized to offer a perfecting
fendant or prisoner at t rtal or on direct
Strike
T!Ue
Two
and
Insert
In
lieu
thereof
amendment regarding title II of the the following: ''TITLE TWO-HABEAS appeal In the case for which the appoint•
bill. There will be 6 hours of debate on. CORPUS REFORM"
ment 1s made unless the defendant or pris.
the Thurmond amendment equally ·di- SEC. • SP.-:CIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN oner and counsel expressly request continued representation.
vided and controlled by the Senator
.
CAPITAL CASES.
'"(el The Ineffectiveness or Incompetence
from South Carolina CMr. THURMOND],
(a) b
GDERAL-Part IV of title 28,
counsel during State or Federal collateral
and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. United States Code, Is amended by Inserting of
post-<X>nvlctlon proceedings In a capital case
Brno] or their deslgnees.
Immediately follow!~ chf i r 153 the fol• shall not be a ground for relief In a proceedlowlna new chapter:
O I ~ JttL,.
The Senator from Delaware.
lni arising under this chapter of this title.
"CHAPTD 154-SPECIAL
W Cruus
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as the
Thill subsection shall not preclude the apPROCEDURES
IN
CAPITAL
CASIS
Chair Indicated, there Is a 6-hour time
pointment of different counsel at any phase
of Federal post-conviction proceedings.
limitation on this amendment. What Is "Sec.
"2261.
Defendan~
subject
to
capital
punishat stake here Is the bill before us now
I %262. Mandator7 ata7 or execution: duration:
ment and prisoners In State
limila on •ta.t·• ol execution: a11cr ush·t peticontains a provision relating to habeas
custody subject to capital senUont
.
corpus. the so-called Biden bill that ls
tence: appointment of counsel:
•·ca> Upon the entry In the appropriate
sitting at the desk. It has been amendrequirement of rule of court or
ed by Senator GRAHAM so that there is
st..atute: procedure. for ap- State court of rerord of an order pursuant
to section 2261<cl of this title for a prisoner
now a habeas corpus provision In the
pointment.
under caplt..al sentence, a warrant or order
legislation sitting before us that will '"2262. Mandatory stay of execution; dura- setting
an execution date for a St.ate prisontion; limit.a on staya of execube better known from this point as the
er shall be stayed upon application to any
tion;
successive
petitions.
Oraha.m-Blden habeas corpus provi- " 2263. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time court that would have Jurisdiction over any
sion.
procee<llnp filed pursuant to this chapter.
requirements; tolling rules.
By unanimous consent, we agreed '"2264. Evldentlary hearings; scope of Feder- The application must recite that the State
with our Republlca.n colleagues and
al review; district court adJudl• has Invoked the procedures of this chapter
and that the scheduled execution b subject
the distinguished Senator from South
cation.
Carolina that he would offer a substi- '"2265. Certl!l.c ate of probable cause Inappli- to stay.
"<b> A st..ay of e xecution 1rranted pursuant
cable.
tute to that portion of the blll before
In capital cases: trial and to 1ubsectlon <al sh all expire Ifus. let me explain this to my col- •·2266. Counsel
"( l> a State prisoner faila to file a habeas
post-<:onvlctlon standuda.
leagues. the h_a beas corpus provision. '"226'7. Law controlling In Federal habeas corpua petition under this chapter within
This v, ill be the only vote on habeas
corpus proceedln1r; retroactlv- the time required In section 2263 of this
corpus we will have In the entirety of
lty.
uue: or

~
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··<2> upon completion of district court and
cou rt of appeals review under this chapter,
the petition for relief Is denied and"( Al the time for fil ing a petition for certiora ri has expi red and no petition has bee n
filed;
"< B > a t ime ly petit io n for certiorari was
fil ed and the Supreme Court deni ed the petition : or
"( Cl a timely peti tion for certiorari was
filed and upon consideration of the case. the
Supreme Court disposed of It !n a manner
that left the capita! sentence undistu rbed;
or
"(3> before a court of competent jurisdiction, a S tate prisoner under capital sentence
wai\'es t he right to pursue habeas corpus
review und er section 2254 of this title, In the
presence of counsel and after having been
advised of the consequences of making the
waiver.
"Ccl If one of the conditions !n subsection
Cbl has occurred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a stay
of execution or grant relief !n a capital case
unless"( 1) the basis for the stay and request for
relief is a claim not previously presented !n
the State or Federal courts:
"C 2l the failure to raise the claim"<A> was the result of State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States;
"CB> was the result of a recognition by the
Supreme Court of a new fundamental right
that is retroactively applicable: or
"C C> is due to the fact the claim is based
on facts that could not have been discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diltgence
in time to present the claim for State or
Federal post-conviction review: and
"C3> the filing of any successive petition
for a writ of habeas corpus Is authorized by
the appropriate court of appeals !n accordance with section 2264<c> and the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, if
proven. to undermine the court's confidence
in the Jury's determination of guilt on the
offense or offenses for which the death penalty was Imposed, or newly discovered facts,
which are not based upon or Include opinion
evidence. expert or otherwise, which would
be sufficient to undermine the court's confidence In the validity of the death sentence.
habeas corpus ~tition; lim~ requi~~nts; tolling rules
"Cal Any petition filed under this chapter

"§ 2263. Filinr of

'

\.
I

t

for habeas corpus relief must be filed In the
appropriate district court not later than 60
days after the filing In the appropriate
State court of record of an order Issued in
compliance with section 2261Cc) of this title.
The time requirements established by this
section shall be tolled"( 1 > from the date that a petition for certiorari Is filed In the Supreme Court until
the date of final disposition of the petition
if a State prisoner seeks review of a capital
sentence that has been affirmed on direct
appeal by the court of last resort of the
State or has otherwise become final for
State law purposes; and
"C2l during an addltional period not to
exceed 60 days, If counsel for the State prisoner"CA> mo\·es for an extension of time In
F ederal d istrict court that would have Jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a
habeas corpus petition under section 2254 of
this title; and
"C BJ makes a showing of good cause for
counsel's lnabtltty to ftle the habeas corpus
petition within the 60 day period established by this section. A court that finds
that good cause has been shown shall explain In writing the basis for such a finding.

law, relring on staff attornC'ys of a defender .,
organiza tion, members of th e private bar, or
bot h: or
<ii> a capital lilig;ition n'source center, rel)·ir.g on staff attorneys, members of the Prl\·ate bar. or bo th: or
·
<iiil a sta tewide defende r organization, rel ying on staff attorneys, members of the prj.
rnte bar. or both.
The certification authority shall:
"§ 2264. E.-identiic:- hearings; scope or Federal
<i1•> CE"rtify attorn eys qualified to repre. ~rnlew; distrlc1 NUrl adjudication
"C al Whenen·~ a State prisoner under a sent persons charged with capital offensel ':f
/ ,.
capital sentenN" !ti es a petition for habeas or sentenced to death; and
<v> draft and annually publis h procedures \
corpus relief to .~ich this chapter applies.
and st andards by which attorneys are cert!-, "!
the district COU:1"( 1 >shall dete:-::iine the sufficiency of the fi ed and rosters of certified attorneys; and . ·,
(\'il periodically revie w the roster of cerU- "'
evidentlary reco.-:! for habeas corpus review;
fi ed attorneys, monitor the performance orand
"C 2) May conc.;ct an ev!dentiary hearing all att<>rneys certified, and withdraw certlfr:
wh en the court.. b its discretion, determines cation from any attorney who falls to m~
that such hear--+ is necessary to complete h igh performance standards In a case to'
which the attorne Is appointed; or falls otli-,,
the record for hs.~as corpus review.
"C b) Upon the d<'velopment of a complete erwise to demonstrate continuing compe.,
evidentiary rec..'\.--d. the district court shall tence to represent prisoners in capital lltlaa '
rule on the me:.:s of the claims properly tion.
"C 2l In a State that has a publicly fund,
before It within ~~e time limits established
public defender system that !s not organized
In section 2268 o! this title.
"C cHll except s.s provided In paragraph on a statewide basis. the requirementa of
C2l, a district co:;rt may not consider a suc- section 2261Cbl shall have been deemed
ha\'e been satisfied If at least one attorney ..
cessive claim un&r this chapter.
"CcH2> A distr;,:: court may only consider appointed pursuant to this chapter before ·
a successive clai:-:. under this chapter if the trial shall be employed by a state funded
petitioner seeks lt'!l\'e to file a successive pe- public defender organization, if the highest
tition in the app:-;:, priate court of appeals." court of the State finds on an annual basis
"CcH3l In a c&S<" in which the appropriate that the standards and procedures estabcourt of appeals ~rants leave to file a succes- lished and maintained by such organization
sive petition, the time limits established by <which have been filed by such organization
this chapter shall be applicable to all fur- and re\iewed by such court on an annual
ther proceedings under the successive peti- basis) ensure that the attorneys working for
such organization demonstrate continulnc·
t ion.
competence to represent Indigents in capital .:'"
§ 2265. Certificat~ of pro bable cause Inapplicable
litigation.
.
"The requirement of a certificate of prob"Cc) If a State has not elected to establish .
able cause In oroer to appeal from the dis- one or more statewide certification authorl• ,
trict court to the court of appeals does not ti es to certify counsel eligible to be appointapply to habeas corpus cases subject to this ed before trial to represent Indigents, In the
chapter.
case of an appointment made before trial; 1.t"§ 2266. Counsel in capital CB.Rs; trial and post- least one attorney appointed under tW.
conviction standards
chapter must have been admitted to prao"Cal A mechanism for the provision of tice In the court In which the prosecution II
counsel services to Indigents sufficient to to be tried for not less than S ye&111, a.nd ,
must have not less than 3 years' experience ·
invoke the provisions of this chapter shall:
"Cl) provide for counsel to Indigents In the trial of felony prosecutions In thal'
charges with offenses for which capital pun- court.
Cd> If a State has not elected to establlsb
ishment Is sought, to Indigents who have
been sentenced to death and who seek · ap. one or more statewide certification authori•
pellate or collateral review In state court, ties to certify counsel eligible to be appoln~
and to Indigents who have been sentenced ed after trial to represent Indigents, In th«
to death and who seek certiorari review in case of an appointment made after trial, at"
the United States Su°J'>reme Court; collateral least one attorney appointed under th1a
review In State court. and to indigents who chapter must have been admitted to pn
have been sentenced to death and who seek tlce in the court of last resort of the Sta
certiorari review In the United States Su- for not less than S years, and must have I
not less than 3 years' experience in the h . .
preme Court.
"C2l provide for the entry of an order of a dling of appeals in that State courts In{,
·
court of record appointing one or more felony cases.
.. <el Notwithstanding this subsection.
counsel to represent the prisoner except
court,
for
good
cause.
may
appoint
anothi
upon a Judicial determination <after a hearing, If necessary) that CA> the prisoner is attorney whose background, knowledge or..
not Indigent; or CB> the prisoner knowingly experience would otherwise enable the 1,1
and lntelltgently waives the appointment of torney to properly represent the defenctani
with due consideration of the seriousness
counsel.
"Cbl<l) Except as provided below. at least the possible penalty and the unique
one attorney appointed pursuant to this complex nature of the litigation.
"C fl Upon a finding In ex parte pr
chapter before trial, If applicable, and at
least one attorney appointed pursuant to !ngs that Investigative. expert or other .
this chapter after trial, If applicable, shall ices are reasonably necessary for the re1
have been certified by a statewide certifica- sentation of the defendant, whether In co
tion authority. The States may elect to nection with Issues relating to guilt or lssU
create one or more certification authorities relating to sentence, the court shall auth
<but not more than three such certification lze the defendant's attorney to obtain s
authorities> to perform the responsibilities services on behalf of the defendant ~ •.
set forth below. The certification authority shall oroer the payment of fees and
for counsel at any stage of a capital case penses therfor, under subsection (gl. U
finding that timely procurement of ~111
shall be:
"Cl) a special committee, constituted by services could not pn...;t!cally await prior a,
thorization,
the court may authorize t
the State court of last resort or by State
<bl A notice.- : 1;,pcal from a Jud gment of
the district coi;..--: :n a claim under this chapter shall be fil1-.: ·• 1t h in 20 days of th e entry
of judgment.
<c> A peti tlo,. '. : r a writ of certiorari to the
S up reme Co ur. ,,[ the United Stat es In a
claim under :~ .; chapter shall be fil ed
within 20 da;-5 : ! the issuance of th e mandate by th e cm::-: of appeals.
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Although I have Introduced another utory proce;lurcs for Federal habeas
habeas proposal which the Attorney corpus review of capital sentences. It l.:i
General and I believe to be preferabl e, aimed at achieving the followi ng goal:
S. 88, I have decided to offer this death penalty cases should be subject
amendment which will effectively end to one complete and fair course of col•
abuse of the habeas procedure. The lateral review In the State and Federal
Issue of habeas corpus reform has lin- syst,em, free from the time pressure of
gered In Congress for several years Impending exceutlon, and with the as•
and we must act. After conferring with slstance of competent counsel for the
a number of Senators and experts in defendant. Once this appropriate, fair
this area, I am convinced that this review is completed, the criminal proc•
·D %267. Law rontrolllnr In Federal habeas corpus proposal warrants adoption by this
ess should be brought to a conclusion.
proceedings; retroactl•lty
body and Is vastly superior to the proThis proposal allows a State to bring
"In case11 subject to this chapter, all posal pending in S. 1970.
death penalty litigation by its prison•
claims shall be governed by the law as It was
This
Nation
is
facing
a
crisis
in
its
ers within the new statute by provld•
when the petitioner's sentence became final.
Justice system. Federal ing competent counsel for Inmates at
A court considering a cl&lm under this chap- criminal
ter shall consider Intervening decisions by habeas corpus and collateral attack trial and on State and Federal habeas
the Supreme Court of the United States procedures are In dire need of reform. corpus review. Participation In the
1rhlch establish fundamental constitutional This is evidenced by the glut of habeas new procedures Is optional with the
rights.
petitions In the Federal system. In addition, Federal courts have proven to States. This legislation also provides
-0 2268. Habeas corpus time requirements
for a 60-day period within which a
"(al A Federal district court shall deter• be slow ln their action on and, In some
mine any petition for a writ of habeas cases, willingness to act upon habeas Federal habeas petition must be filed.
corpus brought under this chapter within petitions. The large Increases In the This 60-day period begins to run on
110 days of filing.
number of habeas corpus filings, many the appointment of counsel. In addi"(b) The court of appeals shall hear and of which are frivolous and used as a tion, this legislation provides for an
determine any appeal of the granting, delaying tactic, and the Inordinate automatic stay of execution, which is
denial, or partial denial of a petition for a length of time death row unmates to remain in place until Federal
writ of habeas corpus brought under this
habeas proceedings are completed.
chapter within 90 days alter the notice of spend litigating In the Federal system.
This
provision ensures that habeas
require
that
legislation
be
enacted
to
appeal Is flied.
claims not be considered by a court
"(cl The Supreme Court shall act on any reform habeas corpus.
Habeas petitions have grown by vast under the time pressure of an impendpetition for a writ of certiorari In a case
brought under this chapter within 90 days numbers in recent years. In 1941, Ing execution. Every claim raised by a
after the petition Is filed.
State prisoners filed 127 habeas corpus death row inmate will be subject to
"(d> The Administrative Office of United petitions ln the Federal district courts. one full and complete review.
States Courts shall report annually to Con- By 1961, that figure had risen to 1,020.
Mr. President, where this amendgress on the compliance by the courts with
the time limits established 1n this section.", Over the years, that number has con- ment mostly differs from the underlyCb) AJamlMENT TO TAJIU: or CHAPTERS.- tinued to rise with Federal district Ing bill, S. 1970, and provides effective.
The table chapt,ers for part IV of title 28, courts receiving an incredible 9,880 true reform Is that It establishes a
United States Code, Is amended by inserting habeas petitions In 1988. The problem timetable for completion .of Federal
after the Item for chapter 153 the following: of these numerous filings is com- habeas corpus appeals. The delay In
pounded by the extraordinary delay in carrying out our Nation's death sen"154. Special habeas corpus procedures In capital cases ..............·-····· 2261". habeas corpus filings and court action. tences has brought our Judicial system
(C) A!o:NDKENT TO SECTIOII 2254 01' TITLS With respect to delay on the part of into disrepute. Families of victims are
28.-Bectlon 2254<c> of title 28, United our Federal courts, a witness who tes- forced to suffer, year after year, while
States Code, Is amended bytified at a recent Judiciary Committee
<l > striking "An applicant" and inserting cited a habeas corpus case he was In- murders sit on death row. Cases Involving capital punishment have
"(l >Except as provided In paragraph <2>, an
volved with where the Federal court dragged through the courts for as long
applicant"; and
<2> adding at the end thereof the follow- took 3 years to decide on one habeas as 18 years. The vast majority of this
petition. The result of these related delay is spent In Federal court. This
ing:
"(2) An applicant In a capital case shall be problems Is years of delay between amendment would, for the first time,
deemed to have· exhausted the remedies sentencing and a final Judicial resolu- establish a definite timetable for comavailable 1n the courts of the State when he tion and imposition of the death senpletion of Federal habeas corpus cases
has exhausted any right to direct appeal In tence.
within
1 year from the time the death
the State.".
The Thurmond-Specter amendment
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I is based, In substantial part, upon the sentence becomes final in State court.
rise today to offer, along with Senator recommendations of the Ad Hoc Com- It would bypass State habeas corpus
SPECTER, a tough habeas corpus mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus in proceedings which currently involve so
reform proposal which strikes at the Capital Cases chaired by former As.50- much delay. Yet, prisoners would still
heart of our Nation's habeas corpus clate Supreme Court Justice Lewis be permitted to pursue State habeas
problem-<ielay. Delay, delay, that is Powell. This committee, commonly re- while proceeding through the Federal
1
,irhat is taking place. This amendment, ferred to as the Powell Committee, system. The essential aspects of the
which is cosponsored by Senator was· formed by Chief Justice William timetable are that:
First, Federal habeas petitions must
HATCH and Senator SI?tlPSON, would Rehnquist In June 1988. The Powell
strike the habeas reform proposal con- committee was charged with Inquiring be filed within 60 days of the final
tained in the Blden bill, which ex- into the necessity and desirability of action in the State court proceeding
pands death row inmates rights, and legislation directed toward avoiding resulting in the death penalty.
Second, a final decision must be
replace It with a new proposal which delay and the lack of finality in capital
appropriately addresses the need to es- cases In which the prisoner had been made on the claim by the U.S. district
tablish a definite timeframe for Feder- offered counsel. Pursuant to the Chief court within 110 days from the filing
al conslderatlon of death penalty Justice's request, the Powell commit- of the habeas corpus petition.
Third, a final decision must be made
cases. This proposal was arrived at tee made Its recommendations and
after consultation with several mem- proposed a legislative remedy to the by the U.S. Court of Appeals within 90
bers of the Judiciary Committee and problem of habeas corpus review In days after, the final Judgment of the
U.S. district court.
emboJies !LfQnsolldatlon of the Powell capital cases.
habeas corpus prOPt)Sa:l 6'mtllhM 'In
Fourth, final action on a grant or
Mr. President, this amendment In~
e and an amendment corporates the Powell committee rec- denial of certiorari. by the Supreme
drafted by Senator SPECTER.
ommendations and proposes new stat- Court of the United States must be
provision of any payment of services nunc
pro tune.
··(gl The court shall fix the compensation
to be paid to an attorney appointed under
this subsection /other than State cmploy.e-es> and the fees and expenses to be paid
for Investigative. expert. a.nd other reason•
ably necessary services authorized under
subsection <c>. at such rates or amounts as
the court determines to be reasonably nee•
essary to carry out the requirements of this
subsection.
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made within 90 days from the final posal would permit any Federal court rently surrounds State death penalty
to grant a second, third, or fourth con\'ictions is cr itical. Law abid ing citijudgment of the court of appeals.
Fifth. continuances would be prohib- habeas petition if the court did not be- zens are justifiably fed up with death
ited except on the showing of good lie.ye the sentence was appropria te. By row inmates using procedural loopcontrast,
the
Thurmond-Specter holrs and unwarranted Judicial delay
ca use.
Sixth, no subsequent Federal habeas amendment would only permit U.S. to their benef it. It Is time we acted.
corpus petition may be entertained Courts of Appeals to grant the right to Legislation wh ic h reforms the current
unless specific permission for the have a second petition heard. Clearly, habeas process must be meaningful
filing of such a claim is granted by the I believe the underlying bill would reform which effectively addresses
vastly expand the rights of death row this problem. I believe this legislation
court of appeals for that circuit.
This expedited timeframe is both inmates. It makes no sense for Con- is the most effective and tough projust and practical because it bypasses gress to pass a death penalty bill in posal before the Senate.
the long delays inherent In State one title of a crime package, while in
In summary, the glut of habeas petihabeas corpus proceedings, without another title, enact a habeas corpus tions in the Federal system and the
eliminating a State prisoner's right to proposal which make the death penal- unacceptable delay In execution of
pursue State review while his Federal ty virtually impossible to Impose.
capital sentences are all evidence of
Mr. President, finally, it is important the dire need for real reform-not
case is proceeding. In addition, it establishes State habeas corpus proceed- to remember that both of these pro- reform legislation which will lead to
ings as the highest priority in the Fed- posals are voluntary to the States. more litigation and abuse. The funcStates can choose to opt into the altereral Judicial system.
Mr. President, In other areas this native procedures or choose to remain tion of the criminal Justice system Is
amendment is similar to the underly- subject to current habeas law. The to seek the truth. Once established,
Ing bill, S. 1970, since it addresses the Thurmond-Specter amendment offers procedures such as habeas corpus
concerns regarding the issue of stand- the States, in exchange for the ap- must not go on endlessly to prevent
ards for qualified counsel and the pointment of qualified counsel, a defi- the imposition of appropriate and Just
issue of retroactlvity. The Thurmond- nite timetable for review in Federal punishment. Additionally, prisoners
Specter amendment adopts the compe- court. The E iden-Graham proposal re- must not be allowed to file frivolous
tency of counsel standards contained quires that the State appoint qualified claims which do not warrant the time
in the Eiden-Graham bill. The counsel counsel in exchange for nothing but and energy of those charged with the
provision provides that a State su- continued Federal intervention and responsibility of handling them. As
preme court can establish its own more litigation. No State-not one- Justice Powell stated during his testistandards for counsel or the State can will choose to opt into the Biden- mony before the committee, the curchoose to adopt the competency re- Graham proposal. Biden-Graham is rent situation brings our Judicial
quirements already required under not a viable proposal which States will system into disrepute. Justice Powell,
Federal habeas law. In addition, this find acceptable.
who is, incidentally, opposed the death
amendment permits Federal courts to
It is clear that the Biden-Graham penalty, nevertheless respects the
consider a successive claim which is proposal Is still very similar to the right of the majority to see to it that
based upon intervening decisions by original Biden bill. It contains a constitutionally imposed sentences of
the Supreme Court which establishes habeas corpus provision which would death are carried out. It is the duty of
fundamental rights which are retroac- h ave the effect of increasing both the this Congress to do the same. Criminal
tively applicable. Under the original n umber of cases In Federal court and cases must be brought to a close. EndPowell proposal, these claims could t he cost of litigation to the Govern- less consideration of issues in criminal
not be heard. The effect of this ment. According to Justice Lewis cases that have no merit and are filed
change would be to permit a Federal P owell, the Blden-Graham proposal only for purposes of delay must be
court to hear a claim, whether or not would increase-I repeat that accord- eliminated from our judicial system.
the death row inmate has been ing to Justices Lewis Powell, a member Federal courts must act upon habeas
through the Federal system, if the Su- of the United States Supreme Court, corpus petitions so that the States can
preme Court were to hand down a de- who Is chairman of the committee, carry out an appropriate and just sencision which is retroactive and estab- who brought up the Powell proposal, tence. The principles of Justice, upon
lishes a fundamental right.
and who was appointed by Chief Jusour criminal Justice system is
Mr. President, where our amend- tice Rehnquist, and this is what Jus- which
ment differs from the underlying tice Powell says-it would increa.se, not based, demand that we take action. It Eiden-Graham proposal is the effect decrease the number· of habeas corpus is imperative that we pass this much
the change on retroactivity, which cases. In fact, the Department of Jus- needed reform measure.
In closing, the Members of this body
both proposals contain, will have on tice referred to the the original prothe ability to carry out death sen- posal contained In the underlying bill, have a clear choice-a vote for t he
tences. Without the timetable con- S. 1970, as a "step in the wrong direc- Biden-Graham proposal is a vote to
tained in my amendment, death row tion." The Blden-Graham proposal allow death penalty cases to drag on
inmates will be able to continue to liti- weakens and qualifies the time limita- year after year, while a vote for the
gate new claims over and over again in tions and finality provisions of the Thurmond-Specter proposal is a vote
Federal court. This Biden-Graham ap- Powell Committee proposal as to to bring endless death penalty appeals
proach, would permit claims to be ensure that no State would opt into Its to a close.
For these reasons, I strongly urge
raised several years after the sentence coverage. Simply put, the Blden prowas imposed. This difference is a criti- posal would expand the rights of my colleagues to support this amendment.
cal difference in the two competing criminal defendants.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
proposals. Our bill protects the right
By contrast, our amendment truly
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
of a death row inmate to habeas balances the need for finality ln death
corpus.
However,
unlike Blden- penalty cases with the requirements BURDICK). Senator SPECTER is recogGraham habeas, it puts specific time- that a defendant have a fair and nized.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I
tables in place so that death penalty timely examination of all his claims.
cases do not drag on endlessly for Thereafter, if the conviction and sen- thank the Chair.
years.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
tence are found to be appropriate, JuIn addition, the underlying Blden- dicial proceedings will be at an end, yields time?
Graham bill has broad rights to suc- absent any exceptional developments . Mr. T}!URMOND. Mr. President, I
yield the distinguished Senator such
cessive petitions which would further In the defendant's case.
expand death row inmates rights. I
Mr. President, finality-I repeat, fi- time as he requires.
find this approach unacceptable and nality-of litigation and the eliminaMr. SPECTER. I thank my dlstln•
unreasonable. The Biden-Graham pro- tion of the habeas abuse which cur- gulshed colleague, Senator THURMOND.
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I will start by con gratul al ing Sena- system which takes a hea\'y toll on ev- rery cardully administered and It ha~
tor TH t: RMOND for an excellent presen- eryone, Including the defendants. It Is to be appropriately lim ited both in th e
tation and congratulate him further not very fair to defendants. although interest of fair Imposition on defendon the outstanding work he has done, doubtless those on death row would ants and also in the interest of retainnot only on the current legislation, prefer the long delays to the alterna- ing the dea th penalty In th e arsenal of
but in the 10 years that I have been tives of execution. But it ls a system weapons, because if we o\·eruse the
here on the Judiciary Committee, in that makes no sense either for the death penalty, I believe that we will
his capacity as chairman and as rank- public. The lengthy delay directly un- lose It, that It will not be retained in
Ing member. I, similarly, congratulate dercuts, vitiates, and eliminates the our srstem of criminal justice.
the distinguished chairman, Senator basic purpose of punishment, which is
When I was district attorney of
BIDEN, for the work which he has done deterrence.
Philadelphia, I personally reriewed all
Deterrence is necessarily based on the cases, which had been the standon this legislation and his work as
chairman of the committee. And it ls two factors: swiftness and certainty. ard for the DA's in that city for many
my thought, even my hope, that as Obviously, there can be no swiftness if years and still ls the standard, and I
this debate proceeds, It might be possi- the appellate process takes 8 years or believe the standard which prevails
ble to work out some of the underlying 18 years, and there is no certainty be- generally, so that the ranking authordisagreements and even to find a con- cause of the vagaries of being caugh t, ity, duly elected prosecuting attorneys,
sensus as we discuss this important the vagaries of being convicted: If con- make that decision at the highest
victed, the vagaries of having the level.
Issue.
Mr. President,
the amendment death penalty; and where the death
When I was district attorney, my
which has been offered, captioned the penalty is imposed, the uncertainty of office established very rigid standards
Thurmond-Specter amendment, co- having that penalty carried out in a for calling for the death penalty. Long
sponsored principally by the distin- system where 125 people have been ex- before the law precluded the use of a
guished Senator from Utah [Mr. ecuted since 1976 of the some 2,600 peremptory challenge to exclude AfroHATCH] and the distinguished Senator plus who have been placed under the
Americans In my district attorney·s
from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON] has death penalty.
Mr. President, defendants are enti- office, we did not exercise peremptory
been the product of very extensive
work and, in accordance with the gen- tled to a thorough, fair review in the challenges to exclude Afro-Americans
eral legislative approach, very substan- Federal courts of the State criminal from Juries.
Under Pennsylvania law, as It was
tial modifications and revisions, even trial process which· results in convicin the course of the past 24 hours. So tion and the imposition of the death under the laws of the States generally.
that my submission to my colleagues Is penalty. But the kind of procedure a peremptory challenge may be exerthat the gaps have been narrowed on which we have should not be used to cised without any cause shown. The
the way important Issues, on the con- defeat capital punishment. Capital number varies from State to State. In
sideration on second or subsequent pe- punishment is obviously a very diffi• Pennsylvania you have 20 challenges,
titions as to the penalty aspect, as well cult Issue, and there are strong differ- and there had been a practice in the
as innocence or quilt, under an appro- ences of opinon. However, 37 States past to strike Afro-Americans from the
priate standard; and also there has have established the death penalty. jury.
When I became district attorney, I
been an appropriate consideration for The Federal Government virtually has
what we call Intervening Supreme no death penalty and has had none stopped that practice because I
Court decisions, not to use the term since Furman versus Georgia in 1972, thought It was unfair. Later the courts
retroactive but, substantively, it In- because the Federal laws have not in this country have precluded the
volves the same matter.
been recodified to take into account prosecutor from striking Afro-AmeriThis amendment also provides for the requirements of the Supreme cans peremptorily because of Its inherappropriate appointment of counsel, Court on aggravating and mitigating ent unfairness.
Mr. President, since coming to the
Investigators and experts, where nec- circumstances.
essary, In the trial process and In the
So at the present time under the Judiciary Committee, early on I voted
Federal habeas corpus appeals. As this Federal system we have only the Uni- against Federal legislation which
Issue ls presented, it ts a carefully form Code of Military Justice and we would impose the death penalty on 16crafted approach which would satisfy have the 1988 legislation on drug king- ~·ear-olds and 17-years-olds because of
my view that we ought to apply the
the two critical Interests: First, soci- pins.
ety's interest in having the death penMy own view is that capital punish- death penalty carefully and not to use
alty carried out in a fair, timely, and ment is a deterrent. I base that on ex- ft on those under 18. Certainly there
judicious manner; second, appropriate perience as an assistant district attor- are many 16- and 17-year-olds who are
protection for the defendant so that ney and district attorney of Philadel- hardened criminals, who have bad
the defendant has adequate counsel at phia, where I have seen many, many records, and have committed vicious
all stages of the proceedings and that cases where professional robbers, and crimes, but I believe that societal rethe defendant has an adequate oppor- burglars would not carry a weapon 'Ip straint is warranted in not imposing
tunity to litigate the relvant Issues the course of a robbery or burglary be- the death penalty In these cass.
when he challenges the appropriate- cause they were afraid of the death
Similarly, I disagreed with the deciness of the Imposition of the death penalty.
sion of the Supreme Court of the
penalty.
The cases are numerous where Jt has United States ln upholding the appliMr. President, there is general agree- been established that defendants are cation of the death penalty for those
ment that the American judicial apprehensive about the death penalty. · who were retarded. I think that is a
system has broken down with the long So in my Judgment there is a very bad judgment. I think you have to
delays on appeals in death penalty solid evldentlary base to establish a have societal restraint as a matter of
cases. That has become apparent, as judgment, and it is a judgment call fairness to the _individual and societal
noted by the distinguished Senator that the death penalty is a deterrent. restraint if we are to maintain the apfrom South Carolina, when some cases Perhaps ln the course of this discus- plicability of the death penalty.
take as long as 17 or 18 years and sion, if this Issue becomes relevant or
Mr. President, In this context then,
when the average ls 8 years before the debated, I will move to some of the ci- what we have before the Senate today
Federal courts have concluded the ap- tations of the evidentiary base to con- is the determination of what standards
pellate process on death penalty cases. clude that capital punishment is a de- are appropriate In Federal court
What happens, Mr. President, is terrent.
review. Bear In mind that before a
Mr. President, beyond my own view case gets to the Federal court a de:
that the public has lost confidence in
the system. The 2,500 inmates on that capital punishment ls appropri- fendant has been indicted, tried with a
death row are subjected to Russian ate, I have consistently maintained jury, convicted of murder in the first
roulette with stays and delays, a the position that it has to be very, degree, had the death penalty lm:
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posed, and taken the case to the su- court this amendment eliminates the the court has the authority to appoint
preme court in the State where the ln- prior requirement that you first ex- investigators, expert witnesses, and
cident occ ~rred. If lh e de ath penal! y h aust State remedi es before go ing to the court sh all fix the compensation
is uph eld, th en t h e mat ter may go to the F ederal court . It also establ!shes a to be paid.
lhe S t:preme Court of the United tim"etabl e which requires the defendOf course. in the administration and
S tat.es on a pe tition for a writ of ce rti- ant to move promptly.
carr ying out of all th ese laws, th ere Is
orari which. as a pr~tical matter, are
One of the really critical aspects of necessarily the requirement of a goodrarely h eard by the Supreme Court.
the pending legislation, and this ls leg- faith effort to see to it that the fees
Then comes the issue of what is islation advocated by both Senator are fa ir and reasonable. We cannot micalled collateral attack or habeas BrnEN and by Senator THURMOND and cromanage the court systems and escorpus proceedings. Habeas corpus Is a myself, relate to the pro\·isions for the tablish an hourly rate for every State
Latin phrase U'hich means have the appointment of counsel. This has in the United States or every county.
body, and it means that the body must always been a very difficult matter in That depends upon local circumbe produced to determine the legality many of the States. It is not possible stances.
of the deten~ion or legatlty of carrying to have a criminal Justice system funcBut it ls the obligation of the trial
out the penality, which. of course, ln tion fairly unless adquate counsel is Judges, ln the State courts where these
this case, is the death penalty.
provided. If a person does not have a capital cases are tried, to see that that
Mr. President, the new features lawyer-a good lawyer and an experi- is done. It is the obligation of the Fedwhich are ·present in the legislation we enced lau·yer-to go through the com- eral Judges, the U.S. district court
are presenti.:lg here today, added to plexities of a criminal trial, Justice Judges, when they have a lawyer apthe amendment filed by the distin- cannot be obtalned. From the vantage pointed for the habeas corpus proceedguished Sena.tor from South Cn.rolina, point of 1990, it is frankly surprising ings, to see to it that adequate counsel
are the pro,l.zions to eliminate State that it took so long in our system of is provided so that fairness is mainhabeas corpus proceedings as a prelim- crlminal Justice to have the requireinary or prerequisite to filing a peti- ments that someone who ls on trial tained. That kind of Judicial supervition for writ of habeas corpus in the even for a capital case have consel ap- sion Is necessary.
Mr. President, once there is the asFederal court.
pointed.
The States will still retain the auThat was decided by the Supreme sur:mce that adequate counsel is
thority to have habeas corpus proceed- Court of the United States ln the mid- present, and that there are funds t-0
ings as they may choose, but under forties ln Betts versus Brady and ex- pay for investigators, and there are
the Thurmond-Specter amendment tended in Gideon versus Wainwright funds to pay for expert witnesses, then
that is not a prerequisite. The reason In 1963 to all criminal cases where the there is no reason why we should not
establish a timetable which would conthat it ls not a prerequisite and the sen tences are longer than 6 months.
reason that there Is a change in this
This legislation requires that U a clude these cases in a reasonable
law is because of the relative meaning- State wishes to have the advantage of period of time. This amendment relessness of State habeas corpus pro- these new speedy habeas corpus pro- quires the Federal courts to give them
ceedings v.-Wch can take yea.,_
ceedlngs, the State must provide ade- expedited treatment. The first and
What happens on a State habeas quate counsel, adequate investigative highest priority in the Federal courts
corpus action Is that after the su- service and adequate witnesses, as de- will be the habeas corpus appeals from
the death sentence.
preme court of the State, say the fined ln some detail under this bllL
Congress legislated many years ago
State of Pennsylvania. has decided
Bear in mind, Mr. President, that
that the conviction was proper, the this legislation does not impose upon on the subject of speedy trials in Feddeath penalty was proper, and the the State a requirement that it under- eral courts, so it Is a logical adjunct for
the Congress now to address the timeU.S. Supreme Court has declined to take this course.
review the case, then it goes back to
But. It offers the State the avail;l.bll- frame on the hand.ling of habeas
the trial court and a Petition for a writ lty of these speedy processes in the corpus proceedings in the Federal
of habeas corpus la filed alleging Federal court, U the State complies courts.
errors that haYe already been decided with these requirements. The ConMr. President, the Thurmond.Specby the Stat~·s highest court Vlith the gress does not seek to impose its direc- ter amendment requires that the petipossiole addition of incompetency of tion on the States, out of respect for tion for a writ of habeas corpus be
counsel.
federalism. But, as is customary in filed ln the Federal court within 60
But when a State lower court, in a many similar lines, we say to the days from the final action by the SU·
State like Pennsylvania,. hears the States that U you want an advantage- preme Court of the United States In
habeas corpus challenge which has al· as, for example, in the case of Federal denylng certiorari. But the reality Is
ready been ruled on by the supreme highway funds-U you want Federal that the 60-day requirement comes on
court of t.lle State, then invariably the highway funds, you have to limit the top of approximately 4 to 6 months,
lower court dk.,nisses It; It goes to the drinklng age t-0 21. We are not saylng which the system has, to see to it that
State supr~e court; they have al- the States have to have the legal drink counsel is appainted after the State
ready heard it, and there is a dismissal age of 21, but if they want Federal supreme court has upheld the death
there pretty much in a perfunctory fundlng on high ways, they have to penalty. That is the activating date.
way.
When the State supreme court has
have it.
The net effect is that State habeas
That is what is required here. If the upheld the imposition. of the death
corpus proceedings do not amount to States want the advantage of this penalty, everyone is on notice that the
much, but they are perfunctory, and speedy habeas corpus proceeding process should begin at that time to
all of the functions which are per- which wlll enable them to carry on appaint counsel, and that counsel
formed by State habeas corpus are du- their criminal Justice system with rea- sh ould at that Point begin to prepare
plicated then when the case goes for sonable promptness, Instead of in 8, or for the Federal habeas corpus proceedFederal habeas corpus. But in the Fed- 18 years, then they have to undertake lng because It is apparent from our exeral system there is a fresh court, a the requirements set forth in this leg- perience that such a small number of
different court, not the court where islation.
cases are ever taken by the Supreme
the de!endant v.•as tried, but the U.S.
The requirements are detailed as to Court of the United States on certioradistrict court. There Is a dl!ferent ap- the procedures for the establ!shment ri that lt is a certainty, a virtual cerpellate court. So you have a different of panels of qualified lawyers or, ln tainty, that the case is golng lnto Fed~
court system and you have a tradition the absence of that, to have a lawyer era.I habeas corpus and that ls the
for an independent review~
with either 5 year's practice, plus 3 moment for action.
This Is not to say that you cannot year's litigating felony cases, which Is
The whole range of the death penalhave State habeas corpus proceedings, the requirement which the Congress ty cases are of sufficient fmparta.nce ln
but if you \\'.ant to go to the Federal set forth In the 1988 drug laws. Then the admlnistratlon of criminal Justice,
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Mr. President, that th esc> cases cannot introduced last week to provide 86 ad- that ti me in an e\·idc ntiary procPcdir.g
be busi ness as usual. You s imply ditional Federal judges. We must pro- to gl\·e full and fair review to what !ms
cannot let the files lie around for 6 vide the necessary judicial manpower happened In the State court. But after
months or a year until the petition is to carry out the administration of the dist rict court has decided it and it
filed . Under the existing practices, the criminal justice and have adequate has been reviewed by the court of appetitions for a writ of habeas corpus Judges to give the appropriate atten- peals and certainly applied for at the
Supreme Court, then there is invariare not filed until an execution date tion which these cases require.
Mr. President, beyond the district ably the situation which would arise
has been set, and they languish for
months or years before they reach court, the case would then go to the when the death penalty application is
that point with the legal processes court of appeals under a timetable, imminent for another petition for a
taking their toll, after the final deci- again, of 110 days. This Is about the writ of habeas corpus to be appli ed
sion on the judicial appellate process. same timetable now utilized in most for. It is this repetition which has reMr. President, after the petition for circuit courts of appeal: 20 days for sulted in the long delays of up to 18
a V.Tit of habeas corpus is filed, the the pleadings, and a briefing and argu- years, and it Is this repetition that has
State would have the customary 20 ment schedule to encompass 110 days, to be dealt with but dealt with in a
days to file a responsi\'e pleading. At Again, If more time Is necessary, the fair manner.
that Juncture the U.S. district court statute provides for the flexibility on
The Thurmond-Specter amendment
which has Jurisdiction would have the the showing of good cause with the provides that a subsequent petition
respcnslbility to give this case expedit• specific reasons being cited.
may be filed only if leave is granted by
Once the case is concluded by the the court of appeals. So that it Is not a
ed treatment. And, under the statute,
it would have 110 days in total: 20 days court of appeals, then there Is again a matter of going back to the district
filing time, plus 90 days for disposition requirement that the Supreme Court judge who may be tough or may be leof the United States conclude the case nient. It goes on the second petition,
of the case.
If the case is complicated and re- within llO days. If cert Is denied, that or subsequent petition, to the court of
quires more time, discretion would be would be not too far from the current appeals-three judges-and if the devested in the district court to extend standards.
is to have the opportunity to
CMr. LAUTENBERG assumed the fendant
the time for the filing of the petition
have another hearing, he has to perso that the 60 days has that latitude chair.>
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at suade, or she has to persuade, two of
and flexibility. The court could extend
three of those court of appeals judges
the time for the decLsion within 110 every stage of the proceeding, the that there Is some merit In having anCongress
would
be
asking
or
directing
days total, but only on a showing of
good cause. to be specified by the the courts to give these cases priority other appeal. That is a fair test which
attention. We ask for the priority at- has a balance on a gatekeeper with
court.
Mr. President, I have handled tention because in the absence of this discretion, a standing-the court of aphabeas corpus cases In the State court priority attention, the death penalty, peals-and always a gatekeeper which
and that Is the basis for my represen- as a weapon in the arsenal of society's will exercise, as best we can In any
tation and argument that they are du- means to protect Itself, Is rendered vir- system of Justice, the appropriate displicative and meaningless. Similarly, I tually meaningless. So that this time- cretion.
This Is a novel approach, candidly,
have handled cases in the Federal table In the Federal court would procourt. This timeframe Is realistic, espe- vide for review in approximately 1 suggested to me by a very distincially given priority attention for year from the initial decision of the guished judge In the court of appeals.
The controversy has arisen as to
Supreme Court of the United States In
these cases to be so resolved.
Mr. President, there would not be denying certiorari on the appeal from what should be the standard applied
any undue burden on the · Federal the decision by the State's highest when someone goes in for Federal
habeas corpus after they have had the
courts. If we take Philadelphia, for ex- court.
ample, there are approximately 10 to
Realistically, as noted before, It Is 4 full State review and the full first Fed12 death cases coming out of the to 6 months in addition to that be• eral review.
The Powell Commission took the poPhiladelphia court system each year. . cause after the State's highest court
Interestingly, of the 110 people on has upheld the Imposition of the sition that the scope of review ought
death row in Pennsylvania, 70 come death penalty and we know It Is going to be limited only to the question of
from Philadelphia, 40 from the re- to the Federal courts, it takes that Innocence. The judicial conference, a
mainder of the State. Considering 10 much time to go to the Supreme Court group of circuit Judges and other Fed•
to 12 death cases a year, that would be of the United States on a petition for eral Judges, took the position that
there ought to be review not only as to
less than 1 case per judge on the Fed- certiorari.
eral court. In Philadelphia, there are
Mr. President, on the two items Innocence or guilt, but also a review as
18 permanent judgeships and 10 senior which have been in contention-and to the propriety of the penalty.
The earlier approach, In this amendjudges, so a judge would have a case there are only two Issues which have
once every 2½ or 3 years.
been hotly contested-It Is my submis- ment, was to limit lt to what the
Similarly, in the case of Florida I am sion that this amendment establishes Powell Commission said, but that has
advised by the State attorney gener- a realistic and workable procedure as -since been changed. So now there is an
. al's office there that there are ap- the amendment has finally been draft- inclusion of consideration on a subse,
proximately 25 death sentences Im- e~
quent appeal to the penalty aspect if
posed each year. Florida has 27 disOne of the arguments has been there Is a showing of fact on newly district judges. So It would be less than whether there should be consideration covered materials.
one a year in the State of Florida.
on subsequent petitions of only InnoSo that now the pro\'lsion reads as
Texas has. again according to the cence of guilt or also on the penalty follows, Mr. President. I read It beState attorney general's office, ap- Itself. One of the very difficult factors cause this Is a very Important proviproximately 25 to 30 death sentences In the administration of Justice where sion:
each year. In Texas. there are 36 dis- the death penalty Is Imposed Is that
The filing of any successive petition for a
trict judges and 10 senior judges. So after you establish a system where a \Hit of habeas corpus Is authorized by the
on the average it would be one every man or woman Is tried before a Jury appropriate Court of Appeals In accordance
18 to 20 months In the State of Texas. and can produce all sorts of mitigating v.·tth section 2264<c>.
. So the burden Is not excessive for the circumstances, and that case Is then
I might explain that that Is the gatedistrict court to give priority attention heard by the State supreme court keeper leave granted by the court of
to these cases.
which upholds it, then there Is a appeals. The text goes on:
• If more Judges are necessary, . Mr. habeas corpus petition filed in the
And the facts underlying the claim would
President. the Congress has to provide Federal court. There Is no limit on be sufficient, tr proved, to undermine the
them, as we are currently with the bill -what the Federal court can hear at court·s confidence In the Jury's detcrmina-
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appropria te breadt h before the dea t h States of America without having the
penalty Is imposed. The substance of Federal court step in and stop that
the -Thurmond-Specter amendment ki nd of a practice.
provides as follows :
I think no one would begin to disA court considering a claim under this agree with that kind of a decision
ch apter ahall consider ln tcrvei1 ing decisions today Just a.s we do not disagree at all
by the S upreme Court of the United States with the decision in Brown versus
So that In this standard, we have the which establish fundament.al riahts.
Board of Education or many of the de•
essence of wha.t has been urged by the
What Chief Justice Rehnquist had clslons of the Supreme Court which
Judicial conference. We have a subse- been arguing for was to allow a death
quent petition allowed If there is a row defendant the benefit of decisions have brought a sense of decency and
contention of innocence or If there are on fundamental rights and decisions Justice to this country.
But then the rights have continued.
n ewly d!scO\·ered facts which bear which were intervening after he had
And I am not going to engage In an exupon the validity of the death sen- run the appellate process intitlally.
tensive discussion as to how those
tence;
But, Mr. President, the most imporIt appropriat ely, Mr. President, does tant aspect of the thrust of the Thur- rights have evolved, but many of them
not allow a second round of Federal mond-Specter amendment ls that we have been very tough on law enforcehabeas corpus, a second bite of the establish a timetable where there will ment.
I recall when Miranda versus Arizoapple, so to speak, If you get a new be relatively few intervening appellate
opinion from a new psychiatrist which court-Supreme Court rights granted. na came down imposing a new standcould have been obtain ed at any tfme. That happens when It takes 18 years ard for policy interrogation which apSo there is the allowance, lf there ls a for a case to be decided. U you took a plied from the date of the decision on
newly disco\·ered fact which bears span of even 8 years, which ls the av- June 13 of 1966, so that in cases which
upon the question of death penalty, as erage, in the 1960's, you would have an had been investigated a week before, a
well as on the question of innocence.
Escobedo, Miranda, and lineups, and month before, when confessions had
Mr. President, I believe that that is search and seizure. You would have a been appropriately obtained under exnn appropriate determination because whole panoply of new righ ts which isting standards- we had a case In
I do not believe that it ls wise or con- would arise. So that when a defendant Philadelphia, Commonwealth versus
scionable to exclude an Individual on wes tried, before a case would run Hickey, where a man robbed a cab
his or her way to the death penalty if through the Federal habeas corpus driver and murdered him and the
there is a fact of this nature which system, he would go through the State police went to his apartment and
bears either on the question of inno• system and in that intervening time found the gun and materials that
cence, guilt. or on the question of the there would be a new right on confes- proved to be from the body of the cab
propriety of the sentence.
sion. That case would go up and come driver. They questioned the defendant
This comes in significant measure, back down. and by that time there In accordance with the existing rights
Mr. President. from the testimony of would be a new right up on lineups. under Escobedo versus Illinois, but
Justice Powell himself when he ap- That case would go up, and before it they did not give the Miranda warnpeared before the Judiciary CornmJt- was finished there would be a new ings: you have a right to remain silent,
tee in a very lengthy session and made right on search and seizure. That case and everything you say can and will be
this comment which appears at page would go up, and before It was fin- used against you; that you have a
359 of the RECORD from November 8 of ished there would be a new right on right to a lawyer, and If you do not
last year, where Justice Powell testi- the selection of Juries. It is a fact that have a lawyer the State will provide
fies:
in the evolving system of criminal Jus- one, and If you start to talk and
I repeat whal I said earlier. that. for the tice in this country we have added sub- change your mind, you can stop at any
time. Who, in May 1968, would have
m06t part, lnnocence Is not an Issue In this stantial new rights to defendants.
cue. The question Is whether or not a death
Mr. President, If you want to read a predicted that a month later the Susentence was appropriate, and whether or shocking declsoin, even though you preme Court would come down with .
not the trial v.-as f&ir:
may be a nonlawyer, pick up the deci- that ruling? But the Supreme Court
Focus in on that, Mr. President. sion of the Supreme Court of the dld. and many cases were wiped out,
When Justice Powell comes to grips United States in Brown versus M.Lssis- and I think inappropriately wiped out
with the application of an appropriate sippi, a case which was handed down after there had been an evolving
standard. Justice Powell moves beyond in 1936. Although it was not so long standard under Mapp versus Ohio in
what the Powell Commission said on ago, there was a time when the Su- search and seizure and lineups, and so
seeking to limit subsequent petitions preme Court of the United States did forth. So as these cases have moved
only to the question of innocence or not have anything to say about any through the State habeas corpus proC"Uilt when he says. and again I quote: case tried in the State courts because ceedings and Federal habeas corpus,
The question b whether or not a death under our concept of federalism, when before they are finally decided, new
sentence was appropriate.
a State court had decided the criminal rights have been created.
So that Is what ls comprehended case, that was that; the Supreme
This amendment takes a realistic
within the modification of the amend- Court would not touch the criminal look at the criminal justice system,
ment which ls now pending before the case, notwithstanding the fact that and we say for the first time that the
Senate.
the 14th amendment was passed Im• emperor has no clothes, when you reMr. President. the other principal med.lately after the Clvll War. But it quire a State habeas corpus proceedbone of contention between the two took until 1936 for the Supreme Court ing which takes several years to be a
positions has been the question on of the United States to say that the jurisdictional
requirement
before
whether lat.er decisions by the Su- provisions of due process of law placed going into Federal habeas corpus, bepreme; Court of the United States a Federa.l limita tion on what a State cause in a Federal habeas corpus you
would be available to someone whose could do.
get all of the rights.
appellate process had already nm its
For the first time the Congress wfll
The defendant in Brown versus Mis•
course, the so-called retroactively sissippl was an African-American man have spoken in · this bill to establish
issue.
who was brutalized virtually beyond meaningful requirements for appointAfter a good deal of effort, the description. He was ta.ken to a neigh- ment and payment of counsel, InvestiThurmond-Specter
amendment
I boring State, beaten, a noose around gators, and expert witnesses If the
think strikes the right balance on this his neck, and hanged to obtain a co- State wants the advantage of this exdifficult Issue. Again, it ls in accord• erced confession. Finally In 1936 the pedited habeas corpus proceedings. It
ance with societal constraint and in ac- Supreme Court of the United States wlll do Justice to the defendants, and
cordance with the basic approach that said, enough; States cannot undertake It wlll do Justice to society by allowina
the defendant ought to be accorded those kinds of practices in the United the procedure which wlll meaningfully
lio n of guilt on the offense or off<' nses for
wh ich th e death penalt y was Im posed. or
newly disco\'C:red facts which a.re not based
upon or Include opinion evidence. ex pC' rt or
ot he rwise. 11,hich 11:ould be su ffi cient to undermine the cou n ·s confidence In tht> validity or the dea th ~ ntence.
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Their
distingu is h ed
com mittee, of evidence on the specific facts of the
allow the lmpositlon of the dl'ath penalty in appropriate cases.
which was made up of five Federal or case, personal circumstances, issues
I thank the Chair and yield the former Federal Judges. pooled th ei r that would go beyond what we would
practical experience and sou ght out- consider the law I\Ild go to the issue of
floor.
Mr. President, may I lnquire as to side counsel on options for ha.beas mercy.
how much time remains?
corpus reform.
H that case Is rejected-If clemency
The consensus that reform is needed is not granted-then it becomes the reThe PRESIDING OFFICER. There
is approximately 2 hours remaining was quickly formed. That recognition spanslblllty of the Governor to sign a
for the Senator from South Carollna of the need for reform is now held death warrant. Typically, that warrant
and a full 3 hours remain for the Sen- broadly within this Chamber. The rea- is signed for a date 30 days subsesons for that recognition and n eed for quent. Twenty days of that period
ator from Delaware.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
reform are obvious.
pass. At the end of that 20 days, a peMr. President, from 1961 to 1986, tition Is filed ln the Federal court for a
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I
State prisoners filing habeas corpus Federal collateral appeal review.
thank the Chair.
Earlier today, I proposed, and the petitions In Federal district courts In·
The Federal court, now faced with a
Senate accepted, a modification of the creased by 786 percent, a 786-percent complicated case, only 10 days or less
underlying bill which substituted a lncrease between 1961 and 1986. The left until an execution is going to
new title II as It relates to habeas number of State prisoners' habeas occur, is requested to enter a stay of
corpus. While that process was under- corpus petitions filed In Federal courts execution which is almost automatiway on the amendment that was co- has Jumped from 497 cases in 1987, cally granted.
sponsored by Senator DECONCINI and and 438 cases In 1988. This brings us to
Then a long process of Federal colSenator BRYAN, a similar effort was an all-time high number of 9,880 lateral review commences. That procunderway with Senator TuuRMOND habeas corpus petitions in the last 4- ess will typically end again at the U.S.
and Senator SPECTER. It is reminiscent quarter year.
Supreme Court. Assuming that that
Mr. President, Senator SPECTER has
of some experiences in science. It was
claim has been denied, then there is a
had
the
opportunity
to
deal
with
these
at the end of the 19th century that a
review to determine whether another
scientist ln India and another scientist cases from the perspective of a Feder- clemency
process ts appropriate,
in Cuba, halfway around the world, al prosecutor. I had the responsibility
were both attempting to understand of dealing with it from the perspective whether there has been any change of
of a Governor of a State with a large circumstances that would indicate
the cause of yellow fever.
And
independently they both number, over 300 persons, on death clemency, not previously granted,
might be considered.
reached the determination that the row.
Assuming that is not the case, anI would like to review what actually
cause was a particular form of mosquito which had in a period of its maturi- happens in these cases under the cur- other death warrant is signed for a
ty served as the carrier for what at rent law. The case I am going to cite is date approximately 30 days in the
that time was one of the world's most hypothetical in that It ls an amalga- future. Twenty days into that death
dreaded diseases. These two scientists, mation of a number of cases with very warrant, another Federal collateral
appeal petition Is filed, raising a
thousands of miles apart, ended up similar factual circumstances.
with the same diagnosis and the same
An individual commits a heinous second Issue, an issue different from
prescription for the resolution of this crime, a multiple murder, in our State. that which had been raised in the first
dreaded disease.
It has to be under circumstances that instance.
That process rolls forward until now
In some ways, that process has been shock the consciousness of the citizenoccurring with this legislation. We ry. That murder results in a trial.. a we are ln the late spring of 1990. That
started off Independently, Senator conviction by a jury, a recommenda- individual, 12 years after the incident,
TmrRMoND, Senator SPECTER, Senator tion by that Jury, and then finally a 12 years after the original convicUon.
still awaits a final determination as to
DECoNCINI, Senator BRYAN, and Judicially imposed sentence of death.
-myself, and attempted to understand
Let us assume that that occurred in punishment.
That is a typical consequence of the
and arrive at a reasonable resolution 1978. There is then a period of direct
of this Issue.
appeals, first to the Florida Supreme way in which the current law operates.
I believe that the result Is an under- Court, and then a request. and if in reality.
lying amendment, which Is now part granted, an appeal before the U.S. SuI believe that we need to move toof the bill, and an amendment which preme Court, a direct appeal. That wards reform. which will have goals of
finality, of certainty, of assurlng that
has been offered by the Senators from process takes until 1981.
South Carolina and Pennsylvania,
Then there is a period of habeu all ~ues are raised at one time, that
\\'hlch is very simllar.
corpus review In the State courts be- they are raised sufficiently close to
The good news with that is I believe cause under the current law there is the events so that if the issue is, for
· there is every reason to believe that the principle of exhaustion of State instance, did this person have a comthis Senate will pass by a strong vote a remedies before access to the Federal petent lawyer at the time of trial, you
would have_some people with recollecvery considerable reform in the cur- court ls available.
rent habeas corpus law, and that the
In our State we have now adopted a tions sufficiently fresh, with memories
result of that will be a greater sense of provision very similar to what this bill of the incidents at trial to be able to
real Justice, real Justice in the sense would provide, and that is a statute of advise appellate courts as to what acthat decisions will be made on evi- limitations. You have to brlng your tually happened so that we would not
dence which is relevant, which is rela- case before the State court within a be dealing with a sense of fantasy, but
tively fresh; decisions will be made on period of time, or you suffer the po- with reality In our quest . for real Jus•
a timely basis; the public's confidence tential sanction of loslng access to the tice.
that the judicial process has some ca- court. It is my understanding that
Both the bill as modified by the
pability of reaching flnality will be re- there are approximately five other amendment that has now been adoptstored.
States that have adopted a similar ed. and the amendment offered by
·I am very pleased with that, and I statute of limitations.
Senators THURMOND and SPECTER, have
wish to commend all of my colleagues
Let us assume that process requires simllar objectives.
who have participated in the effort 2 years to run. We are now up to 1983.
I would like to lay out at this time,
that has brought us so close. I also
Then the person walt.s. What they Mr. President, what I think are the
wish to commend former Supreme wait for is the signing of a death "Q.'ar• principal issues within this common
Court Justice Lewis Powell and the rant. In Florida, that occurs after objective, and then discuss some of the
members of this committee, whose ef- there has been a clemency hearing in differences.
forts contributed so substantially to which the Individual has an opportuniI will state that It wa.s only approxithe result that we have reached today. ty to present the widest possible range mately an hour ago, wh.e n the Senator
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from South Carolina offered his final
amendm ent. that we had an opportunity to review It. And it may be at a
later point in this debate that I will
return for a more thorough analysis of
some of the areas of difference.
But I will attempt to lay out what
appear to be the principal Issues and
areas of disagreement at this time.
I suggest that there are six basic
Issues within the question of reform of
the Federal collateral appeals process.
First, there is the issue of a statute of
limitations for filing Federal habeas
corpus claims; second, the right to
competent counsel for indigent inmates in these . collateral appeals of
capital cases; third, a review of the
procedural default rules; under what
circumstances can a defendant raise
issues during the collateral appeals
process that had not been raised
during the direct appeal or during the
trial itself. Next, what are the limits
on the filing of successive petitions?
Finally, the rules that relate to the
retroactivity, the application of new
law as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme
Court to a case that occurred years in
the past.
We can look at these issues one at a
time. First, the imposition of a new
statute of limitations on filing Federal
habeas corpus claims. This is not a
new idea. In 1983, the Senate passed a
1-year time limit for the filing of Federal habeas corpus petitions. Under
the current law, as I indicated in my
hypothetical example, there is relatively little or no incentive for State
inmates to file petitions for Federal
habeas corpus relief until an exception
date is set.
In most instances, the defendant
who is incarcerated, but feels that he
has some legitimate claim to raise in a
habeas corpus proceeding, has every
incentive to want to expedite that. If
they are able to receive relief, based
on their petition, they might get a new
trial, or they might be outright released. If they fail, they are in no
worse condition than they were on the
day they filed the petition.
What is unusual about capital cases
is that the incentives are reversed.
The defendant is reluctant to file that
last petition, knowing that if that is
denied, then that is the ultimate
result, and they are going to face the
ultimate punishment.
So the fundamental purpose of all of
these proposals is to create some sense
of timeliness In bringing these appeals.
Justice is not well served under the
current scenario. There is a flurry of
activity of almost chaotic nature
which surrounds the signing of the
death warrant In the days leading up
to execution, as attorneys move from
court to court trying to find a friendly
forum that will grant them some delay
or relief. This disparages the public's
opinion, attitude, and perception of
the Justice system.
This amendment would allow Inmates 1 year to file a Federal habeas
petition from the time the sentence
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has -been affirmed in the direct appeal "cause" and "prejudice" test. That ls.
of the State court of last resort. This you ha \·e to show that there Is a just
1-year period can be stayed during a cause for raising this. a reason to bring
review by the U.S. Supreme Court, to the court's attention a matter not
based on a request petition for certio- previously raised, and that cause has
rari or during any period In which the to have caused real prejudice. This
petitioner is seeking relief under State rule affords an adequate guarantee
habeas corpus procedures.
that the Federal habeas corpus courts
This 1-year time limit, as I Indicated, will not be barred from hearing approIs consistent with legislation that the priate claims.
Senate passed in 1983. It is also the
The Powell Committee did not recsame time limit which is contained In ommend any changes in the rules on
legislation offered earlier this year by procedural default. Again, Mr. Presiboth Senator BIDEN and Senator dent, I am pleased to observe that this
THURMOND and legislation which I is an area in which there Is no dishave offered.
agreement. Both the amendment ofThe second issue Is the accessibility fered by the Senator from South
to competent counsel for Indigent de- Carolina and the Senator from Pennfendants facing capital sentences. Mr. sylvania and what is now the underlyPresident, I particularly applaud the ing amendment to the bill itself essenPowell Committee for Identifying this tially adopts the Powell Committee's
critical element of habeas corpus position in the previous law relating to
reform. In adequate representation at
default.
trial and on appeal Is often the under- procedural
The fourth Issue has to do with the
lying cause for the plurality of claims concept
of successive petitions. This is
which slow the finality of State court a very important
issue. The question
judgment. That is not to say that
there is not a pool of very fine, highly is, after the 1-year filing limit is
qualified lawyers to handle capital passed, under what conditions can an
cases. However, most witnesses who inmate raise an unheard claim in the
appeared before the Judiciary Com- Federal court? To use a hypothetical ·
mittee on this topic lamented the ac- example: Having gone to Federal court
cessibility of good lawye·r s for indigent once v.'ith a petition for habeas corpus
inmates. In my State, the State of and having been unsuccessful, can one
Florida, by statute, we have created a go back a second, third, fourth time,
public defender office to provide com- raising additional claims? Successive
petent counsel at the trial level and an petitions should, in my opinion, and in
office of capital collateral representa- the opinion of the Powell Committee,
tives to provide competent counsel for be limited to only the most extenuating circumstances. The Powell Comcollateral appeals in capital cases.
The Powell Committee recommend- mittee would allow successive petitions
ed that should inmates be limited in only in extenuating circumstances and
the time of filing an appeal-if the only when the claim went to the guilt
statute of limitation concept is adopt- or innocence of the prisoner.
In this area, both the Senator from ed-representation should be available
South Carolina, the Senator from
for such collateral appeals.
Senator BIDEN, in his original pro- Pennsylvania and our underlying
posal, had provided a similar ap. amendment have digressed slightly
proach, and I am pleased to say that, from the Powell recommendation, in
in the amendment ·that has. been of- that we have also recognized the apfered by Senator THURMOND and Sena- propriateness under extenuating cirtor SPECTER, almost a verbatim adop. cumstances of bringing petitions
tlon of the competency of counsel and where the validity of the sentence, as
the procedures for their selection and well as guilt or innocence, is at Issue.
compensation has been secured. This That is to sayMr. SPECTER. Will the Senator
is not an issue which ls In controversy.
The third issue involved in debate on yield for a question?
Mr. GRAHAM. The Senator would ·
habeas corpus reform relates to the socalled procedural default rules. Proce- like to yield after he finishes about 10
dural default rules determine under minutes of explaining the issues and
what circumstances an issue which ·attempting to articulate what I sense
was not raised in a defendant's origi- to be areas of agreement and remainnal trial can be raised In a collateral ing areas of disagreement.
To return to the hypothetical, if the
proceeding.
In the 1977 case of Wainwright issue is whether the judge or the Jury,
versus Sykes, the U.S. Supreme Court depending on which institution has
reaffirmed its opinion that claims not the responsibility for determining the
previously raised may be heard only Imposition of death, had properly
under three conditions: First, when taken into account aggravating cirthe failure to raise them was a result cumstances, if there were extenuating
of illegal State action; second, when reasons why certain Information was
the Supreme Court recognizes a new not brought to the attention of the
law that It then retroactively applies; court in the first _habeas corpus petiand third when the failure to raise the tion, we would recognize the fact that
claim was because certain facts could that is a legitimate area as ls the basic
not have been discovered through the Issue of guilt or innocence.
I might say that It has been suggestexercise of reasonable diligence. This
test, as the Senator referred to, Is the ed that up to 70 or 80 percent of the
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cr.scs which get to the United Stat,es some of the rationale for that. This ls the Federal procedures, then you
s uprt-me Court through the Federal from a statement by Justice Lewis would have the prisoner going Into the
11:i!Jeas corpus procedure as applled to Powell, the ch airman of the Powell State system second.
c:i;:ii tal cases go to th e iss ue of sen tenc- Comm ittee, wh ich states:
I do not a gree with t h e argument
;ng an d th e validity of that se ntenc.e
Federal law now req uires that before tha t what will happen is that you v,ill
rat he r than to the issue of guilt or in- cl aims may be asserted In a Federal habeas h ave parallel procedures, that ls procenoccnce itself. But I underscore t hat corpus petition they must fi rs t be presented dures in the Federal court and the
tile ab ili ty to bring a successive peti- Lo State courts. This represents appropriate State court proceeding on the same
tio n. whether for guilt or innocence, or respect for federalism. A State court system clock. It is not In the interest of the
for the validity of the sentence, should should have the opportunity to address any
riso
t h . th t
It Is I th
errors on Its own before intrusion by the P
ner o a\ e a occur.
n e
be only_ available under the narrowest Federal system.
Interest of the prisoner to determine
hat
d
·
·11
d
1
f
'
al
of conditions·t
The provision that ls contained in w
or ermg w1
e ay m Jud gTh e s t a t u e s h ou Jd no t con t a ln
ment as long as possible
·
r ague standards such as miscarriage of the amendment by the Senators from
Justice or other words that would tend South Carolina and Pennsylvania
So 9'.'hat is going to happen ls you
to encourage future litigation. The would essentially say thats the ex- are gom? to ha,·e the State proceeding
amendment which we have proposed. haustion of State remedies require- not avoided, but Just shifted to the
which ts now the underlying amend- ment would be walved, and by setting end of the process which will result if
ment 1n this blll, would allow review of a 60-day time limit In which to bring there ~as. in f~t. some State defecL
successh·e petitions only when the Federal cases It would virtually neces- You will not fmd that out until the
facts underlying the claim undermine sltate that the prisoner move In the very end rath~r than as Is the case
the confidence of the court in the Federal system first.
today, and I thmk appropriately so, to
jury's determination of guilt or t he vaThe argument, as I understand it. make that determination at the begin•
Iidity of the sentence, a standard for that is the a rgument of expedition, ning of the collateral appeal process.
Mr. President. a second area of dif.
which is very similar to the standard t h at the State habeas corpus proceedwhich has been proposed by the Sena- ing ls essentially meaningless, that it ference between the approach that Is
tors from South Carolina and Pennsyl- should be preempted and the defend- now in the bill and that offered b:,
van ia.
ant directed to the forum that really Senators THuRMOND and SPECTER has
Finally, the issue of retroactivity: No counts, the F ederal system.
to do with the Judicial time limits.
State will be able to have an effective
First, I disagree with that statement They would set a 60-day period in
death penalty statute unless that stat- of federalism. The fact is that each which to bring that first Federal
ute is considered to be fair. One of the State has its own State criminal law. appeal. We would set a 1-year period. I
mcst difficult issues of fairness Is All of these people by definition are believe that the 1-year period Is more
where an Individual was found guilty State prisoners. They have been pros- orderly and appropriate. These are
under a certain State law and then, at ecute: they have been tried; they have complicated cases. Typically the colsometime in the future, the law is been fo und guilty under State law.
lateral appeal Is not handled by the
changed. And the question Is, Should
My State, in some areas, has provi- same attorney who handled the a ppeal
they get the benefit of that new law slons that are significantly different at trial and direct appeal
which might avoid their being execut- than the Federal law, one being, the
The reason for that is. very obvious.
ed. giving them some reasonable basis taking of depositions during a criminal One of the standard issues raised in
to pursue a habeas corpus claim, or proceeding.
the collateral appeal fs the competenshould they be exec~ted under the law
Therefore, it is appropriate that the cy of that counsel. so it ts not yer,
as_lt e xisted at the tune that they were collateral review process start In the likely that you are going to have the
originally sentenced?
.
State courts which have the Jurlsdic- same attorney who tried the case and
The 1989 Supreme Court case of tion of looking at both allegations of appealed the case doing the collateral
Teague versus Lane established a basic misapplication of State law and also appeal where in that collatenl
rule that new !aw arising after a sen- have the r esponsibility to review for appeal' they a~ raising the Issue of
tence became final may not be applied compliance with Federal law.
their own professional competence. So
In a habeas corpus proceeding.
Once that process Is completed, and th
in
We have suggested a modi!ic.atlon if the State court has made the deterere needs to be a period of time
which, again, I believe ls very close to mlnatlon that all State procedures order for that transition to new counthat which has been proposed by the were properly abided by, and In their sel to occur.
Senators from South Carolina and Judgment Federal procedures, then
The 1-year period is the period that
Pennsylvania, and that 1s we would the state collateral appeal process is this Senate, in 1983, felt to be appropro\ide that law cannot be applied ret- exhausted. At that point, the prisoner prlate. The I-year period was the
roactively unless the U.S. Supreme has an opportunity to go into the Fed- period that Senator THtnwoND, when
Court has promulgated that new law. eral court, which will only be look.Ing he Introduced his original habeas
That Is to say, it could not have been at the issue of compliance with Feder- corpus blll, felt was appropriate. It ls
promulgated by a court in the Federal al law.
the period t hat Sen ator BIDEN had insystem below the Supreme Court and
So I believe there 1.s, as Justice eluded in his original blll. And It was
specifically made that law retroactive Powell Indicates, a very basic rationale the period that myself and several coin its application.
of federalism for the exhaustion of sponsors had included in our bill.
Mr. President, this slUilDlary indi- State remedies.
Most States, those of which have set
cates that on the major issues there Is
The argument Is made that It will a statute -of limitations for State prowide area of agreement.
result In expedition, that you will save ceedings, h ave set a limit of more than
Let me Just turn in closing to our all this time that now Is taken up in 1 year. In the State of Florida It Is 2
preliminary analysis of the amend- the State collateral review process. I years tha.t Is given as the stat ute of
ment as offered by the Senators from disagree with that. What Is going to limitations to file in the S tate court.
South Carolina and Pennsylvania as to · happen ls not a termination of the So I believe the period that is suggestwhere we think there are some areas State procedure but rather a reorder- ed. that Is the period of 1 year, is an
of difference. One area of difference Is Ing.
appropriate one. ·
In the hypothetical I cited, the State
A second issue tha.t concerns me la
In the application of State habeas
corpus.
habeas corpus process was availed of the time limits that occur aiter the peThe tradition has been that the Fed- and exhausted first before the Feder- tltlon is filed. The amendment by the
eral courts would not intervene until al. If the amendment, as offered by Senators from South Carolina and
the individual had had a full hearing the Senators from South Carolina and Pennsylvania would set various timeof his collateral claims in the State Pennsylvania, would be adopted, what frames In which the Federal court.a
court. And I might quote at this time would happen is that you would have must act.
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We have similar provisions in oth er
The PRESI DING OFFICER. The ence whether it ls fri vol ous or not , it is
areas of F ederal criminal procedure. Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH) is rec- granted . We t:ave at least one, and in
many cases more than one. who would
There is what is call ed t he speedy trial ognized.
Mr. HATCH . Mr. Presiden t, h abeas grant a Federal petition for habeas
rule , which essen t ia ll y says t h a t, if
yo u are charged with a cri minal of- corpus reform is probably th e most corpus for almost any reason no
fense, the prosecution h as to brin g important issue in t he deba te so far, matter h ow fr ivolous. T hat is wha t is
your trial with in a certain nu mber of although all of t he issues in volved in rui ning th is system.
There are other r easons why I th ink
days. If they fall to do so, if they fail t his ma tter a r e very, very import ant
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch
apto meet that speedy trial rule, you can Issues. And, to that extent, I want to the
go to the court and ask for a dismissal compliment the distinguished Senator proach is better. Even so, I pa y treof t he charges. That Is a basic part of from Florida. Although I do not think mendous tribute and homage to the
our sense of fair play, that you cannot h is is the bett er proposal, It is so much distin guished Senator from Florida for
be accused of a crime and then just better than what the original Biden the efforts he has made.
Frankly, I do not think the Congress
left In limbo Indefini t ely awaiting your proposal was in the bill, and I know he
has a profound imprint on it. It is basi- should be in the business of telling the
trial.
So the sanction for nonperformance cally a movement In the right direc- Supreme Court what is the effect of
on a timely basis is essentially against tion. He deserves an awful lot of their decisions, and I think that,
the public. The public loses Its right to credit, because I understand the con- again, is what happens with the
try an Individual for violation of law, flict and the difficulties on his side of Graham-Biden amendment.
What are the advantages of the
if that trial does not take place on a the aisle. We ha\·e some of that over
here, but nothing like what the distin- Thurmond-Specter-Hatch
amendtimely basis.
guished S enator from Florida has to ment? I would like to appeal to my
The question I have is what are the contend
with
on
his
side
of
the
aisle.
sanctions, and against whom, If the What he has done is singularly very, good friend because I think he has
given thoughtful reflection to this. He
Federal courts do not comply with the very important.
time periods contained in this amendWhat the distinguished S enator has been a Governor of a major State
ment? If we say the Federal court from Delaware has done is also very in this Union. He has seen the abuse
within 120 days has to hear the peti- important. At the beginning of this of habeas corpus, time after time, estion and 125 days elapse and they h ave debate, I raised almost all of the issues pecially in his jurisdiction, but all Junot done so and there is no acceptable that the · distinguished S enator from risdictions have seen abuses of habeas
excuse for that delay, what happens? Florida has tried to addr ess in the corpus petitions. He h as seen the tremendous costs to taxpayers that really
Does the same thing h appen that technical amendments be h as filed.
occurs at the trial level, and that is
They are not so technical. They are are Just running out of control. And
that the charges are dismissed, the very substantive amendments. And I he knows that this is a serious probprison door is opened, the defendant is think regardless of what the Senate lem.
I would like to appeal to him to look
released?
does, we have a chance here of really
I think that is a very serious issue, of having a least a step forward in habeas at some of the provisions of the Thurus, through the legislative process, at- corpus reform. something that many mond amendment. No. 1, the Thurtempting to set a whole new set of of us felt could not occur except for mond-Specter-Hatch a mendment rerights for a State prisoner in the col- what has been done by the distin- quires a death row inmate to file his
Federal habeas corpus petition within
lateral a ppeal process, and that is the guished Senator from Florida.
right to be heard within a certain
But, having said that, let me Just 60 days after the death sentence benumber of days. What happens if that point out some of the disadvantages of comes final, that is, after appointment
r ight of the St ate prisoner to be h eard his appr oach vis-a-vis the Thurmond- of postconviction counsel. So there is a
within that number of days is not in Specter-Hatcb appr oach- and it is no t imeframe. They have to move. They
fact accomplished? That is a signifi- secret I helped work on the Thur- are not going to be waiting until the
cant second difference, which on first mond-Specter-Hatch
approach.
I last second so they can keep the
analysis exists between the underlying would list the following. No. 1, the dis- person alive for that much longer.
amendment and the amendment of- tinguished Senator from Florida, in They have to move and they have to
fered by the Senators from South the changes he has brought about, do so in a good-faith, legitimate effort
Carolina and from Pennsylvania.
waits until all State proceedings are with legitimate arguments.
No. 2, it prohibits any Federal disMr. President, in conclusion, I am exhausted before allowing Federal
very pleased to be here today, when I habeas to proceed. We need to know trict court judge from thereafter
think that we are within a short that that can be 3 to 5 years to 10 granting any other habeas petition or
period of time of adopting a very fun- years and maybe even more. But some- stay of execution. This is what the
damental, balanced, and I hope soon where between 3 and 10 years before Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendment
to become law, reform in habeas that matter is resolved.
does. You get around t hese Judges for
corpus. There are few things we could
No. 2, he does not set any time limits whom it does not make any difference
do which would have a more salutary on the courts to require them to dis- what the law is, they are going to
effect on the criminal Justice system. . pose of these habeas corpus cases. So grant that petition no matter what it
There are few things we could do that they can go on, on either side of that means because of their own personal
would more help to restore the pub- tree-for the State habeas approach ideology or philosophy. It is easier for
lic's confidence in our basic sense of through the Federal habeas ap- a trial judge to do t hat. It is almost
justice than to reform this process proach-for very lengthy periods of impossible for an appellate panel of
which has been t rivialized, which has time.
Judges to do that.
been the subject of delay, the subject
No. 3, the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch
No. 3. and I think one of the most
of obfuscation, and increasingly the critical differences is, he allows succes- amendment gets around that process
subject of ridicule by the public, di- sive petitions and stays of execution and that problem by requiring the perected at our justice system.
by a single Federal district trial Judge. tition to be authorized by circuit court
So, Mr. President, I applaud all of That is a very significant difference of appeals authorization before any
those who have brought us to this between the two approaches. There successive petition may be brought. So
point today. The amendment we have are almost 700 district judges. certain- you have to go straight to the circuit
offered demonstrates the seriousness ly more than 600 in this country. In court of appeals. It is much more
of our effort to achieve reform in this every district court in this country, in likely that you are going to have, not
area. We are serious about protecting every jurisdiction, there are always only a more sophisticated look at the
the constitutional rights of defend- one or more Judges who, the minute petition, but also that they are not
ants. We are serious about securing you file a habeas corpus petition, going to put up with the frivolity of
order and finality in capital cases.
grant it. It does not make any differ- petitions that go on today.
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No. 4. th e Thurmond-Specter-Hatch drews deserved the death penalty. And actually conducted a new e\·ldent :ary
am endmen t forces the courts, both that Is what he got. But 17 years later, hearing, 16 years after the ori ginal
trial and appellate courts, to act expe- he was, as of the time I was speaking crime, to determine if Andrews· rig ht
on the floor decrying this type of a sit• to an impartial jury had been s9. tisditi ous! ;-.
The district court has to decide the uation and this type of a procedural fled. In a thorough, 62-page opinion.
case v,ithin 110 days. That is in the in- system, flling his 27th appeal.
the judge concluded that no evidence
terest of everybody, to be frank . The
All I can say Is this has cost the of any constitutional violation or
circuit court has to decide the case State of Utah millions of dollars. other Irregularity in the Andrews trial
within 90 days, and then the Supreme There are legitimate reasons for the existed. Instead, he concluded that the
Court v.i ~hin a 90-day period thereaf• petition of habeas corpus-I am a prisoner's conduct was "an abuse of
ter. So ,;i.·e have speedy, quick, effi- great believer in the petition of habeas the writ."
cient, honest, just approaches to this. corpus-I believe it Is a way of rectify.
Andrews had filed another plea to
But it is still a timely approach. That ing wrongs, but not like this.
have a thorough review of his latest
That is why the Thurmond-Specter• frivolous complaint reexamined by a
saves the taxpayers millions of dollars
while still protecting the rights of the Hatch approach really is a good ap- Federal court. I presume this will be
proach. If we can get enough col• taken right on up to the Supreme
accused. the rights of the defendant.
No. 5, the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch leagues to vote for that, we will send Court of the United States of Amrrica
approach does not postpone consider• one heck of a beautiful message. I will with all of those consequent delays,
atlon of the State's claim at all. That tell my colleagues something, I will be with all of the costs involved, all from
is a State matter. State habeas corpus for this bill regardless of what hap- a person who literally deserves the
can proceed at exactly the same time, pened on the gun issue. I am not judgment that he has received.
or subsequently, as the State deter- happy about that, as a person from
Mr. President, I would like to speak
mines best. It can go on at the same the West, as someone who made the v.ith a little more specificity on the
time the Federal habeas petition is principal arguments against it. I will issue of habeas corpus reform because
filed. Nothing prevents the State. We be for this bill assuming we can corthis is such an important issue.
do not interfere with the State ap- rect some of the other things that are II think
to say that I naturally am in
have
proach toward habeas corpus at all. wrong with it and assuming that we
They can do whatever they want to can have decent resolution of the cap. support of the Thurmond-Specter.
do, and they can take whatever time ital punishment sections of the bill. Hatch amendment on habeas corpus. I
they want. But we all know that But It will go a long way toward caus- believe it is one of the most imaginative and effective answers to a difficult
States are much less likely to grant ing me to want to support this bill.
· habeas corpus petitions than the FedThat is a pretty big concession on legislative issue that I have seen in the
eral courts. The reason that is so is be- my part, if you stop and think about time I have been here.
In all honesty, we did not have this
cause there are some Federal district it, because I feel very deeply about the
judges you can absolutely count on to assault weapcns issue that we were put together as of last night. We tried
grant a Federal habeas corpus petition talking about. I think many people in very, very hard. We worked hard all
regardless of what the merits are, re- my State feel very deeply, and the last night and most of the day today.
gardless of how frivolous or inconse- people all across this country. That Frankly, I did not expect that the
Senate would today be considering a
quential tt may be, because of ideology was a serious, significant issue.
and because of a different belief.
But this ls so important, this is such habeas corpus bill that would really
I brought up on Monday, the An- an important criminal issue, such an reform the system. I did not think
drews case in Utah. I spoke at some important constitutional set of issues, that we would see a bill that would
length about that Utah case, State such an important criminal Justice truly limit the number of cases that
versus William Andrews. I complained issue that I would feel very, very good could be brought and that would limit
about the 26 separate appeals or re- about it if we agreed to the Thur• the amount of time that those cases
would take. Under the Thurmond•
views of Judgment that this 1 death mond-Specter-Hatch amendment.
row prisoner has obtained. Fifteen of · I think the distinguished Senator Specter-Hatch amendment, this ac•
those twenty-six appeals or reviews from Florida would feel good about It. complishes both of those goals.
It is clear, the Graham amendment
have been in Federal court. They have He knows this ls a better approach bebeen in the Federal system. His other cause he has thoughtfully looked at constitutes, represents a good faith
11 appeals have been in the State this. That is not taking a thing away effort to address the habeas corpus in
system.
from him because his approach ls a death penalty cases. But it Is equally
I just learned that one of these ap- step in the right direction. I never clear that that amendment does not
peals whkh I had shown on my chart thought It would happen on that side do enough. It is likely, I believe, that
as pending· was, in fact, decided of the floor. I am not being critical. I this approach to our habeas problems
against Mr. Andrews on May 12 of this know there are sincere people who will result in the filing of not fewer
year.
love these appeals-who hate the but more cases. It will thus have the
Guess 1ohat else has occurred in this death penalty so much that they are effect of delaying death sentences, not
case? While I was speaking on the willing to do anything, no matter what allowing them to be carried out.
floor of the Senate on Monday, An- the cost. That is not good law, not a
The Graham amendment would indrews filed another appeal, No. 27, 16 good approach.
t roduce new avenues of delay and
years after he committed his crime.
I do not blame them for fighting. postponement to be exercised by Pris•
What was his crime? Everybody against the death penalty if they feel oners on death row. Unlike the Thurknows. There is no question of guilt. that way. That ls their right. Some of mond-Specter-Hatch amendment, this
The evidence is so overwhelming and these views are very legitimate from amendment sets no limit on the
compelling that even Andrews does their viewpoint; not from mine, but number of habeas petitions that can
not deny it. He and another friend from their viewpoint. I do not see how be flied by a death row Inmate. Even
went into a hi-fi shop. They tortured any of us can allow this system to go more important, the Graham amendthe people there. They drove pencils on: Multiple appeals, the right to come ment does not even try to set a time
into the ear of at least one, poured up with any frivolous reason to get an limit on the filing and trying of the
Drano down their throats, tortured appeal and to cost the taxpayers and habeas corpus petition.
them, beat them up, and then shot everybody else In the process.
That ls the great Innovation of the
them in cold blood. Everybody knows · William Andrews flied this 27th Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendment,
that.
appeal on Monday, while I was talking that It sets an absolute watertight
There 1s no question they did it. about and criticizing the fact he had tlmeframe, within which a death row
There is no question of guilt. There is 26 up to then. He objected In this inmate's Federal review remedies will
no question it was a heinous crime. appeal to the Federal magistrate who be exhausted. After that time, all fur•
There is no question that William An• had denied him relief. This judge had ther proceedings, with one limited ex-

S 6818

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

}.fay 23, 1990

ceptlon, shall be In th e State courts or o!fcnses for which t he dea th pe nalty their own lim e in decidi:,g the ca.se.
in clem ency proceedings before the wa.s imposed, or the validity of U1e There Is no Incentive for quick action
State's Governor or board of pardons. sentcnc-.e of d eath."
whatsoever. And with all the pres3ures
That Is where the serious ca.ses of heiThe Graham amendment provides of the courts, they are not going to be
noll5 crimes belong, not In the Federal an avenue for the prisoners to reliti• quick any more than they are today.
courts.
gate and relitic-ate the appropriateness
Under the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch
Let me explain. Under the Thur- of the death sentence that was re- amendment. each of those courts is
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment. Fed- turned. The only practical llm1tation Is placed under careful deadl!nes to
eral habeas corpus proceedings come that the prisoner has to th.ink of a ensure their quick attention to these
first, not second, as the~· do under cur- new issue not raised before.
Important cases. The entire Federal
Well. that should not be ha.rd. There portion of their appeal should be over
rent practlce. State habeas review can
be provided by any State, of course, are plenty of attorneys out there v.·ithin a year. Contrast that to the 17
but If a prisoner wants a Federal court ready to volunteer thelr services, and years that the death row Inmates such
to review his death sentence for con- they are very creative in these mat- as Utah prisoner William Andrev:s has
stitutional defects, he must seek such ters. All they have to do Is keep creat- been able to tie up the Federal courts
review \\1thin 60 d:lys of his case be- ing one new Issue after another and and the State with their appeals under
coming final. The State post.conviction they can take multiple successive the current system. And the average
review, i! any, will still be available habeas appeals.
The
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch of these habeas petitions Is years. It
after the Federal habeas process Is
complete, or it can go on at the same amendment, on the other hand, has amounts to years and yea.n; and years.
The Graham amendment also exsomething very different to say about
time.
The great ad\•ar.tage of the Thur- a Federal district Judge's ability . to en- pands the right of appeal from adverse
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment Is tertain a second habeas petition for a rulings on habeas petitions. Under
that this Federal habeas process will death row inmate. He or she has none. present law, most unsuccessful habeas
reach an end, and It will be quick. No Federal trial Judge, not one of the petiti oners may only appeal the disFirst, a State seeking the benefits of ' more than 600 nov.· serving ~111 have missal of their petitions where the disthe n ew h:,.bea.s procedures must pro- Jurisdiction to consider a successive trict Judge issues a certificate of probvide apPolnted counsel In pcstcomic- habeas petition under the Tburmond- a'!>le cause asserting that the Legal
tion proceedings. The Thurmond- SPecter-Hatcb amendment. Now, that Issues presented by the case are not
entirely frivolous.
The Graham
Specter-Hatch amendment requires Is habeas reform.
They have their role to play in the amendment creates, for the first time,
that.
I personally would not have gone original a.ppeal, but no successive an absolute right to have habeas decithat far, but I am not agalr..st it. I Just appeal will be granted in the first in- sions reviewed on appeal, and that Is
say tha.t it does require appointed stance by a Peder&l district .t'Jdge, 110 in his proposed section 2259.
counsel.
there is not going to be this automatic
I want to tell my colleagues it Is abThen within GO days after the ap- granting of a successive petitioIL
solutely guaranteed that this wm furpointment, the habeas petition must
Instead., the Thunnond-Specter- ther aggTavate the current overload
be filed in the appropriate Federal dla- H&tch amendment would only allow being experienced by the Federal
trict court.
Federal court review of the second pe- courts of appeals. Moreover, the new
Next. the trial court must determine tition where a Federal court of appeals appeals allowed by the Graham
the habeas petition within 110 days of has specifically authorized the filing amendment will by definition be frfvofillna. Any appeal of the district court of such a case.
lous cases which would not pre\1ousl)'
determination must be filed in the
In other words, the circuit court Is have been Htigated beyond the trial
Federal court of appeals within an- going to have to make that determina- level. Those who a.re experts in this
other 110 days. If further appeal to tion and, let me tell you. they are fie ld know that, and I know It.
t.be Supreme Court ls sought. it must going to be much more speclfie on
I acknowledge that the Thurmondbe filed within 20 days of t.be issuance what the law ls than these district
Specter-Hatch amendment makes a
of the mandate by the court of ap- Judges. Thus, the ability of a single simflar change In the law, but there 1s
peals. Then the Supreme Court must Federal district judge to derail the
little or no Potential for delay resultin tum render its decision within 90 entire appellate process, which is now
Ing frc.n this change in the overall
days of the filing of the petJtlon.
so often seen 1n the death - penalty
Now, that is a remarkably tight area, will end il the Tbunnond-Spec- framework of the strict limits that
schedule for any case to follow, but it ter-Hatcb amendment is adopted. Thurmond-Specter-Hatch would estabis appropriate for these death penaJty That ls a revolutionary change in our lish. In other words, we set time limits.
Yes, we protect their right to have a
appeals. They deserve the priority at- law. It is as welcome as It is overdue.
tention of our courts and the ThurWhat that says Is, purely and successive appeal, but we set time
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment en- £imply, that after the first petition for limits in the process, and In succe.ssive
sures they will receive it.
habeas starts in the district court and appeals we reQuire them to go straight
The Graham amendment. Why ha.ve goes all the way up to the S upreme to the circuit courts which will decide
I concluded that the Graham amend- Court, if there Is a successive petition these matters fairly, equitably, and
ment, despite its expressed intent to filed, it goes ·straight to the appellate quickly.
These are the prlnclpafreasons why
reform habeas, ha..s failed? First, be- court. the circuit court of appeals, and
cause prol)OSed section 2257<c>, which they have to grant the right for It to any Senator who truly favors re!orm
of the habeas corpus system should
purports to withdraw Federal district go on from there.
court jurisdiction over successive
I can tell you they a.re not going to oppose the habea., corpus provlsiom of
habeas petitions, contains an excep. do that very often unless there Is le- the Graham amendment. That bill,
tlon so broad t-hat It entirely swallows gitimate reason for doing so. And if while a step in the right direction,
the purported habeas limit and ren- there is, then they should and they ..-bile clearly intended and far superior
ders it. useles5.
will That is the way it should work. to the proposal I crlticlred last
That exception would allow succes- But it puts a finality to this that Monday, is not. I am afraid. true
sive petitions in Federal district court, really ought to be there to stop the 27 hl\beas corpus reform. It wouid result
where the prisoner was raising a new different, frivolous. fru!Ue.ss, awful ap- in habeas even further out of control
issue that had not previously been pre- peals by William Andrews and others
Th.e habeas provtstons of the Thursented in State or Federal court and in similarly situated circumstances.
mond-Specter-Hau-h amendment by
"the facts underlying the claim would
Once a successive petition Is filed contrast are designed to establish a
be sufficient. lf proven, to undermine under the Graham amendment, the new time limitation. generally 1 year,
the court's confidence in the Jury's de- district court., the court of appeals, alter the death aentence becomes final
termlnaUon of cunt on the offense or and the Supreme Court can each take for lnstitutJng and trying habeas <:3$eS.
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Now, I urge my colleagues, this
Compare that to tile Am erican situa- as we did In 1970 when Congress abolshould be a bipartisan issue; this tion, where we regularly allow not one ished Federal habeas In the District of
should not be a Democrat \·ersus Re- but two complete postconvlction re- Columb ia. Thal despite the fact that
publican issue as the assult weapons views of criminal sentences. Foreign eve ry critic I am aware of concedes
issue became. Yes, there were a few lawyers and Judges cannot understan d that the experiment of abolishing
Republicans who voted with the \'ast why we do that. Do we have so little habeas in the District of Columbia has
majority of Democrats on that par- faith In our criminal Justice system?
worked remarkably well. No criminal
ticular issue. That was certainly a parWe have one review In the State defendant's rights have been abused
tisan vote. There Is no question about courts. Then we have one In the Fed- because of it.
It. We all know which way It went. eral courts. We come back, back, back,
No, we cannot enact those sweeping
There Is no question that it came again and again; 27 In the case of Wil- changes today, even though the two
dov.-n to partisan politics, but this one liam Andrews.
previous Attorneys General of the
should not.
I have to say-maybe it is an appro- United States called for the total aboE,·ery one of us has to live with this priate place to put this In the lltlon of habeas corpus. But we can
system. Every one of our States are REcono-that I myself do not like cap- ensure that the postconvictlon procrying for help. Every one of our Ital punishment. I myself would only ceedings that we keep In place are not
criminal law enforcement people who use It under the most heinous criminal abused. The Thurmond-Specter-Hatch
have any sense about this are crying circumstances. I would not allow It to amendment gives us that assurance.
for help. Everybody admits the system be -used indiscriminately, If I had my The Graham amendment, despite all
is breaking down. Everybody looks at way. But I have no doubt' there is an Its good intentions, simply does not.
the Andrews case and just sighs and appropriate criminal sanction under
We know where we will be if the
wonders how this great country can certain circumstances, and it ought to Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendment
allow this situation to continue.
be one that can be opted for by socie- becomes law. One year after a death
So I urge my colleagues to support ty.
sentence becomes final, Federal court
· the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendI do not have any desire to put review, in all but the most extraordiment and oppose that of Senator people to death. Nobody does that nary
will be over. Petitions seekGP..ARAM. I recognize that there are who thinks It through. I will tell you, Ing a cases,
stay
of
execution from a single
some in this body, a small minority, we have to get tough in this country. Federal district
Judge will simply be
who favor the abolition of the death Our kids are beset with drugs and
penalty in all circumstances. I do not criminal activity. They are beset with turned away as beyond the jurisdicexpect them to vote for the Thur- all kinds of other activity; beset with tion of the court to grant.
There will be no question about it.
mond-Specter-Hatch
amendmentexamples all over this country.
There will be nothing on which the
they should not; their personal beliefs bad
We
have
to
get
tough,
and
one
of
are that way-because, I have to tell the best deterrents I know of is to let court need rule.
We do not know where we will be if
you, the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch them know there is punishment If you
the Graham amendment becomes law.
amendment will certainly, beyond are
to maliciously, in a heinous First, Its Federal habeas provisions
doubt, ensure that death sentences are way,going
k1ll somebody, and willfully. You will not come into effect Immediately
carried out.
So as to those who are against It, I are going to face the possibility of the after the death sentence becomes
sentence.
final. It would wait until all available
cannot blame them. I cannot blame death
I have to say, from that standpoint, State remedies are exhausted. The
them for voting against ThurmondSpecter-Hatch. But those who are for I am one of the most vociferous advo- process usually takes several years,
it, those who are really tired of the cates of the death penalty. As Judge and again, in some Instances, It takes
criminal elements in our society, who Henry Friendly, of the Second Circuit, as long as a decade. or even more.
·
The notorious Illinois case of John
really want to do something about it, once remarked:
The proverbial man from Mars would Wayne Gacy 111ustrates these points
this is now the best chance we have
we
must
consider
our
system
of
surely
thlnlt
very welL That individual stands conever had in the history of Congress to
Justice terribly bad 1! we are willing
do something about this out-of-whack criminal
to tolerate such efforts at undolnr Judg- victed of the murder of 33 young men.
situation.
ments o! conviction. • • • His astonishment No one In American history has been
After 1 year has passed, the death would 1row when we told him that the one convicted in connection with so many
sentences,
by Thurmond-Specter- thing almost never suggested on collateral deaths.
Hatch, will be Imposed in the various attack Is that the ·prisoner was Innocent of
Gacy has received 12 separate death
States. and they will be carried out the crime.
sentences for his crimes. The murders
unless the States themselves or the
Judge Friendly summed it all up. were committed between 1975 and
U.S. Supreme Court stays the execu- Almost anybody has to wonder about a 1978, and Gacy was sentenced to death
tion. All rights are protected, but system where nobody really questions way back in 1980. But It took 9 years
there will be no frivolity, that is, no the guilt of the defendant, the crimi- for Gacy's death sentences to be finalsuccessive appeals that are frivolous. nal or the prisoner, if you want to use ly affirmed on direct appeal. You talk
There will not be any more abuse of that term. It is almost never even con- about protections of a defendant; 9
the s~rstem; there will not be any more sidered, because everybody knows that years, just on the issues of his death
of this tremendous cost to society.
the criminal committed the crime. sentence. That is a not surprising
Finally, we will have an effective What we have here is an attempt .to amount of tune, given the thoroughdeath penalty in this country that is try under any circumstances to vindi- ness of direct appeal and the nature of
certaln, that is reasonably swift, and cate that criminal's rights over the these crimes.
one which at the same time protects rights of the victims that he killed.
So the death sentences became final
every conceivable constitutional right
Mr. President, lawyers, Judges, and in May of 1989. What happens next?
of the defendant.
laymen are astonished that the Ameri- Onder current law, which would not
The Chief Justice of the U.S. Su- can criminal justice system allows be changed by the Graham amendpreme Court, William Rehnquist, postconvlctlon review of sentence, and ment, Gacy must exhaust every
spoke on the subject of habeas corpus It allows It twice, not only in the State, avenue of postconvlctlon relief availjust last week. He made an Important but in the Federal courts, and many able to him in the Illinois courts. That
point when he noted that no other times thereafter.
could take another 3 to 5 years. We
country In the world allows final
I concede, regrettably, it may be too are up to 13 to 15 years, or even more.
criminal convictions to be reopened late In the day to abolish habeas
Then and only then would he be
and reexamined in the courts. Only corpus across the board, rm action that able for the first tune to turn to the
Pardon and executive clemency are this body debated in 1968. But it Is Federal courts and begin the process
generally available. No other country even probably too late to abolish Fed- of filing what wll1 surely be a series of
In the world does what we do.
eral habeas in a particular Jurisdiction, habeas corpus petitions. All that the
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Graham amendment requires basically
result In suoota.ntial cut.backs on thing worthwhile and substantial
:i.bout this problem.
Is that each new habeas petition that the !illng of fri volous cases.
Ga.cy files assert some new ground !or
Senator GRAHAM has done a terrific
In order for the appellate court to
relief. You have to be a pretty poor _11-t- grant authority for the district court job wi th the G raham amendment, and
tomey not to come up with dozens of to hear a successive petition, the pris- he has brought people further than I
new grounds for relief on multiple oc- oner Is going to have to make some thought some could be brought, but It
casions and on successive petitions for very specUlc allegations showing his or Is not far enough 11 you want to make
habeas.
her entitlement to relJef. First, relief real inroads on this problem and do It
How does the Thurmond-Specter- may be granted If there la newly dis- In an Intelligent way, a constitutional
Ha.tch amendment handle this case? covered evidence relating to guilt or way, a protection-of-the-defendant
Today, habeas corpus would almost innocence. Everyone agrees on the im- way, but also In a conslderation-o!-thecertainly be over and whatever further portance of allowing unllmited review vtctlm.s way. This Is the way to go.
remedies thnt he might have, he In such a case. I do not think any of us This Is our chance. This Is a chance tG
would have to seek from the nunois would deny that.
help every State In this Union to stop
courts.
Second, the claims relating to the these frivolous appeals and the treHad Thurmond-Specter-Hatch been appropriateness of the sentence of mendous millions and billions of doJ.
law last May when Oacy's death sen- death may be considered, but only If Jars that they cost. This is a chance to
tence became final, the state of Illi- based on new factual evidence. To really do It right.
nois could have immediately appointed clarify this point, the amendment lanKeep in mind that at the same time.
competent pastconvlction counsel.
guage specifies that the factual evi- although we set time llmits, we gift
That would have started the strict dence necessary to establish a succes- them the right to competent counseL
habeas deadlines under Thurmond- sive
cannot be opinion evi- That Is something that really I do not
Specter-Hatch. Gacy would have had dence,petition
but
must
be factual. That think we have to do, because there
60 days to file the Federal habeas peti- means we are not going
to have the have been competent counsel handline
tion or lose It forever. Once fi1ed, the
approach of every psychiatrist this anyway. But this Is a guaranteed
case would be finally decided, all the phony
right that the Th•..umond-Specterway through the Supreme Court of In the world coming up with some new Hatch
amendment would do.
reason to overturn the death sentence.
the United States, within a year.
I hope our colleagues will look at
Habeas corpus sounds complicated,
U Thurmond-Specter-Hatch were
the law last year, he would be unable but lt 13 not. It is about justice, and this and vote for It. This Is the last
today to seek a stay of his death sen- most people have a strong, accurate, chance to do something substantive on
tence 1n any Federal district court in innate sense of what is Just and what this Issue. If you do not want to do
America. The final resolution of his 12 Is not. It ls simply not just, by any that, Graham Is certainly an Improvedeath sentences would be in the hands standard, that a murderer such as ment over what the original Blden
of the Supreme Court of Illinois, Gacy 1n Illinois, or William Andrews amendment was in this bill, S. 19'10.
where lt should be, and ln he hands of in Utah should be allowed to delay his But it does not go far enough and does
not solve the problem. John Wayne
the Governor of Illinois, where it death sentence lnde!lnltely.
Death sentences are unique. A pri.&- Gacy, William Andrews, and all like
should be, or, if a fundamental constitutional claim arises and he can show oner sentenced to life in prison ts at them will continue to file successive
it, which I am sure he cannot, then hla least serving his sentence whlle ap- petitions as long as their attorneys
case could be in the hands of the Su- pealing. But in capital cases, every think up new ideas to keep them alive.
preme Court of the United States of year that goes by without the execu- Frankly, there has to be a finality
America. He would still have all those tion of sentence ls a year in which Jus- about these things. There has t.o be a
protections. U that were the case, we tice has .been denied, denied to the vic-- tJme when we say, "You know you did
would not. have t.o wonder, and neither tlms of these horrible crimes and IL We know we did It." We know that
would he, about the ultima.te disPo&- denied to IOciety. Every year that goes there ls a price to be paid for dome
tion of that case.
by, Justice ls denied, especially when things like this, and we want people in
U the Graham amendment had there ls really no rea.I reason to do this country to know it so that leas of
become law last May, how would that what they are doing. That Is what ls this criminal type of actlvity, heinoua
have affected the Gacy case? Basical- happening all over America today.
ct1minal activity, will occur.
That is why the dealth penalty i., a
ly, not at all. The prisoner would be in
.Again, I point out that habeas
exactiy the same PoSition he ls in corpus reform is all about Justice. Ask deterrent. I know a number of priaon
today, going through the slow, deliber- the people of Illinois whether they gu&rds who would be &live today had
ate process of exhausting the State would prefer a system of Justice In the death penalty been carried out on
court remedies, even though he has which John Wayne Gacy's Federal ap- time. They were killed by people oo
been in court for 10 years on appeal al- pea.l.a would now be over, or one in death row. The fact of the matter is.
ready. At some point In the future, which they would still not have start- we have to stop this. We have to stop
years from now, we can expect that ed, and would have the prospect of this lnsanlty of costing unnecessary
Gacy would file his first habeas peti- stretching as far into the future dec- billions of dollars Just because some
tion in Federal Court. How long would ades as any of us can see. What do you people do not want to see the death
It take that court to rule on the case? think their answer will be? If you can penalty enforced, when 85 percent of
We can be sure that without the dead- answer that Question, I think you can the American people are fed up with
lines of the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch decide between the Thurmond-Spec-· tee criminal s.ctivitles of certain eleamendment, It would be a very, very ter-Hatch
amendment
and
the ments of our society a.nd want the
long time.
Graham amendment. Only Ute Thur- death penalty to be an option, so we
It ls true that, under the Thunnond- mond-Specter-Hatch
amendment can deter some of this offensive crimiSpecter-Hatch amendment, & prisoner really deals with the crisis in death nal activity.
can bring a successive petition under penalty litigation.
I hope our colleagues will support
extraordinary circumstances. That is
I am hoping that our colleagues will the Thurmond-specter-Hatch amendone of Its strengths. It is not Inflexible. put aside partisan feelings, winning or ment. It is the best OPPortunity we
But notice how the successive petitions losing h ere, and do what ls right for will ever have, and I do not think we
must be handled. First, a.nd most im- America. I guarantee that your law en- will see thls opportunity for a Jone
portant, no Federal district court can forcement people will be very happy lf time to come. M good as Graham
hear a successive petition until the rel- you adopt the Thurmond-Spect.er- moved us forward, it is not far enough.
evant Federal court of appeals first Ha.tch amendment here today. I hope because John Wayne Gacy and others
grants authorization for the new we will, because lt ls the greatest op- like him will be alive for many, many
habeas filing. That Is a significant portunity that I have ever seen in the years after Graham is enacted Into
change in the law, which I guarantee history of the Congress to do some- law, assuming that It la.
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Blden as amended by Graham, or how- I provldrd spN:i!lc standards to ensure
U1at counsel would be competent: Five
e\'er you want to phrase It.
But the fact la that former J ustice years litli;ating experience and 3 years
v.ay toward making me a supparter of
thio bill, a long way, regardless of the Powell never com mented on G r aham, of trying felony cases, some measure
prior vote on the assault weapons. I only on Diden and specific items abcut by which we know that In the most.
ha \·e to say that this ls one of toe wh ich P owell sai d Biden would add complicated and import.ant caBes of all
most important issues that this body delay; t h at ls, the m iscarriage of Jus- 1n the crim inal justice system an lndihas e\'~ r seen, and It ls time to do t ice rule tha t had been in my orl gin ai gent person was, ln fact, being providsomething about It. With that, I sug- legislation has been delet£-d. It he..s ed 11rith competent counsel.
been deleted by Graham. So let ua
Senator GRAHAM has persuaded, me
gest the absence of a quorum.
t.hat the States are entitled to a greatThe PRESIDING OFFICER <Ma. start off with the facts.
Let me say that there have been few er role in the standard-setting process.
MIICULSKI). The clerk wlll call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to legal actions that have been more ven- His amendment added to the bill
erated In our legal system than the ,1.-ould permit the States either to
call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous great writ of habeas corpus. When we adopt the standards in my orl.g_inai bill
consent that the order for the quorum tamper with that, we touch the very or set their own standards through an
roots of our system of justice.
call be rescinded.
1ndependent certification authority.
For some time now complaints have
I believe t.h&t allowing the States to
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With•
been
raised
that
habeas
corpus
la
adopt their own standards 13 likely to
out objection, it ls so ordered.
being
abused
to
gain
delay,
not
to
gain
achieve wider acceptance of these.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam Presi•
dent. I want to express my commenda- Justice. As a result, last year's drug bill habeas corpus reform measures Md.
up a timetable for consideration of therefore, I supported the change· in
tion for the remarks made by the able set
habeas corpus reform. Consistent with my original proposal.
Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH]. Sena- that
timetable, I introduced legislation
tor HATCH is a valuable member of the on habeas
second difference between Sen&corpus reform in October of torTheGRAlLUl'.s
amendment and . my
Judiciary CommJttee. He is a profound last
year.
orfglnal
bill
is
in
the area of second pelawyer, and he has expanded on this
Despite some of the charges that
matter, I think, in a way that ought to have been leveled against ft. I believe titions. Senator GRAHAM's alternative
convince anybody that the proposal my bill is truly balanced reform. It re- is a much more stringent rule than thewe have offered ls preferable and formed and streamlined the habeas rule in my bill Reluctantly. I have
should be adopted by the Senate.
corpus system without in any way for- been persuaded this is a necessary
There is no use to pass any habeas saking anyone's constitutional right.CJ.
compromise.
Under my original proposal, a death
corpu.. at all unless ft means some•
My bill would have limited prisoners
thing, unles it is going to prevent this to one habeas corpus petition, and row prisoner could, in certain limited
dalay that has been going on for yea.rs that would be the first time ever that circumstances, file a second petition i1
and yea.rs..
the prisoners were so limlted. Now he could show that it would result in a
In my State, only 3 weeks ago a man they can file as many habeas corpus "miscarriage of justice" i! he did, not;
went to the electric chair. They took petitions, from 2 to 2,000, as they have an opportunity to file a second
11 years to send him there. He killed want.
petition.
four people and he killed a fifth one, a
I continue to believe, based on the
My bill would have limited the time
women; he disfigured her for life. He in which prisoners may file a habeas Supreme Court cases from which that
went through all the courts. It went to corpus petition, not Just how many, to term was taken-I Just did not piclr.
the Supreme Court on four dif!erent 1 year. Again, this would have been the term "ml.sca.rrfage a! Justice!' 4\It.
occasions.
the first time ever that a limlt was of the air-that a "miscarriage ot .iua-Madam President, ft Is just inexcus- ·placed on the time in which & habeas tfce" exception ts not the "loophole"
able that it would take that long. We petition could be filed. Now, a petition that it.a opponents claim ft to be~
have to shortem these things. We can be filed any time, from 2 t.o 20
Nevertheless, in the interest of cl&l'-have a bill here that will shorten ft to years after the conviction.
ity and to avoid any appearance that
about 1 year and that will take care of
Having said all that in support of this reform does not mean- what. it
ft. U people really want a habeas the Biden bill, I must now add that I says, that pruoners ~.II be- limlted- to
corpus bill, now is the chance to get it. have come to the conclusion. some- one, and only one, habeas corpus peti.The PRESIDING OFFICER; The what reluctanUy, to support the more ticn, I have reluctantly decided- that,
Senatv, from Delaware, the chairman conservative amendments offered by the best alternative ls to drop the
of the Judicie.ry Committee.
Senator GJLUIAM and have agreed to phrase in the exception of "m.fscu,.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I their beinii attached to my amend- riage of Justice," in the second petihave refrained from speaking on my ment.
tion. Thus, the Graham amendment.
legislation to this point because I do
While I would prefer to leave my bill limit., the- possibilities of any second
think th.at the proposal offered by my as it was, I am more interested In get- habeas corpus petition.
friend !rorn South Caroli.n9., the rank- ting a bill that will, in fact, reform
At the same ti.me, the amendment.
ing member of the commJttee, ls solid habeas corpus, than no bill at all.
makes clear that innocence b not the
improvement over that from where we
Senatcr GRAHAu:'s amendment, in· on.y extra.ordinary case Justifying a.ostarted..
my view, makes this a. more conserva- exception to the one petition rule, and
Let me s:iy at the outset that both of tive and tougher bill, but overall pro- obviously no one would want to sugthese
proposals
are
significant vides the kind of balanced reform tha.t gest th.at a second habeas corpu.s petichanges in the great writ; both. of I e2n support.
tion would not be filed ff in the intei:these propcsals are significantly dif.
Senator GRAHAM'S amend.merit 11.niit.s im It was determined that there was
ferent than what the law is at tbi.s prisoners to one habeas corpus peti- evidence to pro..-e that the person was
rnomenL
tion in a 1-year time period, and tt nar- innocenL I hope-no one would think o1
R eference was ma.de earlier by my rows the reach of my bill on four spe- suggesting t.hat, although• there. has
friend f:-om South Carolina. who was, cUic is:.ues.
been a suggestion some may haave.
along -g,i , h me, the subject of discusFirst. Senator GRAHA111's amendment
But beyond that, not only- in th!& ex.sion by i h e Chief Justice, with regard offers more flexibility to the Sta~ to. traordinary ability to file second: petito proposed changes in habeas corpus comply with the counsel provisions of tions going to be avail.able- in- the- ca.sea.
law. We have also been the subject of the act.
where there- is evidence suggest.Ina:
oth'er discussions. a.nd I believe the
One of the key elements- of any that there Ls innocence buUhe-amendranki.n& m ember, Senator THURMOND, habeas corpus reform, in my mind. ls ment makes it clear that innocence is,
said that 10r1ncr Jw;tice Powell bad providing competent counsel to death not the only extraordinary case just!,..
commented on the Graham proposal. row prisoners. In my original proposal. fytng an exception to the- one-petit.Jcc
11 ~e pass the Thunnond-SpecterHatch amendment. It will go a long
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rule. An attack on th e sentence. for of that. as one who maybe did not file accept the prov1s1on that Justlc
Powell, a former member or the U.f
example, where there has been perju- until the day after the decision.
My bill would ha\'e made a rather Supreme Court. rrcommcnded. The~
ry, is equally Justified.
So. not on ly could you ha\'e someone signifi cant change in th e law to cor- was a commi t tee or judges se t up an
who was, in fact. guilty, but the sen- rect that probl em. Th e G raham th ey studi ed th is qu estio n and th e
tence not just ifi ed. if you could show amendme nt corrects it. but is consider- made recor:1m endati ons. That w
t hat perj ury as it related and Impacted abl y more consen ·ative. It limits my go ing to be in my bill. to lntrodu
upon the impos iti on of the sentence. original provision In two ways. First, here. But after talking to a number o
It seems to me that should be able to changes In the law will not apply to Senators. Including Senator HA TC!i
prisoners currently on death row. and Including Senator SIMPS01', an'
be shown.
The third difference between my Second, changes in the law will only the Senator from Pennsyh•anla, I de
original bill and the Powell Committee apply when the Supreme Court has clded we may even go further an'
blU concerns so-called procedural de- explicitly said they will apply.
I
make some modifications to that.
Although this amendment does not
fault. Under that doctrine, a claim not
We cannot go any fur th er. There L
raised by a defendant at the proper express all of my wishes for reform In no use to pass this bill If you are goini
time in State court cannot be raised In this area, it does satisfy my most seri- to compromise where It will not ac
ous concern. For the sake of compro- complish anything. These appeals IJ:
the Federal habeas petition.
and for the sake of habeas corpus
My bill would have made specific mise
cases have gone on for years. lr
reform, I lent my support to the some
changes to the law In that area, ch
my State, I Just recited the case i
anges
Senator
GRAHAM has prochanges I continue to believe have
years ago where a man killed fow
substantial merit. Prisoners should not posed.
people, thought he killed anothei
we
are
coming
very,
very
close.
Now
be the victims of their appointed coun- The differences, although real, are not woman, and it was 11 years from th1
sel's failure to bring claims In the nearly as broad nor as deep nor as time he was sentenced to death unti
State court, particularly where the wide as they were before this process the time he was finally executed.
cost may be their lives. It is a heck of began. And I hope there is a possibiliSenator HATCH said in his State !
a trade-off. Having an attorney who Is ty of one of two things happening. case went for 16 years. I understand Ir
not so bright not stating the claim One, us agreeing to compromise the Oklahoma, one went for 18 years.
that may have prevented you from true differences that are left, and do
The public is disgusted with that.
being sentenced to death in the first that as expeditiously as possible. Or, if The public wants action. The public
place, to say, Just because that not-so- we cannot do that, then for us to wants delay .no longer. The bill that
bright attorney failed to understand quickly yield back our time and vote has been offered here by my dlstin•
the law and raise that claim- and we on this matter rather than take all 6 guished friend will not get the resul~
now know that they did not raise that hours. I do not want to cut off any- it should.
claim-tough, we are going to hang body's rights. I am not suggesting to
The bill we have offered here, we
you anyway. That does not seem to me do that at the moment. I am making a weakened it a lot, but it will get reto be particularly fair, as I said, par- broad statement.
sults. We cannot go any further. I apticularly where the cost ls one's life.
Let us either compromise the three preciate my friend's suggestion. I
The Graham amendment ls silent on or four differences that are left, and worked with him all I could. I have
th.ls point, and I chose to accept that there are not many more than that, gone, gone, gone as far as I can go.
silence. In accepting that silence, I am maybe five, and t hey do not go to the
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
making what I believe to be a major heart of h abeas corpus reform, or get Senator from Delaware.
change in my bill, a change I hope will on with the business of voting on this
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I am
convince everyone that I am serious amendment.
sure the Senator did not mean to
about tough habeas corpus reform. I
I see my colleague from South Caro- imply the bill of the Senator from
have only come to accept the change lina rising. I might note ,he has made Delaware would allow anyone to file
because It ls the price, I believe, that significant compromise to this point. I petitions for lll years. Either bill will
haa t-0 be given in order to achieve might add, although he ~ a man with correct the aberrations he has suggesttrue habeas corpus reform and not whom I have worked for years and ed. There is no question about thaL
some unusual proposal that does not with whom I have often comprohave a little bit of surprise, frank·
warrant consideration and effectively mised- hopefully we both believe for ly,I at
one thing. After serving at the
obliterates the great writ.
the benefit of the country and the inFlnally, the fourth difference be- terests of Justice-I suggested a elbow of my friend from South Carolitween my original bill and the number of these compromises to him na for so many years now, I know of
Graham amendment is on the topic of last night but I was not nearly as per- his great respect for the State courts. I
retroactlvity. Until last year, prisoners suasive, nor nearly as incisive, nor know of his great respect for Justice
generally got the benefit of changes in nearly as effective as, apparently, the Lewis F. Powell.
Justice Powell, a former Associate
the law that were handed down after Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SPEC·
Justice of the Supreme Court, now retheir sentence became final but before TERl was.
they had a chance to file a habeas
There have been a number of com- tired, will, in testimony tomorrow
corpus petition. Last year, however, promises made. I am not suggesting before the Committee on the Judicithe Supreme Court changed that rule, that compromise has not been made. ary, say the following with regard to a
barring prisoners from the benefit of It has. And there 1s real compromise. little thing that has always been of
changes in the law that occurred after But there are only a few outstanding great interest to my friend from South
they were sentenced.
issues that separate the two bills and I Carolina, States rights.
I might add, the bill put forward by
Now a prisoner sentenced 1 day after suggest we either resolve them by
a major Supreme Court case cannot compromise or we, as soon as ls rea- my friend from South Carolina cut.I
claim any benefit from that case, sonable to check on either of our sides out the State courts at the front end
while a prisoner sentenced 1 day who else would like to speak, prepare It says we are not going to WO?TY
before can. That seems to me, where to yield back a lot of the time, to get about whether or not t here ls any
someone's life ls at stake, not Just nor on with the vote, to get on with some movement through the State courts.
We are going to go straight to the Fedsound. The mere fact that the Court other Issues in the bill.
eral courts, eliminate the State courts,
I yield the floor.
did not recognize a right the day a
person was sentenced, after they had
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The and we are going to go to Judges in the
Federal court and set time limits. 5o·
filed their petition, seems to me to be Senator from South Carolina
overly technical. It seems to me to be
Mr. THURMOND. Madam Presi- far so good, but what about federalism
overly technical to suggest they dent, my original bill was a much and States rights? Justice Powell wUJ
should not be able to have the benefit tougher bill but .I decided I would say,
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or two as t.o what Sent.or BIDKl'f had to defendant's su~ta.ntlve rights to tak~
say. I shall not be Jong. I th ink it or- that up in the Federal court habeas
derly if I make a comment at this corpus.
tn 1:o tc·e rntJrt.s. S c•~ Rose,·. Lu.ndv. 45 5 U.S . point.
HI might have the attention of the
509, , i'l62l. This r<'presents r.ppro~riat,e ·re•
Wl:C'n the disting11bhcd Sen:;.tor s ~nator from Delaware, what I just
sµ:"C": for federall : m- a St a'.e court system
sh oi; :d have an oµportuni t y to address any from Delaware says t.h ?t appropriate said he has h eard before and I think
errors on i:.S own befor e Intrusion by the recognition is not being given to States he m ight agree with It If we were in
1-' edt'Thl system.
rii;hts, I will forcefuly dlsagn.,e with the Cloakroom. I believe we can deal
That Is the fundamental remaining him on two counts: O:le Is that the with the Etate habeas corpus lsme and
difference between the bill offered by State has been given a full opPortuni- I believe we can agree with the time
my friends from South Carolina and ty to correct its errors. The .State is parameters. I am not in concrete on
being given a full opportunity to do 160 days or some other t ime!rame. I
from Pennsylvania.
They do it in the name of expediting justice because it has that opportun ity think we can work out that timeframe.
the process, and it does expedite tne on the direct appeal.
although I think we do it in a way
When the Thurmond•Sp.ecter bill that does not a.now unr1cessaril:y large
process arguably. It does because If
you do not have t.abeas corpl!.S going permits going into Federal court with- blocks of tL-ne.
throueh the State courts, then you out goin g through State habeas corpus
The two critic3.l issues which I think
can cut off the difference between the procee-:!ir:gs, we are not .saying R t.hing have to be resolved are the Lssues on
about
the
States
rights
!.o
have
habt!as
Powell Committee repc,rt on this point
innocence or penalty. I want to com•
and the position taken by the Thur- corpus. We are dealing solely and ex- pliment in the most eloquent terms
mond-Specter blll. You could argu::i.bly clusively '1.·lth delineatir.g when the the willingness of the disLinguished
save up to 2 years potentially, argu- Federal court will entertain jm1sdic- Senator from South Carolina to a.gree
ably. But I say on!y arguably becasue tion. That is the prerc.gative of the to the more expansive view. beyond
e.Iter you go through the federal Congress of the United States to say what the Powell Committee said. Tbe
sy.,t.e:n, they can still go back to the and define when you may go Into the distinguished Senator from South
St.ate courts for coliater~ review. It Federal courts on habeas corpus. It Carolina had moved f.Fom his bill in
has always been the F ederal Jaw, a.s esd'.'les no t cut them out.
the first instance to the Powell Com,So t.he point that I am making is tablished by the Congress, that the Ju• mittee and then made a meaningful
risdiction
of
the
Federal
court
was
not
this: That in the name of being toughmove from the Powell Committee
er, the distinguished Senator from extended in habeas corpus until there when we had extensive dlscW1Siona.
had
been
a
collateral
at.tack
in
State
South Carolina has cut out the right
The distinguished Senator from
o! the State of South Carolina to h~beas corpus proceedings.
So our responsibility, simply stated, Utah, Senator HATCH, Wa.9 very elomake its own judgments, at lea.,t at
quent in articulating the importance
the front end, to correct it.s own errors is to see to it that Federal habeas. of considering in a subsequent petition
corpus
does
not
take
8
years
or
18
if the::-e are any at the front end. And
the issue of death penalty beyond In•
he has not in fact saved any time be- years.
When the distinguished Senat-0r nocence, the issue of pen.a.lty if there
cause what will happen is that at the
end of the Federal process, they will from Delaware says you cru, go back to are new facts-not opinions, not. psythen be able to go back to State court the State courts under the Thurmond- chiatric Judgments which can be obSpecter bill, he is exact!:, right. &it It tained in a different fashion, but a.facand file a habeas corpus petition.
So the differences we have here are is also true that you can go back to the tual matter. When the distinguislled
not fundamental in terms of time. The state courts, under the C1..1Tent system Senator from South Carolina heanf
most significant difference fs in terms where you have direct appeal~ State that contention. and thought this
of whether the State should be cut in habeas corpus, Federal habeas corpus. might bridge the gap, he WU willlng to
or not. U the State does not want to You can always go back to the State accommodate his-own preferen¢e.
In discussions in Ute €loakr.oom wlU.
have habeas corpus review, they can court at that stage. There ill nothing
make that judgment. But I- do not at all to prevent going back to the- some of the distinguished Senaton on
know how many times r have hes.rd State courts as Jong as the State the other side of the aisle; r think that
ta something which-SenatoP Tiroa·
· my friend from South Caronna say, Jet courts will entertain that claim.
But the very significant adva."lce JllOM>'S view-as modified, I think,
the States make those decisions. But
do not say, as we are saying here; from the legislation which Senator would be acceptable.
The last issue which, candidly, Ls the
'(State court, we're going to start with- THURMorm and I are offering is that
. out you; ,,.e do not want to know what you do not have to .exhaust meaning• toughest issue ls the issue on fnrerven•
you think about this; we're going to less State habeas corpus in order to ing rights. There, a-gain, concessions
take care of it."
get into the Federal courts. That is for were- made in the final analysis not to
There are se,·eral other differences. the Congress to determine when rou have additions made to the sentence
Again, I do not mean to imply that my can get into the Federal courts.
which reads, on the issue of intervenfriend from South Carolina has not
Those who have pract..iced in the ing rights:
compro!':1!.,ed. P.:e has, and I appreciate State courts and who have handled
A , court considering- a claim under · this
that F!:-y much. I just think with a these State habeas corpus proceedings chapter shall consider interveni11g decisio~
little :::::;.:-e focus on the rights of the know that they are pro fonna; that by the Supreme Court of the United States
States r.nd a lit.t.le more focus on each after- the State supreme court has w.h ich est.al>llshed fundamental constituof us gi,;ing a little bit more-because I upheld the conviction of the death tional right...
ha,·e gj\·en a great d eal a.s well from penalty and you go b~k to a lower
It is my view that this language rs a
where I was -we could close this thing court and re~rt the same claims, good accommcdatfon of some very
down ,ery quickly and get on to other- the lower court is not going- to disagree tough positions on that matter. Ji beimportant Lssues. But I understand if with the State supreme court, nor is lieve that if we cannot come out with
we care}ot do ttiat, I am ready to vote the State supreme court going to dis· an agreement, it wm have much more
on this .
force on this issue when we talce it to
agree with itself.
I seE: one of my colleagues, Senator
When you go to the Federal ccurt conference, much more force and
KEr.-1~ .::,.,.-. who bas not spoken on the for habeas corpus, then for the first ·weight with the American people than
issue a::d wanu, t,o speak on the issue. time you have an independent review. if we decide this ls.sue within a IO-vote
I assun1e he is s.eE:king recognition. I The only issue which the State court margin. I think the most we are going
am prepared to yield the floor .
,
can litigate differently · in habeas to have here- Is 55 to 45', and we may
The PRESIDL--«i OFFICER. . The· corpus than. on direct. appeal is .the well prevail on thi•side of the-aisle.
Senator from PennsylvanlL
question of competency or counsel, . But however we prevail, the force of
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Pl:'esident, I seek: and that it can do. But there is ad.- our position wnr have so -mum. more
recognition to make a. brief comment ~uate opportunity in dealing wltti the acceptance by the publlc, .not · ~
Federal l:,.w now n.>Qu !r es that before
cl aims ma..,· be as.,1'rLed in a F edenl habeas
corp1: :; i;: eriti on. Ll-i r! Y must first be p re.•Kn!Pd
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analogous but sort of like talking less delay. Responding to thls growing · clogging up the criminal Justice
about the desegregation decision concern, the Chief Justice of the Su- system with excessive delays.
where the Court came to a unanimous preme Court created the Ad Hoc ComThis amendment would limit succesopinion on a very Important matter in mi t tec on F ede ral Habeas Corpus in si\'e or second petitions for re vie w of
orde r to have that kind of public con- Capital Cases, chaired by for me r Jus- original con\'lctions and of sen tencing
fidence. I submit that we are really- tice Lewis Powell. The Powell Commit- where rel ief is based on a claim not
ri ght down to that one sentence on in- tee, formed In June 1988, lssued Its pre,·iously presented in the State and
te,vening rl ghts which is the crux of report to the Judicial Conference in Fed eral courts. In other words, only
reaching an agreement.
September 1989.
on very extraordinary conditions
I thank the Chair and yield the
I had the privilege last evening, Mr. would successh·e petitions be allowed.
floor.
The Graham amendment embodies
President, to have a chance to vlsit
Mr. BIDEN. I am not sure that I dis- with Justice Powell about habeas the essence of the guidance suggested
agree. The Senator may be correct, corpus reform, and he r~marked that. by the Powell committee, Mr. Preslthat It Is the most Important distinc- although there we~e different views dent, and provides for sensible and estion and difference. I am happy to aired by the committee, there was a sential reform of the Federal habeas
continue while others seek the floor to universal agreement by all who made process.
see if ther·e is anything we can do to presentations that reform in habeas
I commend Senator BIDEN for his
bridge that gap. But In the meantime, corpus procedures were necessary.
leadership In processing the omnibus
when we started this little bit of disThe committee foun~l. after delibera- crime bill and that of our colleague,
cussion. Senator KENNEDY, who was tlon, that only a fraction of the worst Senator GRAHAM, In Initiating the
seeking recognition. must have murdt:rers convicted and sentenced to amendment which ls before us today.
thought that both of us were Inclined a capital sentence actually had that
1 yield the noor.
to go beyond our inclination to go In sentence carried out. Today there are
Mr SIMPSON Mr President this is
this debate at this moment. and he 2,200 convicted murderers on death
. ·
·
·
· .
has left the floor. So unless someone row awaiting execution, 52 in my own a ~ery l~portant part of this leg16l&else is seeking recognition at the State of Nevada. Justice Powell also tlon. I _think the American people have
moment. I suggest the absence of a stated that the average length of time made •~ very clear that they are just
between conviction and execution has plain sick s.nd tired of the endless
quorum.
delars on ~ppeals of murder convicThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The been more than s years.
Mr. President, J submit to you that tlons. <?<?nv1ctions that are for especlerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro- this delay between conviction and the _ clally v1c10us and f~ml murders. That Is
carrying out of the death sentence Is what we are talkmg about. Also, receeded to call the roll.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I ask unacceptable. The criminal . Justice member that the death penalty Is lmunanimous consent that the order for system, while designed to protect con- posed by a Jury.
stltutional and procedural safeguards
I am convinced that the Thurmondthe quorum call be rescinded.
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. (Mr. should be swift and fair, protecting Specter legislation is an excellent reBIDEN). Without objection, It is so or- the public at large, and providing Jus- sponse to the demands of Americans
tlce for the victim, as well as Justice to curtail these numbing efforts t~at
dered.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I thank for the accused, and finality as part of Just continually drag on In our Judicial :
. the Chair.
the Judicial process. It has often been system. Unlike the Graham-Blden alMr. President, I am proud to be a co- said that Justice delayed ls Justice tematlve,
the Thurmond-Specter
sponsor of S. 271. Introduced by our denied. That adage has been most fre- package applies to both Federal capdistinguished colleague, the senior quently applied to the litigants them- ital cases and to State capital cases. I
Senator from Florida, at the beginning selves. Mr. President, I suggest that cannot understand why the Grahamof. the 101st Congress. I know, having the public Is also entitled to Justice, Blden proposal does not specifically
worked with him, that he has labored and when Justice Is not carried out recognize a Federal death penalty. I
mightily over the last year or so on swiftly, the public is deprived of Jus- cannot understand that.
.
habeas corpus reform.
.
tlce as well
With respect to the appointment of
I know It ts an Interest that the
The Powell committee .r eported that counsel !or Indigent defendants, the
President shares, and that you have a major problem with the current Thurmond-Specter
substitute
is
worked with him on.
system Is the need for qualified coun- tougher. It requires that In cases
I applaud both his leadership and sel to represent Indigent prisoners at where a defendant does not want
your o\\"ll, Mr. President, In bringing all stages. Justice Powell also recom- court-appointed counsel, the court
us to the position where we now con- mended that a time limit on the filing then makes a specific order In the
sider t.he essence of the Graham of habeas corpus petitions would record which reflects that the defendamendment.
reduce unnecessary delay in the crimi- ant made his choice "knowingly and
Mr. President, this is not a debate nal Justice system.
willfully."
about whether habeas corpus reform
Mr. President, the amendment ofThis section also recognizes that the
is necessary. I think all would agree fered by the distinguished Senator petitioner might not be Indigent.
that it Is. Current habeas corpus pro- from Florida, accepted by you, pro- These people are not all Just poor begcedures allow multiple postconviction vides for a statute of limitations for gers running around, being duped by
challenges to State criminal convic- filing of Federal habeas claims, a right the system Just so they can be salted
tions In Federal court. Although not to competent counsel for indigent in- away 6 feet deep. That Is not what is
mandated in the Constitution, they mates, IL-nits In the filing of successive happening here. There are petitioners
have In fact been In practice !or more petitions, and rules for retroactivity. who have learned to milk this system
than a century, datjng back to 1867, Many of these reforms were recom- In spades. That is who we are talklne
and have In my Judgment been abused mended by the Powell committee.
about. There Is a possibility that a peby many prisoners to continue to chalThe amendment, which has been ac- tltloner may not be Indigent and.
lenge their conviction In the Federal cepted, provides for a longer time limit therefore, Is not entitled to appointed
courts.
.on the filing of Federal habeas claims counsel at the Government's expense.
In 1945, the Federal courts were con- than that recommended by Justice This finding would be made part of
fronted with petitions for habeas Powell. The limit of 1 year would, In the record as well.
.
corpus In 535 cases.
my Judgment, provide ample time for
The Graham-Biden propooal apparForty-five years later that number .counsel to be changed and thoroughly ently does not think It should be neehad grovm to. Indeed exploded to, briefed throughout the trail . and the essary to make defendants pay their
some 10.389. That is an Increase . of appeals process. It does not-I empha- own .way whenever they can. That ls a
l,800· percent, . 1,logglng the crl.m.lnal slze .tbls--allow the clock . to continue puzzling .Part.of this. By follo~1ng the
J.U:itlce.. l!Yitem .an~ pro1,1dlng for encl- to. tic~ . endlessly Jor ye.a.rs at a.:time, Thurmond-Specter .propooal, . $11 , de.:, vv .. -.
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fcndants are ensured that they have Graham proposal has written another fortune. the disempowered, and all of
representation by competent counsel.
I -year and 3-month delay into the pro- that. But for heavens sakes, we all see
Argu me nts by convicted murd erers cedure. during whi ch the convict and this abuse . No wonder people are frust h at th ei r orig inal attorneys were In- his attorney can dream up a magnifi- trated. pained. and some of them - escompctent have been so much over- -cent good excuse for filing late.
pecially family members of someone
Since there ts supposedly, under thls who has suffered at the hands of one
u.:;ed. a nd abused. in habeas petiti ons
to a degr ee that ts almost beyond com- legislation, a competent attorney on of these people-completely lose their
pre hensi on. Both of these proposals hand beginning at the trial- that ls respect for the laws of the United
have st rong provisions that ensure what everyone would want to see- States. That Is not good. They become
that attorneys representing these there ls no reason at all that the pa- scofflaws of society because they know
murder defendants are very compe- perwork cannot be ready In time to that nothing ever gets done. Under
tent. This will eliminate a great many file within 2 months, as the Thur- this provision something will finally
frivolous arguments on that issue.
mond-Specter proposal states. So here get done.
I th ink a major difference to share it ls. the Biden-Graham with still anLet me Just note with regard to retwith my colleagues is in the area of other I-year and 3-month delay, or roactivity, which is a burning Issue as
successive petitions. The problem with Thurmond-Specter with a 2-month any other part of this, that the Bldenthe Graham-Blden proPoSal Is that d~lay. Take your pick.
Graham proposal allows full retroactheir language creates a giant loophole
The Thurmond-Specter proposal Is a tlvlty with new rules, and overrules a
In the law, the kind of loophole that very tough reform bill. Again, as I string of Supreme Court cases In the
has already generated 8- to IS-year read these proposals, we get down to process. I think that opens the flooddelays in these matters. The Graham- two really big differences. In the gates to a deluge of new petitions. SecBiden proposal overturns retroactivfty Biden-Graham proposal there are tion 2267 of the Thurmond proPoSal
across the board, which allows many some giant loopholes, big encugh to allows retroactivity application of new
appeals to a Jury decision to impose drive a "Wyoming cattle truck" rules on fundamental, constitutional
t:-ie death penalty. That has nothing through. There are built -in delays, at rights, only In habeas proceedings
to do with guilt, only whether the least 2 years of delays, as opposed to a brought
under this chapter. There are
death sentence Is appropriate the maximum of I-year in the Thurmondmany that participated in the crafting
s1>cond time around. The Thurmond Specter bill.
proposal imposes. significant restrfcWhich version do our constituents of that section. I was one of these
ti6ns on how a convicted murderer can want? We are going to find out soon. I people and I can tell you that the
challenge the Jury decision to impose read my mail, not Just all the mail Thurmond-Specter proposal Is int.end•
death in a second habeas petition.
from Wyoming but some from around ed only to codify existing law and not
The Thurmond-Specter proposal the country. The American people are to overrule that law.
So, those are some of the things that
says that a second habeas petition can . sick and tired of watching these vionly be raised if the defendant gets cious, brutal animals, drag the same are of concern to me. We wlll soon
approval from the appropriate Federal old nonsense through the courts over vote on this. We are either doing a
crime bill or we are pretending to do a
circuit court of appeals. This proce- and over again for years and years.
dure does away with the need to get a
Senator WILSON Just referred to a crime bill. And we are either doing a
certificate of probable cause, which Is man on death row for 11 years, who is bill that Is up front-I would hope
current practice. This practice Is also appealing again, as I speak. He Is one that we could do a bipartlsaii crime
greatly a.bused. Some district courts of the most active locker-room lawyers bill.
I have watched Senator BIDEN, the
issue these certificates very casually.
in America, and that is 'A"hat we have
The Biden-Graham proposal creates here. These are people who get into chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
a presumption that the defendant's the State library, get into the state and Senator THuRMOND, our well reposition has merit.·What an absurdity. law libraries or the Federal libraries garded and respected ranking member.
This all but assures that the convicted and are just bright enough, and clever These two men work closely together.
murderer will be allowed to file succes- enough, to just crank it out. Somebody It would have been good 11 we could
sive petitions. It 1s this precise practice Is always there to protect them. They have come up with a -bipartisan bill.
which we are trying to reform.
· are smug, arrogant, cynical and twist- We are going to craft something, going
The Thurmond-Specter proposal ed. I do not know why our system to get into a couple of more "hot ones"
corrects the problem; the Blden- should have to break down under their like the Racial Justice Act-boy, tell
Graham proposal perpetuates the prowess.
us what that one 1s. The needless
problem. perhaps makes matters even -So let us certainly be more than fair trickery and the games in here are
worse. But both proPoSals allow the to the defendants. We really do t hat In wh&.t makes ft tough to legislate.
petitioner to challenge the guilt phase -America. Anyone who says we do not
Ii one would Just get up on their
of the trial. The proponents take great ta..._.e care of criminal defendants in hind legs and say, "I hate the death
pains to eliminate any risk of execut- America Is smoking something.
penalty and would not have anything
lng an innocent defendant. No one in
We have the Miranda decision which to do with It," that 1s guts and that is
this Chamber is interested in execut- was, ln its ov.-n way, good when lt was courage. But when you only then play
ing an iwlocent defendant.
decided, and then was terribly abused. around with words and semantics-I
We seem to start on the premise We have had other good decisions like have heard enough of that in the last
that some are here to save the !nno- that, they get used, abused, and then 2 days. I went to law school and then
cent and others are not. We are all the people go on to greater crimes.
practiced law for 18 years. I felt like I
here to save the Innocent. That ls not
But let us also start being fair to the had been out to lunch during most of
what we are talking about. Get that people who pick up the tab for these the discussion yesterday. You have
out of the debate.
endless delays and frivolous appeals. some very bright people, speaking
The next big difference is the time Let us also be fair to the voters of at almost · in tongues-I would love to
allowed to file a habeas petition in least 37 of the States which have know sometimes what they are speak•
death penalty cases. The Thurmond- voiced their concerns by having capital ing.
.
.
Specter bill gets serious. We allow 60 punishment statutes. Let us exhaust
I think we should have a rule. I am
days after the Judgment and sentence the remedies before we exhaust all of Just going to throw this In-I know it
in the State court have become final. the resources of the Judicial system, will receive very little acknowledgment
The Biden-Graham proposal gives the pandering to a clever lot of manipula- or credence-that before you can come
defendants a full year. Believe · me, -tors and often their counsel, too. I here to weave your wonders · on the
. they will wait as long as possible in the think that time has come.
·
staff of a Senator you must first go
hopes that evidence or witnesses will
We are a remarkable, civilized socfe- practice law somewhere fn real llfe for
~ lost and the memories fade. Also, ty, and we do meet our obligations to 5 years: See how It really ts out there
and please . hear this; · the Blden- the lesser of society and to those -les-5 among the great unwashed. It would ·
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a.ctton. And the action ls the finality · years and what they v.-ant Is something reasonable that will get results.
of the death sentence.
t\re bright. creative, privileged people
A!5 soon as society-who ha\'e been What about the victims here, who
v. h o a rt' often on the Law Rc\'iew. ready to go on that-and the criminal ha\·e been killed? Their families
T hey are s killed. They are remarkable .. element know that this is the way it ts suff Pr, years and rears. before there ls
We sho J ld h eed them. But we must be In America. I honestly believe things final completion of the act. It just
care: fc1l \'.-hen they pile distinction will begin to turn around in this coun- does not make sense.
If my colleagues want a habeas
upon distinction and nuance upon try. And as soon as we deal with jm·er.\l!tn('e F.nd try to get away with It. nlles ,r.-ho commit adult crime:; as If corpus bill to get results. vote for this
Not o~ of them really knows where they were adults, we will begin to bill. If they do not want that, vote for
they 9.-ant to go, they ha\'e lost the big make progress there too.
the other bill.
I do hope Senator THURMOND's pro,·iew and s0me have lost their way.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
So. let 1.1.5 get in here and put togeth- posal will receive the careful attention yields time?
n a thoughtful bill , not to see wllo of the body. I think It ls a darned good
Mr. THtTRMOND. Mr. President, I
can diddle the President or who can propoS11.l. In fact it ls pretty close to yield the distinguished Senator from
what
could
be
a
bipartisan
proposal
California such time as he may reget to Senator JoE BIDEN, or who can
hang v.ho on the most vo1es on the except for nuances of meaning, which Qulre.
ce&th p enalty, or who will be called a have really shrouded it and really we
The PRE.SIDING OFFICER. The
racist bc<:ause we did not do a right have almost reached an absurd and Seru1.tor from California [Mr. Wn.so•J
perhaps
Indistinguishable
distinction
thing on a racial justice bill. That does
Is recognized.
not hu·e a th.Ing to do with it. The which In my mind may not actually
Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I thank
racial Justice caper Is nothing more make any really significant difference. the distinguished manager. I rise In
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. support of his amendment.
than a ploy to arnid standing up to be BRYAN).
The Senator from South
cou:1t.ed lf you do not like capital pun- Carolina.
The pas.sion he has just exhibited Is
ishment.
Mr. THURMOND. I wish to compli- entirely warranted. It brings to mind
So, to trot that thing out-a bill that ment the able Senator from Wyoming the passion, not spoken but felt, by
says you must execute as many blacks for bringing out the points he did, the crime victims in my State. Mr. Presias you will whites-how is that for a differences between these t wo propos- dent. there are now a number of crime
marvelollS and stupid kind of a propos- als. There Is no question about It, if victims organizations In California,
al? Call it a racial justice thing if you you want a tough proposal that will with a growing number of members,
want, but In certain areas of this coun- get action, that amendment we have unhappily, as the number of victims
try you are going to ha\·e ca.p it al pun- offered will do it. We feel. and the Jus- increases.
ishment on too many blacks. In other tice Department feels, that the
What we hs.ve before us ls an
areas you are going to have capital amendment offered by Senator BIDEN an1endment that seeks t-0 limit an
punishment on too many whites. Who and Senator GRAHAM will not do the abuse of the use of the writ of habeas
among you wants to Impose a quota on job. Why take a chance? It would be corpus. The writ of habeas corpus has
imPoSition of the death penalty?
better to pass nothing, unless we are long been recognized, 1n the United
What does that have to do with any- going to get results.
Kingdom. the United States. In my
thing tn the real world? If you commit
As I stated, It has been delay, delay, State of California, as the most powera crime. whether you are black or delay. People have been killed. It has ful remedy available in the law for
white, lf you are responsible for It, you been years and years before the sen- curing some miscarriage of Justice. It
v.11J pay the ultimate penalty called tence Is finally executed. It Just does overcomes almost all other considerdeath. as directed by a Jury of your not make sense.
ations in allo'\ll.1ng a court to consider
peers. You then go through the appeal
I remind the Senate, too, that these whether or not extraordinary circumprocess after that jury trial .. through organizations I am going tQ read en- stances exist in a criminal case which
the appellate processes, to the Su· dorsed my origlnal bill, which was a demand extraordinary relief. It can be
preme Court, and they say "you have tougher bill. We came down to the said that habeas corpus Is at the very
been aentenced to death, a jury unani- Po~ll amendment and then we ha~ foundation of our, system of crtmJnal
mously found that sentence weighed even modified that.
justice.
all of the mlttgat!ng circumstances,
But. Mr. President, having said that.
These organizations even went for
and you will die."
the other bill: The International Nar- ft also needs to be said. as has been
Once that message goes out in thls cotk: Enforcement Officers Associa- said by the distinguished Senator from
country, we will have fewer problems tion; Airborne Law Enforcement Asso- South
Carolina.
this important
1n our society. There Is the question, ciation; Society of Former Special remedy has been very much subject to
in my mind that is true. It does not Agents of the FBI; the National abuse; in his State. In mine, and all
hal'e a thing to do with whether you Troopers Coalition; the Virginia Asso· across the Nation. A1J death row popuare black. or white or brown. It has to elation of Chiefs of Police; the Victims lations swell, as inmates on death row
do with the fact you have committed a Assistance Legal Organization; the grow older and older, there Is clear eviterrible crone, ago.inst your fellow Federal Criminal Investigators Asso· dence that the system is not ,rnrldng.
nan. In a most heinous and ugly and elation; and the FBI National AcadeIn my State, twice, the people have
foul wa.y.
my Associates. The attorney generals voted-not the legislature, but the
As I say, in
ragged practice of in a majority of the States, a majority people have voted-for a remedy
the la'f., doing a couple of first-degree of the attorney generals in the whole whi<:h they felt necessary fn order to
rnurde!' trials and some other "little United States including the Attorney provide them adequate protection
cape~ .. with human beings, I learned General of the United States, ap- from violent crime. They have voted a
one thing above all: you must remem- proved my original bill.
death penalty on two oct:asions.
ber that there are animals in the
·we have tried to go along here to
But, Mr. President, in the years and
world. They are called human animals get a consensus and we weakened our years that have ensued sfnce they did
but they are, Indeed, animals. The bill to try to do that. All these organi- so, they have been denied the protecsooner Wt' arrive at a sensible way, an zations here were for the original blli. tion of that death penalty. They voted
honest v.,.y, a confident way, a caring A majority of the attorney generals for It In the belief that the death penway-there Is no need to chuckle that were for the original bill. The Attor- alty is a deterrent, at least ln those
one aspect away either-to gtve them ney General of the United States was eases where a crime of \1olence has
e\·eey benefit thJs marvelous society for the original bill. President Bush taken place, not in a fit of passion but
can give them. the better. And if they was for the original bill.
as the result of premedlt!on:· •: ' ·
fail at every step of the proceedings, ··•· Are they worth listening to? These : They are ·ent1tled to that protection.
then mut It off. Get on with too people have dealt In crime all these It ~ems to me. But what is very ctear,
bi' a shocking thing. I ha\'e said It
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Mr. President, Is that even as we are
The facts In the case are not In disdebating this here, as debate ensues In pute. He has even filed a petition on
my State and oth ers, there are people the grounds, Mr. President. that It is
who continue to argue th a t the dc> ath cru el e.nd unusual puni shme nt that he
penalty Is not a deterrent. Mr. Presi- h as spent 11 years on death row when,
dent, It is not a deterrent H it Is not of course, the length, the duration of
enforced.
h is stay there has been affected by the
Simply stated, wh::it the Th urmond filing of one petition after another on
am endment seeks to do is to gi ve some h is behalf. It is not unlike the celeguarantee that when the r.ccused has brated case of the killer who threw
been afforded the remedy of a Judicial himself on the mercy of the court desystem that r. llows for appeal and for claring himself an orphan after he
the use of th e habeas corpus peti~i on, h ad murdered his parents.
that t here be some finality. Because
This Is a situation In which the lrowe :ir? all, I think, whether lawyers or nles abound. But the Intolerable lrcny
n ot, famlliu with the brom ide, the Is that wlt.h all of the effort, all of the
maxim that comes to first-year law risk taken by conscientious law enstudents in their study in the criminal forccment officers, with all of the tax
. law, that Justice del~,yed is Justice dollars expen ded on a criminal justice
denied.
system that begins with detection by
Well. so it is, hut not nearly as much these law officers and then takes the
to the accused as, afin- trial, to those criminal accused through the courts in
who a.re crime victims, who have to a lengthy, lengthy system that, in my
relive the ordeal that they first experi- judgment, fuHy protects the rights of
cnced when either th ey experienced the accused but does not begin to prothe trauma of criine or when they, tect the rights of the victims, wit h all
worse, lost a loved one.
that is spent on probation, all that Is
The other effects it has spread far spent on that court system, all that is
be:yond the lmmedi::i.te victims of spent on parole, on corrections, the
crime, Mr. President, to those who, as people of . my State, and I suspect
general members of society, begin to many others, !eel that they are not
feel that the criminal Justice system adequately protected.
will not protect them.
Recently, a rather shocking sun•ey
I hope I wm bl? pardoned for the revealed that 1 in 5 In my State had
pride with which I speak of law en- experienced some criminal violation
!orcement in my home State. Whether within the pa.st 5 years and that a maI go to the o!:!ice of the U.S. attorney jority expected that they would within
in New York or to FBI headquarters the next 5 years. Mr. President, that is
here L"l Washington, or the office of Intolerable. We can speak all we wish
the DEA in North Mia.mi, I have been to of affording opportunity in a var!etold, "You have as fine a law enforce- ty of ways.
ment in California as exists anywhere
We spend a great deal of time on
in the world. They are the most dedi- this floor, and quite properly, talking
cated; they are the most conscientious; about education, about the needs to
they are the most professional. They make our young people competitive in
are highly skilled."
a global marketplace so that they can
The fact of the matter Is that Iron- compete and win. We all know that for
lcally In our State, the streets are too many, their horizons are limited
needles.sly dangerous; In part, because and extend not much further than an
of a drug traffic that Is seeking a large ambition to be a member of a drug
and lucrative market; in part, because gang.
the State criminal law is far too leWe also know that for a great many,
nient.
their lot in life will perhaps include
But most recently, Mr. President, being crime victims, in part because
the focus has been on the !allure of this drug traffic Is so rampant, but, in
the criminal justice system, both State part, Mr. President, because the risks
and Federal, to afford some finality to are seen as rather minimal, even- In
make real the threat to criminals that the extreme case of the taking of a
if they take a life, they will have to life.
pay with their own. The death penalty _ What happens when someone dehas not been a deterrent because it/ cldes that in order to support a habit
has not been enforced and it has not he will rob a liquor store or a gas stabeen enforced because of the abuse of tion late at night when there Is a
the habeas corpus process.
· single attendant and decides that the
Currently, the focus Is upon Robert odds are with him if he puHs the trigAlton Harris. Mr. Harris has been on ger because he may eliminate the sole
death row in the California penal witness to his crime? And, In fact, if he
system for over 11 years. He has Just Is caught, in some States where there
recently filed a fresh petition. Those Is no death penalty, I say the odds
who have been reading the newspa- very definitely favor his pulling the
pers and reading, again and again, the . trigger. But even In those States
recital of the facts of this grim case in where there is a death penalty but
which this cold-blooded murderer shot where It Is not enforced because of the
down two teenage boys in cold blood abuse of the habeas corpus process,
and then ate the hamburger of one, the effect Is much the same. Rational
found, through comments at the time, criminals clearly figure that the odds
. that his · callousness. was · almost are In their favor, not in favor of the
beyond belief; · ·
·
citizen; · that the profits greaUy out~

..., vot. •

weigh the risk to them even In the
most extreme case where they are paid
to eliminate a witness, paid to elimlna t c compC'tltio n In the drug traffic.
!\fr . President, I repeat, tha t Is not a
tolerable situation. It is not tolerable
to h ave public confidence undermined
with respect to the most basic right
that a ci\·ilized society should afford
its citizens: The right not to become
crime victims, the right to feel safe In
their own homes and unafraid to leave
th em. That is not the case In my
Sta:e. It is not the case In all too many
where people are afraid of their homes
and afraid to leave them.
Mr. President, what is being sought
here is not a denial of the due process
and the Bill of Rights protections that
we celebrate, and quite properly, with
pride in a Nation that has afforded
fairness and justice unparalleled in
the history of civilization. But to do
so, Mr. President, does r.ot require
that we continue to abuse the process
In a way that undermines quite reasonably the confidence of ordi nary
citizens, decent people, entitled to
expect and receive the protection of
the law. That Is what is at stake here.
That is what the Thurmond amendment is all about.
I cannot urge too strongly that we
adopt it because if we fail to adopt it.
Mr. President, once again the American peopl e will have heard that the
Senate of t he United States has had
the opportunity to make them safer,
to attempt to at least change the odds
In their favor. If we fail, they will
rightly ask why. Why · Is it that we
have this overweening concern for the
rights of the accused at such great
cost to the rights of the citizens? Why
do we not worry as much about the
victims of crime as those who are
thought to be victimized by a crimlnal
system which does not afford them
limitless rights of appeal?
The answer, Mr. President, Is that It
Is not justice to those ordinary citizens. It Is certainly not justice to those
crime victims If we perpetuate a
system that permits its abuse In a way
that makes It impossible for those citizens to feel confident because the reasonable expectation is that, In fact,
the death penalty will continue to be
on the books as a dead letter, unenforced because we permit limitless filings of petitions for habeas corpus. That · is the situation now. It is
wrong. We must change it. The Thurmond amendment will change It.
I commend my friend from South
Carolina who has many virtues. But
perhaps the most Important of those
Is tenacity In the cause of Justice to
citizens. And he recognizes that that
system Is not working and that the
time has come to change It. Indeed,
when the number of death row inmates across the Nation numbers in
the thousands, It Is pa.st time to
change it.
·
Mr. President; no amount of words '
will bring ·back • Wyatt· ·Loggins .

or

t<.obert James Devaul. who were
among the victims of serial killer
Randy Kraft. No amount of words on
this floor will bring back Michael
Baker and John Mayeski. the two
teenage \ictims of Robert E. Harris,
nor will th ey bring back Dayle Okakakl, a \'ictim of the nightstalker,
Richard Ramirez.
The list of death row inmates ls exceeded greally by the list of their victims. The comfort we can give to those
who are the loved ones of those victims is rath er limited, but at the very
least they are entitled to believe in
this country that we will do justice.
We do not do justice with a system
that permits those who have been convicted by facts that are no longer in
dispute to continue to escape the penalty that the law provides by the
abuse o! this process.
Mr. President, the time has indeed
come to adopt the Thurmond amendment.
I thank the Chair and yield the

floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I

com mend the able Senator from Califo r nia for his very pertinent remarks.
They are Tight on point. He has again
emphasized that the people of this
country are sick and tired of the delay,
delay, delay in the criminal justice
system. Cases go on, as we have stated
here. 7, 8, 10. 12, 16, and in one case we
understand 18 years. How do the families feel? Put yourself in their shoes.
Mr. President, I now yield to the distinguished Senator from Iowa for 15
minutes.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I
commend the Senator from South
CarolinL I thank him for yielding to
me. I support his compromise.
The question to ask when we inquire
whether the Federal habeas corpus
system needs reform is not what procedures will apply to a capital defendant who has only "one bite at the
apple" but what procedures wlll apply
where the defendant has already had
numerous "rntes at the apple," including having the same claims heard by
several different State and Federal
courts?
Congress can change these procedures-established by statute in 1867without doing violence to any right already guaranteed to individuals under
the Constitution.
. The present Federal habeas corpus
statute has fostered a system that no
longer seems to be int~rested in the
factual guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Instead, prisoners appear to be encouraged to attempt to persuade some
Federal Judge that some kind of technical error has occurred during the
criminal prosecution against them.
The present system allows a· State
pclsoner to relitiiale virtually every
aspect of his or her confinementfrom · pretrial through postconviction
proceedings-an unlimited number of
times throughout their term of confinemenL

The ele\·atlon of procedure over sub- workable solution to the present Fedstance deprives the criminal justice eral habeas corpus morass to be led
system of a crucial element of deter- astray.
We cannot afford to merely go
rence: swiftness and cert.alnty of punthrough an exercise in reshaping realiishment.
Particularly in capital cases, the ty to fit certain slanted notions of fairpresent habeas corpus systems under- ness or e\·en r ight and wrong.
mines the effectiveness of the des.t h
If our efforts result in only the illupenalty as both a deterrent and as a sion of reform. we face the prospect ol
legitimate expression of society's complicating the ever-growing gridlock
moral outrage concerning the most in capital litigation.
abominable of intentional killings.
We must balance greater certainty
ConsequenUy, the will of the people and finality In capital sentences, In exin the 36 States that have a death pen- change for a fuJJ and fair adjudication
alty ls being thwarted by repetitious of a defendant's claims.
litigation.
As I have said before, the question ls
Because of my strong belief in feder- not what procedures will apply to a
alism and my preference that the capital defendant who has only "one
States make their ov.n decisions in bite at the apple" but what procedures
most areas, I have supported habeas will apply where the defendant has alcorpus reform since the beginning of ready had numerous "bites at the
my service in the Congress.
apple," including having the same
My goal is to eliminate pointless and claims heard by several different State
duplicative relitigation of claims that and Federal courts?
have already been fairly considered
A reasonable and rational habeas apand decided by State courts at both peals
system will net allow claims to
the trial and appellate levels.
be raised in successive Federal habeas
Only then will we make it possible to corpus
petitions that have nothing to
obtain real Justice by eliminating unreasonable and illogical results in do v.-ith the question of defendant's
factual innocence or guilt.
criminal proceedings.
A reasonable and rational habeas apMr. President, our goal should be to
avoid inconsistencies in the treatment peals system will not allow claims to
be raised in successive petitions deof similar cases.
Unfortunately, the result of the spite the absence of any justification
present habeas system encourages in- for the defendant's failure to raise the
same claims in earlier proceedings.
consistencies.
By encouraging claims unrelated to
We need to establish a standard that
affords protection for both a defend- the factual guilt or innocence of the
ant's due process rights and the integ- defendant or by encouraging relitlgarity of State and Federal crimnal pro- tion of claims from the sentencing
phase of the capital proceedings, the
cedures.
As we all know, the current habeas goal of finality is defeated.
Furthermore, I believe very strongly
corpus system allows for no end to the
litigation of a State criminal convic- that we cannot abandon well-setUed
tion. This results in using the Federal law regarding the dUerence to be given
courts to review ad nauseum convic- State procedural rules.
We know that delay results in ef!ections in State courts.
·
We need to establish some realistic Uve abridgement of the sentence of a
capital defendant.
and logical finality to these cases.
Therefore, convicted capital defendI believe that reasonable time
limits-similar to those contained in ants have a greater incentive to w!th•
the Thurmond-Specter proposal- hold claims for use in later proceeda.fford every State prisoner an oppor- ings than any other convicted criminal ·
tunity to apply for Federal habeas tnca.rcerated in prison.
Our actions in this area of law
corpus relief following the conclusion
should not establish the dangerous
of the State criminal process.
Reasonable time limits will create a presumption that only by deprivina
means for control of the filing of peti- the States of procedural bars and detions years or even decades after the f enses and expanding the scope of
natural conclusion of criminal pro- Federal habeas corpus review and the
ceedings, because, as a practical role of Federal courts, can there be
matter, the ~age of time may make any assurance of adequate constitureliable determinations of asserted tional review of capital cases.
Mr. President, we need to focus on
claims~lther during a retrial of the
petitioner or during another collateral Y,hat actually happened during a parproceeding-diificult or practically inl- ticular criminal proceeding, rather
than on Issues such as the background
l)OSSible.
Consequently, without in any way or compensation of a lawyer represent·
prejudicing the substantive rights of ing a capital defendant.
I believe that we should be more
State criminal defendants, a system of
reasonable time limits on habeas cases concerned with the impact of the
maintains orderly procedures already habeas system on America's .citizens
contained in other areas of Federal and on the victims of crime, actual or
criminal law and It assures finality of potential, rather than being concerned
with its impact on America's lawyers.
State criminal adjudications.
It seems to me that if we are really
Mr. Pre.ident, we cannot allow our
search !or a true, meaninpul, and interested in serving the public inter-
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justice can continue in our great coun- filed to get y:ou a. stay for anot.ber 15
try." So U. Is an a\·eraire, everyd!lY months or 2 or ,t years.
We sa.y U ~ou want to, file a seeond
American concun.
First, we should note that this a.1>- or subzcquent time, you have a lawyew
pllPs only to death penalty cases. That and you send It up to three judges u
Is what a lot of people are worried the circuit court. And they have to
about. On averaire rte-ht now, becair.;e decide whether there Is some- ea.use. U
of the numerous appeals th.rou~h the they say, " It loolu like· we rni&'>eo
habeas corpus process, It takes an av- something," then It st&rts again, a:m:t
s \·stem:
erage of 8 years after a com:iction, you get another time through. Federal
· First, a State capital defendant's after using all o! the processes of the Judge, circuit Judge, all the way- t.o the
c~e should be afforded a full and fair States, on a'\lerage, 8 years of waiting Supreme Court. It sems to me nothing
series of appeals-both directly anct around for the process to determine. could be fairer. I think we ought to cm
collat erally-based upon the prisoner's with finality that Justice has been this. It la h!i"h time.
guilt or innocence and the procedures- served and the will o! the peopie Is to
I thank the manager !or the- time-r
followed during the State's criminal' be complied with. A Jury has been im- and li yiel'd the naor:
tri:il proceedings.
paneled and has convicted and bu
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. Pl'esfdenC, J
Second, when the capital defendant sentenced, and still they wait.
'lnI1t to commend Ulat e,cceilent state-has exhal:tSted his State remedies, he
So I think everyone should know: ment by the abre Senator froJll'l NeW'
should be afforded another- series of this is a major issue in our- country, Mexfco.. He Is not a member. o# the .Ju-equally !un and fair appeals in the
and people want us to decide it with' diciar:,r Committee, and he- has not had.
Federal courts.
Third, once a State capital defend- some Justice and fairness, but with an opportunity to Itn~- about the bffnJ
ant's- conviction and sentence are some degree o! commcm sense and fl. along this fine that have been- befo~
found to be appropriate, jud1cial pro- nality. The· approach of the Thur- the committee- for-years, but he undermond-Specter &mendment seems to- stand that the Ameriean people- a:re
ceedings sfiould be concluded:.
Fourth. Federal habea3 corpus relief the Senator from New Mexfeo to be- sick and tired of these delays.
I want to- emphasize this: Under our
should remarn an extraordinary eminently fair. I see- it as very simple;
bill, we will bring a conclusion in t
remedy which should upset a State- but profound.
First, this amendment would apply· year. Under the Biden bt!I, it could tre
conviction only where necessary. to reonce the case is all finished-the con- indeteminate for years;
dress & fundamental Injustice.
Mr. President. 1 yield to the able
Mr. President, no reform proposal as victed murderer- has had his- day in
State court, a Jury ha, convici,ed him~ Senator from California.
sweeping &S this is ever perfect.
Mr. WILSON &ddressed the Chair..
While the Thurmond-Specter pro- Md then found he should have the
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
posal may, not achieve what I orieinal- death penalty-. He has exercised all his
ly hoped we could achieve,. it is a posi- State remedies and he is- there with yieWs time?
that case completed.
The Senator for cailfa.rnfa..
tive step.
What this amendment says is that
Mr. WILSON. Mr.President.,.! than&.
I urge my colleagues. to support.it.
the Judges in the federal system. from the Chair. I thank. lllJi friend uooi
I yield the-floor.
Mr. THURMOND.. Mr. President, I those who sit at the trial level to the South Carolina.
Mr. President, I want to raiae: a pomt
wish to commend the· able Sena.tor circuit and to the SUpreme Court..
from Iowa for his splendid arguments. have to understand that. it. ts impor- of concern. I h9.Ye. already sp.oken aL.
on this subject. He is a valuable- tant that they expedfte this. process. some length. in suppart o! the Thw:member of the Jud1ciary CommJttee, So it. is gjven high priority.. They must mond amendment. I will not reiten.te
and we thank him very much.
put It at the top of the roster and hear what I have-said..
.Mr. President. I yield 5 m:nutes to, it. After ~ there are not thousands.
I have. a concern that we have :aot,.
the able Senator from New Mexieo.
o! these cases.
.
either in this ameru!m.ent or in ,neThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The
So we say to them, "You do it." We G.raham amendment, or elsewhere in.
Senator from New Mexfco.
say to the. defendant, "Yau have iO the Biden proposal, addressed lhe. necMr. DOME-"llflCL Mr. President. r days after all that has been finishe-d- essary point with respect. to ap"1Jcarthank the distinguished ranking you have. h&d your tFial. you. have had tion oi what we adopt here as: limit.
member for yielding 5 minutes, and your appeals, and you have gone t.o lions upcn the abuse of the. habeas
while I feel strongly on. thfs issue. r 51our State supreme- court. Now you. corpus procedure, and how it shaU De
might not use the 5 minutes.
have 60. days. to e-et yow: appeal applicable to. existing_ death raw InBut let me in my own way state wl'ly ready." But contrary to. prior law. we· mates..
r thin.k.. the Thurmond-Specter amend- furnish him with a lawyer in the. event. It seems to. me that we. would be- terment should be airreed to_
he. is. ind1gent. He no longer has to ribly derelict, Mr. President, if we- ditiWe speak o! habeas corpus. reform as write up his o,;im habeas carpus. proc- not spell that out in the law. I am weU.
if it Is something that.. average Ameri- ess. He gets a lawyer. Within 60 days, aware that there is a unanimoos-concans are not concerned about, some- he files.
sent agreement that prevents- the
thing that average Americans do not
Then we say to the Federal Judge, mGdification of the amendments tha~,
understand.
"You put ft at the top, of the list and are pend:L.,g and that have already
Let me tell you, Mr. President, there you hear it." Then we say to the cir- been acted upon, but, I address to. my
is no question, whether it be in the cuit Judge, "Judges, if it is. appealed, coUeag-ues an urgent p-lea. that. we not
State of Nebraska, the State the dTs- you put it at the top of the- list and leave this sub.Ject, and specWc.ally that.
tinguished occupant oi the chair you hear it." Then we say to the U.S. we not lea\·e this legislation.. without.
comes from,. or the St:i.te of New Supreme Court the- same ..
having amended It, so as to make ele&11
Mexico. if you ask average citizens
So, we are-saying. wil.hin 1 l!ear after the application oj the limitattens upon
what they think. about those \\<ho are. that has been filed, there will be an the habeas corpus process to existin&
waiting on death row for 8, 10, 11,. 12,. adjudicaticn by the best eourts in the lruna.tes ol death row-.
15 years while· the courts of this coun- land, yes or no.. It. seems. to me that is,.
We. have ha.d, as I .Pointed out, the:
try are determining their fate. and p11etty fair. But second,. we say. since recent in3taoce in California.. of :ret a.er
while they are on thefr sixth or se\.'- we want to be- absolutely certain and other filing by Robert Alton Harns,
enth or eighth appeal to the U.S. Su- do not want to deny another bite at who has been on ~atb row- Ulere for
preme Court, I! you. nsk average Amer- that apple of appeal, we. give. you over 11 years since his conviction.
icans of good common sense what they other opp.ortun!.tJcs, to appeaL. Bu.t,
Mr. Preslden~. whateYer we deride
think about lt. they will tell you, "We what -we say. ls.. that. they should not, be b,y way of & limit. upon, the- abuse o£
do not under.stand how thfs. klnd ol frivolous. They should net. be just. the present. procesii:. what. we 1 2 ~ '6·,
capital cases will
not be deTayed because of, among
oth er reasons, a lack of qualified couns<' I. v,e must carefully consider options
0 :, how the habeas appeals system
sl1ou!d be reformed.
I have attempted to keep In mind
four goals as we iro about the task o!
reforminir the Federal habea s corpus
t'.·"
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do Is t.o make clear specifically how It
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- what I think are billions of dollars to
the American public, unnecessary dol npplies to the literally thousands of In- out objection, It Is so ordered.
mates of death rows and prisons across
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. lars to the American public.
the Nation. Let there be no doubt that the able Senator from Delaware has
Th ere has to be an end to this, and
we are grandfath ering them somehow, agreed to ylrld se\·eral minutes to the we have the chance right here with
so that In the prospective application distinguish ed Senator from Utah.
the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendThe PRESIDING OFFICER. Does ment to put an end to it and do It In
of this law we wlll have no application
of Its requirements to those who are the Senator yield time to ~he Senator the way that protects all of the Interpresently on death row, convicted of a from Utah.
ests, all of the rights of the defendant
capital offense.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 5 minutes to my In the most reasonable way. It does
I thank the Chair.
dlstlnghlshed friend from Utah.
have finality, it does give the defendThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The ant his opportunity for court, or his
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Senator from Utah Is recognized for 5 day In court, In every way, but It puts
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I minutes.
a tlme constraint and a time llm itatlon
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank on what happens.
am glad the Senator brought that out.
This bill would apply to those on my distinguished colleague from DelaThe Thurmond amendment requires ·
death row. He said some have been ware, the chairman of the Judiciary the death row inmate to file a Federal
there for 11 years, and they may be Committee, and also my distinguished habeas corpus petition 60 days after
there 5 or 10 more years If we do not friend and colleague from South Caro- the death sentence becomes final. It
pass this bill. We limit it to 1 year. lina, the Republlcan leader on the Ju- prohibits any Federal district judge
That ls what the public wants, what diciary Committee, for allowing me from thereafter granting any other
the law enforcement people want, the extra time.
habeas petition for stay of execution.
I will take a few minutes to Just
what the President wants, what the
It requires a circuit court of appeal
Attorney General wants, what the ma- briefly summarize why I think we authorization before any successive
jority of attorneys general in the really have to pass the Thurmond- petition may be brought. That Is a
United States want.
Specter amendment if we are to enact major advancement in this Issue. It is
Mr. President, I think we are about true habeas corpus reform.
fair advancement. You are giving
ready for a vote. The Republican
This is our last chance. To me this is athem
a complete Jump to the circuit
leader wanted to make some closing the most wonderful opportunity we
remarks. I suggest the absence of a have had to really correct the excesses court of appeals where we know we
of habeas that have been going on for have the appellate ability to handle
qUO!'Uill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ~-ears. The Gacy case since 1980, that thee matters in the very best constituclerk will call the roll.
Is Just through the process of appeal. tional way. If they do not like It, they
The assistant legislative clerk pro- Now they Just filed their first habeas then can go to the Supreme Court of
case, the first habeas petition. By the the United States. And It forces the
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I time they get through with that, that trial court and the appellate court to
ask unanimous consent that the order ls another 10 years or more. Yet this act expeditiously.
The district court has to decide the
for the quorum call be rescinded.
man is convicted of murdering 33 boys,
case in 110 days, the circuit court in 90
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- as I recall.
out objection, it Is so ordered.
In the case of William Andrews. 17 days, and the Supreme Court in 90
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, years, having murdered a number of days after that. It does not postpone
there are some points I want to clari- people after torturing them and pour- consideration of State claims at all.
fy. On the Issue of States rights, Sena- ing Drano down their throats. After 26 They can do it.
The difference under Thurmond is
tor BIDEN states that the Thurmond- appeals, 15 in the Federal courts, 11 in
Specter proposal would infringe upon the State courts, he Just filed his 27th we resolve the problem; under
States rights. This ls not the case. appeal while I was speaking here on Graham, we do not resolve it, even
This bill would not-I repeat, would the floor on Monday decrying this sit- though I have to admit there have
been some improvements over what
not-eliminate State habeas corpus uation.
review. Under our proposal, death row
He knows, and everybody else knows, the original bill had to say.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
inmates may file State habeas peti- that he committed those murders. It Ls
tions whenever the State law permits. a Just penalty. Everybody knows it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
No State-laws are touched.
·
There ls no more good argument. HJs HAluaN). The clerk will call the roll.
In addition, the Biden-Graham bill, appeals are frivolous. Everybody
The assistant legislative clerk proaccording to the Department of Jus- knows that. But they will keep filing ceeded to call the roll.
tice, would overturn the case of them as long as we keep this current
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
Teague versus Lane, which held the system.
ask unanimous consent that the order
changes in law are not to be applied
And the difference betwen these two for the quorum call be rescinded.
retroactively in collateral proceedings. amendment is that the ThurmondThe PRESIDING OFFICER. WithIn other words, by overturning Specter-Hatch . amendment ends these out objection, it Is so ordered.
Teague, the Senate would be expand- appeals beyond reasonable llmJt.s.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President,
ing the rights of death row inmates,
the distinguished chairman of the
Mr. THURMOND. One year.
murderers; It would expand the rights
Mr. HATCH. I have to say that the committee has agreed the Senator can
of convicted murderers on death row.
Graham amendment ls a serious, good- talk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The fai th effort on the part of the dlstin-·
Mr. DOLE. I will talk in my leader's
Chair advises the Senator from South gulshed Senator from Delaware [Mr. tlme.
.·
Carolina that all of his time has ex- BIDEN] and the distinguished Senator
Mr. President, was leader time repired.
from Florida [Mr. GRAHAM] to address serve earlier?
Mr. THURMOND. I suggest the ab- this habeas situation. But It Just plain
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, 10
sence of a quorum.
does not do It. The debate now Is be- minutes of the leader tlme has been
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The tween the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch reserved.
tlme wlll be charged to the Senator amendment, which addresses habeas
Mr. DOLE. I understand the distinfrom Delaware. The clerk will call the now, and the Graham amendment, guished Senator from South Carolina
roll
which Is content to allow the same has more time.
The assistant clerk proceeded to call system to continue.
Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield
the roll.
U Graham Is enacted here today and to the Republican leader.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I become the law, It Is a step in the
Mr. DOLE. I will use my leader time. ·
ask unanimous consent that the order right direction, but it will not stop
Mr. President, everyone ln the
for the quorum call be rescinded.
.,j
these frivolous appeals at a cost ·of Senate has either read about or heard
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about tbe so-called habeas corpus
me rry -go-round.
Tho usands upon. thousands of
habe as p etl t! ,:ms cl og the F ederal district court dockets each year; 40 percrnt of these petitions are filed more
than 5 years after a. person has been·
convicted. And nearly o.ne-th.ird of the
p<'titlons are filed more than a decade
af ter conviction.
Yes, t h a.t is right. A full decade.
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger
describt'd the habea.s q uagmire this
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Secood,
,he
Thurmond-Specter
coz1ci.us10x
amendment limits the a\'ai!o bi li ty of
Mr. P resi dent, the Thurmond-Spec.. second or successlve petitions-the pe- ter approach to habeas 1:orp\ia. reform
Utlons. In other words, t hat are-a field Is. sound. It Is comprehensi.ve. And I&,
day for ereati ve attorneys who gin-up will go a Jong way tol':a.rd pu\tiog a
spurious el alms to keep their clie nts in stop to the endless litigation delays
the litigation pipeli.ne.
that clog the courts. and consume pre-The Thurmond-Specter amendment cious JudJclal resou.rce.s.
would stop this abuse- by providing
This is • lL"Ilited retroactive exeep.
that &. successive petition can only be- tion that makes sense and it Is only
raised in two. specific circun13tance~ fair since fundamental: cons.tltutiona.l
First, if evidence· becomes available issues wa.uld be at issue.
that calls Into question the guilt or inMr. Presiru.:nt,. I know this. is an im\\·a.y:
nocence of the defendant; or second, ii portant !.;sue, im trnportant ~cision.
I have seerr cases- and this occurs in many a previously undiscoverable ta.ct comes lf we are· con::emed: about reform, if
courts today- where 3, 4.. or 5 trle..Ls are ac- ta li&"ht that. calls into question the ap- we are· concerned a.boat. what l recorded ta the a.ccused with an appeal !oll'?w~- proprlateness of the original sentence. !erred to in the earlier quote from, the
ing ea.ch trla.l and reversal of the conv!ct 1on
Perhaps more il?lJ)ortantly
the former: Chief .Justice Warren Burger,
on purely pr~eduraJ ~ -ounds ... • .. rn one Thurmond-Specter amendmen'i re- it wourd seem to me tl'lat this apcasc! more thz.n 60 _Ju. ors and alternates.
. 'naJ d f ~--t t .... ~11 .. pr::>ach shoufd be adopted. J u~ my
v:ere Involved In 5 tnals • • • more than 30 quires a Crlm.l
e eilUd.U O ..., ..u......,,.
.
.
differe n t lawyers particlpa.t.ed • • • amf get the approval o1 a Feder al court of colleagues to· suppo!:1' t.he Thurmond-mer e- than 5tl appela.t~ Judges reviewed the appeals; before a district. court can Specter. ame~dmen~ when we- votelater this e!enmg.
.
case of th~ appeals. • • • The tragic aspect h ear a sw::cessive petition~
wa.s the wastP. and f utility since e,ery
Mr. President. this approach strikes.
Mr. Pres:dent. I reserve any time I
la ·;,yer. every Judge and e~ery Ju~or was a fair balance. Wlth the F ederal appel- may have;
fu.Jy co::ivH:ccd of the dc.endant s gunt lat" courts as the ga tekee pers· It v.ill
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Presfdent, I'
from ~ gmrung to end.
ens-ure that frivolous cl:ili:is ~e not intend to- vote against the amendment
I t hink it is fair to_ say that ,we all ra ised in successive habeas petitions. of the Senator from South Carolina.. I
share t.l'..e !oz:mer Chief J ustices. con- And, at the· same t ime, it will greatly prefer the G'raI;am-Biden alternative.
cems. And we an agree t._hat habeas. reduce the risk. of e xecuting an inno- although I contmue: to fltvar addltfonr ef~r:11- is a~:utely essen t ial ff we. are cent person or a per.son who does not al m e_asnres in several' areas to protect
r ~a!lj'__ mteresLd in restOI!,-'lg SOffie ~a- deserve a capital sentence.
const1t utioa:ll rights..
When it comes to the successive petiStroJ:?-&',er counsel standards and com!1~~=~ty to our criminal justice
tions fssue-, ,he Thurmond-8pecter ap- pensat1on modeled' on the. work of the
l
·
mi1 soLU'nos
proach beats the Graham-Bfden &J>"- American Bru; Association s?'louJd be.
When ft eon.res _to me:mir.,if.ul habeas proach h2.nds. down.
guaranteed to ca~al defendants. anct
reform.. there ts- only one proposal on
The Graha.m-Bfden proPosa.l would · habeas petitfo!l~ more. protectfon
the table-and that's the preposal of- allow J'ederaJ eourts to hear a succes- should be provided to habeas. petition-•
!ered by- my distinguished colleagues, slv~ r,etition 50 long 88 &he facts· aI- ers whose cia.fms ran vfctfm to un!a.1r
Senators Tlitm:llotrn and SPEClllt.
leged! by the defendant-ff proven- procedural default.. rules whieh allowBoth Sen&tors have· studied the- would place 8 defendant's guilt into ignorance,. negl~ct or Incompetence oC
ls.$ue-~ They hllve worked ha:rd on the- question
counsel to extinguish constitutional
ls.$ue. And theif' proposal, H enacted,
In oth~r words, no proof is- requ ired~ rights; and mo.re should lu~ done _to
would improve~ habeas.system in at Ko red facts are required. JUBt m ake undo rec1:nt Supreme Court retroactilll.east three slgru!J.<!ant ways.
some ailegatiens JU5t alJege some- ity dccis10l'1S that. virtually eliminate
Pint. the Tlutrmond-Speeter amend·
the ability ol habea& petitioners to,
meat get.!! serious with des.dlines. It re- tacts, and a dfstrict ~rt ean hear the- obtain iull and fai.r l'.eview o! m&)JI Po-quires defendants to file a habeas peti- succ~sn-e ?_ia1'lea5 petltlon.
tentialll! meritorius claims. T hese
tion in. Feders.l court within 60 da,ys. of
Mr. President, th is approach rs not issues a-o to the heart of ow- sy&tem. Qf
th
any Hnal Judgment and sentence by· a. ha?eas reform .. It will not reduce
e !ustice and its. a.bility tQ ensure accea
State supreme eourt.
haoeas ~a:seloa.a.
. .
to equal- justice for. all. Neve.rthelesi;..
N-Ot 1 year, a.s I)&opo.sed by my dist~
It is si:nply a PT~~criptio~ for open,- the Graham-Biden alternative. coarguished colleag,u es,. Senators. BlllEN Ing np the suecessive- petition flood- tains worthwl-Jle provisions to secu,e
and GR..\3AM. Not 9 months. Not even ~tes a nd . for c~ogging t~ eom-ts even counsel for capital defendan~ and.
6 months. but 60 days.
tcrthe; wi th ~r;olous cla.ims.
habeas. petitioners, 11snd it deserres. the
The Thurm ond-Spect er amen dment
Fma.i!y,
tae
Tbunnond-Specter support of the Senate.
also rec;.ui!'tS: any defendant whore ame ndrn ent would allow the Federal
The writ of habeas ccrpus b one of
Federa: b ;.!;~as application is. denied to courts to conslder-t J:Ie habeas_ cases- the il"eat.. b!storical bulwarks of Angur
file a ~ u;:-; cme Court petition for certi- only · those intervemng decisions. by American jurisprudence, a.'ld it contlnorari v.; Ll~in 20 days. of the denial. And the U.S. Suprem':l Court v:hich estab- ucs to play a fundamental and unique
e,en mare, it requires the Supreme· Iish fundamen tal constitutional rights. role u:i aur modem ~·stem ol justice.
Court to m:\ke a final decision within
This is a. liinl.t ed retr oac.tivity ex cet>- Ha.beas corpus, review ol death sen90 days of the filing. of the cert. peti- tion that makes s.e.c..se. And it.. is only- tences is the r;,rinclpal means oJ relie{
tion.
fair, since fundamental constitutional a vail:-.ble to a wrongfully convicted inMr. President, criminal defen dants rights would be at Issue.
dhi dual faci!l&" execution.. I.t. has
may not like t h ese deMlines. Criminal
The Grah.am-Biden pro.pos:ll, howev- spared the lin:s of m3JlY innocent perdd ense aU.orneys may feel put ou t. er, would go be yon d fundamen tal con- sons who were uncons.titutiorullly eonAnd the nine Jus tices on the Supreme stitutional ri;rhts. It would 2.ilow the victed iu1d sentenced to death. The
Court may not like Congress. g!vi.ng courts in hab ~:is c::!.Ses to c..in.sider "any rig h ts at ir..sue incJude. the right to a.
them deadlin es and telling th em how· interim change in the law p r om ulgat- fair and speedy trial, 11. fairly coru;titu~
to schedule their o!licial business. .
ed by the Supreme Court," I r epeg.t: ed Jury, competent counsel. &nd ace.es.
But, ln my view. clear-cut and un- "a,ny L.,terim cba.nge in the law." . - .· to evide nce and witnesses. are essea.
breakable deadlines are essential U
This ls obviously a. much broa.der tial att.ributes of fairness in Olli:
we're really serioU& about. redt1clng the retroar.tlvitY exception.. And it wili system of justice. Habeas peUtJQns
delays. lD the habeas process. And in slmpcy encourage the filing oC ll)Ore- ha\·e saved many individuals from. CODtmy view, meaningful desLdi.me$ are
unwelcome and unneeded--ha:beas pe- stit.uti-0.Cal. v.iolatioDS ol. the~ tights
~t~ to any habe86 ref~rm 1>roPosal.. tiitions.
and ultimately, spared. theJr Uves.. Qfteai

es-

,.
•

~

bl)J~

(.,V1"LYK1:.:">.:,,v.,.n.L

after repeated denials of relief In State
court systems.
I oppose the death penalty, because
capital punishment is wrong In principle and wrong In practice. The death
penal ty Is fund amentally flawed, because of the likelihood that innocent
people will be executed. No system of
Just ice, however wise or resourceful its
judges and Juries may be, can eliminate this risk. That Is a risk we accept
when the punishment I! imprisonment. because a Jailed defendant can
alwa5·s be set free when Innocence Is
proved. But that Is a burden we cannot
tolerate when the punishment Is
death.
The risk of executing Innocent persons ls no theoretical, hypothetical,
proPoSition. A recent Stanford Law
Review study lists 350 cases in which
defendants convicted of capital or potential capital crimes in this century
have later been found innocent.
A 1978 Indian conviction and death
sentence were overturned when, on retrial. it was shown that his conviction
had rested on perjured testimony.
In 1988, a defendant was released
from prison in Florida after it was determined that he had been convicted
on the basis of testimony the prosecutors knew to be false.
All of these violations were revealed
on habeas. The list goes on and on.
How can any of us shut the door to
relief in cases such as these?
The need for counsel in capital cases
ls a protection that · former Justice
Lewis F. Powell, who chaired the
Habeas Corpus Study Committee, and
others have advocated for years. The
Powell committee proposal, as modified recently by the Judicial Conference, would pro,1de counsel for State
habeas proceedings and this proposal
Is a starting point. But I believe that
meaningful representation by counsel
must include minimum attorney competence standards based on experience, as well as adequate compensation. monitoring and investigative resources where necessary.
The Graham-Blden democratic proposal goes further than the Thurmond-Spector proposal and it should
be supported.
The Thurmond-Specter alternative
errs In favor of swifter review of constitutional claims, at the expense of
fair and adequate representation of
those claims. To reduce a habeas petitioner's abllity to obtain review of constitutional cla!ms in federal court In
exchange for representation by counsel, ts a lopsided bargain without additional guarantees as to the adequacy
of the counsel's representation and
adequate procedural opportunity to be
heard. Habeas corpus review necessarily entails consideration of complex
constitutional and procedural issues,
and often requires experienced investigation. The stakes facing a habeas petitioner.in a capital case leave no room
for error.
. •
At every stage in a capital proceeding, whether at trail or on post-ron\ric-

1'.L'~... 'VH. LJ -

.JL , , n .l L

.......,. _.,,

J ,'l.'1(/

1

people that we have historically put 1
tlon review. counsel must be familiar
·
with the arcane procedures that apply to death here in Georgia."
In 1988, the Supreme Court remand- '
In death penalty cases. Meaningful
rf' prescn ta tion by cou nsf'l at the trail ed for a new trial a case in whi ch the
level. In particular, in capital proceed- defen dant was sentenced to death by a
ings would go even further to assure Jury that was selected after the prosfa irn ess nnd render the pos t-com ·ic- Pcutor secretly lndUC' f' d thf' Jury com- 1
mission to underrepresent blacks and
tlon revf PW process more manageable.
Incv!l.ably, the death penalty is ap- women in Jury pools.
In 1985. a conviction and death senplied to minorities and to the poorest,
the least popular, and the least power- tence of a mentally retarded defendful mem bf' rs of society. ConseQuently, ant were re\'ersed after it was estabtoo many defendants facing the death lished that the prosecutor had withpenalty nt trail are represented by at- held evidence that a key eye,,.itnesstorneys who are poorly prepared. un- who at trial had positively Identified
derpaid, overworked. The result ls the defendant as the assailant-had
told the pollce shortly after the arrest :1
often only minimal legal assistance.
Th infliction of death at the hands that he could not Identify the perpe- :•
of Government brutalizes our society trator.
A 1976 conviction was overturned on
instead of atoning for crime. To short
change Individuals charged with cap- retrial in Arizona after it was deterital o'f!enses, In terms of the quality of mined by five expert witnesses that
their representation or their ability to the victim had not been murdered but
obtain meaningful re,iew of their con- had died Instead of pneumonia.
IV..r. EIDEN. I suggest the absence of
stitutional claims, unfairly prejudices
them. I urge the Senate to support the a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Gramm-Blden alternative and oppose
·
the Thurmond-Specter amendment, clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proand to r ecognize that further reform is
needed to ensure that if capital pun- ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask
ishment ls lnfllcted at all, at least 1t is
unanimous consent that the order for
inflicted fairly.
If it ls t-0 be applied at all, capital the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRE.SIDING OFFICER. Withpunishment ought to be applied only
where notions of fairness are given out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3
priority. Despite procedural safeguards, · mistakes a.re often made in minutes to the distinguished Senator
. criminal prosecutions; in the first 6 from Florida [Mr. GRAHAM].
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this
months of 1987, for example, eight
men were released in four States be- has . been a very full and instructive
cause their Innocence was finally de- debate this afternoon. We end where
termined after many years on death we started, and that is in substantial .
agreement. The differences between
row.
Habeas corpus review of death sen- the provision that ls in the bill at the
tences is virtually the only means of present time and the provision offered
relief available to a wrongfully con- by the Senators from South .Carolina
victed individual facing execution and Pennsylvania are 90 to 95 percent
whose constitutional rights have been identical, or at least consistent in
terms of the objectives that they have.
violated.
In 1983, an inmate in a Florida I believe, therefore, that within that
prison was within 15 hours of his relatively small ambit of disagreement,
scheduled execution and bad been that the pro,1sions which are in the
fitted for his burial suit when the Fed- bill represent the sounder policy.
Let me Just mention two of those
eral court of appeals issued a lastminute stay. His conviction was later areas of difference. One is the quesoverturned. and the main prosecution tion of setting time limits once a petiwitness subsequently recanted his tes- tion has been filed in a Federal court.
timony. The defendant was never re- Under the provision as offered by the
Senators from South Carolina and
tried.
In 1967, a habeas petitioner came Pennsylvania, a petition, once having
within hours of execution before the been filed, must be heard by the Fedgranting of his petition led to the dis- eral courts within a stipulated number
covery that the prosecutor claimed of days, 110 days, and then other dates
that the petitioner's clothing was subsequent in the Federal process.
That sounds very good and sounds as
stained ~1th the victim's blood and induced a witness to testify to that if It would advance the objective of fl.
effect, despite the fact that the pros- nality and certainty. The difficulty Is,
ecutor knew that the stains were what is the sanction if those timetables are not met? The concern I have
paint, rather than blood.
In 1982. the eleventh circuit re- is with the timetable, the sanction, for
manded a capital case where defense falling to meet a similar time requirelawyers repeatedly stressed to the jury ment at a trial level where there Is the
that they were only representing the obligation of a speedy trial, bringing -a
defendant because they had to, and person to trial within a ·certain .
that their client, who his · counsel ·de- number of days from the time that
scribed to the Jury as "a · little old they ' are indicted; ff the Government
nigger boy," was not unlike "the kind fails to meet that test and ff the court
of
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In Oklahoma one went for 18 years.
Is delayed In ca r rying out its responsi- corpus statutes allow unnecessa ry
We have to bring finality. Ours Is a
bility, the sa nction is against t he Gov- delay In the delivery of Justice.
ern m ent. a~ai !1s t the people in t he
Th ese sta t utcs are a deterrence to fi- much tou gher bill. It winds It up in l
t orm of a dism issal of the charges. nality In a S tate cou rts ' determi nat ion year.
And the accused person walks free.
of guilt and Imposi tion of ca pit a.I senNow, und r r th eir bill, they can conAn unknown is what is going to t ences.
tinu e. an d it may go a num ber of
h appen under the proposal offered by
I have Introduced legislation on this years. That Is the difference.
the Senators from South Carolina and su bject, as have a number of Members
Do you want l year or do you want
Pennsylvania in the event that the from both parties In both Chambers.
to go for a number of years which can
In fact, the Senate passed habeas be done under the Blden bill? That Is
timetables which they set are not met.
Are we going to have an anomalous corpus reform legislation In the early the main question. Finality, finality.
situation in which a State prisoner 1980's, but the bill was never debated
The people are sick and tired of
held fo r a capital offense, who has In the full House .
these delays. So. if you want to get re•
The Powell Commission report and sults, I t hink you will vote for our bill.
fil ed in a Federal court and the Federal court has not met its time period, recommendat ions issurd In 1989 have If you want to carry on the present
that that prisoner ls going to have his become the con1erstone for consensus system that has improved some but
j.1.il cell opened? I think that we would on how to reform habeas corpus stat- not too much, vote for their bill.
not want to create t hat possibility.
utes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield
The Powell Commission put forth a back the remainder of the time.
Second, Mr. President, Is the Issue of
·
exhaustion of remedies. I believe that new idea which has brought the
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
the procedure which we have outlined, schools of differing thought on this ROCKUELLER). All time is yielded back.
which maintains t h e tradition that a issue to the table.
Mr. BIDEN. Have the yeas and nays
This idea Is the linkage of ensuring been ordered?
Federal prisoner would exhaust his
S t.ate remedies before going into Fed- lnmri.tes accessibility to competent
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They
eral court, is sound in terms of federal- counsel to the imposition of stricter have not.
Ism and in terms of the judicial proc- habeas corpus statutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I ask for t he yeas and
Practically every witness that has nays.
~ss and will not add to t he total time
required for collateral appeals.
a ppeared before the Judiciary ComT he PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
So, Mr. President, those are two sig- mitt,ee In the past yen.r on this issue there a sufficient second?
nificant differences in a sea of slml!ar- has talked about the effect of InadThere is a suff!clent second.
lty. I urge that t he amendment that equate counsel In sl0'.1, lng do\l:n the
The yeas and nays were ordered.
h as been offered be defeated and t hat ex ecution of State criminal lav:.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Mr. President, I am pleased to stand question is on agreeing to the amendthe underlying amendment be thus
adopted.
here today In support of Senator GRA· ment of the Senator from South CaroThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The HAM's habeas corpus amendment. I lina. On this question, the yees and
Senator"s time has expired.
have long been a cosponsor of legisla- nays have been ordered and the clerk
Mr, DECONCINI addressed the tion t hat would provide reform for will call the roll.
Chair.
habeas corpus. There is no questfon In
The legb;latlve clerk called the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who my mind that there Is a dire need for
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
yields time?
reform of the habeas corpus writ. For the Senator from Louisiana [Mr.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 years now the Federal courts have JoKNSTONJ and the Senator from Loumlnute3 to the Senat-0r from Arizona. been Inundated with habeas corpus pe- isiana [Mr. BREAUX] are necessarily
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I titions, a large n umber of which are
am pleased that the Senate Is turning trivial at best. The backlog in the Fed- absent.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
this week to consideration of an omni- eral court system ls immense.
Senator
from Rhode Island [Mr.
bus crime control package.
Senator GRAHA)("s proposal is a CHAFEEJ is necessarily absent.
This package Includes a number of workable solution that should receive
The PRESIDING OFFICER . . Are
iterr.s of which consideration is long wide support in t his body. It allows · there
any other Senators In the Chamoverdue, as well as a number of new the States to choooe what they each ber desiring to vote?
ideas worthy of our debate.
individually believe to be t he best
The rusult was announced-yeas 4'1,
I want to take a minute this after- method of providing competent {'.Oun• nays 50, as follows:
noon to focus on one particular Item sel for death penalty cases; .It is ImporCRollcall Vote No. 105 Leg.)
of significance-reform of habeas tant that defendants receive counsel,
corpus procedures.
YEAS--47
even those who commit the most hei•
The distinguished senior Senator nous crimes. I also know that there Armstron,
Gramm .
Murltowskl
GraMley
Nlcklea
from South Carolina may recall how are numerous good attorneys in my Bond
NUM
Boschwttz
Hat.ch
many years Congress has debated this State of Arizona who are willing to
~ler
Hefl!n
issue. Certainly much longer than I provide free counsel to death row in• Bums
Byrd
Rocll:e!ellnHeinz
have bi:'e.n nere.
mates. They are not necessarily career Coat.I
Helma
Roth
Holltnp
Rudman
Finally, we are at the place where criminal attorneys, but they ate good Cochran
Humphrey
Shelby
action is at hand.
lawyers who are willing to put in the C.>hen
D'Amato
Simpson ·
Kassebaum
Stu~es have been conducted, hear- time to represent these death row in- D&nforth
Stevena .
Kasten
Symma
ings held all over t he country, and nu- mates. Let each State decide what Dixon
Lott .
Lugar
Thurmond
Dole
merous recommendations have been kind of experience requirement Is nec- Domenlcl
Wallop
Mack
forwarded for congressional review.
essary. . .
.
McCain
Wamer
Elion
The most widely publicized recomI need not get Into any more of the Garn
WIison
McClure
McConnell
mendations are those of a special com- details of the bill, but I thin.k It is a Gorton
mission appointed by S upreme Court · good proposal, and I support It.
NAY~50 ·
Chief Justice William R ehnquist and
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Adams
Inouye
Cranston
chaired by former Supreme Court Jus- Senator from South Carolina, and Aull:&
Da..schle
Jeffords
t ice Lewis Powell.
Kennedy
then I will yield back all my t ime.
Baucus
DeConclnl
Kerre1,
Dodd
This distinguished commissionMr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I Bentsen
Kerry
Duren berger
Biden
made up of five Federal Judges- want to say there Is a tremendous f:iif- Bingaman
Ford
Kohl
. pooled their practical experience and ference in these bills. Under our pro- Boren
Fowler.
Lauuo~rc
Leahy
Glenn
sought outside Input on options for posal you wind it up In 1 year. These Bradley .
··
Levin
Bryan
Gore
habeas corpus reform.
things have gone on now · where there Bumpers
Graham
Lieberman :
The Powell Commission reiterated was 11 years on ,a c~. In Utah one Burdlcll
Harkin.
MdsenbaUJn . .
. what :we know: The cµrrent oabeas . went _for 16 years'.
·
·
lialfleld
Mlkul8)U .
Conrad . .
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So lhe amendment. <No. 1687>, was
reJected.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President. I
move to l'ffonsider the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
ques!.ion is on agreeing to the motion
lo re<'Onsider.
:Mr. MITCHELL. I su gges t the absence of a quoruITL

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roU.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quomm call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection. it ls so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I
ask for tt,e yeas and nays on the
motion to reconsider the vote by
which the Thurmond amendment was
defeat~.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficien t second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. .MITCHELL. Mr. President. I
ask unanimous consent that the vote
on the motion to reconsider the vot.e
by which lhe Thurmond amendment
9.•as defeated occur tomorrow morning
at 10 a.m.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Without objection. it
is so ordered.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I, like all
Americans. am anxious to take acUon
against the scourge of violent cci.r:nf:
th.at ha.s plagued our country. It is in•
cwnbent upon us, here in the Congress, to point toward the most sensi•
ble means of addressing this problem.
That is why I have reservations about
certain pronsions of S. 1970, currently
before the Senate.
In the la.st several months. I have received leUecs from hundreds of Delaware constituents who oppose the gun
control provisions of S . 1970. These
letters express concern about the
unfair burden that this bill would
place upon law-abiding cltlzens. As the
bill stands, anyone who owns a weapon
covered by the bill. even if lawfully
owned prior to the enactment of thls
legislation, v.·ould have to fill out a
fonn to continue lawful ownership.
Further, U the weapon was ever sold
or transferred, both parties in the
transaction would have to keep
records of the transfer. While these
recordkeepm.g requirements are supposedly aimed at drug traffickers and
violent criminals, it is highly unlikely
that such criminals would bother with
these fOrtn$. If not, they would be subject. to fine3 of $1,000 or 6 months In
jail. These penalties hardly seem a deterrent Lqc the hardened drug crlmi~
nat ()n. the other hand, honest law
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abiding gun own<'rs are burdened -.·Ith be 2 hours for debate equally dMded
the task of recordk eeplng and filling on the Graham amendment: that
out forms . and If they sli p up, th e y wh e n all time has been used or yielded
could be sent to Jail.
b:\ck, the Senate. without nny inter•
I nm also concerned about a section \'ening action or debate. ,·ote on the
of the b ill whi ch allows the S ecr etary G raham amendment; that upon dispoof the T reasury to recommend new sition of the Graham amendment.
t ypes of weapons to be banned. This S en ator THURMOND be r ecognized to
provision opens the door for future offer an amendment relating to the
gun regulation and could potentially subject of miti gating factors. that
affect guns that are used for legiti- there be 4 hours of debate equally dimate sporting purposes. Hunte rs and \'ided on the Thurmond amendment;
sportsmen from around my home that when all time has been used or
State of Delaware ha\·c expressed yielded back, the Senat e, without any
strong opposition to this portion of S. inter\'ening action or debate. vote on
1970. It Is on their behalf that I will the Thurmond amendment.
continue to look for ways to attack
I further ask unanimous consent
crime in this country that do not place
e.n extra burden on the honest citizen. that no further amendments or moI have been a longtime supporter of tions to reoommit be in order prior to
the right to bear arms as embodied In the d isposition of these three amendthe second amendment of the U.S. ments and that no other amendments
Constitution. In the past, however, I relating to age, mental capacity, or agha\·e ta,·ored sensible measures re- gra,•ated or mitigating circumstances
stricting certain types of weapons. In in the Thurmond amendment be in
the last Congress, I supported the Un- order, and that the agreement be in
detectable Firearms Act of 1988, which the usual form with respect to the di•
effectively outlaws plastic weapons \·ision of time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
that cannot be detected by airport xray machines. I also voted to outlaw there objection?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, v,e
the indiYldual ownership of machine
guns, and to stop the Importation of . ha\'e no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withthe Infamous '·Saturday Night Special" handgun. In all of these c:i.ses my out objection, it is so ordered.
priority has been to address the crlmlAMENDMENT NO. 1690
nal problem without undermining the
(Pur,>OSe: To add a "right versus v.ron&~
rights of lawful gun owners.
standard to the term mentally retarded)
Mr. President, I will continue to take
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. I
an active role in combating the probsend
an amendment to the desk and
lem of violent crime in this country.
While I feel it ls appropriate to en- ask for Its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
courage people to join in this effort, I
do not feel that it Is fair to strap them clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read
with responsibility. We must all work
together to solve the problems . that as follows:
The Senator from South ca.rouna CJdr.
lay before us.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I THU1U11101rn] proposes an amendment OUin·
bered 1690.
suggest the absence of a Quorum.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. I
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
ask unanimous consent that reading of
clerk will call the roll.
The assl.stant legislative clerk pro- the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With•
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment Is as rono~-s:
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
On page 19, line 7, strike the period after
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- Uie word Mretarded" and Insert tn lieu the
follolring: "and is wholly lac.king In the ca•
out objection. it is so ordered.
IUNANIMOUS<OMSENT AGREDIENT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous

consent that Semi.tor
now be recognized to offer
an amendment relating to the bill's
provision on mental retardation; that
there be no debate tonight on that
amendment; that the Senate resume
consideration of the bill and the Thurmond amendment Thursday, May 24,
at 8:30 a.m., and that at that time
there be 90 minutes equally divided on
the Thurmond amendment, and that
the vote on the Thurmond a~nd,
ment occur at 11 a.m.
I further ask unanimous consent
that. upon disposition of the Thurmond mental retardation amendment
Serut.tor GRAHAM of Florida be recognized .to offer an amendment to strike
section Hl7. of the ~ll. and that ther-e
THuRMOND

paeity to understand the difference between
right from wrong.".

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President. I thank
my colleague and his staff particularly

for ~·ontng out this unanimous-con•
sent agreement. For the record, so
that it la clarified, age, mental capacity and a.ggra\•ated and mitigating cir•
cumstancei; in the Thurmond amend•
ments relate to the death penalty.
That is v.-hat we are referring to. ·
I should point out that by earlier
consent there Is · a vote and will be a
vote. tomorrow at 10 a.m. on the
mot.ion to reconsider the .Thurmond
amendment relative to habeas corpus.
That will occur at 10 a.m. tomorrow;
Mr. President,, I see my oolleague
from Montana ffl · here. I yicld the

noor.

.Mr. BURNS. I thank the SenatO!'
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The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
SANFORD). The S enator fr om Montana
Is recognized.
(The remarks of Mr. E mms pertainIng to the introduction of S . 2679 are
located in today's P..i::conn under
•· stat ements on Introduced Bills and
Joint Resol utior.s." )
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I note
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legisl ative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. EIDEN. Mr. President, I nsk
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Wit-hout objection, It Is so ordere~.

msent
r mo"ior to

nend:nents

MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. EIDEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanL'Tlous consent that there be a
p::?riod for morning business with Sena tors permitted to speak therein.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it ls so ordered.
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Mr'. WARNER. Mr. ~ I rise
on behalf of myself and my colles.gue,
Senator ROBB, to pay tribute to a fine
Virginian and exemplary gentleman,
Joe Gibbs, who Is the recipient, this
year, of the Northern Virginia Community
Foundation's
Founder's
Award
Founded In 1978 by a group of
northern Virginia residents who
sought to Improve the quality of life In
their area, the Northern Virginia
Community Foundation endeavors to
promote and acknowledge significant
individual contribution to the community. The foundation is supported by
individual, corporate, and foundation
gifts. It provides funding assistance for
northern Virginia programs In the
arts, education, and youth actMties as
well as health and civic programs.
The Founders Award, the most prestigious award given by the foundation,
is presented each year to that individ•
ual who has distinguished himself
through outstanding community service and dedication to the betterment
of northern Virglnla. This year's recipient is Joe Gibbs, the head coach of
the Washington Redskins, and a resident of Vienna, VA.
This year's Founder's Award recipient has spent most of his life developing the potential of young men. Several years ago, as a counselor to innercity youths, Coach Gibbs wJtnessed,
first hand, the negative influences
that can pull teenagers into a cycle of
despair and poverty. He was compelled
to help these boys, and began, In 1983,
to look for a way to do It.
In 1986, Joe, with the generous assistance of all segments of the community, opened the Youth for Tomorrow
New -L ife Center, near Manassas, VA.
. Today, the New Life Center ta, both a

l

. home and an educational center from
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which young men begin their lives tribute to Dr. Dawson Allen of Milledanew.
geville. GA , wh o celebrates his 96th
Th_e proJram at _the New L_lfe Center bi r thday t oday. Dr. Allen is truly a
pro\·1des a substitu te family which ren aissance man . His life and its
t eaches th e need fo r obedience and achievements df•sen· e the attention of
sclf-dis:ipline. Boys at the center the Senate.
strive to achieve goals in all areas of
Most of Dr. All en's life was devoted
thei r_ lives: social, acade!Ilic, spiritual, to the practice of psychi at ry at Allen's
phrs1~al, fmanclal, vocational, and cit!- Invalid Home In Milledgeville. During
zensh1p. Presently the center Is oper- his p rofessi onal career he wns in
ating at full capa~ity, with many sue- charge of care for wom~n patients at
cess stories In its flies.
this institu tion, whil e his late brother,
March ,of 1989 _saw the _e:5tabl!sh- Dr. Ed win Allen, attended to men .
n:ent of tne Joe Gibbs Chant1es org~- Wh en his father established this instln_ization, set up to enhance the actlv1- tutlon In the final years of the last
ties of the Youth for T<?~orrow pro- century, it was the first private-care
gTam. In addition to pro~idmg fu nd1 ng institution for mentally disturbed pafor the center, last years gala at the tients sout1, of Bal t imore Previously
Kennedy Center also raised funds for
·
•
Hope for a Drug Free America, the only State-~~pported care was availDoug Williams Foundation, and ONE able to fam1lles ~n our region. In that
Ministries.
era, care pr?vtdcd by the State
Already the wlnningest coach in amo~nted to llttle more than custodlR ec!skins h istory and one of only 19 ansh1p. An in~alculable num?er of vieNFL coaches to ever register 100 v:cto- tlms of despair and d~press1on found
rics. Coach Joe Gibbs is beginning his new hop~ und;r the pnva~e care of Dr.
10th season in Washington. Few have Allen, hIS ~ro.~er, and hIS father and
acccmplished so much so quickly, and their psyeh1atnc insight.
the Gibbs era has been one of quality
He has also been a successful cattle
as weH as quantity.
fa~~r. Just as he and his brother had
In addition to his 102 victories, Joe a d1v1Si_o~ of labor in patient care, they
Gibbs has led the Washington Red- also dlVlded their farm~ng interests.
skins to 3 NFC championships, 4 di\'i- Dawson Allen raised dairy cows and
sion titles 5 playoff appearances and produced milk and other dairy prod3 Super · Bowl games, 2 of v.'.hlch ucts, while his brother, Edwin, raised
brought home the Lombardi trophy.
beef cattle.,
In his customary manner, Joe ls
Dr. Allens II?-ost lasting legacy, howquick to credit this achievement to ever, is beautiful carpets of red and
others. " It is a reflection on our entire green over the countryside of Georgia.
organization beginning with the great A strain of crimson clover that he and
ownership provided by Mr. Cooke," his brother developed now covers
said Gibbs, "that Is not passlble with• much of Georgia where there was once
out sacrifices by players, assistant eroded red clay on wornout fields.
coaches, scouts, and the support ot This is a Dawson Allen legacy that will
great fans."
last forever. Dr. Allen's strain of crtmBut it is Joe Gibbs who deserves the son clover Is used to restore nutrients
credit. From the moment he left hJa . to the soil and prevent erosion. It is
post as offensive coordinator of the today used all over Georgi11, In pasSan Diego Chargers in 1981 to Join the tures and along roads. Georgia is a
Redskins, he set the tone for success. beautiful State that is made even
In 1982 he became the first head more beautiful by Dr. Allen's crimson
coach In 20 years to be named Coach clover.
of the Year by Associated Press in conAn Associated Press article about his
secutive seasons. And in that same botanical achievement recently apyear, his team posted the sixth best peared in the Atlanta Journal and
record in NFL history and went on to Constitution, and I will ask unanimous
win Super Bowl XVII. A year later, his C?nsent that It appear at the concluoffense set an NFL record for points In s10n of my remarks.
a season on the way to Super Bowl
Dr. Allen remains alert and active at
XVIII. Coach Gibbs now ranks as the 96. Although his eyesight has failed
fourth wlnningest active coach in the him, his active, fertile mind has not.
NFL.
He remains abreast of current developThe hallmark of Joe Gibbs' career, ments, thanks to the National Library
on the sidelines and off, has been that Service for the Blind, administered by
of consistent success. Whether In the Library of Congress. This service
youth counseling, Christian outreach keeps him supplied with current booka
work, community development, or on tape, and he spends much of his
coaching footabll, Joe Gibbs's success day listening to them. His visitors
touches the lives of many. We are sometime express concern that the
pleased to salute Joe Gibbs as a coach, service has a tendency to provide one
citizen. and father, and an ext.raordl· with more information about the connary Virginian.
tents of those books than one with a
short attention span can absorb. Few
visitors can match the depth of his unTRIBUTE TO DR. DAWSON
derstanding of the world around him.
ALLEN
-It Is a special privilege for me to take
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my pur~ note of Dr. Allen's 96th birthday and
P06e for seeking the noor is . to pay his life of achievement., u well _. µ,ij
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HALL, Circuit Judge:
This is a consolidated appeal and cross-appeal arising
from a class action initiated by death row inmates in the State
of Virginia pursuant to 42

u.s.c.
.

§

1983.

The State appeals an

order of the district court requiring the appointment of counsel
for inmates challenging their death penalty through state habeas
proceedings.

The inmate class cross-appeals the district court's

refusal to order the appointment of
convict ion proceedings.

counsel in federal post-

By a majority vote,

a panel of this

Court reversed that portion of the judgment of the district court
requiring appointment of counsel for death row inmates in state
proceedings.

Giarratano, et al. y. Murray, et al., 836 F.2d 1421

(4th Cir. 1988).

Thereafter, a majority of the Court voted to

reconsider the case en bane.

A majority of the en bane Court has

now voted to affirm the judgment of the district court for the
reasons set forth below.
I•

Virginia currently provides three forms of legal assistance to death row inmates pursuing post-conviction claims--law
libraries, unit attorneys, and appointed attorneys.

Death row

inmates are housed at Mecklenberg Correctional Center, the Virginia State Penitentiary and the Powhatan Correctional Center.
Each of these three centers maintain law libraries.
death row

Mecklenberg

inmates are permitted two half-day periods

weekly;

death row inmates at Powhatan and the Penitentiary are not permitted to visit the libraries, but may borrow materials for use
in their cells.
-3-

Unit attorneys are assigned to the various penal institutions to assist inmates in any matter related to incarceration.
In addition to these unit attorneys, Virginia provides for the
appointment of counsel, under certain circumstances, to indigent
inmates who have been residents of yirginia for six months. 1 Va.
Code

§ 14.1-183

(1950).

Under

this provision the

Virginia have the discretion to appoint counsel
inmates proceeding

in

f orma pauper is.

Death

courts

in

to represent

row

inmates

in

Virginia, seeking collateral relief from their sentences through
state

post-conviction

remedies,

have

traditionally

had

no

automatic right to the assistance of counsel.
This action was originally brought by Joseph M. Giarratano, a Virginia death row inmate, who sought declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to post-conviction assistance of
counsel.

The district court permitted other death row inmates to

intervene in the suit and granted their motion for class certification.

The class consists of:
all persons, now and in the future, sentenced
to death in Virginia, whose sentences have
been or are subsequently affirmed by the
Virginia Supreme Court and who either (1)
cannot afford to retain and do not have
attorneys to represent them in connection
with their post-conviction proceedings, or
( 2) could not afford to retain and did not
have attorneys to represent them in connect ion with a particular post-conviction proceeding.

1 Va. Code§ 14.1-183 was amended in 1987 to delete the
six-month residency requirement. (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Supp. 1987).
However, this change in the Code does not alter our disposition
of this appeal.
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The death row inmates had presented a number of constitutional grounds

in support of their claim of right to postconviction assistance of counsel. 2 However, the district court

granted relief only on the basis of the ~

gh!_,~ ac3

to the

courts as stated in Bounds y. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).

In

Bounds, the Supreme Court held that prison authorities are required to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful

legal papers

by providing prisoners with

adequate

law

libraries or assistance from legally trained personnel.
The district court found, based upon evidence presented
at the trial, that the death row inmates were incapable of effectively using law books to raise their post-conviction claims.
Three considerations led the district court to this conclusion:
(1) the limited amount of time death row
inmates had to prepare and present their
petitions to the courts;
(2) the complexity
legal work; and

and

difficulty

of

the

(3) the emotional instability of inmates
preparing themselves for impending death.
The district court consequently found that the provision of a
library did little to satisfy Virginia's obligation to assist
death row inmates

in the preparation and filing of meaningful

legal papers as required by Bounds.

The district court then

turned to the examination of the assistance presently provided by
Virginia to determine if it met the constitutional requirement.
2 These grounds included the sixth amendment, eighth
amendment, fourteenth amendment due process clause, Article I,
the equal protect ion clause, and the right of access to the
courts.
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The district court found that the assistance provided
by unit attorneys was inadequate both in fact and in law.

Evi-

dence produced at trial indicated that seven institutional attorneys were attempting ~o meet the needs of over 2,000 prisoners
c..-_:--,,

and that each attorney could not adequately handle more than one
capital case at a time.

In addition, the unit attorneys were not

hired to work full time.

The district court also noted that even

if Virginia appointed unit attorneys to service only the death
row inmates, its duty under Bounds would not be fulfilled because
The district court
the scope of assistance was too limited. 3
concluded that only the continuous services of an attorney to
investigate, research, and present claimed violations of fundamental

rights

could provide death row

inmates the meaningful

access to the courts guaranteed by the Constitution and that the
assistance of unit attorneys fell short of this requirement.
The district court then turned to the second form of
legal assistance, provided by appointed attorneys, and found that
the timing of the appointmen
the requirements of Bounds.
§

was a fatal defect with respect to
Appointments are made under Va. Code

14.1-183 only after a petition is filed and then only if a non-

frivolous claim is raised.

Thus, the district court reasoned,

the inmate would not receive the attorney's assistance in the

3 The evidence indicated that the unit attorneys do not
perform factual inquiries, sign pleadings, or make court
appearances. Instead, they act only as legal advisors.

-6-

critical stages of developing his claims. 4

The district court

concluded that in view of the inadequacy of the assistance provided by Virginia

and the scarcity of

competent

and willing

counsel to assist indigent death row inmates seeking post-conviction remedies, 5 such relief was necessary and warranted. 6
In
order to provide effective relief, the district court held that
4 This assistance is particularly critical in Virginia
where all claims, the facts of which are known at the time of
filing, must be included in that petition as they may not be
raised successfully in a subsequent filing and those claims also
could not be considered in federal court because federal courts
generally may not consider claims barred by Virginia procedural
rules.
Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 s.ct. 1618 (1987), and Smith v. Murray, 477 u.s. 527,
106 s.ct. 2661 (1986).
5 The district court found that in the past Virginia
had perceived no need to provide counsel to death row inmates
pursuing post-conviction relief because attorneys volunteered
their services or were recruited to provide pro bono assistance
to death row prisoners. However, the evidence presented at trial
established that few attorneys are now willing to voluntarily
represent death row inmates in post-conviction efforts.
6 The district court's order specifically provided
that:
(1) indigent Virginia death row inmates are
entitled to the appointment of counsel upon
request to assist them in pursuing habeas
corpus relief in the state courts;
(2) defendants shall develop a system whereby
attorneys may be appointed to the death row
inmates individually as provided above;
(3) plaintiffs are entitled to their taxable
costs and attorney fees as provided by law;
and
(4) counsel for the parties shall attempt to
reach an agreement as to counsel fees.
Any
such agreement shall be without prejudice to
defendants' right to contest the right of
plaintiffs to recover same.
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Virginia must provide death row inmates trained legal assistance
in their state post-conviction proceedings.
I I.

On appeal, the State contends that the constitutional
right of access to the courts does not require appointment of
counsel for death row inmates in state habeas corpus proceedings
and that Virginia provides constitutionally adequate legal assistance to death row inmates.

Alternatively, the State argues that

the Supreme Court has determined in Pennsylvania y. Finley, __
u.s. __ , 107 s.ct. 1990 {1987), that there is no constitutional
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.

On cross-

appeal, the death row inmates contend that the district court's
reading of Bounds limiting its application to state post-convict ion proceedings, does not adhere to the current state of the
law.

We disagree with all of these contentions and address them

seriatim.
We are persuaded by the well reasoned opinion of the
district

court

that

legal

assistance

presently

available

to

Virginia death row inmates in state post-conviction proceedings
fails to meet the constitutional requirement of meaningful access
to the courts as set forth in Bounds.

It is now established

beyond a doubt that prisoners have · a constitutional

________________

access to the...., courts.

right of

The district court evaluated the existing

Virginia program "as a whole to ascertain its compliance with
constitutional

standards."

Bounds,

430

U.S.

at

832.

The

district court made findings of fact based upon the record which
indicated that Virginia was not in compliance with constitutional
-8-

rights of

access

to the

courts.

Under Anderson y.

City of

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), we cannot say these findings
of fact are clearly erroneous.

Nor do we find that the district

court abused its discretion in formulating the remedy in this
case.

Milliken y. Bradley. (Milliken .ll), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
The State's reliance on Pennsylvania y. Finley. supra,

as authority for their contention that state prisoners are not
constitutionally entitled to state-supplied attorneys
conviction proceedings

is misplaced.

In Finley,

in post-

the Supreme

Court held that the procedural framework of Anders y. California,
386 U.S. 738

(1967), does not apply to the situation in which

counsel appointed pursuant to Pennsylvania state law later seeks
to withdraw from the representation without first filing a brief.
The Court stated that because Pennsylvania was not constitutionally required to provide counsel in post-conviction proceedings,
then due process did not

require

comport with the Anders procedures. 7
JL

that

the

counsel's

actions

However, Finley was not a

meaningful access case ,~ nor did i't address the rule enunciat: ; in
~

Bounds y. Smith.

Most significantly, Finley did not involve the

death penalty.
Both society and affected individuals have a compelling
interest in insuring that death sentences have been constitutionally imposed.

Moreover,

the complexity and difficulty of the

7 The Anders procedures require counsel to perform a
conscientious evaluation of the record, to write a brief referring to arguable support in the record and to give notice to the
client.
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legal work involved in challenging a death penalty require particular safeguards in order to insure meaningful access.

The

Supreme Court has stated that "there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments."

Becky. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 {1980}.

In addition,

the Supreme Court recently held that matters affecting an already
condemned prisoner call for "no less stringent standards than
those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding."
Ford y. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986}.

See also, Booth

y. Maryland, __ u.s. __ , 107 s.ct. 2529 {1987} {"death is a
punishment different from all other sanctions.") 8
We do not,
therefore, read Finley as suggesting that the counsel cannot be
required

under

the

unique

circumstances

of

post-conviction

proceedings involving a challenge to the death penalty.
I I I.

The death row inmates argue that the district court
erred in denying counsel for fedz
petitions.
(1974),

We disagree.

the Supreme Court

l habeas corpus and certiorari

In Ross y.
rejected a

Moffitt,
claim that

417

U.S.

600

states must

appoint counsel for indigents seeking a writ of certiorari.

The

Court also observed that in considering a writ of certiorari it
would have available appellate briefs,
court opinions.

a transcript and state

Similarly, a federal court considering a peti-

8 Because of the peculiar nature of the death penalty,
we find it difficult to envision any situation in which appointed
counsel would not be required in state post-conviction proceedings when a prisoner under the sentence of death could not afford
an attorney.
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tion for habeas corpus would also have briefs of

counsel,

a

transcript and opinions because of the exhaustion of remedies
requirement.
Virginia provides for a mandatory appeal for capital
convictions and death sentences and counsel is provided for this
appeal.

The death row inmates would have available the appellate

briefs,

transcripts and state court opinions to use

writs of certiorari.

in their

If the inmates are provided with court-

appointed attorneys in their state post-conviction proceedings,
they will have briefs, transcripts and opinions to use in their
federal habeas corpus proceedings.

We conclude that the provi-

sion of assistance of attorneys at these points insure that the
inmates are provided with meaningful access to the federal courts
in their federal post-conviction proceedings.
IV.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED

J
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WIDENER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I

concur

in

Judge

Wilkins'

separate

opinion

without

reservation, but I would add a few words.
I

I am doubtful indeed that the plaintiffs in this case have
standing

to

demonstrated

prosecute
in his

their

case.

dissenting opinion

As

Judge

".

•

Wilkins

• the

has

record does

clearly establish that all death row inmates have always been
represented

by

counsel

in

state

post-conviction

proceedings."

The majority opinion does not refute this factual statement.
In Allen v. Wright,
that

"[t]he

468 U.S. 737

requirement

of

(1984),

standing,

the Court stated

however,

has

component derived directly from the Constitution.

a

core

A plaintiff

must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
requested relief."

468 U.S. at 751.

proposition on

recent

its

Americans United,

454 U.S.

opinion
464

to be redressed by the
The Court relied for that

in Valley Forge

(1982).

College v.

Because the plaintiffs

and their class have always had appointed attorneys upon request,
I suggest they have no standing to prosecute this case.
This suggestion,
will continue.

u. s.

however,

does not meet with favor,

so

I

Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449

368 (1981).
II
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I am at a

loss to understand the logic of the majority

decision which holds that appointed attorneys are not required
in federal habeas corpus proceedings which examine the merits of
the prisoners'

claims but are required in state habeas corpus

proceedings which, even if unsuccessful (as must be contemplated
in the context present here), go no further than exhaustion of
state remedies and fact finding.
III
One cannot but read the majority opinion without the feeling
that the Commonwealth considers death row inmates some kind of
second class citizens who get second class service, for, when
access

to

the

federal

courts

is

provided,

sl.

op.

p.

11,

attorneys are not required, sl. op. p. 10-11, but, when access
to the state courts is provided, attorneys are.
veiled

is

the

inference

that

neither

the

Only lightly

courts

nor

the

legislature of Virginia see fit to take proper care of those
unfortunates.
An

example

insensitivity
felony.

is

which

refutes

Virginia's

this

treatment

implied
of

those

charge

of

accused

of

In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court

established the right under the federal Constitution that one
accused

of

felony,

if

indigent,

has

the

right

attorney represent him in the criminal proceeding.

to

have

an

Almost 70

years before, in Barnes v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E. 784 (Va. 1895),
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the Supreme Court of Virginia established that same right under
the Virginia Constitution:

"Every person convicted of crime has

a constitutional right to have counsel to aid him in making his
defense, but no one is compelled to have counsel."
787.

23 S.E. at

And the Court added that "in the defense of one 'who has

the double misfortune to be stricken with poverty and accused of
crime.

No.

•

• [attorney]

is

at

liberty

to

decline

such

appointment, and few it is hoped would be disposed to do so.'"
23 S.E. at 6787, quoting Cooley on Constitutional Limitations.
The Barnes decision has been consistently followed in Virginia
ever since, and indeed was codified in 1940, more than 20 years
before Gideon.
So,

Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1940, ch. 218.

neither

the

courts

nor

the

legislature

of

the

Commonwealth has been insensitive to the needs of those accused
of

crime,

and

other Virginia

statutes

yet

provide

for

the

obligatory appointment of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings
where a hearing is to be held, as Judge Wilkins demonstrates in
his opinion, but which appointment
honored by the

Virginia courts

authority has in fact been
in all

cases

as

the

record

demonstrates, even when not obliged.
In sum, I do not agree with either the tenor or effect of
the majority decision.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
I
opinion.

join

Judge

Wilkins'

concurring

and

dissenting

He demonstrates well that the majority's holding is

impossible

to

square

Penpsylvania v.

with

Finley,

the

107 S.

Mo ff it t , 41 7 U. S • 6 0 0 ( 19 7 4 }
constitutional

basis

Supreme

not

Ct.

Court's

1990

decisions

(1987),

in

and Ross v.

This creation of a right sans

•

only

contravenes

Supreme

Court

precedent but also disregards the independence of state judicial
systems and the respective spheres of legislative and judicial
competence.
The

federal

post-conviction
question

that

review
a

$tate

interest

the

form

is an attenuated one.
has

~

no

constitutional

--------- ~ ,

provide post-conviction reviEiw .
1994.

in

of
It

state

is beyond

obligation

· to

Finley, 107 S. Ct. at

- ---------------

This is so because post-conviction relief is not a part
-

-

-

of the crintinal trial itself, but a separate Hiv.i,l proceeding.\"
Id.

----- =-------- -

The plaintiffs in this case do not seek to have lawyers

appointed at state expense in order to defend themselves from
state allegations of which they are presumed innocent.

Rather,

they seek the services of a lawyer as a sword to overturn a prior
determination of guilt that is presumed to be valid.
U.S. at 610-11.
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Ross, 417

\
This

analysis

conviction

or

the

and

sentence,
Barefoot v.

exception."

l

with

equal

force

in

capital

"[D]irect appeal is the primary avenue for review of a

cases.

Once

applies

direct

appeal

death

Estelle,

process

penalty

463 U.S.

is complete,

cases
880,
a

are

887

no

(1983).

presumption of

legality and finality attaches to the conviction and sentence.
Id.

Al though the Constitution requires that the death penalty

may be imposed only through procedures that provide the highest
degree of

rel iabi 1 i ty,

there

is

no support

for

the view that

death penalty cases are subject to a separate set of standards
S e e , ~ , Smith v. Murray, 106 S.

for post-conviction review.
Ct.

2661,

2668

(1986)

(rejecting

a

separate

standard

for

procedural foreclosure in capital cases).

~
~

The

demonstrates

limited

scope

of

federal

habeas

corpus

- -~~->>----=-==~-----------the federal interest in the form

of

state

relief

on

state

that

post-conviction

further

is

minimal.

The

intrusion

interests that federal habeas entails may be exercised only for a
narrow purpose, to challenge unconstitutional confinement.
the Courts of Appeals overwhelmingly hold that
corpus

is not available to challenge alleged defects

post-conviction proceedings.
(6th Cir.
1984);

federal

1986);

Vail v.

Mitchell v. Wyrick,

Thus
habeas

in state

See Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245
Procunier,

747 F.2d 277

727 F.2d 773

(5th Cir.

(8th Cir. 1984).

The

principle expressed in these habeas cases is directly applicable
to

the

claims
federal

section 1983
have

drawn

interest

claims

the
is

presented

federal
small

courts

and

relations will be great.
-16-

the

here.
into
costs

The
an
to

plaintiffs'

area where

the

federal-state

The majority has

lost sight of the fact

that

in our

dual system, the states no less than the federal government are
responsible for the protection of constitutional
a state criminal proceeding is
emphasized

that

the

state's

involved,

role

is

509

(1982):

Sumner

v.

paramount.

Mata,

Where

the Supreme Court has

Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986):
U.S.

rights.

~,

Rose v. Lundy, 455

449

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

See,

U.S.

539

Federal courts

( 1981):
should

act with caution where they are asked to create novel rights that
intrude significantly on state

functions.

The

lack of such

caution is all the more startling here, where Virginia provides
unit

attorneys

at

its

prison

facilities

to

assist

death

row

inmates and where Virginia courts are required to appoint counsel
to

represent

such

inmates

in

presenting

nonfrivolous

claims.

Darnell v. Payton, 160 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1968).
I

can

perceive

no

basis

for

the

district

court's

decision other than a policy judgment that it would be a good
idea to provide state inmates counsel at state expense to pursue
state post-conviction remedies.

That policy judgment may well be

correct, but the judgment is for the state legislature, the state
Attorney General's office, and the state courts to make, not the
federal

judiciary.

We

have

been

presented

with

much

stimulating argument on the benefits that state-provided counsel
would

bring,

requiring it.

but

far

less

on

the

constitutional

basis

We have been invited to issue what is at

a legislative proclamation

for

bottom

of displeasure with a controversial

penalty which the Supreme Court has held is
of the states to impose.
-17-

within the province

The

nature

of

the

factual

proclamation

would be based does

The

relies

majority

particularized
findings

of

on

findings

fact

in

the
of

not

that

by trial

case

on

which

this

lessen my objections.

deference

fact

this

findings

are

is

accorded

courts.

broad

Yet

to
the

generalizations.

Indeed, if this case turns on the individual state of mind of the
condemned prisoner, or the amount of time between conviction and
imposition of a particular sentence, it is difficult to see how
the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 could ever have
been met.

The class action device undoubtedly widens the focus

of a case, but it should not be taken as a grant of unl imi teo.
federal judicial authority.
Judicial legislation brings with it unique costs.
purporting

to

base

the

requirement

of

state

:ay

pO$t-conviction

counsel in the Constitution, the court has cre~ted g rigid rule
that

may not

results.

readily be

altered

in the

event of

ynfor~s@en

Although the new right to post-convietion counsel does

not appear to arise from the Sixth Amendment, it will presumably
carry

with

it

some

entitlement

to

"effective

assistance."

Provision of counsel on constitutional grounds plso brin~~ with
it a panoply of procedural requirements sych as those at is$.ue in
Finley, supra (addressing procedural requirements for withdrawgl
of counsel under Anders v. ,California,

386 U.S.

738

(1967)).

What is more, by analogy to previous "meaningful access" cases,
future plaintiffs are likely to argue that they are entitled to
counsel in section 1983 suits as well.
418 U.S.

539, 577-80

(1974).

It

-18-

Cf.

Wolff v. McDonnell,

is hard to imagine a more

fertile

ground

entitlements.

for

litigation

than

that

provided

by

these

The likely result will be additional cycles of

prisoner litigation

in every capital case,

each ever

further

removed from the proper focus of criminal adjudication -- the
trial itself.
State post-conviction remedies will now move one step
closer to the status of a federal protectorate.

The irony is

that the development of state post-trial remedies has always held
substantial promise that the states themselves would assume the
primary responsibility for collateral review of state criminal
convictions.
blanket of

If every state initiative is to involve yet another
federal

administrative oversight,

the capacity and

incentives for the states to undertake meaningful reforms will
disappear.

The

guarantees

of

our

Bi 11 of

Rights

important federal safeguards for state criminal trials;

provide
they

have not to this point been thought to impose a federal model of
state post-conviction review.
Judge Chapman has asked to be shown as joining in this
opinion.
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WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

The question before us is whether the Commonwealth of
Virginia must

automatically,

upon

inmates with appointed counsel

request,

to prepare

provide

death

and file

row

state or

federal post-conviction petitions in order to meet its obligation
under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
meaningful

access,

the

majority

has

Under the guise of

established

a

right

to

appointed counsel where none is required by the Constitution.
The ref ore, while I concur with the majority that there is no
right to assistance of counsel with regard to federal petitions,
I respectfully dissent with regard to state petitions.
The district court clearly erred in concluding that the
Commonwealth of Virginia was not meeting its obligation under
Bounds to provide death row inmates with meaningful access to the
courts.

Further, there is no factual or legal justification for

requiring a ~ se exception for this class of inmates.
I•

In

Bounds,

the

Supreme

Court

constitutional right of access to the courts

held

that

the

is satisfied by

providing inmates "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law."

430 U.S. at 828.

Except as to

death row inmates, the fact that Virginia is in full compliance
with Bounds is not disputed.
action, Giarratano,

Even the inmate who initiated this

conceded that Virginia provides a "decent"

law library which includes Federal Supplement, Federal Reports,
United

States

Supreme

Court

Reporter,
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the

Federal

Digest,

Also, death row

Virginia Reports, and the United States Code.

inmates are provided copies of the transcript, briefs, and state
court

opinion

from

the

initial

automatic

appeal

of

their

conviction •

•
•

In

addition

satisfying

to

requirements

the

of

meaningful access by providing an adequate law library, Virginia
also

provides

inmates.

a

system of

Although

institutional

the

majority

attorneys
that

states

to

assist

Virginia

institutional attorneys, approximately two or three per facility,
are "attempting to meet the needs of over 2,000 prisoners," the
record

does

not

establish

how

many

of

those

prisoners

actually involved in post-conviction or other litigation.

are
But

the record does clearly establish that all death row inmates have
always

been

represented

by

counsel

in

state

post-conviction

appointed

under

Va.

proceedings.
Further,
§

counsel

is

14.1-183 (1950, Repl. Vol.

1985

&

Code

Ann.

Supp. 1987) for any state

post-conviction petition which raises a nonfrivolous issue and
requires a hearing.

Virginia also allows liberal amendment to

pro se habeas corpus petitions.

Plaintiffs' expert on Virginia

post-conviction proceedings testified that he had no firsthand
knowledge of a Virginia Circuit Court ever denying amendment to a
habeas corpus petition in a capital case.
A.

Meaningful Access and Pennsylvania v. Finley

After

the

district

court

rendered

its

decision the

Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. _ , 95
L.Ed.2d

539

(1987).

In

that

case
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the

Court

held

that

the

procedures articulated
( 1967),

in Anders v.

California,

386

U.S.

738

which must be satisfied before appointed counsel may

withdraw from a frivolous appeal, do not apply to state postconvict ion proceedings because there is no constitutional right
to counsel in those proceedings:
Anders did not set down an independent
constitutional command that all lawyers, in
all proceedings, must follow these particular
procedures.
Rather, Anders established a
prophylactic framework that is relevant when,
and only when, a litigant has a previously
established constitutional right to counsel.
We have never held that prisoners have a
constitutional right to counsel when mounting
collateral attacks to their convictions, and
we decline to so hold today.
Our cases
establish that the right to appointed counsel
extends to the first appeal of right, and no
further.
F1nley, 95 L.Ed.2d at 545 (citation omitted).
The majority concludes that "[t]he State's reliance on
[Finley] as authority for their contention that state prisoners
are not constitutionally entitled to state-supplied attorneys in
post-conviction proceedings is misplaced."

The majority seeks to

distinguish Finley because it "was not a meaningful access case,
nor did it address the rule enunciated in Bounds v. Smith.

Most

significantly, Finley did not involve the death penalty."

These

distinctions

clear

are

unpersuasive

in

light

of

Finley's

statement of existing law.
The

decision

in

Finley

Mo f f i t t , 41 7 U. S • 6 0 0 ( 19 7 4 ) •

relies

heavily

on

v.

In Ross, the Supreme Court held

that states are not required to appoint counsel for
seeking

Ross

a writ of certiorari.
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In the plainest

indigents

language the

decision is grounded upon principles of meaningful access:

"We

do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a defendant
in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the
North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not
~

appoint counsel to aid him in seeking [discretionary] review in
that court."

Id. at 615.

~

The reasoning of Ross effectively compelled the result
reached in Finley:
We think that the analysis that we followed
in Ross forecloses respondent's constitutional claim.
The procedures followed by
respondent's habeas counsel fully comported
with fundamental fairness.
Postconviction
relief is even further removed from the
criminal trial than is discretionary direct
review •••• States have no obligation to
provide this avenue of relief, and when they
do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the
Due Process Clause does not require that the
State supply a lawyer as well.
Nor was the equal protect ion guarantee of
"meaningful access" violated in this
case.
••.
In
Ross,
we
concluded
that
the
defendant's access to the trial record and
the appellate briefs and opinions provided
sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to
gain meaningful access to courts that possess
a discretionary power of review.
We think
that the same conclusion necessarily obtains
with respect to postconviction review.
Finley, 95 L.Ed.2d at 547 (citations omitted).

In view of this

language, I cannot agree with the majority that Finley was not a
meaningful access case.
The result in Finley was compelled because there was no
fundamental right to counsel in the first instance, a factor that
was essential to the result reached.
the

potentially

distinguishable
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It was this, rather than

nature

of

the

proceedings

(appellate in Anders versus trial in Finley), which dictated the
outcome.

We

are concerned here with the

identical type of

proceeding addressed in Finley, state habeas corpus, on the heels
of a clear and recent statement by the Supreme Court that there
is no previously established constitutional right to counsel in
state habeas corpus proceedings.
The
because

majority

would

additionally

distinguish

Finley

it did not "address the rule enunciated in Bounds v.

Smith."

In Bounds the

issue was access to "sources of legal

knowledge" to prepare meaningful papers, 430 U.S. at 817, and the
Court explicitly stated that, for inmates seeking to file postconviction

papers,

meaningful

access

to

the

courts

can

be

satisfied by either providing adequate law libraries or "adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law."

Id. at 828.

The

rule of Bounds was not addressed in Finley because Bounds was not
intended to imply a broad-based right of counsel as the majority
now would have it interpreted.

Hooks v. Wainwright,

775 F. 2d

1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986).
The

final

basis

upon

which

the

majority

seeks

to

distinguish Finley is that it did not involve the death penalty
and "there is a significant constitutional difference between the
death penalty and lesser punishments."
625, 637 (1980).

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.

Therefore, the question is essentially whether

on the record before us Plaintiffs constitute an exception to
Finley, or justify an exceptional application of Bounds.
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B.

The Death Penalty and Virginia Procedures

It is now settled that a state may impose a s ent e nce of
death on a defendant convicted of aggravated murder .
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

Gregg v.

Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has

focused on "the procedures by which convicted def endants were
selected

for

punishment

the

difference"

invoked out of

context.

Furman v.

decisions,

penalty

inflicted."

constitutional

under

death

Georgia,

rather

Id.

at

of

which

than

179.

on

the

The

the

actual

"s ignificant

majori ty

speaks

The "constitutional d iff e r ence"
408 U.S.

238

(1972)

is
is,

and subsequent

essentially concerned with a sentencing sys t em

which

must not be arbitrary and capricious in its application : that is,
it must not be "cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."

Furman , 408 U. S. at

309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Under Furman, the sentencing procedures cons idered were
unconstitutional because the death penalty was,
unguided

decision-making,

imposed."

Id.

at 310.

"so

wantonly

Thus,

and

by virtue· of
so

freakishly

the "significant cons titutional

difference" mandated the establishment of procedur es to ensure
that circumstances under which individual sentences of death are
imposed demonstrate a principled, consistent basis fo r the factfinding dee is ion, and a greater degree of rel iabi 1 i t y than is
required in noncapital sentencing.
07:

Beck

v.

Alabama,

447

U.S.

constitutional difference" means
which

a

sentence

of death

See Gregg, 428 U. S . at 206-

is

at

637-38

( "significant

that the procedural
imposed must
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not

r u les by

dimi nish the

reliability of the sentencing phase of the proceeding, or the
guilt phase upon which it is predicated); Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. _ _ , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) (a state statute that requires
consideration of

a victim

impact statement

at

the sentencing

phase of proceedings creates an unconstitutional risk of a death
sentence based upon impermissible or irrelevant considerations);
Ford

v.

Wainwright,

concurring)

477

( "heightened

U.S.

399,

procedural

425

(1986)

(Powell,

requirements

on

J.,

capital

trials and sentencing proceedings" do not apply in the context of
post-sentencing proceedings).

This "difference," significant as

it is, is not a basis upon which we may begin implying a separate
panoply of additional constitutional standards only applicable to
collateral challenges in death penalty cases.
Washington,
noncapital

466 U.S.
cases,

668,

the

686-87

same

(1984)

principle

See Strickland v.

(in both capital and
governs

claims

as

to

effective assistance of counsel).
The Commonwealth of Virginia allows a sentence of death
only in cases of aggravated murder.
(1950, Repl. Vol. 1982 & Supp. 1987).
sentence of death, Va. Code Ann.

§

Va. Code Ann.

§

18. 2-31

Appeal is automatic from a

17-110.lA (1950

&

Repl. Vol.

1982), and procedural safeguards in excess of that required by
the Constitution are provided, such as proportionality review of
the sentence imposed in each case.

Va. Code Ann.

§

17-110.lC.2

(1950 & Repl. Vol. 1982); compare Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,
50-51 ( 1984)

( "There is thus no bas is in our cases for holding

that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is
required in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and
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the defendant requests it.").

At trial and on the first appeal

of right, the defendant is guaranteed the assistance of appointed
counsel as required by the Constitution.
not provide

a

right

to counsel

subsequent proceedings,

Ross,

The Constitution does

appointed at state expense

417

U.S.

at

610-11;

Finley,

in
95

L.Ed.2d at 545, although a state may as a matter of legislative
choice

make

stages

of

counsel

available

judicial

significant that

review.

the

to

convicted defendants

Ross,

issue of

417

counsel

u.s.

at

arose

in

at

618.

all

It

is

Finley solely

because Finley sought to expand a state policy Pennsylvania has
followed since 1967 which "imposes a mandatory requirement upon
the

trial

court

to

appoint

conviction applicant."
235

A.2d

148,

149

counsel

for

an

Commonwealth v. Mitchell,

(1967);

see

Finley,

95

indigent

post

427 Pa.

395,

L.Ed.2d

at

548.

Similarly, Virginia courts may appoint counsel to assist in state
post-conviction
Repl.

Vol.

counsel

1985

in cases

proceedings,
&

Supp.

Va.

Code

1987),

and

Ann.
are

§

14.1-183

required

to

involving nonfrivolous claims that

evidentiary hearing.

Darnell v. Peyton,

(1950,
appoint

require an

160 S.E.2d 749 (1968).

The Virginia procedure is similar to the procedure followed in
the federal courts for review of state prisoner petitions under
28 u.s.c.A.

§

2254 (West 1977).

Rules Governing Sec. 2254 Cases,

Rule 8(a), (c).
I I.

In

addition

to

there

being

automatic appointment of counsel,

no

fundamental

to

there is no factual basis to

support the majority's extension of Bounds.
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right

Under Anderson v.

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), we must accept the district
court's findings

of fact unless clearly erroneous.

The district

court's per se exception to the standards of Bounds is grounded
on three premises, none of which are supported by the record:
emotional instabi 1 i ty of death row inmates as a result of the
circumstances
complexity

of

their

unique

to

confinement;

death

penalty

the

degree

cases;

and

of

legal

severe

time

constraints before execution of sentence.
As to the first premise, the thought of execution may
exact an emotional toll.

But, the district court's conclusion

that death row inmates are rendered incapable of initiating postconviction
presented.

petitions

is

simply

not

by

the

facts

For example, Giarratano has successfully prosecuted

other prose actions while on death row.
596

supported

F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Va. 1984).

conceded during

oral

argument,

See Giarratano v. Bass,

And counsel for the inmates

"the

record does

not

contain

evidence of specific inmates, currently or in the past," where
this premise applies.
The record additionally fails to establish that there
is a unique legal complexity to death penalty cases.

Though the

facts and issues of criminal cases are of varying complexity,
"the legal standards for constitutionally effective assistance of
counsel are constant."

Washington v.

Watkins,

655 F. 2d 1346,

1357 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982). Indeed,
the same argument of
inmates

to compel

"complexity"

appointment of

could be advanced by other
counsel

in noncapi tal post-

convict ion murder cases to raise complex issues involving burdenshifting presumptions, or by federal inmates prosecuted under 18
-28-

u.s.c.A.
§

1963 (West 1984

§

848 (West 1981

&

Supp. 1987)

(RICO) or 21 u.s.c.A.

Supp. 1987) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise).

&

Further, other than the occasional reference to the "esoteric,"
"intricate"

or

"frequently

sophisticated"

nature

of

capital

cases, the complexity addressed in this record refers to factual
complexity and the need for factual
obscures the fact that the

"re-investigation."

This

standards of assessing the fairness

of a capital prosecution are the same as those for other criminal
cases, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as well as
the fact that the purpose of the right to counsel
provide a defendant with a private investigator.
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 191 (1984).
described

two

cases

complete factual

purportedly

re-investigation,

is not to

United States

Plaintiffs' witnesses also

demonstrating
but

the

need

for

later conceded that

in

each instance the habeas corpus petition was actually based on
information gained from the transcript of trial.

Finally, during

oral argument the inmates' counsel agreed that the record did not
contain a single example of a case or issue which would provide a
basis

for

the

district

court's

conclusion,

nor

could

one,

understandably, be posited by way of illustration.
As to the third premise, the evidence presented does
not indicate that Virginia death row inmates are given a limited
amount of time to prepare and present their petitions to the
courts.

Rather,

the evidence establishes the contrary.

For

example, the initiating Plaintiff of the class, Giarratano, has
been on death row

in Virginia for

eight

years.

The

record

indicates that a substantial period of time passed between the
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affirmance of his conviction by the Virginia Supreme Court and
the

initiation of

state or

federal

habeas

corpus proceedings.

Another inmate in the class, James Clark, has been on death row
since 1979.
(1979),

Clark v. Commonwealth,

cert.

denied,

444 U.S.

219 Va. 237, 257 S.E.2d 784

1049

(1980).

His sentence was

vacated on a state habeas corpus petition, based on an initial
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

This finding was

reversed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in June, 1984 and the
trial court was "directed to fix a date for Clark's execution."
Virginia Dep't of Corrections v. Clark, 277 Va. 525, 318 S.E.2d
399, 406 (1984).

Testimony of Clark's counsel established that

efforts on his behalf are ongoing.
The history of inmates on death row in the Commonwealth
of Virginia is consistent with the histories of capital cases
throughout the nation.

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics Bulletin, Capital Punishment, 1986 at 1, 8.
uncommon

to

find

death

penalty

litigation for as much as

cases

which

"a full decade,

It is not

have

been

in

with repetitive and

careful reviews by both state and federal courts," as well as by
the Supreme Court.

Sullivan v.

(1983)

for

(application

Wainwright,

469 U.S.

stay

1133

Wainwright,

of

execution

(1985)

experience

all

The facts,

denied);

(Brennan, J.,

denial of petition for certiorari
imposed in 1974).

464 U.S.

to

delay

amount of time" in death penalty cases.
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112

Songer

v.

dissenting from

review sentence of death

other reliable data,

show significant

109,

rather

than

and common
a

"limited

I I I.

Under

the

majority's

analysis

Virginia

death

row

inmates are to be automatically provided counsel upon request for
preparing state habeas corpus

petitions,

but

are denied this

right for preparation of federal habeas petitions.

I concur in

the majority's conclusion that the Constitution does not require
automatic appointment of counsel for the latter, but I disagree
with

the

treatment

reasoning.
upon

The

the

fact

majority
that

bases

federal

its

habeas

distinction
proceedings

in
are

analogous to the situation in Ross in which a claim for appointed
counsel to seek a writ of certiorari was rejected because of
availability of appellate briefs, a transcript and state court
opinions.

The distinction obscures the fact that inmates will

also routinely have appellate briefs,

a transcript,

and state

court opinions in mounting a challenge to their conviction in
state court.

They wi 11 also be pursuing claims under 1 iberal

pleading and amendment rules that are essentially the same as
those

followed

in

the

federal

courts,

and

will

in

fact

be

provided counsel under essentially the same standard in both the
state and federal courts in Virginia.
IV.
In

testimony

before

the

district

court

there

was

reference to an agency created by the State of Florida to handle
post-conviction capital cases in that state.
apparently

concluded

Commonwealth

of

that

Virginia,

create such an agency.

this
and

would
has

be

The district court
appropriate

effectively

for

ordered

it

the
to

While the Commonwealth of Virginia and
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other

states

may

elect

to

authority to order it.
as

"a

roving

enlightened

this

procedure,

we

have

no

Federal courts are not empowered to act

commission

policy.

adopt

to

impose

• •• [T]he

applaud or even whether

procedures

followed

[this

[our]

question

whether we

in

•••

case].

own

for

notions

decision

we personally

of

is

not

approve

the

The question

is whether

those procedures fall below the minimum level the [Constitution]
wi 11 tolerate."
(Stewart,

J.,

demonstrates

Spencer v.

Texas,

concurring).
that

The

Virginia's

385 U.S.
record

procedures

554,

before
more

569

( 1967)

us

clearly

than

satisfy

constitutional requirements.
I therefore dissent from the majority's rule requiring
automatic appointment of counsel upon request for assistance in
preparing
majority's

state

habeas

decision

not

corpus
to

petitions.

apply

this

I
rule

concur
with

in

regard

the
to

preparation of federal habeas corpus petitions.
Judge Widener, Judge Chapman and Judge Wilkinson have
asked to be shown as joining in this separate opinion.
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A defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a federal claim at trial
in state court may sometimes, but not always, raise that claim on
collateral review. If the mechanism of review is state created, its
terms are set by state law. If the conviction is attacked in federal
court, the law of federal habeas corpus governs access to review. 1
The subject of this article is the law governing federal collateral
review of claims not properly raised in state court.
That law is anything but simple. It is a piecemeal doctrinal
construction, each part more readily explained by the circumstances of its addition than by its relation to a coherent whole. The
cumulation of category and exception threatens to obscure the underlying objectives of federal habeas corpus and to oppress its administration. That reform is needed, few will doubt. But the appropriate direction of reform is hotly controverted. The disputes
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1
This remedy is provided by 28 USC § 2254 (1982). The analogous collateral remedy
for federal trials is provided by 28 USC § 2255 (1982). In important respects it parallels
§ 2254.
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transcend mere questions of doctrine; they strike deep into fundamental disagreements about what federal collateral review should
seek to do.
It would be vain to suppose that doctrinal reconstruction can
altogether bridge such divisions or persuade those who find the
premises of our argument uncongenial. Nevertheless, our purpose
is to propose doctrinal reform of the requirements for federal collateral review of defaulted claims. We propose a radical simplification of existing doctrine so that it can focus more directly on the
objectives we think habeas corpus, as distinct from direct review,
should serve in this context. We hope thereby to reduce the inevitable distance between doctrine and policy and to present a coherent and plausible conception of the law in this field. Naturally, we
also hope to attract support for this view.
Section I surveys existing law. This involves two bodies of doctrine that, although separate in origin and divergent in content,
largely overlap. One is the line of cases, beginning with Wainwright v Sykes2, that articulates "cause" and "prejudice" as requirements for federal habeas review of defaulted claims. The
other involves the Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of
counsel, as that right is enforced on federal habeas. 3 Because these
doctrines cover much of the same ground, any plausible suggestion
for reform must take account of both.
Section II explains our proposal. We reject the increasing
proceduralization of habeas law and focus squarely on the substance of defaulted claims. The question, in our view, should be
whether consideration of a defaulted claim would present a realistic possibility of correcting an unjust conviction or sentence of
death. If so, procedural barriers should be swept aside and collateral review should be available. If not, the conviction or sentence
should stand without "appellate" correction on collateral review of
other trial errors. This reform would grant relief to those defendants who deserve it, deny relief to others, and would do so while
simplifying the issues for lawyers and judges. Significantly, it
would also go some distance toward eliminating the retroactivity
issue that seems about to engulf habeas doctrine. Of course, the
focus on innocence is not original with us. Twenty years ago,
Henry Friendly suggested something similar for habeas corpus as a
• 433 us 72 (1977).
• See Strickland u Washington, 466 US 668 (1984).
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whole,' and the concern for innocence is one of several strands that
run through Supreme Court opinions. Yet we think a good deal
more can be said for this view, particularly in the context of defaulted claims. Thus, Section II attempts to refine and defend that
position. Section III presents illustrative cases. Finally, Section IV
briefly examines certain related issues in the law of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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A.

THE LAW OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Stated Generally

A defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a claim at the time or
in the manner required by state procedures may lose the chance to
have that claim heard. Even if the claim is identified before appeal, the appellate court may stand on the procedural default and
refuse to address the merits. Such refusal is permitted by federal
law and ordinarily will be respected by the Supreme Court in the
unlikely event of direct review. 5 The same is true for claims properly raised at trial but not properly presented on appeal. Such default may justify the appellate court in refusing to hear the claim,
and its refusal will also bar direct review by the Supreme Court.
Sometimes, however, the defendant 6 can attack the default
collaterally. This can be done in two ways. First, under Wainwright v Sykes, the defendant can seek to undo the forfeiture by
showing "cause" for the default and "prejudice" resulting from it. 7
If these requirements are met, the federal court will consider the
merits of the defaulted claim, and if it is sound and its omission
not harmless, order a new trial (or, in a capital case, a new sentencing proceeding). Alternatively, the defendant can treat the lawyer's
failure to raise the claim as an independent constitutional viola• Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970).
• Of course, the procedures themselves must be constitutionally permissible and, in order to bar Supreme Court review, "adequate" and "independent" of federal law. A fair number of cases have found state procedural defaults inadequate to preclude Supreme Court
review, but most mean less than they seem to say. See,. for example, Williams v Georgia, 349
US 375, 383 (1955) (suggesting that a procedural default is not adequate to bar Supreme
Court review if the state court had the power to overlook it). In most of these cases, the
facts suggested bad faith manipulation of state procedures to defeat federal rights. See generally Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State
Relations 614-56 (Foundation, 2d ed 1989). Since such manipulation surely must be rare,
and in any event difficult to discern on direct review, Supreme Court findings of the inadequacy of state procedural grounds are very much the exception rather than the rule.
• For ease of exposition, habeas petitioners are referred to as "defendants."
• Sykes, 433 US at 87-91.
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tion. Under Strickland v Washington, the attorney's failure to
raise a pertinent claim constitutes a denial of effective assistance
of counsel if the error fell below a certain standard of attorney
competence and likely affected the outcome of the prosecution. 8
These two lines of attack are only partly convergent. Lawyer
error constituting ineffective assistance of counsel is indisputably
"cause" under Sykes, 9 but only a small percentage of defaulted
claims involve such error. Effective assistance of counsel ostensibly
requires that the lawyer's conduct be "reasonable considering all
the circumstances," 10 but the Court has emphasized that the Sixth
Amendment claimant must overcome a "strong presumption" that
the lawyer's conduct fell within professional norms. 11 This means
that any colorable reason for not raising a claim (viewing the lawyer's decision without benefit of hindsight) 12 defeats a defendant's
later assertion of a Sixth Amendment violation based on that default. In practice, the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel approximates gross negligence.
Given this standard, it is less important that ineffective assistance is "cause" than that most other attorney error is not. Ordinary oversight, simple miscalculation, bad judgment-none constitutes "cause" for failure to raise a constitutional claim.13 There is a
category of "cause" arising from wholly non-negligent error-failure to raise a claim the basis for which was created by a
subsequent change in the law 14-but this category is narrowly confined111 and in any event inapplicable if a new pronouncement does
• 466 us 668, 687-96 (1984).
• See Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 488 (1986).
10
Strickland, 466 US at 688.
11
Id at 689-91.
11
Id at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time.").
18
See, for example, Carrier, 477 US at 486-88; and Smith v Murray, 477 US 527, 53436 (1986).
14
Reed v Ross, 468 US 1, 13-16 (1984).
'" See Engle v Isaac, 456 US 107, 130-34 (1982). The defaulted claim in Engle was that
the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proof on self.
defense. The trial occurred after In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970) (establishing a constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases), but before the
Court had applied Winship to overturn rules shifting the burden of proof on some grading
elements, see Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 (1975), or on intent generally, see Sandstrom
v Montana, .442 US 510 (1979). The Engle Court stated that "dozens" of defense lawyers
had challenged similar instructions by the time of the defendant's trial, but acknowledged
that such challenges "countered well-established principles of law." 456 US at 131-32. It
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not apply retroactively. 16 (This category is necessary to allow retroactive application of new rulings; otherwise, no institutional apparatus would exist for implementing fully retroactive decisions.) Additionally, "cause" will be found where a claim was not raised due
to "some objective factor external to the defense" 17 (not merely to
the defendant), such as government misconduct that suppresses
facts giving rise to the claim. 1 s But these rare cases aside, "cause"
for failing to raise a claim exists only where the misjudgment or
oversight amounts to an independent constitutional violation
under the Sixth Amendment, and the mistake must be truly egregious to violate this standard.
The upshot of all this is easy to state, but hard to justify:
criminal defendants are often bound by the mistakes of their lawyers. This might be tolerable if the stakes were less high, but the
prospect of defendants sitting in jail because of attorney error is at
least unsettling. This is the chief objection to both Sykes 19 and
Strickland, 20 at least among academics. Their proposed remedies
also are parallel. "Cause" should be defined more expansively,
along the lines of the deliberate bypass standard of Fay u Noia. 21
found the fact that some defense counsel had made such arguments enough to preclude a
finding of "cause" for failure to do so.
10
See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that the rule of Batson v
Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), should not be applied retroactively on federal habeas to convictions that became final before Batson was announced); see also Teague v Lane, 109 S Ct
1060 (1989) (plurality opinion) (concluding that rules that cannot be applied retroactively
on federal habeas cannot be announced on federal habeas); and Penry v Lynaugh, 109 S Ct
2934, 2944-47 (1989) (adopting Teague plurality's analysis and applying it to rules governing
the imposition of capital punishment).
17
Carrier, 477 US at 488.
18
See, for example, Amadeo v Zant, 486 US 214 (1988).
'" See, for example, Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L J 1035, 1100-02 (1977); Barry Friedman, A
Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn L Rev 247 (1988); Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle, 16 NYU Rev
L & Soc Change 321, 332 (1987-88); Daniel J . Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 Harv L Rev 1128, 1215-18 (1986); Yale L. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia:
Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 Minn L Rev 341, 425 (1978);
and Peter W. Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel:
The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 Stan L Rev 1, 67 (1978).
•• See, for example, Vivian 0 . Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 Colum L Rev 9, 81-100 (1986); Gary Goodpaster, The
Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14
NYU Rev L & Soc Change 59, 67 (1986); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const L Q 625, 640-45 (1986).
11
372 US 391, 438 (1963) (holding that the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine does not limit the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a federal
court has discretion to deny relief only where an applicant "has deliberately by-passed the
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Similarly, ineffective assistance of counsel should be expanded to
cover a wider range of merely negligent mistakes. 22 In these suggestions, the critics share the Court's approach, if not its conclusions.
They would continue to inquire into the reason for a default in
order to assess its enforceability. 23 The differences lie chiefly in the
showings that would suffice.
If the defendant can show Strickland ineffectiveness or other
Sykes "cause," the court's attention then turns to "prejudice."
Here, too, habeas and Sixth Amendment doctrine converge, for
both require a showing of "prejudice." The term means some likelihood-greater than that sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
but perhaps less than "more likely than not" -that the error or
default affected the outcome of the prosecution. Strickland expresses the idea this way:
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 24
The Court has not expressly adopted this test for the "prejudice"
prong of Sykes, but its opinions suggest something very similar. 26
orderly procedure of the state courts"). See, for example, Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1215-22
(cited in note 19) (arguing for a deliberate bypass standard, with conscious decisions by
defense counsel counting as deliberate bypass); Tague, 31 Stan L Rev at 38-56 (cited in note
19) (arguing that the Court should have limited the scope of claims that can be raised on
federal habeas instead of enforcing procedural defaults) .
11
See, for example, sources cited in note 20. This argument is often coupled with the
suggestion that the prejudice requirement be scrapped. See, for example, Berger, 86 Colum
L Rev at 89-100 (cited in note 20). The critics who argue for a broader conception of ineffectiveness and abandonment of the prejudice requirement largely endorse the position taken
by Justice Marshall in his Strickland dissent. 466 US at 707-15 (Marshall dissenting) .
•• Two notable exceptions are Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 Hofstra L Rev 617,
702-14 (1984); and Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and
the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U Chi L Rev 1380, 1419-29 (1983). Professor Guttenberg
reaches a conclusion close to ours-we should say ours is close to his-but the structure of
the arguments is different and, in at least one important respect, we reach a different result.
Compare Guttenberg, 12 Hofstra L Rev at 716-17 (arguing that courts should categorize
constitutional protections as guilt-related or not) with text at notes 48-49 (suggesting that
such categorization is both difficult and unnecessary).
"' Strickland, 466 US at 694.
11
See United States v Frady, 456 US 152, 168-69 (1982), which, like Strickland, defines "prejudice" in terms that avoid both the conventional harmless-beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard and the more-likely-than-not outcome determinative test. Both Frady and
Strickland link "reasonable probability" of affecting outcome with due process notions of
fundamental fairness. Compare Frady, 456 US at 169, quoting Cupp v Naughten, 414 US
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Note the nature of this standard. All agree that errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt do not require reversal of a conviction, whether on direct appeal or collateral review. This simply recognizes the futility of a search for perfection. But the Court's
"reasonable probability" standard of prejudice requires a much
higher likelihood of effect on the outcome than the mere possibility
of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the "reasonable probability" standard applies to errors of all sorts. An omitted claim that has less
than a "reasonable probability" of affecting the outcome is barred,
whether it concerns factual guilt or merely the enforcement of a
prophylactic rule. The outcome-oriented definition of "prejudice"
thus treats the possibility of a factually erroneous conviction and
the possibility of mistaken nonenforcement of a prophylactic rule
as equally (non)serious.
An obvious alternative is to shift the focus from the likelihood
of effect on the outcome to the kind of effect that should matter.
"Prejudice" could be used to differentiate among defaulted claims
according to their impact on guilt. This approach would restrict
collateral review of defaulted claims, but in a different way from
the indiscriminate requirement of heightened likelihood of an effect on outcome, as reflected in the definition of "reasonable
probability."
The Supreme Court has toyed with this approach, but its pronouncements to date are mixed and inconclusive. It has supported
a safety valve exception to the requirement of "cause." Where procedural default has "probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent," habeas relief is available without regard
to the nature of the lawyer's error. 26 This willingness to overlook
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141, 147 (1973) (the habeas "prejudice" standard is "whether the ailing instruction by itself
so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process"), with Strickland, 466 US at 696 ("the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of
the proceeding whose result is being challenged").
Despite these parallels, the matter is sufficiently unclear that some argue that the two
"prejudice" standards differ. See James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 24.5(d) at 357-58 (Michie, 1988) (suggesting that Sykes prejudice is "consistent
with traditional harmless error analysis"); and Maria L. Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus
After State Court Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 Fordham L Rev 663,
701-03 (1985) (arguing that Sykes "prejudice" is actually more stringent than Strickland
"prejudice").
•• Carrier, 477 US at 495-96, quoting Engle u Isaac, 456 US 107, 135 (1982):
"[A]s we [] noted in Engle, '[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality
that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.' ... We remain confident that, for the
most part, 'victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-andprejudice standard.' ... But we do not pretend that this will always be true. Accord-
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"cause" to avoid a "miscarriage of justice" is welcome, but the
Court's accommodation is only partial, for the exception applies
only to the "extraordinary" case where the showing of actual innocence rises to the required level of probability. 27 Nevertheless, the
"miscarriage of justice" exception does indicate, in partial answer
to Henry Friendly, that innocence is not altogether irrelevant in
habeas review. 28
On the Sixth Amendment side, the Court's interest in innocence as the criterion of "prejudice" has been even less consistent.
In Nix u Whiteside, 29 the Court rejected the ineffective assistance
claim of a defendant deterred from committing perjury by his lawyer's threat to disclose the falsehood. Whiteside is famous for the
Court's endorsement of the lawyer's aggressive steps to prevent client perjury. 30 Less attention has been paid to the gloss Whiteside
seemed to place on Sixth Amendment "prejudice." All nine Justices concluded that, even if defense counsel acted incompetently
and even if that action had the requisite effect on outcome, counsel's behavior still would not have been prejudicial. The reason was
apparently that perjury is criminal conduct that detracts from the
reliability of judgments. 31 If the right to effective assistance of
counsel aims to promote reliable outcomes, then any effect on outcome flowing from the Whiteside lawyer's threat to expose perjury
would not count for Sixth Amendment purposes. As Justice Blackmun put it, "this Court must ask whether its confidence in the outcome of Whiteside's trial is in any way undermined by the knowledge that he refrained from presenting false testimony." 32 The
obvious answer was no.
Whiteside suggested that some errors affecting outcome cannot establish Strickland "prejudice" (or, by hypothesis, Sykes
"prejudice"), and that the kind of errors that do not count are
ingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ even in the absence of showing of cause for the procedural default."
Accord Harris v Reed, 109 S Ct 1038, 1043 (1989); and Smith v Murray, 477 US 527, 537
(1986).
17
Carrier, 477 US at 495-96.
11
Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 4).
11
475 us 157 (1986).
•• Id at 174-75. See Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on Attorney-Client Relations, 136 U Pa L Rev 1913 (1988); Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U Pa L Rev 1939 (1988); and
Patrick R. Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The
Defendant's Position, 23 Am Crim L Rev 1 (1985).
11
475 US at 175-76; id at 184-88 (Blackmun concurring) .
.. Id at 185 (Blackmun concurring).
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those that do not affect the factual reliability of the determination
of guilt. This reading was undercut, however, later that Term in
Kimmelman v Morrison. 33 Neil Morrison was convicted of rape in
state court, based in part on laboratory tests of a bedsheet that
had been seized, apparently illegally, from his apartment. 34 Morrison's lawyer had failed to file a timely motion to suppress the bedsheet and lab reports. Federal habeas review of the Fourth Amendment claim was barred by Stone v Powell, which held that a
Fourth Amendment claim can be raised on federal habeas review
only where there was not a full and fair opportunity to have the
claim heard in state court. 36 Morrison therefore pursued a Sixth
Amendment claim, arguing that his lawyer had been ineffective in
failing to raise this issue.
The Court unanimously found that Stone v Powell did not bar
the Sixth Amendment claim, even though it was based on default
of a Fourth Amendment objection. The Justices further found that
the lawyer's performance fell below standards of professional competence, but they divided over the kind of "prejudice" that Morrison had to show. Justice Brennan's majority opinion looked for a
"reasonable probability" of effect on outcome: if there was a reasonable likelihood that his counsel's incompetence affected the
outcome of the prosecution, Morrison was entitled to habeas relief. 36 Justice Powell, writing for himself and two others, looked for
an effect on innocence. Powell argued that the right to effective
assistance of counsel was designed to prevent unjust outcomes and
that the attorney's error in no way rendered the conviction unjust. 37 Powell nevertheless voted to grant relief on the ground that
the state had not raised the issue of Strickland "prejudice." For
the same reason, he maintained that the Court's opinion should
not be read to foreclose an innocence-based conception of
"prejudice," although the majority's language seemed to do just
that. 38
•• 477 us 365 (1986) .
•• Id at 368-69. The seizure was warrantless, but it was not clear whether exigent circumstances were present. No court had ruled on the legality of the search when the Supreme Court decided the case.
•• 428 us 465 (1976).
•• 477 US 365, 379-80, 391 (1986). The Court did not apply this test itself but remanded the case to the lower courts.
37
Id at 394-97 (Powell concurring in the judgment).
•• Id at 397-98 (Powell concurring in the judgment). Compare id at 380 (majority statement that "we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination
of actual guilt").
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Whiteside and Kimmelman are hard to reconcile. Both cases
dealt with lawyer acts that enhance, rather than undermine, one's
confidence in the factual accuracy of the convictions. In Whiteside,
that fact seems to have convinced the Court that the lawyer's conduct, even if incompetent, did not merit remedy. In Kimmelman,
the Court reached the opposite conclusion. 39 Kimmelman is also in
obvious tension with Stone v Powell, and for the same reason.
Stone precludes federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims because they do not undermine the finding of guilt; Kimmelman allows the defendant to make an end-run around Stone by
recharacterizing a defaulted Fourth Amendment claim as a Sixth
Amendment violation. Under Kimmelman, Sixth Amendment
"prejudice" is shown by an effect on outcome, even if, as on the
facts of that case, it actually increases the factual reliability of the
conviction.
B.

An Illustrative Application

The preceding discussion states the law, but it gives scant flavor of the elaborate decisionmaking required of federal habeas
courts in procedural default cases. To get some idea of the operational complexity of these doctrines (and of certain related matters
that we have not recounted fully), we suggest the following
hypothetical.
. Imagine a defendant whose lawyer fails to move to suppress an
arguably involuntary confession until the beginning of the trial.
The state has a rule requiring that such motions be made before
trial but allowing trial courts to consider late motions on a discretionary basis. 40 The trial judge decides that the motion should not
be heard, both because there is no excuse for the untimeliness and
because, in any event, "the confession plainly appears to be voluntary." After conviction and appeal, the defendant seeks federal
habeas corpus. He seeks both to have the habeas court determine
the voluntariness of his confession and to attack his lawyer's failure to raise that issue as ineffective assistance of counsel. How
would a federal district judge (or magistrate) dedicated to implementing Supreme Court decisions proceed in this case?

•• The leading treatise endorses Kimmelman's position. See Wayne LaFave and Jerold
H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.l0(d) at 50 (West, Supp 1989).
•• Rules providing for court discretion to consider late suppression motions are common. See, for example, Colo R Crim P 41(g) (1984); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 54-33f(b) (West,
1985); Fla R Crim P 3.190(i) (West, 1973).
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With respect to the confession's voluntariness, the first issue is
whether the trial judge's statement of the grounds for decision satisfied the required plain statement of reliance on the procedural
default, or whether the claim was "really" decided on the merits. 41
If the state court addressed the merits, the federal court should do
likewise. If the state court did not reach the merits, the next issue
is whether the state's procedural requirement was fairly applied.
This resolves into the question of whether the state court's discretion to consider late claims vitiated the requirement that claims be
timely made. If procedural foreclosure ordinarily was not invoked
in such cases, the federal habeas court should address the merits. 42
If such defaults were routinely enforced, the court should proceed
to the Sykes test of "cause" and "prejudice."
Was there "cause" for the default, apart from the lawyer's alleged ineffectiveness? Conceivably so, if the defendant could show
"some objective factor external to the defense" that would have
prevented the attorney from recognizing the claim and raising it in
a timely fashion; 43 otherwise not, as there was no colorable claim of
"new law." If "cause" is found, the court should inquire into
whether the claim of involuntariness had a "reasonable
probability" of affecting the outcome. If "cause" is not found, the
court should ask whether failure to consider the involuntariness
claim would "probably" result in the continued incarceration of
one who is "actually innocent." 44
There is a second progression of issues for the ineffective assistance claim (and for ineffective assistance as the most likely form
of Sykes "cause"). Did the attorney's failure to move to suppress
fall below minimal standards of professional competence? This
question may be troublesome, as it requires estimation of the apparent strength of such a motion at the time filing was required,
given the information then available to counsel. 45 If ineffective assistance is found, the court should inquire (as above) into the "rea-

" See Harris v Reed, 109 S Ct 1038 (1989).
•• See, for example, Ulster County Court v Allen, 442 US 140, 147-54 (1979).
•• The quoted language comes from Carrier, 477 US at 488. Amadeo v Zant, 486 US
214 (1988), provides an example of such an "objective factor"; the state suppressed information that could have supported a claim that the defendant's grand jury and petit jury were
discriminatorily selected.
•• Carrier, 477 US at 496. Accord, Harris, 109 S Ct at 1043.
•• See Strickland, 466 US at 689-90, on the importance of avoiding hindsight when
assessing the competence of an attorney's acts.

690

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:679

sonable probability" of the mistake affecting the outcome. If ineffective assistance is not found, the court should deny relief." 6
This fairly simple example makes an obvious point: the decision tree for habeas review of defaulted claims is intricate and
costly. To be sure, in many cases, the issues raised in the preceding
paragraphs will be easy. Often, "cause" and "prejudice" are plainly
absent, and the court can dispose of the petition without great effort. But many of these issues require intricate analysis and present opportunities for error. Most importantly, those legal issues
seem largely unrelated to the merits of the defendant's claim. This
is surely the greatest vice of the current system. Cases like the hypothetical discussed above are analyzed and resolved without any
serious attention to whether the defendant's claim is one that warrants relief. 47
In essence, Sykes and Strickland require habeas lawyers and
federal judges and magistrates to work through the equivalent of a
law school exam every time a defendant tries to escape procedural
default. We mean no disrespect to those who labor in this field
when we voice the suspicion that most do not routinely track the
ins and outs of this progression. In practice, federal habeas review
may well be more direct, more casual, less preoccupied with the
procedural preliminaries of habeas corpus, and more responsive to
the court's perception (perhaps very quickly attained) of the merits of the claim. All this may be true. It may even be true that,
despite the aesthetic sensibilities of academics and the sympathetic frustration of their students, habeas review achieves generally reasonable results. But even if such speculation were verified,
it would not justify complacency about the law of procedural foreclosure, for it cannot be a very great recommendation of existing
law that it works tolerably well when largely ignored.

•• A further puzzle is whether the exhaustion requirement demands that the defendant
have presented his ineffective assistance claim to any then-available state court. The Court
seems to have said that exhaustion is required whether the defendant is raising ineffective
assistance as an independent claim or as Sykes "cause" for a procedural default. See Carrier, 477 US at 488-89. If that is so, the adjudication of defaulted claims involves yet another layer of complication.
" The question of effective assistance of counsel is not a close proxy for the question of
the merits of the claim because the court is only to consider what the lawyer knew (or
should have known) at the time the claim was defaulted. The lawyer's reasonable assessment at the time and the actual merits of the claim (as judged by hindsight) are potentially
very different issues.
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REFORMING HABEAS REVIEW OF DEFAULTED CLAIMS

We favor reorienting habeas review of defaulted claims toward
protection of the arguably innocent. This means that defendants
should have easy access to habeas review where consideration of
the defaulted claim might correct an unjust conviction (or sentence
of death), but not otherwise. Such an approach would be both
more and less restrictive than existing law. It would be more restrictive in that it would limit Sykes and Strickland "prejudice" to
those omissions that impair the reliability of the finding of guilt.
Where, as in Kimmelman, a default only enhances the reliability of
a conviction, it would not be set aside on habeas corpus. At the
same time, our approach would be less restrictive than existing law
in that we would junk the requirement of "cause." We would not
undertake to characterize the lawyer's error as competent, incompetent, negligent, non-negligent, or whatever. We would ask simply
whether the error might have caused an unjust result. If so, we
would grant habeas relief despite the absence of "cause"; if not, we
would deny review despite effect on outcome.
Our focus is on factual innocence. By that phrase, we mean to
include anyone who did not commit the crime with which he or she
is charged. This includes defendants who are guilty of some crime
but not the offense charged. In other words, factual innocence
comprehends both the fact and grade of criminal liability. Of
course, the "facts" supporting criminal liability are really findings
or conclusions reached by the trier of fact, although we hope these
conclusions closely correspond to real-world events. A claim suggesting "factual innocence" is, therefore, one that, if heard by the
trier of fact, would militate with some appreciable force against the
findings or conclusions needed to support criminal liability.
The arguable innocence standard can be expressed in many
ways. The approach closest to the Court's own language would require the defendant to show a "reasonable probability" that the
procedural default resulted in an erroneous conviction. We prefer
"reasonable possibility" because it avoids the implication that factual innocence need be more likely than not. If relief were to be
granted only on proof of actual probability of innocence, the
Court's "miscarriage of justice" exception to "cause" would be sufficient. In our view, however, refusal to consider a defaulted claim
is objectionable if there is any significant prospect of a factually
erroneous conviction (or an unjustified sentence of death) resulting
from that default. We think that that is true where the prospect of
erroneous conviction is distinctly less than probable. At the same
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time, we do not mean to endorse habeas review of claims whose
supposed benefit to the defendant is fanciful or remote. We suggest the phrase "reasonable possibility" to capture this combination of leniency and realism.
This approach obviously resembles Henry Friendly's suggestion, delivered with characteristic elegance and force, that habeas
relief be limited to those petitioners who can make a colorable
showing of factual innocence. Our proposal for defaulted claims
also resembles the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Stone
v Powell, which barred most habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims based on the non-guilt-related character of those claims. 48
But while the thrust of all these models is to take innocence into
account on federal habeas review, the approaches differ in implementation. Judge Friendly's standard apparently would allow litigation of non-guilt-related claims in cases that, for reasons unrelated to those claims, were close on the merits. 49 Stone, on the
other hand, seems to require the categorization of constitutional
claims in the abstract as guilt-related or not-a task that is particularly problematic for those constitutional rights that may protect
innocence in some contexts but not others.
Asking whether the default raised a reasonable possibility of
an unjust conviction avoids both difficulties. Defendants would not
automatically be permitted to relitigate the merits of the charges
against them by virtue of having, for example, a legally plausible
defaulted Fourth Amendment claim. And there would be no need
to decide, as a categorical matter, whether a given constitutional
right protects innocence or some other cluster of interests; the is•• 428 us 465 (1976).
•• See Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 4). In other words, Judge Friendly
would reopen claims on federal habeas corpus that we would not. Consider, for example, two
rape cases. In both the evidence could have supported either conviction or acquittal; in both
the defendants were convicted in part on judgments as to credibility. Also, consent was the
only issue in both cases; intercourse was established by laboratory analysis of a bedsheet
from the defendant's apartment. In case one, the bedsheet was illegally seized, but defense
counsel failed to move to suppress it. In case two, the bedsheet was obtained lawfully.
As we read Judge Friendly, he would allow relitigation of the defaulted claim in case
one. We would not because, from the standpoint of remedying injustice, the two cases
should be treated the same. Both defendants were convicted in close cases, meaning that
either defendant could have made a colorable showing of innocence. The fact that the defendant in case one has a plausible Fourth Amendment claim has nothing to do with that
showing, since the bedsheet did not in any way undermine the accuracy of the jury's determination. On the contrary, it properly focused the jury's attention on consent, the only real
question in the case. Unless one is prepared to relitigate all cases in which the factual judgment at trial was a close one, one should not grant relief because of the procedural default
in such a case.
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sue would be reduced to whether innocence is plausibly at stake in
the particular case at hand.
More importantly, Stone and Judge Friendly propose solutions to the general problem of how to allocate federal habeas relief. The premise of their proposals is that, for the most part,
habeas corpus relief should aim to rectify particular injustices, and
not (for example) to deter inattention to federal law on the part of
recalcitrant state judges. We generally agree with that premise,
but-and this is important-our proposal does not depend on it.
No matter what one's approach to allocating habeas relief generally, there is no good argument against focusing on innocence
when dealing with defaulted claims.
The test proposed here at least has the virtues of simplicity
and directness. The real issue is not whether our test would simplify habeas review, but whether it would improve it. A "reasonable possibility" of innocence standard is about as economical and
uncomplicated as any legal standard is likely to be. The question is
whether it is also right.
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The Affirmative Argument

It is easy to argue for using habeas review to protect against
injustice. No habeas petitioner evokes more sympathy than one
who can show a reasonable possibility of innocence based on procedural default. In such a case, there is a colorable showing that procedural error caused the administration of justice to go fundamentally wrong. A proper regard for the relative values at stake
demands that we forgive the procedural default. This is not to say
that the state's interests in the integrity of its procedures and in
the finality of its judgments are trivial. It is only to say that those
values are not absolute; they should give way to the imperative of
correcting injustice. We think this simple statement a sufficient explanation of the grounds for habeas review of defaulted claims
where there is a reasonable possibility of innocence. In our view, it
also applies to the analogous case of a prisoner sentenced to death
who can show a reasonable possibility of a factually unjustified
sentence. It is unthinkable to send a defendant to execution without considering such a claim.
B.

The Negative Argument

The hard part of the argument is to show that habeas review
of defaulted claims should be unavailable when the default does
not undermine the factual reliability of the conviction. Kim-

694

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:679

melman v Morrison is an example. 50 There the lawyer's failure to
raise the Fourth Amendment claim likely had a decisive effect on
outcome, 51 but did not conceivably affect the reliability of the conviction. At trial, the defendant claimed that he and the victim had
not had sexual relations. The bedsheet and lab reports that were
admitted into evidence, but that might have been excluded had
the lawyer objected, tended to confirm the falsity of the defendant's claim. 52 It is our view-contrary to the prevailing opinion
among academics and to much of the Court's current doctrine-that such defaults should not be undone on federal habeas
review.
In part, this view rests on the state's legitimate interest in the
finality of its criminal judgments. Federal habeas review, which
comes only after one (and often two) full rounds of litigation,
should not be equated with the first-line appellate function of correcting all errors. Finality of judgments is an important value, as is
confirmed by the law's regard for civil judgments. For all the reasons identified by Paul Bator-conservation of judicial resources,
maintenance of a sense of importance and responsibility associated
with the criminal trial, the need to avoid sending mixed signals
about the defendant's punishment or rehabilitation, and avoidance
of the institutional paralysis that flows from leaving decisions always open to challenge-criminal convictions, once obtained and
affirmed on appeal, should not be lightly set aside. 53 This is not to
say that direct review should be similarly restricted. On the contrary, it is to assert a distinction between direct and collateral review in terms of the kinds of problems that resources should be
used to correct.
These concerns are greatly bolstered if, as Justice Stevens has
surmised, 54 the fact that a claim was not raised at trial suggests its
irrelevance. Massaged by a trained advocate, a given set of facts
may yield a great many constitutional claims. Some are obvious
and central to the case; others are inventive long-shots. Like Jus•• 477 us 365 (1986).
01
See Morrison v Kimme/man, 650 F Supp 801, 809 (D NJ 1986) (on remand) (concluding that the failure to suppress the bedsheet "dramatically affected the evidentiary picture in this case").
•• See id at 808-09 .
.. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441, 451-53 (1963).
•• See Engle v Isaac, 456 US at 136 n 1 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 547-48 n 17 (1982) (Stevens dissenting); Carrier, 477 US
at 506 n 13 (Stevens concurring in the judgment); and Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 9697 (1977) (Stevens concurring).
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tice Stevens, we suspect that even marginally competent lawyers
ordinarily raise those claims that the facts most nearly support.
The claims most likely to go unmentioned are those that are legally remote or factually fanciful. It seems likely, therefore, that
successive habeas petitions based on defaulted claims will be increasingly occupied with the chaff of constitutional argumentation.1111 Of course, the occasional exception is precisely the point of
habeas review, but the probabilities involved are certainly relevant
in assessing the state's interest in the finality of convictions. 116
In addition to its proper interest in finality, the state has a
significant interest in enforcing the procedural rules that give rise
to defaults. States have good and legitimate reasons for requiring
timely presentation of claims; an orderly adjudicative process depends on such requirements. It is wasteful to wait until trial to
decide whether the key piece of government evidence is admissible,
and also wasteful to have a second round of review because the
litigant did not raise the winning claim on the first appeal. These
concerns are no makeweight. Critics of the procedural default doctrine argue that "mere" timing rules are not important enough to
justify precluding constitutional claims, yet virtually no one argues
that such timing rules should be dispensed with in federal practice.117 Surely if federal courts are entitled to insist on routine compliance with sensible procedures in their own trials, state courts
should also be entitled to do so.
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•• This may also explain why federal courts are usually content to screen habeas petitions with rather cursory procedures. See 28 USC § 2254 Rule 4 (1982) (authorizing such a
process).
•• An additional concern might, at least in theory, augment the state's interest in finality. Defense lawyers might abuse federal habeas corpus by intentionally defaulting on their
federal claims in state court in order to save them for subsequent federal review. The occurrence of such "sandbagging" is hard to disprove, but we doubt its frequency. Defendants
have strong and obvious incentives to seek state court adjudication of their federal claims,
even if review is automatically available on federal habeas. Other things being equal, two
bites at the apple are better than one. Also, federal habeas review will be long delayed,
forcing the defendant to serve much of his sentence before obtaining relief. Even for claims
challenging death sentences, where the last factor is not relevant, the defendant loses the
opportunity to have his claim heard by state trial and appellate courts, on state collateral
review as well as on direct appeal. Finally, the usual incentives to raise constitutional claims
must be strongest when the claims are guilt-related, and those are the claims for which we
would ignore attorney performance. For these and other reasons, the sandbagging argument
has been criticized by commentators who otherwise differ greatly on habeas issues. See
Friedman, 73 Minn L Rev at 292 (cited in note 19); Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev at 158-59
(cited in note 4); Guttenberg, 12 Hofstra L Rev at 694-97 (cited in note 23); Meltzer, 99
Harv L Rev at 1197-99 (cited in note 19); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S Cal L Rev 837, 896-98
(1984); and Tague, 31 Stan L Rev at 43-46 (cited in note 19).
07
See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1202-07 (cited in note 19).

696

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:679

Of course, the states' interests in finality and in enforcing their
procedures are well understood. Different observers may weigh
them differently, but nobody denies their existence. The real issue
is whether these concerns are outweighed by some countervailing
interest in allowing habeas review of all outcome-related defaulted
claims. In other words, the argument against federal habeas review
of defaulted claims that do not go to factual guilt is clear; the
question is whether there is any strong argument for hearing such
claims.
We can identify four arguments in favor of federal habeas review of all defaulted claims. First, federal habeas relief might be
justified as a deterrent to unconstitutional conduct by state officers. Second, denial of habeas relief might be thought unfair to
defendants who are, in moral terms, identical to other defendants
whose lawyers raised similar claims in a timely fashion and who
consequently obtained relief. Third, federal habeas review might
be thought justified by the inherent importance of federal constitutional rights, an argument usually cast as an assertion that there
should be no hierarchy among such rights. Fourth, review of nonguilt-related claims might be thought necessary as a surrogate for
review of claims that bear directly on guilt or innocence, but that
are difficult or impossible to identify. We consider each of these
arguments in turn in the sections that follow. 118
•• All four of the arguments view the process of hearing defaulted claims as valuable for
instrumental reasons-because it promotes good outcomes in particular cases, deters official
misconduct, or affirms the importance of constitutional rights. One might take a different
approach and argue that the process of hearing defaulted claims is valuable not for what it
accomplishes, but for its own sake.
Frankly, we consider this position untenable. Process costs money, and it seems sensible
· to use the limited resources available to our criminal justice system where they will do the
most good. For that reason, we start from the premise that process is a means of achieving
certain substantive outcomes outside the courtroom-in this context, the proper allocation
of criminal punishment and compliance with federal law by state and local officials. Obviously, those who view process as an end rather than a means will find our proposal
mistaken.
A variant on this non-instrumental position might be that habeas review is valuable for
the satisfaction it gives habeas petitioners, whether or not it achieves any substantive ends.
A rich literature (one in which we are far from expert) explores the concept of party satisfaction and its relevance to a society's choices about legal process. See, for example, E. Allan
Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 93-106 (Plenum,
1988); John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 67101 (Wiley, 1975). That literature is both important and potentially useful in thinking about
how to structure existing systems of dispute resolution. We do not, however, think it useful
for deciding whether to litigate a given claim or dispute in the first place. Perhaps habeas
petitioners gain some sense of satisfaction from raising Kimmelman-type defaulted claims
in federal court. But if litigating such claims accomplishes nothing beyond making petitioners feel good, we have no hesitation in saying it is not worth the costs it imposes on the
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Deterrence of unconstitutional conduct.

The deterrence argument for habeas relief in cases such as
Kimmelman is familiar. The police officer who conducted an arguably illegal search presumably wanted to solve a crime and catch
a rapist. Undoing the procedural default, vacating the conviction,
and suppressing the evidence in a new trial will send a signal to
officers in similar positions that illegal searches do not pay. 119 This
argument does not depend on factual innocence; it justifies habeas
relief with reasons wholly independent of that concern. 60
There are, however, good (and familiar) reasons to believe that
habeas relief for defaulted claims is, in deterrence terms, insignificant. To be effective, the prospect of deterrence must be visible ex
ante. So viewed, the deterrent effect of federal habeas review of
defaulted claims is likely to be trivial. The police handle a great
many cases. In some cases, constitutional violations would be so
obvious and so central as to preclude prosecution altogether. In
those cases that go to trial, arguable constitutional violations will
almost certainly be raised by defense counsel. The few exceptions,
such as Kimmelman, cannot be identified in advance. And any cost
to the police in terms of lost convictions will be long delayed. It
will come after trial, default, conviction, and affirmance on appeal.
Thus, although the matter is incapable of quantification, we are
confident that the incremental deterrent effect of federal habeas
review of defaulted constitutional claims is vanishingly slight. 61
federal judiciary, government lawyers, and litigants in other cases who suffer delays because
of crowded dockets.
•• This is the standard judicial justification for exclusion of evidence. See, for example,
United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906 (1984); Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 486-88 (1976);
and United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347-48 (1974). To be sure, some Justices offer
different justifications, as noted in James v Illinois, 110 S Ct 648, 651 n 1 (1990), but deterrence is, and has been for some time, the only rationale that commands a Supreme Court
majority.
0
•
At the outset, one should note an important, though not in itself debilitating, limitation of this argument. Granting habeas relief can, at most, deter constitutional violations by
those who are trying to keep convicted defendants in jail. It cannot deter defense counsel,
who presumably have a different objective. If anything (we would guess that the effect is
small), defense counsel might have a greater incentive to raise claims in timely fashion if
they knew that their mistakes were irrevocable. On the other hand, it may be that any such
effect would be offset by the stigmatization of a finding of ineffectiveness, which would increase rather than decrease the cost to the lawyer of procedural default. On balance, the
deterrent effect on defense counsel is probably not significant one way or the other, and we
therefore discount the effect on attorneys as a reason for granting or denying habeas relief.
1
•
This conclusion is buttressed by the absence of a comparable deterrence argument in
roughly analogous civil contexts. No one claims that a plaintiff who loses a product liability
case by failing to object to the introduction of some piece of evidence ought to be permitted
to relitigate the case in order to deter unsafe product design. In the civil context, the as-
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Of course, there is another possible target of deterrence. Federal habeas review might be directed not so much against state law
enforcement officers as against state judges. 62 The Supreme Court
does not often say much about this point, but one's view of the
integrity and reliability of state courts is perhaps the single most
important factor in determining the appropriate role for federal
habeas corpus.
In defense of our proposed standard, we offer two observations. First, distrust of state courts warrants federal court relitigation of previously considered claims more than it warrants consideration of defaulted claims. In other words, a frank mistrust of
state courts would more nearly justify Brown v Allen than Fay v
Noia. 63 And if one were to assume that state courts systematically
skew Fourth Amendment decisions in favor of the government, the
sensible response would be to overrule Stone v Powell 64 and institute routine federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims
heard and rejected in state court. Absent such review, it is hard to
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sumption is that neutral procedural rules generate about an even number of mistaken outcomes on each side, and that any bias from such rules is small. To be sure, the civil and
criminal contexts differ in important respects, but the differences do not substantially undermine this conclusion. Also, the fact that tort scholarship, which is dominated by incentive and deterrence arguments, has paid no notice to the effects of procedural timing rules
on primary conduct suggests that the ultimate effects on deterrence are probably too small
to worry about in both contexts.
There may be one class of cases where this point does not hold true. Where government
officials conceal evidence of their own misconduct, habeas review, while flawed, may be the
only deterrent available. But note that such misconduct will usually implicate innocence
concerns: a prosecutor who suppresses evidence of the defendant's innocence gives the defendant a viable claim under any theory of prejudice. As for other claims, such as that the
government suppressed evidence of grand jury discrimination, the proper solution may be to
require state courts to hear such federal claims in the first instance, rather than to remedy
the problem via the law of defaulted claims. In any event, cases of this sort must be a small
subset of the cases governed by Sykes and Strickland, and can hardly justify treating all
outcome effects alike under those doctrines.
•• For an extended argument that federal habeas should play precisely this role, see
Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991 (1985).
•• In Brown u Allen, 344 US 443 (1953), the Court determined that federal courts
should hear and decide federal constitutional claims that were rejected on the merits in
state court. In Fay u Noia, 372 US 391 (1963), the Court held that federal courts should
reach the merits of defaulted constitutional claims-Le., claims that had never been decided
on the merits-unless the habeas petitioner deliberately withheld his claim in state court.
It is worth noting that Fay might be a good response to state court intransigence if
there were reason to believe that state courts were stretching procedural default rules to bar
subsequent federal habeas review of constitutional claims. In our view, the best solution to
that problem is to regulate state procedural default rules directly, to ensure that they (1)
are not unreasonably harsh, and (2) are applied fairly. For purposes of our argument, we
take as a given that the state rules governing procedural defaults meet these standards.
.. 428 us 465 (1976).
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believe that the behavior of state judges would be much influenced
by the prospect of federal habeas review of the occasional case
where a winning Fourth Amendment claim is defaulted by defense
counsel. The exceptional nature of such cases, the difficulty of
their identification, and the long delay in obtaining judgments suggest that habeas review of defaulted claims would have little bearing on the general behavior of state judges. We think the system is
therefore free to decide defaulted claims with a view toward insuring just outcomes in those cases rather than in pursuit of some
more general deterrence of state judges.
More broadly, and perhaps more importantly, we do not believe that any generalized mistrust of state courts is warranted today. Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court's docket twenty or
thirty years ago could scarcely have escaped noticing that some
state courts, particularly in some areas and particularly with respect to some litigants, were hostile to the enforcement of federal
rights. If, as we think, state courts were generally inhospitable to
federal rights, habeas review offered the only corrective; direct Supreme Court review of large numbers of federal claims was obviously impossible. Today, however, a review of the Supreme Court's
docket confirms that state court enforcement of the Constitution
has vastly improved. The Court sees mostly cases that we would
describe as borderline-disputes concerning the marginalia of constitutional requirements-rather than, as was once true, cases suggesting wholesale disinterest in constitutional guarantees. There is
some evidence to support this view, 66 but it is ultimately as much a
question of evaluation as of observation. In any event, we record
our views frankly, not because they are directly relevant to the
problem of defaulted claims, but because they form the essential
background of our general views on the appropriate role of federal
habeas corpus.
2.

Equality among defendants.

A second possible justification for an outcome-oriented definition of "prejudice" is equality among defendants. Kimmelman, one
might say, is not really about the need to deter unconstitutional
searches or to ensure that state judges take such claims seriously.
Rather, one might argue, Neil Morrison should be granted relief
•• See Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Preliminary Study, 77 Georgetown L J 251 (1988) (concluding, based on a study of appellate
opinions in nine states, that state courts do not systematically err in the government's favor
in adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims).
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because a similarly situated defendant with a better lawyer would
have raised the Fourth Amendment claim, had the bedsheet suppressed, and vitiated the prosecutor's case. Quite plausibly, such a
defendant would have been acquitted. There is something wrong,
the argument goes, with a system that sends Morrison to jail but
lets his hypothetical counterpart rapist go free, where the only difference between the two is the performance of their lawyers. Gary
Goodpaster has put the point as follows:
Fairness to the defendant also requires that criminal defendants be treated evenhandedly. Equal protection principles
should ensure that the criminal justice system, which relies on
defense attorneys of widely varying abilities, skills, knowledge,
industry, and professional moralities, does not treat similarly
situated defendants unequally. Similar defendants who have
committed similar crimes under similar circumstances ought
not to receive vastly different dispositions because of their respective lawyers' varying professional attributes. 66
This intuition has widespread currency, both in the classroom
and among thoughtful scholars, but we nevertheless think it wrong.
For one thing, the argument proves too much. The inequality complained of is not unique to an innocence-based construction of
"prejudice." It exists also under the current regime. Under Sykes a
non-ineffective lawyer's error binds the client, placing the defendant in a worse position than a hypothetical defendant who is similarly situated but better represented. Nor could the problem be
solved by returning to the Fay rule that claims are defaulted only
by the defendant's deliberate bypass, or even by eliminating procedural defaults altogether. So long as some defendants have better
lawyers than others, similarly situated defendants will fare differently-unequally, if you will-because of their attorneys.
But this objection strikes only a glancing blow at the equality
argument. That across-the-board equality cannot be achieved
hardly compels indifference to inequalities that can be corrected.
Our greater objection is that the particular inequality in question,
while troubling, does not have the moral force commonly ascribed
to it. To see why that is so, one need only shift attention from the
small-scale inequality among those prosecuted with varying grades
of defense counsel to the large-scale inequality between those who
are prosecuted for their crimes and those who are not. Many, probably most, criminals are not caught, and many of those who are
•• Goodpaster, 14 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 65 (cited in note 20) .
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caught are not prosecuted, in some instances because of police
oversight or mistake. The inequality between those who are and
those who are not caught and tried dwarfs any inequality about
which someone in Morrison's position can complain. Yet the much
greater arbitrariness resulting from imperfect law enforcement is
not commonly thought to raise serious fairness concerns.
Consider the following example. Two confederates rob a bank.
One is more slow-footed, less quick-witted, or more easily recognized than the other, and he is caught and convicted. The other
gets away. The convicted robber undoubtedly feels aggrieved, but
no one, to our knowledge, believes that he has a strong moral claim
to equal treatment with his more fortunate confederate. This conclusion does not depend on the supposition that the reasons for the
different outcomes were beyond the government's control. The
lucky robber might escape only because of police negligence (failure to follow obvious leads, failure to take a suspect into custody at
the first opportunity, etc.). Indeed, he might escape punishment
only because of unconstitutional police behavior. If the police illegally search his apartment, he would have a Fourth Amendment
claim while another robber would not. Again, no one, to our knowledge, suggests that a properly prosecuted defendant should escape
punishment simply because the police erred in searching another.
The conviction of the one bank robber is not unjust, but merely
unlucky. 67
Neil Morrison is in a position very much like the unlucky bank
robber. A factor unrelated to moral blameworthiness (police error
or lack of foot speed in the one case, a lawyer's mistake in the
other) is a but-for cause of his conviction. A perfectly just system
might acquit both Morrison and the bank robber on that ground,
for different treatment of like cases is surely a vice. In a system
striving to do justice within real-world constraints, however, the
bank robber's conviction is always deemed just because the defendant did in fact commit the crime charged. The same should be
17
To be sure, commentators do complain about the broad scope of prosecutorial discretion, but not out of concern for these kinds of formally "unequal" outcomes. The most common concern is that, because of their vast authority, prosecutors may do a good deal of
under-the-table lawmaking and may exercise their discretion on illegitimate (and not simply
arbitrary) grounds. See, for example, James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 Harv L Rev 1521, 1555-57 (1981). Commentators also note that prosecutors may
have incentives to not exercise their discretion in a consistently public-interested manner.
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J Legal
Stud 43, 49-53 (1988). These arguments identify systemic problems associated with
prosecutorial discretion, but they do not question the fairness of particular charging decisions to the particular individuals involved.
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true for Morrison. Comparing him to another with a better lawyer
may prompt regret about the role of chance in life (and in the administration of criminal justice), but it cannot make a sufficiently
strong moral case for exculpation. Were it otherwise, any defendant could escape punishment simply by pointi~g to others, no less
guilty, who avoided criminal liability due to some police or
prosecutorial mistake.
A narrower version of the equality argument might seem more
promising. Some factors affecting the outcome of trials, even
though unrelated to the factual guilt or moral culpability of the
defendant, should be excluded because they are invidious. Race is
the plainest example, but perhaps not the only one. Pursuing this
line of reasoning, one might point out that attorney mistakes likely
correlate with client poverty, since poor defendants have court-appointed, and perhaps low-quality, counsel. In this view, the real
problem with letting the Kimmelman conviction stand is that it
may hurt defendants who are poor68 and result in a particular kind
of inequality between poor and non-poor defendants. 69
Here, too, the equality argument cuts too broadly to be convincing. Wealth effects are not limited to, nor are they produced
by, trial procedure. A large portion of the prison population are
persons who, one might think, would not be there had they been
born into middle-class homes. We do not indulge the common but
insulting assumption that poor people commit crimes simply because they are poor. But we do think it plausible that many persons who commit crimes would not be the persons they are (and
also would not face the temptations they face) had they been born
into better economic circumstances. Their claim of invidious treatment on account of wealth seems at least as strong as Morrison's,
in the sense that poverty plausibly might be (but in any individual
case cannot be proved to be) a but-for cause of punishment.
Most courts and scholars have concluded, however, that punishing such people is not unjust, even if it reminds us of unattractive features of our society, because poverty did not in any real
sense compel the commission of crime. 70 In other words, the persons in question (at least by hypothesis) could have chosen not to
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•• This problem may not have occurred in Kimmelman itself, where the defendant retained private counsel.
•• Perhaps we should say rich and non-rich defendants, for poor defendants are not the
only ones who could have a complaint based on wealth inequality. Anyone unable to hire the
best could make a similar claim.
1
• See, for example, United States v Alexander, 471 F2d 923, 968 (DC Cir 1973); Sanford H . Kadish, Blame and Punishment 102-03 (MacMillan, 1987); and Stephen J . Morse,
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commit crimes, as do most persons who are similarly situated.
Their actions are in a sense "caused" by many factors, some of
which have no just bearing on punishment. But so long as the
defendant's own choice was one cause of the criminal conduct, conviction is just. 71
Both for Morrison and for those defendants who might not
have committed crimes but for their poverty, the inequality is
something to be regretted. At the same time, the poor defendants
surely have the stronger claim for relief; they would not have committed crimes at all but for their poverty. Since that claim is not
granted by our criminal justice system, it is hard to see why Morrison's should be; his claim is only that he would have been able to
escape punishment for his crimes had he been wealthier.
Finally, it is important to note that not all constitutional
rights intrinsically require equal treatment of all individuals who
may be affected by their administration. Constitutional criminal
procedure contains many rules designed to deter governmental
misconduct. Implementing these rules benefits some defendants,
but that benefit is incidental to the purpose of the rules. It follows
that the benefits of such rules need not be made equally available
to all, just as the benefits of, say, a punitive damages award in a
civil case need not be equally distributed to all victims of the defendant's tortious misconduct. Where a given constitutional requirement is designed to deter police misconduct across the board
rather than to secure correct outcomes in individual cases, there is
no a priori reason why the protection of that requirement should
be equally or comprehensively available to all defendants.

The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Baze/on, 49 S Cal L Rev 1247,
1251-54 (1976).
As the title of Morse's article suggests, the most prominent dissent from these views is
David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S Cal L Rev 385, 388-98 (1976).
For a recent response to Judge Bazelon and to his critics, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Just
Punishment in an Imperfect World, 87 Mich L Rev 1263, 1287-92 (1989) (reviewing David
L. Bazelon, Questioning Authority: Justice and Criminal Law (Knopf, 1988), and suggesting that punishment of the sort described in the text is not fair but is nonetheless
necessary).
71
The key to this familiar point is to recognize that while many factors, some of them
random, may "cause" a criminal action, causation does not logically negate responsible
choice. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal L Rev 1091, 1139-48
(1985); Stephen J. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 35, 42-50 (U Nebraska, 1986). The argument is that in
many cases both of the following propositions are true: (1) the defendant would not have
committed the crime but for his (economically or otherwise) deprived background and circumstances; and (2) most persons from the same background and circumstances would not
commit comparable crimes.
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of harmless error. 79 Many, probably most, constitutional violations
go unremedied because they are harmless. They are harmless, that
is, in that they do not affect outcomes. Viewed from a symbolic
concern for the affirmation of rights, constitutional violations that
do not affect outcomes might not be harmless at all. Though superficially plausible, this view is widely rejected because it would demand a perfection in the administration of justice that no human
institution can achieve. Therefore, affirmation of rights is usually
said to require the remedying of all non-harmless errors, although
it is hard to see why that is anything more than an arbitrary stop
in the reasoning.
More commonly, the concern for affirmation of rights takes
the form of the negative claim that there should be no hierarchy
among constitutional rights. This is an important assertion, for it
poses the chief rhetorical barrier to differentiating among claims
according to their impact on innocence. Rebuttal is essential to our
case, and requires separate consideration of two allied strands of
the argument: first, that the Constitution itself admits of no hierarchy of rights; and second, that in any event the habeas corpus
statute does not permit differentiation among the rights to be
enforced.
The assertion that the Constitution admits of no ranking of
rights or values is commonly made, 80 but deeply puzzling. In a
sense, all of modern constitutional law is to the contrary. The famous footnote four of Carolene Products is celebrated precisely
because it laid the foundation for a redirection of emphasis among
constitutional rights. 81 Modern theorists do battle over the criteria
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•• The Supreme Court has emphasized that, with rare exceptions, errors that clearly
did not affect the outcome of a criminal proceeding cannot justify reversal. See, for example,
Rose v Clark, 478 US 570, 579 (1986) ("The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct
judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment
should be affirmed.").
For a recent, comprehensive effort to unravel the Court's harmless-error jurisprudence
(and also to suggest some changes), see Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 Colum L Rev 79 (1988).
•• See, for example, Friedman, 73 Minn L Rev at 320 (cited in note 19) ("ranking of
constitutional rights finds no basis in the habeas statute or the Constitution itself'); and
Stacy and Dayton, 88 Colum L Rev at 90 (cited in note 79) ("The Constitution does not
create a hierarchy of rights or values.").
1
•
United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938). There is a massive literature on Carolene Product's transformation of constitutional law. For some deservedly famous discussions, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard, 1980);
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713 (1985).
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for constitutional adjudication, but all envision something other
than a featureless plane of undifferentiated rights. No one thinks
the Second Amendment is as important as the First, or that the
cumulation of precedent leaves the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments effectively unranked. The "economic" and "personal" aspects of constitutionally protected "liberty" have been sharply distinguished;82 the apparent exclusivity of Article III adjudication is
more hole than cheese; 83 and the Commerce Clause has expanded
beyond recognition. 84 Whatever may be said for or against these
decisions, they all proceed from the common ground that there is a
hierarchy among constitutional protections. The only sense in
which this is not true is the verbal sleight of hand that some rights
have been greatly expanded, while others have been defined away,
but that all rights, as reconstructed, have a sort of nominal equality. This fiction is too threadbare to require rebuttal.
The real point of the no-hierarchy-of-rights rhetoric, we believe, is not that differentiation among constitutional rights is inherently wrong, but that it is impermissible to introduce such differentiation into the law of habeas corpus. The contention is that
rights that are vindicated on direct appeal must also prevail on
collateral review. Properly understood, this argument is not about
the nature of constitutional rights but about the scope of federal
habeas corpus.
Both commentators and Supreme Court justices have observed that the federal habeas statute gives no textual warrant for
differentiating among constitutional rights. 811 That is true. It is also
true that virtually all ingredients of federal habeas law were announced without statutory authority. At least since 1886, federal
habeas law has developed by judicial innovation, followed (sometimes) by legislative ratification. This is true of the exhaustion re11
Compare, for example, the deference paid to state rules that affect individuals' interest in choosing their occupations, see Williamson u Lee Optical Co., 348 US 483 (1955), with
the exacting scrutiny paid to state regulation of personal associations, Moore u City of East
Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977).
11
Northern Pipeline Co. u Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982), may represent
the last bit of cheese.
.. For two examples of the limitless reach of the Clause, see Garcia u San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985); and Wickard u Filburn, 317 US 111
(1942).
11
See Stone u Powell, 428 US at 503-06, 515-33 (Brennan dissenting); J. Patrick Green,
Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger Court, 10 Creighton L Rev 655 (1977);
and Mark Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L Rev 1301, 1316-18 (1978).
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quirement, which was announced in 1886, 86 codified in 1948,87 and
has been significantly modified since then. 88 It is also true of the
range of legal issues that, once heard in state court, could be relitigated on federal habeas corpus. Decisions early in this century defined a relatively narrow scope for relitigation (whether in accord
with congressional intent, we do not say). 89 The range of such
claims cognizable on federal habeas review was expanded in Brown
u Allen°0 and partly contracted in Stone u Powell, 91 all without aid
of statutory intervention. Similarly, the scope of relitigation of the
facts underlying federal claims was first announced by decision 92
and only later codified by statute. 93
Finally, and most to the point, judicial innovation has determined the scope of habeas review for defaulted claims. Whatever
one might say about the supposed original intent of the habeas
statute, 94 federal habeas review of defaulted claims was at first

88
87

Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886).
Act of June 25, 1948, ch 646, 62 Stat 967 (1948), codified at 28 USC § 2254(b),(c)

(1982).
See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982).
This historical issue has occasioned a good deal of debate. The standard argument
that Congress intended the 1867 habeas statute to cover only jurisdictional claims is made
in Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 463-77 (cited in note 53). For the argument that the statute was
meant to cover a much larger category of claims, see Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 579, 603-63 (1982).
•• 344 US 443 (1953). Brown extended the scope of federal habeas to federal constitutional claims generally, holding that it did not apply merely to claims bearing on the jurisdiction or authority of the relevant state court.
1
•
428 US 465. Stone barred relitigation of Fourth Amendment claims, save where the
defendant did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court.
•• Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293 (1963).
•• Act of Nov 2, 1966, Pub L No 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat 1105 (1966), codified at 28 USC
§ 2254(d) (1982). Section 2254 requires a federal habeas court to defer to "a determination
after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court." Interestingly, the
statutory amendment departed from the Court's pronouncements in a way that, although
seemingly significant, was not given effect until the Court itself decided to constrict the
scope of factual relitigation. Sumner v Mata, 449 US 539 (1981), on review following remand, 455 US 591 (1982) (per curiam), held that § 2254(d) applies when a state appellate
court made the factual findings, as well as when a trial court made the factual findings. In
Mata, the majority's ahistorical emphasis on statutory text had a constrictive rather than
expansive effect on the scope of the federal habeas remedy, perhaps explaining why the
approach has not received approval from all quarters. Compare Mata, 449 US at 544-49
(majority opinion undertaking a close text-bound construction of§ 2254(d)) with id at 55559 (Brennan dissenting) (emphasizing prior Supreme Court decisions rather than the statutory text).
•• Compare Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 399-415 (1963) (arguing from history for broadly
available habeas relief for defaulted claims) with id at 449-63 (Harlan dissenting) (arguing
from history for the opposite conclusion).
88
89
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completely foreclosed, 96 then substantially allowed, 96 and later
partly restricted, 97 all without statutory change. Indeed, the issue
is not now, and never has been, expressly resolved by statute.
Against this background, one can hardly insist on the primacy
of legislative innovation in the law of federal habeas corpus. To
put the matter bluntly, it is simply too late in the day to assert a
lack of judicial authority to reform habeas law. 98 No doubt the separation of powers argument, as it is sometimes called, is attractive
to one who is alarmed at the direction of judicial innovation, but
this kind of tactical response will not do. Judicial authority to expand habeas review necessarily implies the authority to restrict it
also. That, at least, is the view taken by the Supreme Court, 99 and
we think it fairly meets the expectations in this field. At the very
least, it applies where, as here, prior decisions have not been
codified.
This is not to say that Congress could not override the Court's
decisions, nor that a genuine legislative command ought not be
respected. It is only to acknowledge that the pattern of statutory
amendment in this area has been merely to confirm judicially announced changes in the law. We suggest that this tradition should
be presumed to continue, unless and until Congress indicates its
dissatisfaction.
In short, there is nothing inherently wrong with differentiating
among constitutional rights, either directly or as a condition of
habeas review. The question is not whether such distinctions are in
principle permissible-surely they are-but whether they are wise.
In our view, it is wise to differentiate among constitutional claims
according to whether they raise a "reasonable possibility" of factually erroneous conviction (or factually unsupported sentence of
death), at least when these claims were defaulted in state court.
This approach would, in most cases, respect the states' interests in
finality of judgments and in enforcing legitimate procedural requirements. At the same time, it would vindicate the overriding

.. Brown u Allen, 344 US 443 (1953).
" Fay, 372 US 391.
.., Sykes, 433 US 72; Carrier, 477 US 478 .
.. David Shapiro has argued that this proposition extends well beyond federal habeas:
that the exercise of judicial discretion is a proper and useful part of defining the bounds of
federal jurisdiction as a general matter. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion,
60 NYU L Rev 543 (1985).
" See Sykes, 433 US at 81 (analysis of Court's habeas decisions "illustrates this Court's
historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even
where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged.") .
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federal interest in hearing federal claims suggesting unjust conviction or punishment. The federal interest would be addressed directly, without the deflective intermediate step of categorizing reasons for the default. Defaulted federal claims that do not arguably
demonstrate innocence (or unjustified sentence of death) would
not be heard on habeas corpus, simply because there is no compelling reason to do so.
4.

Attorney ineffectiveness and pervasive neglect.

Paradoxically, review of non-guilt-related defaulted claims
might be thought necessary to protect innocence. One could argue
that a defense attorney's incompetent handling of an issue signals
possible incompetence in other areas-including matters not
known to the court or, for that matter, to the defendant. This
point suggests that even if the law were concerned solely with
preventing unjust convictions, attorney ineffectiveness could be a
useful tool for determining which convictions are unjust. Indeed,
the Strickland Court suggested as much, in the course of explaining why it was not adopting an even more stringent prejudice standard than reasonable probability.100
The idea of attorney error as a sign of pervasive neglect implies that claims of the sort raised in K immelman must be heard
not because those claims themselves suggest injustice, but because
the underlying attorney errors do. One might say that in Kimmelman, for example, the defense attorney's failure to move to
suppress the bedsheet calls into question the competence of the
rest of his representation. Perhaps, the argument goes, Neil Morrison was not really guilty, but was convicted only because an attorney foolish enough not to file a suppression motion was also sufficiently inept to botch an available factual defense. 101
This point has some rough plausibility. It is a familiar idea
that one instance of misconduct may be evidence of other undiscovered misconduct, and this proposition surely holds true of professional incompetence. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
weigh this chain of inferences too heavily. The fact that errors
100
See Strickland, 466 US at 694 (rejecting the more-probable-than-not outcome determinative standard used for newly-discovered evidence claims, and noting that "[a]n ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of
the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate
standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower").
101
See Strickland, 466 US at 710 (Marshall dissenting); and Berger, 86 Colum L Rev at
92-93 (cited in note 20). This, of course, is the accuracy-based argument for the performance
prong.
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sometimes come in bunches does not change the fact that they
often come alone. More importantly, the signaling argument requires simultaneous acceptance of three propositions: that the error in question indicates a substantial likelihood of other errors;
that those other errors bear on the defendant's guilt or innocence;
and that those other errors are undiscoverable. For if errors that
suggest injustice are uncovered, they can support a claim directly,
making it unnecessary to use non-guilt-related errors as a marker
for pervasive incompetence. We think it likely that Kimmelmantype mistakes coexist only rarely with other, undiscoverable errors
that result in the conviction of innocent defendants.
This conclusion is reinforced by another aspect of ineffective
assistance doctrine. In United States u Cronic, the Court held that
truly pervasive neglect by counsel (or action by the government
that pervasively prevented counsel from doing his or her job) requires reversal without any showing of prejudice. 102 Although the
Court discussed pervasive neglect in the context of a claim that
defense counsel lacked adequate time to prepare the case, there is
no reason why Cronic should be limited to that context. When a
defense attorney makes a series of mistakes rather than an isolated
error, the inference of pervasive neglect is much stronger. Accordingly, when a defense attorney has made a series of clear misjudgments, the case should be treated as one where the possibility of
injustice is high regardless of the nature of the attorney's mistakes. This would require some expansion of Cronic's scope, but
the expansion seems wholly appropriate.103 In short, Cronic implements the signaling insight by allowing for relief when there is reason to believe that counsel did many things badly. Given the
Cronic remedy, it seems excessive to assume pervasive neglect
based only on evidence of one discrete attorney mistake, even if
the error was serious.

1
•• 466 US 648, 657-62 (1984) (prejudice may be presumed when there has been "a
breakdown in the adversarial process that would justify a presumption that [the defendant's] conviction was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution").
108
Lower courts have generally assumed that Cronic applies to pervasive defense attorney neglect, and not simply to excessive constraints placed on defense counsel by the government. See LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.l0(a) at 39 n 22.8, § 11.lO(d) at
51 n 76.10 (Supp 1989) (cited in note 39). At the same time, the lower courts have defined
pervasive neglect very narrowly. Id. If the courts reduced the number of Strickland claims
by defining prejudice in guilt-related terms, they could expand the scope of Cronic by defining pervasive neglect to include all cases with a large number of serious attorney errors.

~
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DEFINING AND APPLYING A GUILT-RELATED PREJUDICE
STANDARD

We have suggested that the law of defaulted claims should be
radically simplified by limiting relief to cases where the defendant
can show that the default created a reasonable possibility of an
unjust result. What that standard would mean in practice depends
on how it is applied. In particular, any rule for defaulted claims
must take account of the different categories of constitutional rules
at issue in federal habeas. Some constitutional claims are wholly
unrelated to guilt. Others clearly bear on the accuracy of the defendant's conviction. A third category of claims invoke constitutional rules that enhance the accuracy of criminal adjudications
generally, but have an indeterminate effect on any particular case.
Finally, an increasing number of federal habeas petitions challenge
death sentences rather than criminal convictions. These different
types of constitutional claims raise different issues of habeas administration, and complicate the definition and application of any
rule for defaulted claims. What follows is an attempt to deal with
these differences in a way that is consistent with a focus on
preventing unjust outcomes, but that avoids the complexity of the
Court's defaulted claims jurisprudence.
To explain how our proposed standard might work in practice,
we apply it to four of the Court's recent procedural default decisions, representing the four kinds of federal constitutional claims
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Kimmelman v Morrison involved a Fourth Amendment claim unrelated to the defendant's
guilt. The defendant in Murray v Carrier raised a due process
claim that went directly to the accuracy of his conviction. Teague v
Lane offers an example of a systemic accuracy-enhancing rule that
may or may not have affected the outcome in that particular case.
Finally, Dugger v Adams involved an Eighth Amendment challenge to the defendant's death sentence.
A.

Non-Guilt-Related Claims: Kimmelman v Morrison 10•
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u

opene
chancJ
racy o
non-n:
curac)
been t
revieV1
not a1
compe
convio
It
travag
thing
should
speaki
than 2
COUnSE

the gt

T
faulte~
We ale
it diffi
faulte
of litii
two c1
claims
parity
as well
portun

B.

Kimmelman, for us, is an easy case. The defendant had a
plausible claim that the bedsheet introduced in his rape trial had
been illegally seized. Defense counsel did not object to the evidence in a timely fashion. The evidence was therefore admitted,
and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court found that
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the lawyer's error could show ineffective assistance of counsel,
which would support federal habeas review of the defaulted Fourth
Amendment claim.
Under our approach, the defaulted claim would not be reopened. Whatever the character of the lawyer's error, there is no
chance that the failure to ask for suppression impaired the accuracy of the conviction. On the contrary, the admission of relevant,
non-misleading physical evidence could only have enhanced the accuracy of the outcome, however unwelcome that effect may have
been to a guilty defendant. We therefore would have denied habeas
review, unless it could have been shown that the lawyer's error was
not an isolated default, but rather part of a larger pattern of incompetence that undermined the reliability of the defendant's
conviction .
It is perhaps conceivable that an isolated error could be so extravagant as to call into question the lawyer's ability to do anything else correctly, but we think that kind of loose inference
should prevail, if at all, only in extraordinary cases. Generally
speaking, pervasive incompetence should require proof of more
than an isolated mistake-particularly where, as in Kimmelman,
counsel's error seems to have actually increased the reliability of
the guilt determination.
The same result would follow in virtually every case of a defaulted Fourth Amendment claim. We think that entirely proper.
We also note that our approach has the advantage (others will view
it differently) of aligning the Sykes standard for review of defaulted claims with the Stone v Powell limitation of habeas review
of litigated claims. It is an indictment of current law that these
two channels for federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims are unaccountably divergent. We see no reason for the disparity and would extend the policy of Stone v Powell to defaulted
as well as litigated claims, so long as there was a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in state court.
B. Guilt-Related Claims: Murray v Carrier106

Prior to Carrier's trial for rape and abduction, his lawyer
sought to discover the victim's statements to the police. The trial
judge examined the statements in camera, concluded that none
was exculpatory, and denied discovery. This was almost surely error, since, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, "the

•

••• 477

us 478 (1986).
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conclusion that there was no 'exculpatory' material in the victim's
statements does not foreclose the possibility that inconsistencies
between the statements and the direct testimony would have enabled an effective cross-examination to demonstrate that [Carrier]
is actually innocent."1° 6 In an apparent oversight, Carrier's lawyer
failed to include the discovery claim in his petition for appeal,
thereby defaulting the claim under state law. The Supreme Court
concluded that (1) the Sykes cause-and-prejudice test applies to
procedural defaults on appeal as well as at trial, 107 and (2) nonineffective lawyer error was not "cause" for a procedural default. 108
(The Court also said that ineffective assistance would constitute
"cause," but that this claim should be exhausted in state court
before federal habeas review.) 109 Since Carrier did not claim that
the lawyer's oversight amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, the default was conclusive.
Our approach to this case would be more direct. We would ask
only if there was a "reasonable possibility" that the failure to make
the victim's statements available to defense counsel resulted in the
conviction of one who was factually innocent. Answering that question would require an analysis of the statements Carrier sought to
discover, together with the victim's testimony at Carrier's trial, to
determine whether the course of the trial plausibly could have
been different had defense counsel known the contents of the
statements. We have not examined the record, and cannot say
what conclusion that analysis would yield. But we are confident
that it focuses on the right question.
This approach should not be especially burdensome for federal
habeas courts. Indeed, courts should find our analysis natural,
since it is precisely the analysis that governs the merits of Carrier's
claim. Carrier's claim is that the government failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence. Under a line of cases governing prosecutors' duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, a defendant is entitled to have his conviction overturned if the nondisclosure of such
evidence created a reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome.110 Satisfying this standard would necessarily satisfy our proposed prejudice standard. Thus, under our approach, Carrier's
, .. Id at 499 (Stevens concurring).
Id at 490-92 (majority opinion).
,.. Id at 485-88.
109
Id at 488-89.
110
See United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985); United States v Agurs, 427 US 97
(1976); and Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963).
101

iii
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claim should be granted if it is a valid claim on the merits, and not
otherwise. The presence or absence of "cause"-the issue that
dominated forty-five pages in the United States Reports-would
be irrelevant.
Our approach is similar to, but a good deal simpler than, that
offered by Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in Carrier. m
Stevens argued that the focus should be on "prejudice" rather than
on "cause" whenever the claim relates to fundamental fairness, a
category that, for Stevens, would extend beyond guilt-relatedness.112 Otherwise, apparently, the ordinary cause and prejudice
test would apply. Additionally, in cases where the claim does relate
to fundamental fairness, Stevens apparently would require a federal habeas court to balance the interests protected by the claim
against the state's interest in enforcing the relevant procedural
rule. 113 It is not clear how courts are supposed to balance such incommensurate interests in specific cases, and we think the inquiry
is in any event unnecessary. It would be sufficient-and a good
deal easier-to ask directly whether Carrier had shown a "reasonable possibility" of a factually unreliable conviction and there let
the matter rest.
C. Claims Involving Systemic Accuracy-Enhancing Rules:
Teague u Lane 114

Teague, a black man, was convicted of attempted murder,
armed robbery, and aggravated battery by an all-white jury. The
prosecutor had obtained the all-white jury by using all ten of his
peremptory challenges against blacks. Teague's lawyer objected on
the ground that this process violated the Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury represent a fair cross-section of the community; this objection was overruled. On federal habeas corpus,
Teague pressed three related claims: (1) that the prosecutor violated Batson u Kentucky ,115 which announced, after Teague's trial,
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited (at least in some circumstances) the race-based use of peremptory challenges; (2) that
the prosecutor also violated the more lax pre-Batson equal protec477 US at 497-516 (Stevens concurring).
See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens dissenting) .
111
See Carrier, 477 US at 506 (Stevens concurring) ("An inquiry into the requirements
of justice requires a consideration, not only of the nature and strength of the constitutional
claim, but also of the nature and strength of the state procedural rule that has not been
observed.").
m 109 S Ct 1060 (1989).
111
476 us 79 (1986).
111

111
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tion standard of Swain v Alabama; 116 and (3) that the prosecutor
violated the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement.
T.he Court's resolution of these claims illustrates the excessive
proceduralization of habeas review. Each theory was rejected for a
different reason, none of which addressed the merits of the relevant claim. First, the Batson argument was rejected on the ground
that, as the Court had held previously, 117 Batson did not apply to
convictions that had become final before the decision was announced. Second, the Swain claim was rejected because it had
been defaulted: Teague's lawyer had not raised the equal protection argument at trial or on direct appeal. Finally, and most importantly, the fair cross-section claim was rejected because it required a departure from existing Sixth Amendment doctrine. A
plurality of the Court declared that new rules of that sort 118 could
not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus. The plurality concluded that the new rule sought by Teague could be approved only if other litigants in his position would also enjoy its
benefit. Since a new Sixth Amendment requirement governing peremptory challenges would not apply retroactively on federal
habeas corpus (as in Batson), neither could it be announced on
federal habeas corpus. 119 In other words, the Court concluded that
even if Teague's Sixth Amendment claim was valid, he could not
get the benefit of it on federal habeas corpus. The Court thus denied all three related claims without reaching the merits of any of
them.
Teague provides wonderful fodder for law school exam questions, but it only complicates the administration of habeas corpus.
The retroactivity tangle that dominated the opinion and the proce-

• 380 US 202 (1965). Under Swain, defendants had to prove, in essence, a pattern of
race-based peremptory challenges unrelated to the nature of the case or the defendant. See
id at 223-24 (describing the kind of evidence that would give rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination). A defendant could not make out an equal protection claim based
solely on the prosecutor's decision to strike members of the defendant's race in the defendant's case.
117
See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) (per curiam).
11
• A different result might have been reached had the new rule concerned a procedure
"without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 109 S Ct at
1076-77.
110
The retroactivity analysis was announced in a plurality opinion by Justice
O'Connor, joined on this point by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice White did not join this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, although his separate
opinion does not disagree with the plurality's analysis or result. See id at 1078-79 (White
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In any event, a majority of the Court
later adopted Teague's retroactivity analysis and applied it to rules governing the imposition of capital punishment. See Penry v Lynaugh, 109 S Ct 2934, 2944-47 (1989).
11
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dural bar doctrine that precluded the Swain claim share a common
objective. Both are designed to allow relief in cases of injustice, but
otherwise to avoid wholesale collateral review of federal claims. 120
Teague illustrates the complexities of an essentially procedural approach to this objective. Yet the issue is not so difficult if approached directly.
We would ask simply whether the prosecutor's conduct in
striking blacks from the jury raised a "reasonable possibility" of a
factually unreliable conviction. Quite possibly, such a showing
could be made. The r ace-based use of peremptory challenges would
tend to undermine the accuracy of determinations of guilt, at least
in close cases. Thus, in a general way, the Batson rule is designed
to secure just outcomes, not merely to deter misconduct that is
otherwise objectionable. 121 The force of this point is amplified
when one remembers that the accuracy of conviction concerns not
merely the fact, but also the grade, of criminal liability. Even if it
were clear beyond doubt that Teague was guilty of some form of
assaultive behavior, the jury may have had room for judgment as
to the appropriate grade of criminal liability. 122 Accordingly, we
think it likely that Teague could have shown a "reasonable possibility" of factual error, and, in any event, that this is the right battleground. If such error could be shown, it is simply intolerable not
to grant relief.
Having said that, we add that cases like Teague raise difficult
administrative issues: they involve protections that promote accuracy in a systemic sense, yet do not necessarily affect accuracy in
any particular case. In other words, the fact that the Batson rule
was designed in part to promote accuracy does not mean that
every violation of that rule creates a significant risk of an inaccurate judgment. The task is to find a mechanism for separating
those cases in which the jury selection might have led ·to an unjust
conviction from those cases in which any jury would have convicted. That is precisely what the Court's approach, focusing on
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On the role of retroactivity in protecting against basic injustice, see Penry, 109 S Ct
at 2952-53; and Teague, 109 S Ct at 1076-77. On the role of habeas review of defaulted
claims in serving the same goal, see Sy kes, 433 US at 90-91.
111
See Allen v Hardy , 478 US 255, 259 (1986) (accuracy of results is one justification
for the Batson rule).
111
Teague was found guilty of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed
robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. The court entered judgment only on the attempted murder and armed robbery counts, sentencing him to thirty years' imprisonment
on each count. People v Teague, 108 Ill App 3d 891, 439 NE2d 1066, 1068 (1982).
Teague's lawyer sought an instruction for lesser included offenses at trial, but the trial
court refused. That decision was upheld on appeal. 439 NE2d at 1076-77.
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retroactivity, does not do. Retroactivity analysis inevitably has an
all-or-nothing character; either everyone with Teague's claim will
receive a new trial or no one will. Since the number of cases at
stake is large, and the number of potential injustices a good deal
smaller, the Court predictably has decided that the costs of blanket reversal are too high. Those costs are a good deal more bearable, however, if one aims to distinguish worthy from unworthy
claimants.
The only solution is to look at the record to see whether the
case was close on the merits. If the evidence-against Teague was
overwhelming, he should not get relief. On the other hand, if areasonable jury could have acquitted (and if no inadmissible evidence
clearly established guilt), he should get relief, for the very sort of
bias that Batson aimed to prevent might have caused an unjust
conviction. In other words, a viable Batson claim should entitle
Teague to greater-than-usual scrutiny of the sufficiency of the evidence against him, but not to automatic reversal.
This approach makes it unnecessary to consider either
Teague's Swain claim or his fair cross-section claim. Teague could
thus obtain the benefit of his most clearly meritorious legal theory
(and courts could avoid his more controversial claims), because the
prejudice standard sufficiently limits the universe of possible
claims.
Our approach also makes the retroactivity analysis that lay at
the heart of Teague unnecessary. This is no small benefit. The
most recent term of the Supreme Court suggests that retroactivity
is likely to become the newest, and perhaps the messiest, procedural thicket to trip up habeas courts. Deciding retroactivity under
the Court's analysis requires a federal court to determine both (1)
whether the defendant's claim requires adoption of a "new rule" or
merely application of existing law, 123 and if the former, (2) whether
the new rule is one "without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished." 124 Each of these issues is complicated and hard. Many arguments involve some marginal alterations of existing law, and no one knows when such arguments seek
"new rules" and when they do not. And many constitutional rules
protect innocent defendants sometimes, yet do not necessarily protect innocence in any particular case. An approach that looks directly to the merits avoids both of these categorization problems.
And although retroactivity analysis extends beyond defaulted
118
12
•

See Butler v McKellar, 110 S Ct 1212, 1216-18 (1990).
Teague, 109 S Ct at 1076-77; see also Saff/,e v Parks, 110 S Ct 1257, 1263-64 (1990).

Reforming Habeas Corpus

1990)

719

claims, we suspect that a substantial portion of the cases that raise
retroactivity issues will, like Teague itself, involve efforts by counsel to excuse a procedural default by pointing to new law. Making
such claims easier to decide would go far toward untying the procedural knot Teague has created. m
D. Challenges to Death Sentences: Dugger v Adams 126
Adams was convicted of murdering an eight-year-old girl in
1978. At his capital sentencing proceeding, the trial judge repeatedly told the jury that its recommendation would be advisory only
and that the court had ultimate responsibility for fixing the sentence. These instructions were improper under state law because
the jury's recommendation enjoyed a presumption of correctness
and could be overturned only on clear and convincing evidence of
error, but the defense counsel did not object. The jury recommended death, and the court imposed this sentence.
On federal habeas corpus, Adams argued that the judge's instruction violated Caldwell v Mississippi, 127 a 1985 decision holding that the Eighth Amendment requires that juries not be misled
about their role (as set by state law) in imposing death sentences.
Adams won in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court found that, even though Caldwell had not been decided
at the time of Adams's sentencing, his claim was barred by his law111
Eliminating retroactivity analysis is useful generally, but particularly so in cases
(unlike Teague) where the prejudice issue is easy. For example, in Butler v McKellar, 110 S
Ct 1212 (1990), the defendant declined to talk to the police and asked to see a lawyer when
police questioned him about an assault charge. The next day, officers gave him Miranda
warnings, and, with the defendant's permission, proceeded to question him about a thenunsolved murder. He made several incriminating statements, all of which were concededly
voluntary and reliable. 110 S Ct at 1214-15. The defendant argued, correctly, that these
statements were obtained in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988), which held that police may not question a defendant who has invoked his right to counsel, even if the questioning concerns a different crime. Roberson was
decided long after Butler's conviction became final. In a detailed and controversial application of Teague, the Court found that Roberson had created a " new rule," and was not
merely an application of existing law. 110 S Ct at 1216-18. Consequently, the Court held,
Roberson could not be applied retroactively to Butler's case.
Butler's claim was not defaulted. Had it been, the Court's analysis would have been
even more complicated: the Court would have had to consider whether Roberson created the
type of new rule that satisfies Sykes "cause." See notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
There is a much simpler way to resolve cases of this sort. Butler's claim resembles the
claim in Kimme/man v Morrison, since it aims to suppress concededly reliable evidence of
guilt. Thus, the claim cannot possibly raise any serious doubt about the fairness of Butler's
conviction. At least if the claim were defaulted, we would deny relief on that ground alone.
,.. 109 S Ct 1211 (1989).

117

472

us 320 (1985).
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yer's failure to object to the instruction. The reasoning behind this
conclusion is a little complex. A Caldwell Eighth Amendment
claim logically requires a violation of state law. If the instructions
accurately state the role assigned to the jury by state law in capital
sentencing proceedings, there is no Eighth Amendment violation.
Even though Caldwell was decided later, the Court concluded that
the underlying error of state law should have been recognized at
the time of Adams's sentencing. Therefore, the Court concluded,
the lawyer's failure to raise the state law claim barred federal
habeas review of the associated Eighth Amendment claim.
In one sense, Adams's claim closely resembles Teague's. Both
involve systemic rules that enhance the accuracy of jury decisionmaking. The two cases are different, however, because of the difference between capital sentencing proceedings and more ordinary
criminal adjudications. Given the judgmental and evaluative character of the criteria used to sentence Adams to death, 128 we think
it very likely that Adams could have shown a "reasonable possibility" of error, though that ultimately would depend on the
evidence.
The point can be generalized. Our approach is broadly forgiving of procedural defaults concerning the sentencing stage of capital proceedings. The reason is not primarily that the death penalty
is special, although that may be thought sufficient. The reason is
that the statutory and constitutional criteria governing the death
sentence involve irreducible elements of subjectivity and discretion.129 Where that is so, the concept of factual reliability loses its
128
The trial judge, in upholding the jury's recommendation of death, found three aggravating and three mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances were (1) that
the murder was committed in the course of a rape and/or kidnapping, (2) that it was committed for the purpose of preventing arrest, and (3) that it was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Adams v State, 412 S2d 850, 854 (Fla 1982). The mitigating factors were (1)
that Adams had no significant prior criminal history, (2) that he was "under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance," and (3) that he was only 20 years of age at the
time of the crime. Id. The third aggravating factor, the first two mitigating factors, and the
ultimate recommendation call for evaluative judgments that differ appreciably from those
required at the guilt-innocence phase of most criminal proceedings. And a jury that knows it
will probably have the final say on such issues may react very differently from one that
thinks it is merely offering advice to the trial court.
,.. This is due partly to the nature of the beast, see McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279
(1987) (rejecting an elaborate statistical challenge to Georgia's imposition of the death penalty and emphasizing the role of individualized discretion in imposing the death sentence),
and partly to the Supreme Court's disapproval of a more categorical approach. See, for example, Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1982) (holding that sentencing juries and judges
must consider individual mitigating circumstances); and Sumner v Shuman, 483 US 66
(1987) (rejecting mandatory death sentences for murders committed by those serving life
terms) .
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clarity and hardness. To the extent that the determination is
overtly evaluative and judgmental, any defaulted claim that is not
constitutionally harmless would have a "reasonable possibility" of
affecting the reliability of the sentence of death.
Of course, that is not inevitably so. The defaulted claim might
concern an issue that is no more indeterminate and judgmental
than the factual conclusions that typically underlie a guilty verdict. But in general, the concept of "reasonable possibility" of factual error would have a broader reach in capital cases because of
the broader range of facts relevant to the imposition of a capital
sentence. In other words, for defaulted claims with respect to
death sentences, we would expect the difference between an
outcome-based construction of "prejudice" and one oriented toward the factual reliability of the underlying findings to be relatively insignificant. Both standards are likely to converge on the
traditional concept of harmless error.
Though our approach is generally favorable to capital defendants, it would not aggravate the problem that seems to bother
some of the Justices-the long, drawn-out nature of litigation in
capital cases. That problem arises not from defaulted claims, but
from repetitious habeas petitions. Any legal change that would encourage defendants to collapse all possible claims into one habeas
petition, and thereby allow courts to resolve all merits issues at
once, would reduce that problem. We think that that is exactly the
effect of our proposal, since it would tend to lead directly to a merits decision on all available claims.
IV.
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SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS

Our discussion of procedurally defaulted claims is now at an
end. The argument need not be carried further, as it is possible to
simplify and, we think, to improve the law of defaulted claims
without affecting the rest of the habeas landscape. At the same
time, our argument does cast a shadow on at least two other important habeas issues: (1) the proper standards for purely factual
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) the proper standards for claims of constitutionally insufficient evidence. We do
not treat these issues exhaustively, because the concerns they raise
are different from those raised by defaulted claims and merit fuller
treatment than is possible here. What follows is therefore brief and
somewhat speculative.

,.....__
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Factual Ineffective Assistance Claims

Most ineffective assistance claims are not based on the defense
counsel's failure to raise a federal claim or defense. More commonly, the allegation of ineffectiveness concerns a decision that affected the development of the facts-for example, failure to offer
an alibi or character witness or to uncover and present other exculpatory evidence. Such cases are in some ways like the allegation of
ineffectiveness based on defaults of federal claims. In both instances, the defendant argues that, through no fault of his own,
some claim or evidence was not properly presented. The law of defaulted claims seeks to sift through such arguments to identify injustices that require habeas relief. In our view, ineffective assistance doctrine should have the same aim in factual error cases.
This last step is quite controversial. The conventional wisdom,
among both judges and academics, is that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel goes not to the substance of the conviction,
but to the process by which it was obtained. 13° Consequently, the
argument goes, such claims should be granted regardless of the nature of the attorney error in question-essentially the position
adopted in Kimmelman v Morrison.
In our view, this process-oriented approach to ineffectiveness
is flawed for the same reasons that argue against federal habeas
review of defaulted Fourth Amendment claims. Consider, for example, a defendant who tells his lawyer that he wants to testify on
his own behalf. The lawyer responds with a simple, "Fine with
me," and neither dissuades the defendant from testifying nor
warns him of the attendant risks. The defendant then takes the
stand and testifies that he was in another place at the time of the
crime. On cross-examination the prosecutor shreds his story, forcing him to admit that his direct testimony was false. Predictably,
the jury convicts.
Even if the defense counsel made no other error, one could
argue that the defendant was convicted in part because of his lawyer's incompetence in failing to make him aware of the risks of
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See, for example, LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.10 at 50 (Supp
1989) (cited in note 39)(criticizing the argument that ineffective assistance doctrine should
focus exclusively on outcome effects that bear on the defendant's guilt); Berger, 86 Colum L
Rev at 94 (cited in note 20)(arguing that the "prejudice" prong of Strickland should be
abandoned because the constitutional protection concerns the proceBB of effective representation, without regard to its effects); and Goodpaster, 14 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 68-70
(cited in note 20)(arguing that ineffective assistance doctrine must protect the entire process, not merely determination of guilt, on the ground that the adversary system serves
multiple functions) .
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waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. Yet, even assuming that
incompetence can be shown, it is not so clear why relief should be
granted. The defendant fared worse than he might have, in that a
better lawyer might have gotten him off, but the error does not
cast doubt on the reliability of the determination of guilt. The
problem here seems to us very much like the situation in Kimmelman, and our response might well be the same. 131
One is left with the argument that this hypothetical defendant
should get relief on the ground that effective assistance of counsel
is not an aid to accurate results but an end in itself. This proposition may be the implicit premise of those who maintain that guilt
and innocence should be irrelevant to assessing ineffectiveness. But
it is hard to see why counsel should be viewed as an end rather
than a means. Counsel, after all, is part of a larger adjudicative
process, and the entire process is short-circuited whenever the defendant pleads guilty. The fact that this happens in the majority of
cases 132 suggests that our attachment to the process as an end in
itself is, at best, half-hearted. Unless disposition of criminal prosecution by guilty plea is necessarily and inherently wrong, 133 it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the trial process-including effective assistance of counsel-is a tool for reaching right results
and not an end in itself.
On that view, factual ineffectiveness claims present a classic ex
ante/ex post problem. Ex ante, adequate representation across the
board is required so that innocent defendants (or merely arguably

111
One might argue that the defendant should have a viable Fifth Amendment claim
on the ground that his waiver was not sufficiently "knowing" and "intelligent." This argument is a hard one to make out, however, given that defendants regularly waive the privilege
without legal advice of any sort in the police station, and such waivers are not thought to
raise constitutional problems. See, for example, Moran v Burbine, 475 US 612 (1986) . Nor
can one distinguish police station waivers from courtroom waivers based on their practical
consequences: the likeliest consequence of a confession in the police station, as in the courtroom, is conviction. For the classic exposition of this point, see Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice
in the Gatehouses and Mansions of Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to ... , in A.E. Dick Howard, ed, Criminal Justice in Our Time 1, 9-25 (U Virginia,
1965).
111
Estimates vary, but all agree that more than half of all prosecutions are resolved by
guilty pleas. See, for example, Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 17 (West, 7th ed 1990) (estimating that guilty pleas dispose of 7090 percent of felony cases not dismissed); and Michael 0 . Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis
of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv L Rev 293, 313 (1975) (reporting
guilty plea data from selected federal districts from 1970-74 which show that more than half
of all cases not dismissed were terminated by guilty pleas).
111
That is, apart from inducements offered by the government to secure the plea.
Many persons think that plea bargaining is normatively unacceptable, but few assert that
disposition by plea is itself unacceptable.
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innocent defendants) can successfully defend the charges against
them. In other words, one cannot deny counsel to guilty defendants while granting counsel to innocent ones, because it is impossible to tell them apart in advance of trial. Ex post, however, it is
sometimes possible to separate cases where lawyer error raises a
"reasonable possibility" of injustice from cases where it does not.
The defendant whose lawyer failed to prevent the client's false
(and damning) testimony falls into the latter category. Arguably,
relief should not be granted in such a case.
In short, the argument for applying a unitary innocencerelated prejudice standard in this context is the same as the argument for applying such a standard to defaulted claims. If the law's
goal is to respect the states' interests in finality by denying relief in
most cases, while correcting cases of real injustice, the courts
should focus directly on the risk of injustice when deciding
whether to grant relief. That is why we have proposed a simple
prejudice test for defaulted claims. The same reasoning applies to
other attorney errors as well. If an alibi witness suggests that the
defendant may be innocent, the defendant deserves relief no matter how negligent or reasonable was his attorney's decision not to
call that witness. By the same token, if the witness's testimony
shows nothing of consequence, it should make no difference
whether, given the information available to counsel at the time, the
decision not to call the witness was or was not grossly negligent. If
preventing unjust punishment is the goal, an innocence-related
prejudice standard is both a necessary and sufficient means of
achieving it.
Yet simply abolishing the performance prong of Strickland for
all cases would raise serious practical problems. Anytime a criminal defendant loses his case at trial, he can point to a long list of
evidentiary decisions by counsel that could have been made differently. Every choice to investigate (or not investigate) a defense or
argument, to interview (or not interview) a potential witness, or to
ask (or not ask) a question at trial can be second-guessed. A sound
ineffective assistance doctrine must weed out the mass of such
claims, yet preserve relief for those defendants who most deserve
it. The system cannot afford to examine closely the impact of the
lawyer's every action on the factual record.
Unfortunately, the screening process is a good deal harder in
cases of factual error than in cases involving defaulted claims.
First, while the list of legally plausible defaulted claims in any
given case must be fairly short, the list of evidentiary decisions is
very long indeed. Second, a large portion (probably a majority) of
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defaulted claims can quickly be categorized as irrelevant to the justice of the defendant's conviction. That is because many constitutional claims-including virtually all Fourth and Fifth Amendment
claims-do not bear on the question whether the defendant in fact
committed the crime charged.
Factual errors by defense counsel are different. Most evidentiary decisions by lawyers do bear on guilt or innocence, for the
simple reason that only evidence relevant to that issue can be introduced at trial. For every criminal trial that generates a conviction, the defendant can point to a host of evidentiary decisions by
his lawyer that, with hindsight, might conceivably have affected
the accuracy of the guilty verdict.
One can plausibly defend the performance prong as a convenient device for screening such claims. It may be easier to dispose
quickly of many ineffective assistance claims on the ground that
the attorney decisions at issue were within the range of competent
lawyering than to look into the likelihood that the relevant decisions undermine one's faith in the outcomes. (But perhaps not; the
answer is not obvious.) Note, however, what that rationale implies
about the purpose of the inquiry into attorney performance. That
inquiry may be useful, but not because attorney performance is
particularly important in itself. Instead, the performance prong
makes sense, if at all, as a rough proxy for prejudice-that is, as a
way of screening out those cases where a prejudice inquiry would
be costly, and in any event would probably result in a denial of
relief.
No such proxy is needed in cases of defaulted claims, and for
those cases the performance prong therefore should be discarded.
Indeed, a separate doctrine of ineffective assistance is unnecessary
in that context; a single doctrine for procedural defaults should
suffice. Whether the proxy is useful in purely factual cases depends
on whether it is an effective proxy-whether a focus on lawyer performance reaches substantially the same results as would a focus
on prejudice. That is a hard question. But even if the performance
prong should remain intact, it is worthwhile to focus judicial attention on that prong's ultimate purpose of promoting fair outcomes,
and not on process for process's sake.
B. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claims
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review raises the question of how
far the system should (or can) go to protect innocence. Since we
have argued for innocence-protective review in the context of defaulted claims, one might fairly ask how we would apply our ap-
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proach when a claim of innocence is not tied to any direct claim of
constitutional error.
Consider two cases. In the first, the defendant seeks to compel
the government to disclose certain witness statements prior to
trial, on the ground that the statements might suggest that someone other than the defendant committed the crime in question.
The trial court, after reviewing the witness st~tements, denies the
defendant's motion, and the defendant is convicted. The defendant
fails to raise the discovery claim on direct appeal, thus triggering a
state-law procedural bar. On federal habeas, he seeks to resurrect
the discovery claim, and the habeas court concludes that had the
evidence in question been disclosed, the defendant reasonably
might have been acquitted. If the court were to apply our proposed
standard, it would vacate the conviction and order a new trial. 134
In the second case, the trial court decides in advance of trial,
correctly, that the evidence must be disclosed. Defense counsel
then uses the witness statements skillfully at trial, marshalling the
evidence to show that the government may have prosecuted the
wrong person. Inexplicably, the jury convicts. The trial court denies the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and the conviction is affirmed on appeal. On federal habeas, the defendant argues
not that his trial or appeal were constitutionally flawed in some
procedural sense, nor that his counsel was incompetent, but simply
that he is innocent-that the system got his case wrong. Under
Jackson v Virginia, the defendant is entitled to relief if the habeas
court finds that no rational jury could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 1311 While this standard sounds hard to meet in
the abstract, in practice it is even harder: simple insufficiency-ofthe-evidence relief on federal habeas is almost unheard of.
If our argument about defaulted claims is right, then the insufficient evidence claim should receive a more favorable hearing.
The defendant's claim of injustice is essentially the same in both
situations. And, one might contend, there is no obvious reason to
grant relief to arguably innocent defendants who happen to have
constitutional claims, but to deny relief to arguably innocent defendants who are victims of factfinder error. An innocenceprotective law for defaulted claims, such as our proposal, seems to
This hypothetical is derived from Carrier, 477 US 478. We have added the additional facts (which may or may not have been true in Carrier) that the undisclosed evidence
was exculpatory in suggesting a misidentification, and that nondisclosure thus prejudiced
the defendant.
m 443 US 307 (1979).
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lead logically to the position that habeas courts should regularly
and strictly review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting state
convictions. If this conclusion is accurate, our argument has more
radical implications for habeas corpus than we have acknowledged.
This point is at least partly true. It is wrong to worry a great
deal about protecting innocence in the first hypothetical, but not
at all in the second. To that extent, our argument does imply that
habeas courts should take seriously (more so than they probably
now do) claims of insufficient evidence. But Jackson suggests as
much. The rarity with which such claims are granted in federal
habeas may indicate that current practice is not consonant with
Jackson's promise. This may be because habeas doctrine concentrates on purely procedural issues-issues that may have the effect
of drowning out less "legal" claims that go directly to the justice of
the defendant's conviction. If so, reforming the law of defaulted
claims along the lines we have suggested would facilitate more serious review of Jackson claims by simplifying the process of getting
to the merits.
Having said that, we also think that habeas courts should undertake sufficiency-of-the-evidence review in a very deferential
manner. This position is not at odds with a less deferential
prejudice standard for defaulted claims. Sufficiency-of-theevidence review simply allows another decisionmaker to secondguess the conclusion reached earlier on the same facts. In deciding
what standard to apply to such claims, there is no good reason to
prefer the bottom-line judgment of the second decisionmaker to
that of the first, given a constant record. Indeed, the opposite is
true. The jury that heard the case, complete with live testimony,
was in a better position to assess the evidence than subsequent
decisionmakers. The jury's judgment should be accorded substantial deference, particularly when state appellate courts have affirmed that judgment.
The analysis changes when a constitutional claim (other than
the Jackson insufficiency claim) is involved. Deference to the
factfinder should recede when the jury's judgment was based on an
incomplete record, as when the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial. Deference is also less appropriate in
cases like Teague, where the jury was selected in a manner that
might bias it in the government's favor. These examples show that
the presence or absence of a defaulted constitutional claim may
not be irrelevant to the defendant's claim of innocence, but instead
is sometimes a strong piece of evidence supporting that claim. At
least that is so when the constitutional claim in some way suggests
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that the outcome was unjust. The presence of a constitutional issue
should therefore be a significant factor-albeit not an essential
one-in evaluating the defendant's-claim of innocence.
V.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine that governs disposition of defaulted claims on
federal habeas corpus is needlessly complex, and does not clearly
serve any sensible policy of collateral review. We have argued for
two complementary reforms. First, the concept of "prejudice,"
under both Wainwright u Sykes and Strickland u Washington,
should be narrowed to include only outcome effects that create a
"reasonable possibility" of factually erroneous conviction (or sentence of death). Second, the Sykes requirement of "cause" for procedural default and the analogous and intersecting Strickland requirement that attorney error reflect incompetence should be
ignored. When a default raises a "reasonable possibility" of unjust
outcome, relief should be granted without regard to the "cause" or
competence categorization of the error. This approach would allow
courts to grant relief where it is most justified and deny relief
where it is not warranted. Equally important, it would foster simplicity and rationality, qualities sorely lacking in the current law.
The temptation at this point is to suggest that our argument
implies a much broader and deeper reform of habeas law, going far
beyond the law of defaulted claims. We might find such a reform
congenial. But defaulted claim cases raise unique problems, and
the analysis of such claims may not be transferable to other contexts. Because defaulted claims arise infrequently and unpredictably, the deterrence argument for relief in such cases is weak. That
may not be true for non-defaulted claims. Similarly, because the
list of potential defaulted claims in any one case is small or nonexistent (and usually consists of non-guilt-related claims), applying a
unitary prejudice standard such as the one we propose should
prove workable. That may not be so for other ineffective assistance
claims, where the list of potential attorney "errors" in any given
case is very long indeed.
Thus, the reform we urge is not especially far-reaching. It is an
effort to rectify a fairly small problem of habeas administration
that has received far more judicial time and energy than it deserves, in the process generating noticeably inequitable results.
This may be one of those rare opportunities to improve the caliber
of justice offered by our system, without the heavy adjudication
costs such improvements usually entail. If so, it is an opportunity
that our criminal justice system can hardly afford to abandon.

